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Abstract
Latin America and the Caribbean received record levels 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2007, with inflows 
surpassing the US$ 100 billion mark for the first time ever. 
This development is all the more significant because the 
previous record was set in 1999 in the context of one-off 
privatizations. The upsurge in investment was fuelled mainly 
by market-seeking transnational corporations (TNCs) 
intent on taking advantage of growth in local demand 
for goods and services and by natural-resource-seeking 
companies against a backdrop of buoyant global demand. 
Meanwhile, despite lower levels of outward FDI from the 
regions’ transnationals (trans-Latins), new companies 
in different industries are investing outside their home 
countries, while some of the traditional trans-Latins are 
taking their foreign investments to new levels.
This report provides an overview of FDI flows to 
and from the region in 2007 and of the recent activities 
of transnationals in the region and of trans-Latins outside 
their home countries (chapter I). It further explores 
three topics: investment in hardware for information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) (chapter II); 
investment in telecommunications services (chapter 
III); and Canadian investment in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (chapter IV). Chapters II and III describe 
the evolution of ICT hardware and telecommunications 
services industries in the context of the technological 
changes that have generated convergence among ICT 
services and have had impacts both on the industrial 
organization of manufacturing and on the market structure 
and incentives for telecommunications operators. These 
chapters provide insight into the challenges involved 
in maximizing the benefits of FDI in industries subject 
to rapid technological change, where the regional 
strategies of transnational corporations are shaped by 
a combination of global strategies and trends in local 
policy and regulation. The Canadian experience is 
relevant both because of the country’s increasing role 
as an investor in the region in a wide range of sectors 
—from mining to autoparts to finance— and because in 
many ways it represents a parallel to the Latin American 
and Caribbean region’s own corporate evolution owing 
to the existence of a number of seldom-recognized 
similarities (notably, a strong natural-resource base and 
a heavy reliance on the United States economy). Within 
this context, the slowdown of the United States economy 
presents an opportunity for officials and investors from 
Canada and from Latin America and the Caribbean to 
reevaluate their relationship.
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Summary and conclusions
This report provides an overview of FDI flows to and from Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 2007. It also examines the recent activities of transnationals in the region and of trans-
Latins outside their home countries (chapter I). It further explores three topics: investment in 
hardware for information and communications technologies (ICT) (chapter II); investment in 
telecommunications services (chapter III); and Canadian investment in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (chapter IV). 
Chapters II and III provide insight into the challenges 
involved in maximizing the benefits of FDI in industries 
subject to rapid technological change, where the regional 
strategies of transnational corporations are shaped by a 
combination of global strategies and trends in local policy 
and regulation. The Canadian experience is relevant both 
because of the country’s increasing role as an investor 
in the region in a wide range of sectors and because in 
many ways it parallels the Latin American and Caribbean 
region’s own corporate development history. Although the 
different chapters are quite diverse in terms of their focus, 
they all convey a common message: if it is to maximize 
the benefits of foreign investment, the region must 
develop its capabilities, improve its competitiveness and 
strengthen the capacity of its regulatory and policymaking 
institutions. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)1
A. Overview of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. FDI inflows and activities of transnational corporations
1 In this report the term “Caribbean Basin” refers to Central America (including Panama), Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, the 
members of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. The main 
financial centres in the Caribbean —Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Netherlands Antilles— have not been included since, according 
to the best available information, most of the investment received by these jurisdictions is related to their roles as financial centres and not, as 
in the case of the Bahamas and Barbados, to other activities such as tourism and offshore services.
The record level of FDI received by Latin America 
and the Caribbean in 2007 —US$ 105.9 billion— is 
good news for a number of reasons, above and beyond 
the result itself. Unlike the previous record high (of 
US$ 89 billion in 1999), investment in 2007 was not 
linked to privatizations. Globally, Latin America and the 
Caribbean were the region where FDI flows increased 
the most in percentage terms (46%, against a global 
increase of 36%). The region has thus started to regain 
some ground in terms of its share of global investment 
flows, which had decreased in the past three years. In 
addition, the economic slowdown in the United States 
(the largest investor country in Latin America and 
the Caribbean and the region’s largest export market) 
did not significantly hurt investment in the region in 
2007, chiefly because it did not actually make itself 
felt until the fourth quarter of the year. The resilience 
of local economies (as demonstrated by the fact that 
regional demand remained buoyant), continuing global 
and especially Asian demand for natural resources, 
and the capacity of transnationals in the region to 
diversify their export markets also contributed to the 
rapid growth of FDI.
The main FDI recipient country in 2007 was Brazil, 
followed by Mexico, Chile and Colombia. In fact, a large 
share of the rise in inward investment can be attributed 
to increases in the FDI received by these four countries. 
Brazil alone received US$ 15 billion more investment 
in 2007 (an 84% increase) than in 2006. In contrast to 
the situation in recent years, when investment received 
a significant boost from one, or a small number, of 
acquisitions, in 2007 the upswing in investment in Brazil 















































In terms of GDP, with the exception of the Bahamas, 
where a large share of investment is related to its role 
as a financial centre, Chile and four Central American 
countries were the largest recipients. 
The fact that investment rose more in South America 
than it did in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin1 (see 
figure 1) reflects the fact that the main sources of growth 
were natural resource- and market-seeking investments, 
as the former subregion has traditionally attracted more 
of these types of inflows than the latter.
Figure 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FDI INFLOWS BY 
SUBREGION, 1990-2007 a
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as of 0 April 00.
a  Does not include the main financial centres. The figures presented here differ from 
those shown in the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean and the 
Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean released 
in July and September of 007, respectively, because these latter publications report 
FDI inflows net of FDI outflows.
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Although the trend in investment in natural resources 
has been far from even, hydrocarbons and especially mining 
have been among the major sources of investment —and of 
the rise of investment— in many of the regions’ countries. 
Brazil and Chile have benefitted the most from investment 
in mining. However, even Mexico and certain Central 
American countries, which have not traditionally been 
major recipients of natural-resource-seeking investment, 
have more recently become important destinations for such 
flows. Colombia has been the rising star of investment in 
hydrocarbons, which accounted for approximately 40% 
of its total inflows in 2007.
Steel was one of the main sectors of investment in 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. This development reflects 
a combination of natural-resource- and market-seeking 
strategies. Whereas the availability of iron ore, coupled 
with increasing global demand for steel, has prompted 
export-oriented ventures, growth in the region’s automotive 
industry, construction (residential, commercial, infrastructure) 
sector, and oil and gas industry, among others, has spurred 
investment geared towards serving regional demand.
In turn, these industries (motor vehicles, oil and 
gas, construction), along with services (retail, banking, 
electricity) and food and beverages, have been the main 
focus of market-seeking investment. This category of 
investment was encouraged in 2007 by sustained growth 
in the region, higher real incomes and improved access to 
credit in some countries. Companies have also increasingly 
sought to take advantage of the incorporation of low-income 
consumers (the “bottom of the pyramid”) into the market 
by developing innovative product strategies.
Efficiency-seeking investments in manufacturing, 
which have been concentrated in Mexico and the Caribbean 
Basin, are the most sensitive category of investment to 
the slowdown in the United States economy. Although 
these investments were not the motor behind increased 
investment flows, it is significant that they did not decline 
in Mexico (and actually grew in some sectors). Some 
of the reasons for the resilience of FDI flows in these 
sectors were a very dynamic first nine months, a possible 
lag between investment decisions and implementation 
coupled with uncertainty as to the actual dimensions of 
the crisis in the United States and its effect on demand 
for Mexican and Central American products, and the fact 
that the epicentre of the crisis was not import-intensive 
activities. Furthermore, companies have managed to 
diversify the markets for exports from Mexico and the 
Caribbean Basin, directing more products to Europe, 
Japan and other countries within Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The countries in this subregion have gradually 
been working to diversifying the investments they receive 
towards higher-value-added activities. On the other 
hand, a decline in investments in the apparel industry 
in Mexico reflects a longer-term loss of competitiveness 
in this industry rather than an effect of the short-term 
situation in the United States market.
The main investors in Latin America in 2007 were the 
United States, the Netherlands and Spain. Although this 
situation has been largely unchanged for over a decade, 
there have been substantial shifts in the composition of 
second-tier investors which have entailed a small rise in 
intraregional investment. 
Data to 2006 on the operations of transnational 
corporations show that these companies’ share of the 
sales and exports of the 500 largest companies in the 
region have continued to decline. Much of this result is 
attributable to natural-resource industries, where local 
companies are strong and prices are soaring. But the 
trend persists in manufacturing and services. Hence, 
there are two possible readings of this trend. On the one 
hand, the fact that local companies —both State and 
private— are playing increasingly important roles in the 
region’s economies is a positive development; on the 
other, some transnational corporations seem to find other 
destinations more attractive. Although renewed growth in 
FDI in 2007 could signal a change in the composition of 
the region’s largest companies, this may not necessarily 
be the case. In electricity and fuel distribution, there are a 
number of cases in which transnationals are withdrawing 
from the region.
Improving the quality of investment inflows and 
harnessing the benefits of FDI for local development 
remain the main challenges for the region. Notwithstanding 
the greater volumes of FDI and the increasing level of 
investments in a variety of industries (often as a result of 
policy efforts to diversify), the region still faces challenges 
in terms of capacity-building and the development of the 
institutional conditions necessary to maximize spillovers 
from FDI activity. The hardware industry is a case in 
point (chapter II, summarized in section B below). 
Institution-building, particularly in the area of regulation 
and competition policy, is also a necessary step towards 
ensuring that the benefits of investment in services are 
maximized in a rapidly changing technological setting, 
as illustrated by the telecommunications services industry 
(chapter III, summarized in section C below).
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Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) volumes slid 
to US$ 20.6 billion in 2007 after having soared to over 
US$ 40 billion in 2006 (see figure 2). Nonetheless, rather 
than signalling a slowdown in the internationalization 
of trans-Latins, this result reflects the strong impact on 
aggregate flows of a single transaction in 2006 —the 
acquisition of Inco (Canada) by the Brazilian company 
CVRD. In 2007, although a comparable acquisition (that 
of Rinker, based in Australia) was undertaken by Cemex 
(Mexico), part of this transaction was financed through 
foreign subsidiaries of the Mexican companies and 
therefore was not registered as Mexican OFDI. 
Beyond these largest transactions, in sectors where trans-
Latins are already established international players (steel, 
mining, cement, oil and gas, food and beverages, retail), 
many of these companies are taking their internationalization 
processes to new levels, both increasing the scale of 
investments abroad, entering markets for higher value added 
products and reaching new geographical destinations.
At the same time, new trans-Latins are appearing in sectors 
where OFDI by Latin American companies had not reached 
significant levels up to now, such as software, petrochemicals 
and meatpacking. Some of the largest acquisitions by Latin 
American companies outside their home countries in 2007 
were undertaken in these three industries.
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FLOWS OF OFDI, 
1990-2007
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates based on official figures as of 0 April 00.
B. The ICT hardware industry in Latin America 
 and the Caribbean
The ICT hardware industry includes products that 
transmit, process and/or store information and data: 
telecommunications handsets and network equipment, 
personal computers, television sets and their key components 
(such as semiconductors and displays). This sector has 
played an important role in the development of many 
Asian economies and, by virtue of this fact, has drawn 
the attention and inspired the efforts of policymakers 
worldwide. 
Mexico and Brazil have, historically, been the region’s 
main destinations of FDI in this industry. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, both countries pursued import-substitution 
strategies (ISI) to develop local technological and 
industrial capacity in this industry. Economic reforms 
in the 1980s and 1990s opened up markets and, while 
many local companies suffered from new competition, 
increased levels of foreign investment started flowing 
in. Several leading companies set up or expanded their 
plants in the second half of the 1990s in response to 
the entry into force of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the growth of local demand 
in Brazil, which was spurred by monetary stabilization 
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and re-regulation of the telecommunications industry. 
While investments in Mexico are mostly export-oriented 
(efficiency-seeking), in Brazil they primarily target the 
domestic market (market-seeking) and are strongly 
influenced by a combination of high import tariffs and 
tax incentives. Nonetheless, in both countries, activity 
is concentrated in assembly and sub-assembly activities 
based on imported components. This attests to the fact 
that ISI policies failed to provide incentives for R&D 
and the development of a competitive components 
industry. Competition from Asian producers, with larger 
economies of scale and with lower costs, made catching 
up increasingly difficult, especially in the context of a 
rapidly advancing technological frontier. Therefore, 
neither Mexico nor Brazil became a strong player in the 
higher-value-added or technology-intensive segments 
of this industry (see the following figure), that is, those 
with the greatest potential to generate spillovers into 
local production capacity.
Figure 
VALUE ADDED IN AN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY SUPPLY CHAIN
In Mexico, a large share of the surge in investments, 
exports and employment in this industry is related to the 
activities of CMs, which have gradually undertaken a 
broader range of activities in the country. This has been 
reflected in growing exports, although the ratio of exports 
to imports has been relatively stable. Production clusters 
have formed in several areas of the country, and surveys 
show that assembly operations based on low-cost labour 
coexist with capital-intensive and knowledge-intensive 
activities, R&D and design. Assembly operations still 
predominate, however.
In Brazil, these global transformations have also 
been reflected in the increasing presence of CMs, but 
this has not changed the fact that the industry is mostly 
focused on the local market and is highly dependent on 
imported components. Despite increasing exports in 
certain products, there is a significant and growing trade 
deficit in this industry. In fact, this industry’s dependence 
on foreign components has been exacerbated as the 
value of components relative to the price of finished 
products rises and as new technologies displace ones 
in which a components base had been developed over 
time (as is the case of cathode-ray tube displays versus 
liquid crystal displays (LCD) and plasma screens for 
televisions).
Beyond manufacturing, as OEMs such as International 
Business Machines (IBM) and Hewlett-Packard (HP) 
outsource manufacturing and focus increasingly on markets 
for services or “solutions”, new opportunities are arising 
in the region in areas such as the production of firmware, 
embedded software and business-process outsourcing. 
In this context, the main policy challenge for countries 
hoping to tap into the potential of this industry is to increase 
their activities in the higher-value-added and technology-
intensive segments of the value chain. However, high 
entry barriers (in the form of accumulated investment in 
technological and industrial capacity in other regions) 
in certain segments may make competitiveness in these 
segments an elusive goal that can only be achieved at a 
high cost in terms of incentives and public investment. 
Therefore, countries must realistically identify their 
competitive strengths, whether in manufacturing, in 
product-related services such as R&D and design, or in 
the services towards which the former OEMs are gearing 
their strategies (telecommunications solutions, information 
management solutions, business-process outsourcing 
and other corporate services), and strategically develop 
the necessary capabilities in terms of infrastructure, 
technological capacity, human resources and an 
environment conducive to linkages between companies 

















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of PRODUCEN (Centre for Strategic Intelligence), “Presentation 
on the electronic cluster”, Baja California, November 00.
The industry has undergone major transformations at 
the global level in the last two decades: the development 
of international systems of integrated production (ISIPs); 
sharper competition, which has led to increased outsourcing 
by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for the 
contracting of manufacturers (CMs); and the offshoring 
of various activities, including research and development 
(R&D). These changes have generated opportunities for 
developing countries that have become destinations for 
offshore activities and have benefited from the transfer of 
advanced knowledge in manufacturing, process engineering, 
product design, markets for local providers and access to 
international markets, among others. 
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C. Telecommunications operators: investment and  
 corporate strategies in Latin America and 
 the Caribbean
2 In this process, the fact that European, rather than North American, operators have been dominant in the region made the GSM technology 
predominant, facilitating a gradual migration to new generations of mobile telephony. 
The 2000 issue of this report (ECLAC, 2001) described 
foreign direct investment in telecommunications services in 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of a market 
that was opening up to private (and transnational) investment 
and was starting to absorb wireless communications 
technologies on a massive scale. Since then, a number 
of important changes have come about. On the one hand, 
the bursting of the dotcom bubble weakened several of 
the major operators and resulted in the expansion of two 
main operators in the region which filled the gaps left by 
companies that downsized or decided to focus elsewhere. 
On the other, technological advances and new applications 
based on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), Video on 
Demand (VoD), Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) and 
mobile broadband, among others, have blurred the limits 
between telecommunications and broadcasting segments, 
thereby exposing traditional telephony operators to 
competition from various sources. This has generated new 
sources of revenue and imposed non-trivial regulatory 
challenges on host countries. 
The crisis in the information technology (IT) industry 
at the beginning of this decade hurt telecommunications 
operators in Latin America and the Caribbean, some of 
which —BellSouth, Verizon, AT&T— decided to leave 
the region. The relatively solid financial positions of 
others —especially Telefónica and Telmex/América 
Móvil— allowed them to take advantage of this situation 
to expand their Latin American operations.
Both Telefónica and Telmex/América Móvil had 
been backed by national champion policies and, upon 
privatization, had maintained vertically integrated structures 
and large market shares in their home countries (Spain 
and Mexico, respectively). Latin America was the focus 
of the internationalization strategies of both companies. 
While Telefónica focused initially on fixed telephony 
in the Southern Cone countries, moving progressively 
north as it found its way into new segments (mobile 
communications, Internet and, more recently, pay-TV), 
from the start Telmex/América Móvil set its sights on 
mobile communictions and on the largest market (Brazil) 
and later expanded into the rest of the region.
Brazil became the first major battleground for the 
two competing companies, which soon extended their 
rivalry to the rest of the region and even to Europe as they 
competed in the bid for Telecom Italia, whose Brazilian 
subsidiary was the third-largest operator in Brazil (the 
battle for Telecom Italia was ultimately won by Telefónica). 
Competition in the Latin American market has taken 
on new dimensions, however, as recent technological 
advances have emerged.
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA: MARKET SHARES OF THE MAIN OPERATORS, 
BY COUNTRY AND SEGMENT, 2007
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from corporate docments.
New applications —on fixed and mobile broadband— 
have allowed for the convergence of telecommunications, 
television and then broadcasting services offered 
through networks and hardware configurations.2 For 
telecommunications companies worldwide, two of the 
major outcomes of this process have been the emergence 
of new sources of competition, as companies that had 
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the technological capacity to offer others (in particular, 
companies coming from different backgrounds have started 
offering telephony services) and new sources of revenues 
for what had traditionally been telephony companies. 
In fact, in addition to telecommunications operators, 
cable TV companies, content providers and Internet 
providers have all started to offer service packages that 
include telephony, Internet access and cable television 
(known as “triple packs”), thereby adding to the competition. 
Fixed telephony had already begun to stagnate in the late 
1990s, with the rapid spread of mobile telephony. These 
new technological changes dealt another blow to fixed 
telephony in the long-distance segment, as VoIP enabled 
consumers to use voice services at lower prices.
Competition was further enhanced in some countries 
by regulatory options for open access to the “last mile” 
(local loop unbundling), enabling multiple providers to 
offer services over the same network. 
Major transnational telecommunications operators 
were further affected by the saturation of telephony markets 
in developed countries and by uncertainties regarding 
future developments in new markets, which held back 
new investments in technology and infrastructure. These 
challenges led to a new wave of mergers and acquisitions 
between 2004 and 2007. Companies from the United States, 
Japan and Europe focused on strengthening their positions 
on local (and in the case of Europe, regional) markets, while 
building their capacity to offer multi-pack services. 
Among the European companies, Telefónica can be 
considered an exception as it expanded further into Latin 
America. The company quickly expanded its supply of 
ADSL broadband access and offered television services 
through satellite-based DTH (direct-to-home) technology, 
which enabled it to market different packages of integrated 
services. Telmex/América Móvil, on the other hand, was 
successful in gaining market share in some of the most 
dynamic segments (mobile telephony, broadband access, 
corporate communications services), but had trouble 
integrating services. It has made advances, however, 
especially in Brazil, where it has acquired a stake in cable 
TV operator Net. In parallel, the new fringe competitors 
have started to offer their first multi-pack products as a 
means of continuing to exert competitive pressure on the 
dominant players. 
Different options have been adopted worldwide in order 
to maximize competition while at the same time creating 
the necessary conditions for investment in infrastructure, 
where, as in other public services, there seems to be at least 
some degree of a trade-off between investment incentives 
and competition in a context where uncertainty exists as 
to the actual size of the market for such services as high-
speed broadband. In Europe, authorities have stimulated 
competition for the last mile in parallel with investments 
in infrastructure by local authorities and utility companies. 
In the United States, the focus was initially on spurring 
competition in networks; subsequently, the requirement 
of open access to fibre-optic networks was relaxed to 
encourage further investment. The Republic of Korea and 
Japan have adopted measures to encourage private-public 
alliances as part of their science and technology development 
strategies. These strategies are important reference points 
for the regulatory debate in Latin America, where there are, 
nonetheless, specificities that will require original solutions, 
such as sharp income inequalities and geographically 
dispersed populations in tandem with pockets of heavily 
concentrated urban populations.
D. Canadian foreign direct investment in Latin America 
 and the Caribbean
The share of Canadian investment in the FDI received by 
Latin America and the Caribbean has grown considerably 
over the past few years, not only in natural resources and 
services, but also in some manufacturing operations. The 
experience of Canadian investors is relevant both because 
of their increasing role in the region in a wide range of 
sectors —from mining to autoparts to finance— and 
because in many ways they represent a parallel to the 
Latin American and Caribbean region’s own corporate 
evolution, given a number of seldom-recognized similarities 
(for example, a strong natural-resource base and a heavy 
reliance on the United States economy). 
Canada is a large country with a small population 
whose development trajectory proved successful enough 
to place it among the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial or 
developed countries. Over time, Canada has transitioned from 
a more inward-looking development path based on policy-
led industrial and trade initiatives to an outward-looking 
market-based orientation. Canada is currently benefiting 
from the strong international prices for the natural-resource 
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commodites that it exports. Nevertheless, there are clouds 
on the horizon in the form of the continuing “prosperity 
gap” with the United States and, in the context of the 
appreciating Canadian dollar, the weakening international 
competitiveness of the Canadian manufacturing sector.
Canada has been one of the principal national 
recipients of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and, 
as a result, foreign capital inflows and the presence of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) have played a significant 
role in Canada’s development process. Seventy-seven of 
Canada’s 300 largest corporations are transnational firms. 
These TNCs are concentrated in commercial activities 
(especially wholesalers), natural resources (most particularly 
integrated oil companies) and some other manufactures 
(such as motor vehicles, steel, electrical equipment and 
electronics). Canada has also been a destination for 
investments by Latin American companies, especially 
in the mining and steel industries. 
Canada’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
has had three main sources. One of these sources has been 
service companies such as banks (Scotiabank, Royal Bank), 
providers of other financial services (such as Brookfield 
Asset Management, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund) 
and others (such as Finning International, SNC Lavalin, 
Thomson) that generally seek markets in which to offer 
their services. Another source has been mining companies 
(global leaders such as Teck Cominco, Barrick Gold, 
Potash Corp., Cameco) that are seeking out new supplies 
of natural resources (however, Canada’s leading oil and 
gas companies (PetroCanada, EnCana, Suncor Energy) 
have been more interested in opportunities available in 
Canada, especially the Alberta oil sands, than in those 
outside of the country). The third source has been the 
manufacturing sector, in which three different categories 
can be highlighted: companies that are market-seekers 
(such as Quebecor World, McCain Foods); those that are 
looking for natural-resource inputs to support competitive 
manufacturing sites (such as Methanex, Agrium); and 
those that are looking for sites that will provide them with 
efficient export platforms (such as Magna International, 
Linamar, Bombardier, Celestica, Nortel). Thus, Canada’s 
OFDI is driven primarily by service companies seeking 
market access, natural-resource-based producers seeking 
new supplies, and manufacturers seeking access to markets, 
sites close to natural-resource inputs or sites from which 
they can export efficiently.
Canada’s FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean has 
surged in the last 15 or 20 years and has been thoroughly 
overhauled in the process. The two principal corporate 
strategies driving it are the natural-resource-seeking 
strategies employed by Canadian mining companies 
and market-seeking strategies used by Canadian banks 
or financial service providers. Market-seeking FDI 
by other Canadian companies seems to have slowed. 
Efficiency-seeking FDI by Canadian manufacturers and 
natural-resource-seeking FDI by Canadian oil and gas 
companies also appear to be on the decline. 
The Latin American and Caribbean region is clearly 
very important for natural-resource-seeking Canadian 
mining companies, especially those in the precious 
metals sector. All the various classes of such companies 
—global leaders (Barrick Gold), senior firms (Goldcorp), 
intermediate companies (such as Yamana Gold, Kinross 
Gold and IAM Gold) and junior enterprises (such as 
Silver Standard Resources)— have concentrated their 
mining assets in the region. This is less the case with 
other Canadian global leaders in mining, such as Teck 
Cominco in base metals, Potash Corp. in industrial minerals 
or Cameco in energy minerals, although all have some 
assets in the region and Teck Cominco’s presence could 
increase substantially depending on the progress made 
by its project pipeline. Canadian exploration companies 
continue to invest heavily in the area. Mining is the single 
activity in which Canadian OFDI is most evident in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
Canadian retail banks and providers of other 
financial services have been the other major group of 
firms investing in the region in recent years. Banks 
have done so in order to offer their financial services 
in local markets, as in the case of Scotiabank, which 
has been active mainly in Mexico, Central America and 
South America, and Royal Bank, which has focused 
primarily on the Caribbean. Asset managers such as 
Brookfield Asset Management have acquired real estate 
or infrastructure assets in Brazil and Chile. Pension 
administrators such as Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 
have invested in sanitation companies in Chile. Other 
market-seeking service providers, (such as Finning 
International in the Southern Cone, SNC Lavalin in 
Chile and Brazil, and Thomson in Argentina), have 
established a notable presence in the region; however, 
these investments have been on a far smaller scale than 
those undertaken by the above-mentioned retail banks 
and other financial service providers. 
Canadian manufacturers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean have used three principal corporate strategies: 
efficiency-seeking, market-seeking and natural-resource-
input-seeking approaches. Efficiency-seeking FDI in 
Latin America and the Caribbean by Canadian companies 
gained momentum as a result of NAFTA and other trade 
liberalization measures affecting the apparel industry. Several 
leading Canadian firms set up efficiency-seeking plants in 
Mexico. The experience of some of the major Canadian 
electronics companies, such as Nortel Networks and Celestica, 
suggests that the benefits of NAFTA have not made up for 
the increased competitiveness of Asian firms in the North 
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American market. Something similar seems to be taking place 
with regard to the automotive industry, in which Canadian 
autoparts suppliers (Magna International, Linamar) are 
still heavily dependent on United States automotive TNCs 
such as General Motors (GM), Ford and Chrysler, which 
are losing market share to Asian automotive TNCs such as 
Toyota, Honda and Hyundai. Bombardier and Bombardier 
Recreation Products have set up efficiency-seeking plants 
in Mexico for aircraft components and recreational craft, 
respectively. While the apparel industry is usually considered 
to have suffered even more severe dislocations as a result 
of Asian competition, one Canadian company —Gildan 
Activewear— has proved to be the exception, as it has 
successfully established efficiency-seeking activities in 
the Caribbean Basin in order to compete more effectively 
in the North American market. With the exception of 
Gildan, efficiency-seeking investments in Mexico and the 
Caribbean Basin by Canadian manufacturers do not seem 
to have lived up to expectations.
Examples of market-seeking manufacturers include 
QuebecorWorld in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Peru and Colombia and McCain Foods in Argentina. 
The operations of both these companies have been quite 
successful, although QuebecWorld’s subsidiaries in the 
region have had to deal with the dislocation caused by the 
parent firm’s financial weakness. McCain Foods was hurt 
by the 2000-2001 crisis in Argentina but has overcome 
that bump in the road and is considering expanding into 
Brazil. Examples of natural-resource-input-seeking 
manufacturers are Methanex, which has facilities in Chile 
and Trindad and Tobago, and Agrium, which has set up a 
joint venture with Repsol in Argentina. Methanex exports 
around the world from its base in the region, while Agrium 
focuses mainly on the Argentine market but also sends 
some exports to Brazil.
In general, Canadian FDI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean has not had an integrative effect in bringing Canada 
and the region closer together. Little of the market-seeking 
FDI has been aimed at integrating operations in the region 
(Scotiabank and QuebecorWorld might be exceptions); few 
of the assets of Canadian firms in the region represent an 
important part of their overall assets (mining companies 
are the exception here, as in the case of Gildan); and the 
efficiency-seeking investments mostly involve Mexico and 
a few Caribbean Basin countries and are focused solely on 
the North American market. The slowdown of the United 
States economy opens up an opportunity for officials and 
investors from Canada and Latin America and the Caribbean 
to reevaluate their relationship and explore opportunities 
arising from their complementarities. 
E. Conclusions and main messages
In 2007 the Latin American and Caribbean region received 
a record level of FDI as investment surged thanks to local 
growth and the continuation of a favourable international 
environment for natural-resource producers. Canadian 
companies have been one of the driving forces behind 
this type of investment, especially in financial services 
and mining. As inward investment rises, the trend 
towards the internationalization of Latin American 
companies continues, despite smaller flows in 2007 than 
in 2006. More than ever, the challenge for the region 
is to find ways of deriving greater benefits from FDI 
for the promotion of local development. In a scenario 
of ever-increasing competition for investment and for 
global opportunities, the development of a competitive 
business climate, suitable infrastructure and a strong 
stock of human resources is essential both in order to 
attract investments in higher-value-added activities and 
to support the performance of local companies in the 
global market. 
Case studies on investment in hardware and 
telecommunications services demonstrate how important 
a role policy and regulation play in ensuring that local markets 
actually benefit from investment, especially in industries 
experiencing rapid technological change. Understanding 
the region’s, and each country’s, competitive advantages 
and potential together with the specificities of the relevant 
markets is crucial, as is the existence of an institutional 
structure capable of responding dynamically and efficiently 
to these challenges. The Canadian experience reveals the 
importance for dynamic growth of both FDI and OFDI, as 
well as underscoring the significance of interaction between 
TNCs and local companies that are undertaking their own 
internationalization processes —an important parallel for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Viewed from a forward-
looking perspective, then, the slowdown in the United 
States economy may open up an opportunity for officials 
and investors from Canada and from Latin America and 
the Caribbean to reevaluate their relationship.
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Chapter I
Foreign direct investment and 
transnational corporations (TNCs) 
in Latin America and the Caribbean
A.  Introduction
In 2007 foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean amounted to 
US$ 105.925 billion, which was an unprecedented sum for the region and represented a growth 
rate of 46% over 2006 (see figure I.1). South America accounted for much of the increase, 
although investments in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin also rose considerably. 
(section D) in 2007. The analysis is based on balance-
of-payments data and information concerning the 
activities and strategies of the main transnational and 
regional corporations. Section B gives a brief overview 
of world FDI flows in 2007, as a background for the 
situation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Although flows of Latin American investment abroad fell 
short of the surge seen in 2006, at US$ 20.619 billion they 
exceeded the figures for 2004 and 2005. Brazil was the 
largest outward investor in 2007.
This chapter looks at how the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries performed as investment 
destinations (section C) and as international investors 
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Figure I.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND OUTWARD FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1993-2007 a b
(Billions of dollars)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates on the basis of official figures as at 30 April 2008. 
a The FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus disinvestments (sales of assets) by foreign investors. The OFDI figures indicate outflows of direct investment 
by residents, minus sales of assets abroad by those investors. The FDI figures do not include the flows received by the main financial centres of the Caribbean. The OFDI figures 
do not include the flows originating in these financial centres.
b These figures are different from those contained in the editions of Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean published in July and December 2007, respectively, as the latter show the net balance of foreign investment, that is, direct investment in the reporting 
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B. Global context
According to preliminary estimates, in 2007 global 
flows of FDI reached US$ 1.8 trillion.1 This represents 
a growth rate of 36% with respect to 2006 and the largest 
volume of FDI ever, since it exceeded the previous high 
recorded in 2000.
Despite the crisis in the United States high-risk 
mortgage market, which shook the credit markets and 
placed a squeeze on low-cost capital, cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions continued to increase and 
reached a fresh high in 2007, both in terms of number 
and the amounts involved (see box I.1). In fact, as well as 
a very dynamic first semester, other factors —the global 
economy’s resilience vis-à-vis the crisis in the United 
States mortgage sector, robust growth in other regions, 
the continuing high demand for natural resources and a 
diversity of capital sources— helped to fuel FDI growth 
during the year.
Preliminary data show that the largest recipient of FDI 
was the United States, followed by the United Kingdom. 
The developed countries received 70% of this investment, 
developing countries 25% and the transition economies the 
remaining 6%. The largest recipient among the developing 
and transition economies was China, followed by the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong, Russia and Brazil. 
The Latin American and Caribbean region (including the 
main financial centres) recorded the largest percentage 
increase in FDI with respect to the previous year: 39% 
(46% if the financial centres are excluded), as against an 
average of 17% for the developing countries. The region 
received 7% of global investment flows.2
1 Estimated by extrapolating quarterly data available at 30 April 2008.
2 In order to ensure comparability with data on other regions, the data referring to Latin America and the Caribbean contained in this section 
include the main Caribbean financial centres. This accounts for the difference between the regional figures published in this section and those 
published in other sections of this chapter. The main trends identified, however, also apply to data that exclude those financial centres. Bermuda 
is not included in either of the two definitions, because UNCTAD includes it, starting in 2007, in the category of the developed countries.
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2007 23
Box I.1
OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN 2007
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Recuadro I.3
IED RECIENTE EN EL SECTOR BANCARIO DE CENTROAMÉRICA
World mergers and acquisitions reached 
yet another unprecedented level in 2007, 
in terms of both the number of transactions 
and the total amount involved. Although the 
upward trend in mergers and acquisitions 
eased slightly in 2007, the rate of growth 
in cross-border mergers held steady. 
Cross-border operations have, in fact, 
come to account for a higher proportion 
of global mergers and acquisitions, in 
terms of both the number of transactions 
and the overall amounts involved. 
Transactions conducted by private 
equity funds continued to increase, but 
more slowly than in previous years. The 
fall-off in the rate of acquisitions by private 
equity funds was sharpest in the second 
semester, owing to the reversal of factors 
that had fuelled these operations in earlier 
years. One indirect result of the crisis in 
the United States high-risk loans market 
was that buyers tended to become more 
conservative and low-cost loans more 
difficult to obtain (Fortune, 2007b).
The number of cross-border acquisitions 
for amounts in excess of US$ 10 billion 
announced in 2007 was up with respect 
to 2006. With few exceptions, the buyer 
and bought firms in the 25 operations of 
this type reported in 2007 (see table) were 
from developed countries. Latin American 
and Caribbean firms were not involved 
in these mega-transactions as either 
buyers or targets. Nevertheless, some of 
the largest operations at the world level 
—especially the purchase of ABN Amro 
(Netherlands), Endesa (Spain) and Alcan 
(Canada)— resulted in major ownership 
changes in the region, affecting companies 
which are among the main transnational 
corporations.
Transactions announced prior to 2007 
and completed during the year include two 
major purchases by corporations from 
developing countries: the acquisition of 
Rinker (Australia) by Cemex (Mexico) and 
of Corus Steel (United Kingdom) by Tata 
Steel (India). 
CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS FOR AMOUNTS IN EXCESS OF US$ 10 BILLION, ANNOUNCED OR CONCLUDED IN 2007 a
(Millions of dollars)
Firm or asset acquired
Country of the firm 
acquired
Buyer Country of buyer Stated value Sector
Operations announced in 2007
ABN AMRO Holding NV Netherlands Fortis, Banco Santander, 
Royal Bank of Scotland
Belgium, Spain, United 
Kingdom
100 028 Banking
Endesa S.A. Spain Acciona, Enel Spain, Italy 53 303 Electricity
Alcan Inc. Canada Rio Tinto Plc United Kingdom 42 934 Metals/aluminium
Bell Canada Enterprises 
  (BCE Inc.)
Canada Providence Equity Part., 
Ontario Teachers’ Pension 
Plan, Madison Dearborn, 
Merrill Lynch
Canada and United 
States
42 435 Telecommunications
Alliance Boots Limited United Kingdom KKR & Co. United States 23 351 Pharmacies
ABN AMRO North America United States Bank of America Corp. United States 21 000 Banking
Altadis SA Spain Imperial Tobacco Group Plc United Kingdom 20 476 Tobacco
Rodamco Europe NV Netherlands Unibail-Rodamco France 18 605 Diversified
Hanson Plc United Kingdom Heidelbergcement AG Germany 18 289
Construction materials/
cement
Thomson Reuters Plc. United Kingdom Thomson Corp. Canada 18 199 Media
Koninklijke Numico NV Netherlands Groupe Danone France 16 473 Foods
Intelsat Bermuda BC Partners Ltd. United Kingdom 16 430 Telecommunications/
satellite
Imperial Chemical Inds. United Kingdom Akzo Nobel Netherlands 16 059 Chemicals
Mol Hungarian Oil and Gas Hungary OMV Ag. Austria 15 938 Hydrocarbons
Energy assets Spain, Italy EON Germany 15 786 Electricity
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Box 1.1 (concluded)
Firm or asset acquired
Country of the firm 
acquired
Buyer Country of buyer Stated value Sector
OCI Cement Group Egypt Lafarge SA France 14 998 Construction materials/
cement
Medimmune Inc. United States Astrazeneca Plc. United Kingdom 14 668 Pharmaceuticals
Organon Biosciences Netherlands Schering-Plough Corp. United States 14 504 Pharmaceuticals
Banca Antonveneta Spa Italy
Banca Monte dei Paschi 
Siena
Italy 13 214 Banking
Hutchison Essar Ltd. India Vodafone Group Plc. United Kingdom 13 100 Telecommunications
AGF Assur. Gen. de France France Allianz SE-Reg Germany 11 788 Insurance
GE Plastics United States Saudi Basic Industries Corp. Saudi Arabia 11 600 Chemicals/plastics
Trane Inc. United States Ingersoll-Rand Co. Ltd. Bermuda 11 202 Construction products 
Alinta Ltd. Australia BNB & SP Consortium 
(Singapore Power, Babcock 
& Brown)
Singapore, Australia 10 518 Gas distribution
Kelda Group United Kingdom Citigroup, GIC Special 






Operations announced prior to 2007 and concluded in 2007
Scottish Power Plc. United Kingdom IBERDROLA SA Spain 27 234 Electricity
Gallaher Group Plc United Kingdom Japan Tobacco Inc. Japan 19 020 Tobacco
Rinker Group Ltc. Australia Cemex Mexico 14 627 Cement/construction 
materials
Corus Group Plc United Kingdom Tata Steel Ltd. India 12 780 Steel
Keyspan Corp United States National Grid Plc. United Kingdom 11 283 Gas distribution
Euronext NV Netherlands NYSE Euronext United States 10 434 Financial services
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from Bloomberg; and Fortune magazine, “Why the private equity bubble 
is bursting”, 20 August 2007. 
Note:  The data on mergers and acquisitions refer to concluded or pending operations announced each year. The amounts do not necessarily refer to the number of transactions 
registered because the value of some operations is not made public.
Table I.1
GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF NET FDI INFLOWS IN THE WORLD,
BY GROUPS OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, 1992-2007
(Billions of dollars)
1993-1997 a 1998-2002 a 2003-2007 a b 2006 2007 b
Percentage change 
2006-2007 b
World total 340 593 934 825 1 067 010 1 305 852 1 777 183 36
Developed countries 207 908 713 359 692 663 857 499 1 235 459 44
Developing countries 126 943 210 505 319 533 379 070 442 548 17
Latin America and the Caribbean c 38 820 83 849 82 957 83 753 116 009 39
South-East Europe and the 
  Commonwealth of Independent States 5 741 10 961 54 814 69 283 99 176 43
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
World Investment Report, 2007. Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, Geneva, 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.II.D.9; and 
estimates for 2007 on the basis of data obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Investment Service of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 
available as at 30 April 2008. 
a Annual averages. 
b Preliminary figures.
c Includes financial centres.
FDI has increased steadily as a proportion of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the developing 
economies. With the exception of South-East Europe 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States, this 
ratio stood at about 3.6%. When measured in terms 
of GDP, the FDI received by Latin America and the 
Caribbean rose for the first in 2007 time since 2004 
(see figure I.2). 
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Figure I.2
FDI INFLOWS AS A PROPORTION OF GDP, DEVELOPING 
REGIONS, 1990-2007
(Percentages)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of official figures of United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2007. Transnational 
Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, Geneva, 2007. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.II.D.9; and estimates for 2007 on the basis 
of data obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Investment Service of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), available as at 
30 April 2008. The proportion is calculated on the basis of FDI for each year 
and the three-year moving average with respect to GDP.
In terms of the origin of inflows, the world’s largest 
investor country in 2007 was the United States. The 
transactions conducted by North America, Europe and 
Japan represent 85% of all investment.
The volume of outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) by developing and transition economies continued 
to mark new records in 2007 although their participation 
as a proportion of global OFDI volumes fell (see figure 








































1990s, but in the last few years investors from other 
regions, including Russia, Brazil and Mexico, have 
become more prominent. Asian investors continue to be 
the largest among the developing countries in terms of 
volume, however. 
Figure I.3
OFDI FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES, 1990-2007
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of official figures of United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2007. Transnational 
Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, Geneva, 2007. United 
Nations publication, Sales No: E.07.II.D.9.; and estimates for 2007 on the 
basis of data obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Investment Service of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), available 
as at 30 April 2008.
In short, preliminary data show global FDI flows 
reaching a new high in 2007. Latin America and the 
Caribbean was the developing region where such investment, 
in relative terms, grew the most. The following sections 
look at the region’s performance as a destination for 
investments and as an investor.
C. FDI inflows and transnational corporations in 
 Latin America and the Caribbean
1.  Trends and features of FDI flows into Latin America and the 
 Caribbean in 2007
Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding financial 
centres) received US$ 105.925 billion in FDI inflows in 
2007 (see figure I.4). This figure represents an increase 
of 46% with respect to 2006 and the highest volume of 
FDI since 1999, when the high level recorded had much 
to do with inflows generated by privatizations.3
3 It will be noted that the statistics for some countries differ from data published in the previous edition of this report. This is because of habitual 
updating of data, because of the way investments are recorded (some, for example, are recorded after the actual date of the investment), and 
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changes in the methodologies used to quantify investments. In 2007 some alterations were made in Ecuador on the basis of recommendations 
made by the IMF statistical technical assistance mission. Thus, flows of external debt between related companies came to be registered under 
the heading of “Other FDI capital”, in net, and no longer gross terms. In addition, the data are no longer provided by the National Hydrocarbons 
Department, but come from the Central Bank of Ecuador’s administrative records on external borrowing. At the time of writing, estimates were 
pending for reinvested and distributed profits in the petroleum, commercial and financial sectors, as were treatment as FDI of certain equity 
investments in the mercantile and financial sector and the estimate of investment flows abroad (Central Bank of Ecuador, 2007). Honduras also 
made changes to the methodology used to calculate FDI, in the framework of the improvement of macroeconomic statistics. In particular, foreign 
investments in maquila activities began to be included in the category of FDI in the balance of payments (Central Bank of Honduras, 2007a). In 
Mexico, the distinction between maquila and other types of firms was eliminated from the foreign investment statistics under the Decree for the 
Promotion of the Manufacturing, Maquiladora and Export Services Industries (IMMEX), which was issued on 1 November 2006 and merged the 
programme for the promotion and operation of the maquila export industry with the temporary import programme to produce articles intended 
for export (PITEX). Thus, the FDI reported in the category “imports of fixed assets by maquila firms with foreign investment” is now included 
under the heading “inter-company accounts”. Those changes have not, however, changed the total amounts of foreign investment registered in 
the balance of payments.
4 In the case of Brazil, interestingly enough, in 2007 the increase was not, as in previous years of FDI surges, associated with a single transaction, 
but to rising investment in a large variety of sectors, including mining, metallurgy, financial services and a category known as “activities of 
parent firms and consulting in corporate management” (Central Bank of Brazil, 2008).
Figure I.4














































The increase in global FDI flows internationally 
as noted above, the region’s robust macroeconomic 
performance and the maintenance of high commodity 
prices were some of the main factors underpinning the 
marked increase in investments in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and in South America in particular. 
Much of the FDI received by Mexico and the Caribbean 
Basin has gone to the manufacturing sector, which caters 
largely to the United States market, making this subregion 
more vulnerable to a slowdown there. However, the fact 
that the United States economy recorded relatively high 
growth during the first three quarters of the year, in 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates based on official figures as at 30 April 2008. 
a Excludes investment received by the main financial centres. These FDI figures differ from those published by ECLAC in the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 
and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean because those studies show the net balance of foreign investment, i.e., direct investment in 
the reporting economy (FDI) minus outward foreign direct investment (OFDI).
addition to other factors, meant that FDI flows did not 
decline substantially in this sector. 
By individual country, the region’s largest FDI recipients 
in 2007 were Brazil, which received US$ 34.585 billion, 
Mexico (US$ 23.230 billion) and Chile (US$ 14.457 
billion). These were also the countries in which FDI 
increased most in absolute terms (by US$ 15.803 billion, 
US$ 4.019 billion and US$ 7.100 billion, respectively) 
and which thus account for much of the increase in FDI 
in the region (see table I.2). The countries to see the 
largest relative growth in FDI were El Salvador, Chile 
and Brazil.4  
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Table I.2
FDI INFLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, BY RECIPIENT COUNTRY, 1993-2007
(Millions of dollars and percentages)




Brazil 8 015 26 463 19 345 18 782 34 585 15 803 84
Mexico 10 681 18 946 20 594 19 211 23 230 4 019 21
Chile 3 332 5 000 8 056 7 358 14 457 7 100 96
Colombia 2 410 2 290 6 094 6 464 9 028 2 565 40
Argentina 5 629 9 202 4 360 5 037 5 720 683 14
Peru 2 443 1 539 2 864 3 467 5 343 1 876 54
Costa Rica 343 552 1 082 1 469 1 889 420 29
Panama 502 651 1 429 2 574 1 825 -749 -29
Dominican Republic 266 997 1 160 1 459 1 698 239 16
El Salvador 22 448 555 219 1 526 1 305 597
Uruguay 135 233 775 1 399 879 -520 -37
Trinidad and Tobago 510 736 892 883 830 -53 -6
Honduras 65 259 608 674 816 142 21
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2 111 3 408 1 234 -590 646 1 236 …
Bahamas 91 160 463 706 580b -126 -18
Guatemala 89 325 280 354 536 182 51
Nicaragua 100 235 262 282 335 53 19
Ecuador 545 870 530 271 179 -92 -34
Bolivia 370 814 86 278 164 -114 -41
Paraguay 140 127 74 110 142b 32 29
Belize 26 36 84 100 92b -8 -8
Other Caribbean (estimate) 518 1 017 1 469 2 079 1 425 -654 -31
South America 25 131 49 946 43 417 42 574 71 143 28 568 67
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin 13 211 24 364 28 838 30 101 34 782 4 772 16
Total 38 342 74 310 72 254 72 585 105 925 33 340 46
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates on the basis of official figures as at 30 April 2008. 
a  Annual averages.
b  Extrapolation performed on the basis of data for the third quarter.
Excluding the Bahamas (whose inflows are associated 
mainly with its role as a financial centre), the largest 
recipients of FDI in 2007 as a proportion of GDP were 
Central America and Chile. Chile stands out because it is 
among the largest recipients of FDI both in terms of absolute 
values and with respect to GDP (see figure I.5).5 
The region’s average FDI-GDP ratio was 3.6%, 
which was higher than the preceding three years. Given 
the region’s growth, this figure is lower than that for the 
1990s, even though the total amounts of FDI exceed those 
received at that time. The current figure is significantly 
higher, however, than the levels of around 1% recorded 
at the start of the 1990s (see figure I.2).
The national statistics available are not sufficient 
to underpin conclusions about the performance of each 
type of investment —reinvestments, new investments, 
debt between parent companies and subsidiaries, and so 
forth— at the regional level. Among the main recipients, 
5 The data presented in this section do not include the main financial centres of the Caribbean (Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, 
British Virgin Islands), where most of the FDI received is associated with these countries’ role as financial centres. Bahamas and Barbados, 
which receive substantial investments in tourism, extra-territorial services, etc., are included in this data. When reference is made to Bahamas 
and Barbados as sources of investment received by the rest of the region, however, these territories are classified as financial centres. 




















Venezuela (Bol. Republic of)
2005 2006 2007
Figure I.5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
RATIO OF NET FDI INFLOWS TO GDP, 2005-2007 a
(Percentages)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official FDI figures available as at 30 April 2008, and GDP data 
and projections from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic 
Outlook Database, October 2007.
a  The ratio shown in the figure is obtained on the basis of each year’s FDI and the 
three-year moving average of GDP.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)28
in Brazil, most of the FDI growth was in equity holdings; 
in Mexico, in new investments, and in Chile, evenly 
distributed among equity holdings, profit reinvestments 
and other capital investments (including loans).
The available data on foreign firms’ acquisitions of 
companies and assets in Latin America and the Caribbean 
suggest that such transactions were up on the 2006 figure, 
but by less than overall FDI, despite a strong increase in 
large transactions (see box I.2). In combination with the 
strong pressure to expand natural-resource production to 
cater for global demand and the increase in local demand 
for goods and services (see subsection 3) in 2007, this 
would seem to indicate that much of the growth in FDI 
is accounted for by investments in new capacity.
Box I.2
LARGEST CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN 2007 a
The number of large cross-border 
acquisitions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean increased in 2007, reflecting 
the rise in this type of operation globally 
(see box I.1). The number of transactions 
in excess of US$ 500 million rose from 20 
in 2006 to 30 in 2007 (see table). 
The sectors that stood out among those 
30 acquisitions were steel, infrastructure, 
public services and financial services. 
Brazil was the principal destination for 
large investments (11 of the 30), although 
Mexico received three of the five largest. 
The investors in these large transactions 
were highly diversified in terms of origin, 
with buyer firms from 14 countries including, 
prominently, the United States, Canada and 
Spain. Trans-Latin corporations conducted 
four of the 30 largest transactions, in steel, 
petroleum-industry services, retail trade and 
petrochemicals (see section D).
CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS OF ASSETS AND FIRMS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  
FOR AMOUNTS IN EXCESS OF US$ 500 MILLION, ANNOUNCED OR CONCLUDED IN 2007 a
(Millions of dollars)
Firm or assets 
acquired
Country of 









Operations involving entry of or change-of-hands among foreign firms
Operations announced in 2007







Mexico 4 021 Infrastructure/ roads
2 Grupo Imsa Mexico Ternium Argentina   3 187 Steel




Royal Bank of 
Canada
Canada Various Trinidad and Tobago 2 187 Financial services





  1 808 Steel
5 Electricity and 
gas assets
Mexico Gas Natural SDG Spain Electricité de France, 
Mitsubishi
France, Japan 1 448 Electricity






1 191 Financial services








Mexico Altria Group United States Grupo Carso Mexico 1 100 Tobacco





Marubeni Japan Mirant United States 1 082 Electricity




GP Investments Brazil Pride International United States 1 000 Petroleum-industry 
services
12 5 malls Brazil Brookfield Asset 
Management
Canada Malzoni Investment 
Group
Brazil 963 Real estate
13 LQIF Chile Citigroup United States Quiñenco Chile 900 Financial services
14 Cable business Chile Nexans France Madeco Chile 853 Metals
15 Banco del 
Desarrollo
Chile Bank of Nova 
Scotia
Canada Sociedad de 
Inversiones, Crédit 
agricole, Intesa São 
Paulo
Chile, France, Italy 810 Financial services





United States McDonald’s Corp. United States 700 Restaurants
17 Chilquinta, Luz 
del Sur







United States 685 Electricity
18 Adriano Ometto 
Participações
Brazil Abengoa SA Spain   684 Chemicals
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Box I.2 (concluded)
Firm or assets 
acquired
Country of 









19 Essbío Chile Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Fund
Canada Southern Cross 
Group
Argentina 677 Sanitary services









ING Group Netherlands Banco Santander Spain 655 Financial services
21 AFP Bansander Chile ING Group Netherlands Banco Santander Spain 645 Financial services
22 Grupo de 
Supermercados 
Wong
Peru Cencosud Chile   623 Retail commerce
23 Generadoras de 
electricidad
Mexico AES Corporation United States   611 Electricity
24 Electricity 
generators
Brazil Israel Corp., DS 
Construction
Israel, India CDC Group United Kingdom 568 Electricity
25 Tevecap Brazil Telefonica SA Spain Brazil 566 Cable TV
26 Acindar Argentina ArcelorMittal Luxembourg/
India
  543 Steel
27 Bolsa de 
Mercadorias e 
Futuros
Brazil General Atlantic United States   534 Financial services
28 Food voucher 
services business
Brazil Sodexho Alliance France VR Group Brazil 523 Food voucher 
services





Rusoro Mining Canada Gold Fields South Africa 507 Mining
30 Grupo Amanco Brazil Mexichem Mexico Nueva Holding Chile 500 Chemicals/ 
petrochemcials
Operations announced prior to 2007 and concluded in 2007 
1 Arcelor Brasil SA Brazil ArcelorMittal Luxembourg Arcelor Luxembourg 5 412 Steel
2 Grupo Cuscatlán El Salvador Citigroup United States Corp. UBC 
Internacional
Costa Rica 1 510 Financial services
3 Villacero plant Mexico ArcelorMittal Luxembourg Grupo Villacero Mexico 1 439
4 Grupo Industrial 
Herraduras
Mexico Brown Forman United States   776 Beverages-wines/ 
alcoholic drinks






Petersen Group Argentina Repsol YPF Spain 2 235 Hydrocarbons






AES Corporation United States 739 Electricity
3 Empresas Emel Chile Cía. General de 
Electricidad
Chile PPL Corporation United States 660 Electricity







Verizon United States 572 Telecommunications
5 Solpart Brazil Brazilian pension 
funds
Brazil Telecom Italia Italy 515 Telecommunications
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data provided by Bloomberg and press reports. 
a  Includes initial acquisitions of 5% or more of the equity in a firm or consortium, initial acquisitions of less than 5% but for amounts in excess of US$ 200 million, acquisitions 
of additional equity for any amount and joint operations creating new firms.
Despite the circumstances described 
in box I.1, which led to a slowdown in the 
expansion of private equity funds, such 
funds’ acquisitions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean increased in 2007. Advent, General 
Atlantic and Brysam were prominent in the 
main cross-border acquisitions by private 
equity funds, but so were regional private 
equity funds, particularly GP Investments 
of Brazil. There was also an increase in 
operations by pension funds and asset 
management companies, among which the 
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund (OTTP) 
and Brookfield Asset Management, both of 
Canada, stood out (see chapter IV).b Those 
investors’ interest in Latin America has been 
stimulated, among other factors, by the 
control of macroeconomic variables, more 
competitive and better developed economies, 
capital market performance and a perceived 
need for asset diversification.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data provided by Bloomberg; América economía, “Ford invertirá US$ 160 
millones en Argentina”, 13 August 2007; Latin Finance, “Private equity takes root”, September 2007. 
a  This section is based on data taken from the Bloomberg financial information system. The data on mergers and acquisitions refer to concluded or pending operations announced 
each year. They do not include global operations in which the bought firm holds assets in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as the purchase of Banco Real (a division 
of the Netherlands bank ABN Amro) by Banco Santander in the framework of the global purchase of ABN Amro by a consortium that included Santander (see box I.1).
b  These investors are tending to buy larger shares in and, in many cases, take control of the target firms, so a larger proportion of these investments is registered as direct 
investment.
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Figure I.6 shows the official statistics available on 
the sectoral distribution of foreign investment in the main 
recipient countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 2007. There are important gaps in the data as a result 
of the different methodologies used by each country, 
which makes it difficult to compare, and impossible to 
accurately aggregate, the data. Some countries exclude 
certain categories of investment from their statistics on 
the sectoral distribution of FDI. In Chile, for example, 
certain types of reinvestments are not included, which 
leads to a significant underestimation of investments in 
natural resources, as most profit reinvestment in Chile is 
made in the mining sector (see subsection 3). In Peru, 
investments in the hydrocarbons sector are classified under 
segments associated with exploration activities, such as 
transport services, which leads to a similarly significant 
underestimation of investments in natural resources.
Figure I.6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SECTORAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF FDI INFLOWS, 2007
(Percentages)
were the United States and the Netherlands (see figure 
I.7). Notably, the investments of the Netherlands include 
investments made by companies from other countries 
through their Netherlands-based subsidiaries.7
Figure I.7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ORIGIN OF FDI, 1998-2007
(Percentages)
6 For further details on the sectoral distribution of the FDI received by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, see table I-A-2 of the annex.
7 For further details on the origins of the FDI received by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, see table I-A-3 of the annex.
8 Spanish investments shifted towards other regions and, in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, towards new sectors such as construction 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures available as at 30 April 2008. 
The data do make it possible to infer the following: 
(i) the distribution of FDI among the countries of the 
region is extremely heterogeneous; (ii) FDI in natural 
resources is more important in South America than in 
Mexico and the Caribbean basin, and FDI in manufacturing 
is relatively more important in Mexico and the Caribbean 
Basin than in South America, and (iii) as in previous years 
(ECLAC, 2006, 2007a), in the aggregate and according 
to the available data, the majority of the FDI was made 
in the services sector.6
For the countries for which data is available, the 
largest investors in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures available as at 30 April 2008. 
A comparison of the period 2003-2007 with 1998-2002, 
shows a change in the configuration of the main investor 
countries. Spain and the United States’ involvement as 
investors in the region has declined, while the Netherlands 
is taking a larger share. This shift may have much to do 
with the end of the cycle of privatizations, in which Spanish 
firms were heavily involved, and with the departure of 
United States transnational corporations.8
The outward investment flows generated by 
Latin American firms have increased as a result of 
their intensified international expansion efforts. The 
proportion of intraregional investments represented 10% 
of total investment received in the region in 2007 (see 
section D).
China’s emergence on the world stage has affected 
investment in Latin America both directly and indirectly. 
Indirectly, because of the eminently visible effects of 
Chinese demand on commodity prices which have, in turn, 
fuelled investments in mining and hydrocarbons. China 
has also competed strongly for low-cost manufacturing 
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efficiency-seeking investment, especially in Mexico 
and the Caribbean Basin. And directly, because of Latin 
America’s primordial role as a supplier of raw materials, 
which have become increasingly important as China is 
driven to diversify its resource options. The region has 
also gained significance as a market for Chinese products. 
According to official figures, China, like other developing 
countries, continues to be a minor investor in the region. 
Companies from developing countries have invested in 
several countries of the region, however, as described in 
section 3.
Lastly, the attraction of foreign investment is high on 
the policy agendas of the region’s countries. Box I.3 sets 
out some of the most salient foreign-investment-policy 
measures that the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
have adopted recently. 
Box I.3
FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROMOTION POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN – NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 2007
A brief survey of investment promotion 
agencies in the region was used as 
the basis to identify, on the one hand, 
initiatives aimed at developing new 
sources of attraction for foreign investment 
(or that achieve this as a secondary 
effect) and, on the other, measures that 
restrict previously existing benefits or 
guarantees, in the framework of a revision 
of the role of TNCs in the development 
of the respective countries.
Argentina: in 2007 ProsperAr, 
Argentina’s national investment development 
agency, started up operations. ProsperAr’s 
activities include missions abroad and the 
provision of an information and advisory 
centre for potential investors. As regards 
the business environment, one important 
measure was the elimination of the regulation 
requiring a double indemnity payment for 
the dismissal of workers, which had been 
in place since 2002. 
Brazil: one of the main advances was 
the adoption of the Growth Acceleration 
Programme (PAC) which is directed towards 
providing the conditions for sustainable 
development in the medium and long terms 
by broadening access to credit, improving the 
business environment, promoting investment 
in infrastructure, improving the taxation system 
and developing long-term tax measures. 
Among other steps, a special tax regime was 
made applicable to purchases of machinery 
and equipment used in infrastructure works, 
investment funds were set up for infrastructure 
projects and a number of projects were put 
out to tender.
Colombia: a series of measures 
were adopted to improve the protection 
of investors and access to third markets: 
transparency requirements in transactions 
between associated companies; the 
implementation of electronic tax declarations 
to speed tax payments; gradual reduction 
of income tax and simplification of the rules 
of accounting; extension of port hours; a 
selective policy on customs inspection; 
reduction of cargo handling time in ports 
and terminals; creation of special or single-
firm free zones; progress in the negotiation 
and signature of free trade agreements 
with chapters on reciprocal promotion 
and protection of investments; progress 
in negotiating double taxation agreements; 
efforts to promote benefits for investors, 
especially legal stability contracts; and the 
presentation before congress of a bill to 
create free zones for second homes.
Guatemala: the main efforts have 
been aimed at developing skilled labour, 
with training funds for specialization and 
promotion of grants for the specialization 
of skilled labour in the different industries 
that attract investment. These initiatives 
have been developed in the framework 
of the National Competitiveness Agenda, 
which was launched in 2005 to improve 
levels of education and training, strengthen 
institutions, improve infrastructure and 
develop the country’s potential as a tourist 
destination, export platform, logistical centre 
and energy centre. 
Costa Rica: Costa Rica has sought to 
upgrade its position vertically, by pursuing 
greater participation in global value chains 
in a given sector, and horizontally, by 
increasing the country’s attractiveness to 
FDI in new strategic sectors. The targeted 
sectors include: medical devices, the 
automotive sector, aeronautics, aerospace 
and services (post-production, engineering, 
design, 3D animation). The country launched 
a programme called the Costa Rican 
Multilingual Plan to address the shortage of 
skilled labour and is analysing the possibility 
of changing the tax incentive scheme for FDI, 
and for research and development activities 
in particular. The country has also taken 
measures to broaden market access. The 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 
was approved by referendum. Costa Rica 
also obtained an extension of the deadline 
to adapt its legislation to the rules on free 
zones until 2015 from the World Trade 
Organization. This extension also benefits 
other countries of the region, such as the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Panama and Uruguay.
El Salvador: in the context of 
broader policies to improve the business 
environment and infrastructure, the 
Government passed the International 
Services Act in order to promote investment 
in strategic sectors, including distribution 
and logistics, business process outsourcing 
(BPO) centres, contact centres, software 
development, R&D, and the repair and 
maintenance of cruise ships, cargo vessels 
and aircraft carriers. The Act also provides 
full exemption from import taxes on capital 
goods required to carry out the respective 
activity, exemption from income tax and 
municipal taxes on the company’s goods 
and capital, and exemption from VAT on 
purchases of inputs and services required 
to carry out operations. 
Ecuador: in the context of a review 
of national legislation, the main change 
relating to investment promotion at the 
end of 2007 was the issue of a new tax 
law setting new rates for taxes on income 
and capital withdrawals and repealing 
the Tax Benefits Act that had been in 
place since November 2005. As Bolivia 
had done in May 2007, in February 
2008 Ecuador announced its intention to 
withdraw from nine bilateral investment 
accords which allowed investors recourse 
to the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as an 
investment protection mechanism.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of questionnaires answered by the investment promotion institutions in Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala; “Ecuador will denounce at least nine bilateral investment treaties”, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, 5 February 2008. Jorge Woodbridge, “Perspectivas de la inversion extranjera directa en Costa Rica” and Gabriel Llobet, “El futuro de la 
IED en Costa Rica”, documents presented at the seminar on the Costa Rican economy and the role of foreign investment, held in San José, 15 April 2008.
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2. Importance and distribution of non-financial TNCs in  
 Latin America and the Caribbean 9
Foreign firms accounted for 26% of the sales of the 500 
largest non-financial enterprises in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in 2006 (the most recent year for which data 
are available). These firms vary in importance from one 
sector to another, however. TNCs account for just 6% of 
sales in the primary sector, but 29% and 37% of sales 
in the services and manufacturing sectors, respectively 
(see figure 1.8).10 
Figure I.8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SALES OF THE 500 
LARGEST FIRMS, 1990-2006
(Percentages)
When the data are broken down still further (see 
figure I.9), it becomes apparent that TNCs account for a 
much higher proportion of the primary sector (30%) than 
of hydrocarbons (10%). State enterprises predominate in 
both these sectors, however. 
With respect to manufactures, TNCs predominate in 
the sectors with a higher technology content, including 
the automotive and electronics sectors (93% and 77%, 
respectively), which are concentrated almost exclusively in 
Mexico and Brazil. Conversely, local private firms prevail 
in the foods and agroindustry businesses, representing 
63% of sales, while foreign firms account for 37%.
Despite the preponderance of foreign firms in 
telecommunications —including the subsidiaries abroad of 
Telmex and América Móvil of Mexico— and the existence 
of large TNCs in other segments, transnational corporations 
represent a minority in the services sector. 
Figure I.10 shows the sectoral distribution of the 
sales of the TNCs in the region in 2006. It shows that 46% 
correspond to manufactures, 37% to services and 17% to 
the primary sector. Within manufactures, the automotive 
and vehicle parts sector stands out with 22% of sales. 
The main transnational groups in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as listed in Annex table I-A-4, reflect this 
distribution, which is dominated by firms in the automotive, 
telecommunications and vehicle parts industries.
Geographically speaking, 70% of the sales of these 
subsidiaries take place in Brazil and Mexico. Brazil is 
the country with the largest number of TNC subsidiaries 
(45%), followed by Argentina (14%).
9 ECLAC is grateful to América economía for allowing the Commission access to its database on the 500 largest firms in Latin America. 
10 This section treats as foreign firms or TNCs both the subsidiaries of firms from other regions and those of Latin American firms outside their 
countries of origin but within the region. Latin American firms with investments outside their countries of origin (trans-Latins) are examined 
specifically in section D.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of the América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2007.
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Figure I.9




































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department of América 
economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2007. 
Note:  Excludes financial services.
Figure I.10
LATIN AMERICA: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF  
THE SALES OF TNCs, 2006
(Percentages)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2007. 
Note:  Excludes financial services.
The trend seen in the last few years whereby TNCs 
have a smaller market share than local private and 
State-owned firms has continued (ECLAC, 2007a).11 
Indeed, the share of these firms in the sales of the 
region’s 500 largest firms fell from 41% in 2000 to 
29% in 2005 and 26% in 2006; this phenomenon was 
common to all three sectors (see figure I.8). Between 
2005 and 2006, the share of TNCs decreased from 
14% to 6% in the primary sector, from 41% to 37% 
in manufacturing and from 31% to 29% in services. 
This is partly because local firms have seized the 
opportunities generated by growth in the region, which 
is also reflected in the increasing internationalization of 
trans-Latin firms’ activities into other countries of the 
region (see subsection 1 and section D). In addition, the 
—mainly local— firms associated with these sectors 
have found their footing strengthened by the rise in 
commodity prices. 
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The relative decline in the importance of TNCs is 
also reflected in export data (see figure I.11). Thus, while 
foreign enterprises were responsible for 50% of the exports 
of the 200 largest export firms in 2000, this share dropped 
to just 27% in 2005 and 18% in 2006. 
Figure I.11




SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE EXPORTS OF THE TNCs 
AMONG THE 200 LARGEST EXPORT FIRMS,  
2002, 2004 AND 2006 a
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2007. 
Note:  Excludes financial services.
Figure I.12 shows the sectoral distribution of the 
largest TNC exporters between 2002 and 2006. The 
mining sector has come to account for a gradually larger 
share of the exports of the 200 largest export firms, rising 
from 7% in 2002 to 17% in 2004 and 33% in 2006. At 
the same time, the exports of the automotive sector have 
lost ground within TNC exports: from 48% in 2002, 
these dropped to 36% in 2004 and 35% in 2006. The 
share of TNCs in electronics exports also decreased, 
from 19% in 2002 to 2% in 2004, with a slight upturn 
in 2006 (4%). 
Briefly then, TNCs have a considerable presence 
across a variety of Latin America’s economic activities, 
but their relative position among the large corporations in 
terms of sales and exports is declining. The strong rise in 
FDI flows in 2007 could indicate a reversal or a standstill 
in this trend, but the major role of local firms in strongly 












1990 1995 2000 2005 2006
Transnational corporations Local private enterprises State companies
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of the América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2007. 
Note:  Excludes financial services.
a  The data for 2002 are calculated on the basis of 93 firms, while a universe of 88 and 
65 firms was used for 2004 and 2006, respectively. The number of firms corresponds to 
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3. FDI from the point of view of corporate strategies
FDI may be classified by the strategy or main motivation of 
the investor. In general, what firms seek in third countries is 
the opportunity to exploit natural resources, access to local 
or regional markets, lower production costs for exporting to 
third markets (efficiency-seeking) or access to strategic assets, 
such as knowledge, state-of-the-art technology and skilled 
labour (ECLAC, 2004 on the basis of Dunning, 1993). This 
classification is useful because, using stylized facts on the 
determinants and effects of different types of investment, it 
helps us to understand and identify the main trends in FDI 
and the principal challenges involved in getting investment 
to contribute as much as possible to the development of the 
respective destination country (ECLAC, 2007a).
Traditionally, Latin America and the Caribbean has 
received market-seeking investment, natural-resource-seeking 
investment and investment that is efficiency-seeking, i.e., 
pursuing low-cost production in order to export to third 
markets. Whereas market-seeking investment has gone to the 
whole region (and, in the case of manufactures, particularly 
to the large markets), natural-resource-seeking investment 
has gone mainly to South America and efficiency-seeking 
investment to Mexico and the Caribbean Basin. Although 
a number of firms have set up world centres of excellence 
in services or technology in the region, Latin America 
and the Caribbean has not been a major destination for 
strategic-asset-seeking investments.12
Of course, the association between investment strategy 
and subregion is not absolute. Indeed, investment in 
natural resource segments —mining, agroindustry and 
tourism— has risen in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin 
and there are TNC subsidiaries producing certain product 
lines for the global market in South America.13 But the 
investment-type distribution described in the preceding 
paragraph is still the general rule.
An overview of FDI flows into Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the framework of each of those strategies 
follows.
(a)	 Market-seeking	FDI	
Market-seeking FDI was fuelled in 2007 by the sound 
performance of the region’s economy, which has grown 
steadily and exhibited lower rates of unemployment, 
higher real average wages and a drop in poverty and 
indigence levels with respect to the start of the decade 
(ECLAC, 2007b, 2007c). Corporate managers have 
sought to lock into the higher demand resulting from 
this performance which —in combination with easier 
access to credit in some countries— has encouraged 
new segments of the population into the consumer 
market. This has had very evident effects on the activity 
levels of TNCs, especially in the segments of motor 
vehicles, mass consumer goods, retail trade, financial 
services, telecommunications and construction. The 
main investments in those sectors are described below, 
with the exception of telecommunications, which are 
examined in chapter II. The investments of steel TNCs 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, which combine 
market-seeking and natural-resource-seeking strategies, 
are analysed in box I.4.
(i)  Automotive sector: expansion in MERCOSUR 
The bulk of the market-seeking operations of automotive 
TNCs in Latin America and the Caribbean are located 
in MERCOSUR.14 This sector expanded in 2007 owing 
to the steady upturn in the South American economies 
(especially Argentina and Brazil), in addition to increased 
access to credit for Brazilian consumers. 
Vehicle production continued to climb, reaching 
its highest ever levels in both countries. Exports from 
Argentina also rose, going mainly to Brazil. Although 
Brazilian exports —which went mainly to Argentina and 
Mexico— remain high in historical terms, they declined 
for the second year running (see figure I.13).
12 UNCTAD (2005), for example, shows that Latin America and the Caribbean is relatively unimportant as a destination for R&D investments.
13 Argentina, for instance, has received increasing amounts of investments in excellence centres integrated into TNC production networks in segments 
such as television contents; R&D centres; accounting, administrative and informatics services; and software development (ProsperAr, 2008). 
14 In view of the fact that 80% of Mexican vehicle output is exported (AMIA, 2008), the operations of automotive TNCs in Mexico are examined 
in the subsection on efficiency-seeking investments.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)36
Box I.4
STEEL: THE DOUBLE DRAW OF RESOURCES AND MARKETS
The investment strategies pursued 
by steel companies in Latin America 
and the Caribbean have combined the 
search for resources with the search 
for markets. In this respect, the sector 
has been favoured by both the global 
situation and the growing demand in local 
markets. Steelworks were the targets 
of some of the major acquisitions and 
investment projects that were announced 
in 2007. The region has been considered 
a key part of corporate strategy by 
ArcelorMittal because of the potential 
of its main markets. Other companies 
have invested in joint ventures with 
the Brazilian company CVRD to build 
new steel production facilities for the 
export market. The investments made 
by Ternium, the Argentine group Techint, 
and the Brazilian corporation Gerdau 
are described in section D.
Arcelor Mittal
Latin America, and Brazil and Mexico 
in particular, have been key components of 
the growth strategy of ArcelorMittal which 
has focused on markets that enjoy high 
growth and offer low costs. At the same 
time, the company has worked towards 
vertical integration from iron ore production 
at one end and the manufacturing of 
higher value added products, such as 
steel pipes, at the other. The purchase of 
the shares of the minority shareholders in 
Arcelor Brasil for approximately US$ 4.2 
billion increased ArcelorMittal’s stake to 
97.85% and enabled it to streamline the 
structure of the company, optimize its 
debt and cash flows, rationalize its tax 
payments and increase its presence in 
the South American market. The company 
inaugurated a third furnace at its Tubarão 
mill and announced investments in the 
expansion of its production capacity in 
Brazil of US$ 5 billion over the next five 
years. In Mexico, Arcelor Mittal bought 
out Sicartsa which, together with Lázaro 
Cárdenas (another steel mill in which it is a 
stakeholder), make up its main operations 
in the country. The company also negotiated 
a distribution agreement with the Villacero 
group. ArcelorMittal invested in iron ore 
mining in both countries with a view to 
vertically integrating its operations and 
facilitating access to its main raw material. 
The investments in the Tubarão plant in 
Brazil and in the Lázaro Cárdenas plant in 
Mexico are key elements of the company’s 
growth plan for its flat steel interests up to 
2012. In long steel products, the company 
increased its holdings in Acindar (Argentina) 
(to boost capacity), Point Lisas (Trinidad) 
and Sicartsa (Mexico) and upgraded its 
operations at Juiz de Fora (Brasil) and 
other plants in South America. Finally, 
ArcelorMittal bought the stainless steel 
pipe manufacturer Cister in Uruguay. These 
investments in the Latin American market 
were largely motivated by the revitalization 
of motor vehicle production and construction 
in the region and the continued growth 
of the hydrocarbon industry, which is 
discussed in the next section. 
ARCELOR BRASIL: DISTRIBUTION OF NET CONSOLIDATED INCOME 
(In millions of reais)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the 
basis of data provided by Arcelor Brasil, Relatório anual 2006.
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If the market was what motivated 
ArcelorMittal to invest in the region, 
natural resources are what inspired joint 
ventures undertaken with Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) to invest in new 
steel production capacity in Brazil. After 
selling its shares in steel mills as part of a 
strategic reorientation after privatization, 
CVRD returned to invest in the Brazilian 
steel sector through four projects carried 
out in partnership with some of its main 
customers: ThyssenKrupp (Germany), 
Dongkuk (Republic of Korea), Baoshan Iron 
& Steel (China) and a fourth, which has yet 
to be disclosed. These four ventures are all 
located along the Brazilian coast near to 
major ports and have logistical connections 
with the mines of either the southern or 
northern systems of CVRD. These are 
the first investments to be made in new 
steel mills in Brazil in several decades. 
The partnership arrangements are similar 
to those used by CVRD in its main iron 
pellet production operations (Nibrasco, 
Kobrasco, Itabrasco, Hispanobras) but one 
step further along the production chain. 
CVRD could enter into a similar partnership 
with Nippon Steel. The companies have a 
long history of interaction and cooperation 
(through Nibrasco and others, and their joint 
participation in Usiminas). The Japanese 
company has shown an interest in Brazil 
and recently upped its share in Usiminas 
and announced investments of over US$ 
8 billion until 2010. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of “Fuertes inversiones de Nippon Steel en su filial brasileña Usiminas”, 
americaconomica.com, 13 August 2007; “Transforming Tomorrow”, presentation by Aditya Mittal, CFO, Arcelor Mittal, in Sandford Bernstein – Pan European Strategic 
Decisions, 25 September 2007; ArcelorMittal, “Growth Plan 2012” presented at ArcelorMittal Investor Day, 11-13 September 2007; Arcelor Brasil, Relatório anual 2006; 
“Vale do Rio Doce anuncia aliança com Nippon Steel”, Folha Online, 18 December 2006; Latin Finance, “M&A”, November 2007; AméricaEconomía.com, “ArcelorMIttal 
compra uruguaya Cinter y austriaca Eisen Wagner”, 26 December.
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Figure I.13
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF THE
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY, 1996-2007
(Thousands of units)
priority for long-term expansion (General Motors, 2007; 
Ford 2007; América economía, 2007b; AméricaEconomía.
com, 2007a; KPMG, 2007; Business Latin America, 
2007a; PSA Peugeot-Citroen, 2007a).15
The Asian firms Hyundai, Toyota, Honda and Nissan, 
which have a smaller presence in Brazil and Argentina, 
also announced new investments, both in new plants and 
in the development of new models, in Brazil and Argentina 
in 2007. In addition to Japanese and Korean firms, motor 
vehicle companies from India and China invested in 
production in South America in 2007. As in the case of 
Hyundai’s recent investments in Brazil, the management 
of those firms opted to set up assembly operations with 
local partners. The Indian company Tata signed a joint 
production agreement with Fiat to reactivate Fiat’s plant 
in Córdoba, Argentina. The Chinese firm Chery associated 
with the Argentine group Socma and invested US$ 100 
million in a sports utility vehicle assembly operation in 
Uruguay, for the MERCOSUR markets. The plant is owned 
by a local assembler. Chery also negotiated with another 
Uruguayan firm, Bognor, to produce armoured vehicles 
locally. This operation will benefit from the agreement 
between Brazil and Uruguay that provides for the annual 
export of 2,000 armoured vehicles to the Brazilian market 
(AméricaEconomía.com, 2007b, 2007c).
Notwithstanding the good performance of the South 
American markets, the managers of the main automotive 
firms have also sought to increase sales from Argentina 
and Brazil to the rest of the region, particularly to Mexico, 
to whose market they have enjoyed greater access thanks 
to the gradual liberalization provided in the Economic 
Complementarity Agreement between Mexico and the 
MERCOSUR countries.
There are a number of factors today that could give 
the South American automotive industry a larger role on 
the world stage. The high prices of petroleum, mounting 
consumer concern over the environment and the growth 
of emerging economies with large numbers of potential 
consumers have generated an increasing demand for 
small cars and those running on alternative fuels. South 
American production units offer certain advantages 
when it comes to these types of vehicles, because of the 
nature of the regional market (in which most consumers 
are price-sensitive) and the decades of experience with 
biofuels in Brazil, which led to the development “flexfuel” 
engines. This could generate opportunities for export from 
South America. In fact, some firms have taken steps to 
make maximum use of their production capacity in South 
America, increasing their exports and taking advantage 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (ADEFA) 
of Argentina and the National Association of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
(ANFAVEA) of Brazil.
Brazil registered an increase in FDI in the automotive 
sector in 2007 and, although no official data are available 
for Argentina, the investment announcements of the 
industry’s main firms indicate an increase in FDI in 
the segment there too. The main firms established in 
MERCOSUR (GM, Ford, Fiat, Volkswagen, Renault and 
PSA Peugeot-Citroën) announced major investment plans 
to increase production capacity, reactivate plants, develop 
new models and heighten productivity. 
For United States firms, rising demand in South 
America —and in other emerging markets— represents 
an opportunity to soften the effects of the contraction in 
their home market, which are adding to the challenges 
posed by competition from Asia. Even independently of 
the current circumstances, the main automotive firms 
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15 In addition to the investment plans mentioned, Ford bought the Brazilian firm Troller, which makes all-terrain vehicles.
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of the technological advantages the region has in these 
niches.16 In order to fully seize these opportunities, 
however, they must address the challenge of reducing 
production costs and maximizing economies of scale and 
regional complementarities. 
In addition, although the Mexican automotive industry 
manufactures mainly for export, some firms, such as 
Nissan, GM and Ford, have announced investments in 
vehicles for local sale (Expansión, 2007a, 2007b). Chinese 
entrepreneurs are also seeking to take advantage of the 
opportunities of the Mexican market and are beginning 
to occupy niches with low-cost products. In 2006, First 
Automotive Works (FAW) set up a strategic alliance with 
the local group Bler (which sells domestic appliances) 
to create Giant Motors, an assembler of light trucks 
for goods delivery. For the moment, sales are mainly 
in the Mexican market, with 15% intended for export 
(Expansión, 2006). In 2007, FAW formed an alliance 
with the retail and financial services group Elektra, in 
which Elektra will sell vehicles initially imported from 
China, with the idea of beginning to assemble them in 
2010. One of the cornerstones of this alliance is Elektra’s 
intention of financing vehicle sales through its Banco 
Azteca (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007d). 
(ii) Mass consumer goods: bringing in lower-income 
segments and building on synergies between local 
firms and TNCs 
The upturn in domestic demand in the largest Latin 
American economies has also encouraged investments in 
mass consumer goods: hygiene and cleaning products, 
processed foods and beverages.17 Economic growth has 
brought new consumers into the market, but opportunities 
have also arisen because of changes in habits: the rising 
proportion of women joining the labour market has led to 
a higher demand for processed foods and greater concern 
over health has generated markets for niche products 
(Business Latin America, 2007b).
Investors in this sector seek to take advantage of 
the opportunities arising from the incorporation into the 
market of lower-income consumers —the base of the 
pyramid. To this end they have combined price strategies 
with innovative marketing. As well as lowering prices, 
Procter and Gamble have developed new products 
and formats adapted to the habits of the lower-income 
population —such as handwashing clothes— while also 
cultivating brand and quality (Expansión 2007c; Valor 
online, 2008). Nestlé has also set out to conquer the 
“emerging consumer” segment with different formats 
(small packages for occasional consumption products 
such as chocolate and larger, more economical packs 
for regular use goods such as coffee), access to high-
draw distribution points and building on popular brands 
(Nestlé, 2008). Price competition continues to be a key 
factor, however, as shown by the experience of Unilever, 
which lowered the price of its detergents to tackle local 
competition, or Pepsico, which bought the potato chips 
manufacturer Lucky in Brazil, thereby adding a cheaper 
product line to its range of appetizers (Elsevier Food 
International, 2007; Valor online, 2007a).
At the same time, businesses in the foods and beverages 
sector have sought opportunities for growth in the higher-
income consumer segment —in Latin America and in 
the rest of the world— in order to position themselves 
as firms making not only foods but also products for 
health and well-being. Thus, firms are expanding their 
lines of functional foods, teas, juices and water. Notable 
in the beverages market was the purchase of the Mexican 
firm Jugos del Valle by Coca-Cola Femsa, one of the 
Mexican partners of The Coca-Cola Company, which 
also participated in the operation, the purchase of Tés 
Leão en Brazil, also by The Coca-Cola Company, and 
Nestlé’s agreement with the Modelo group to distribute 
mineral waters in Mexico. 
Traditionally, beverages TNCs have operated in the 
region through partnerships with local firms, such as 
Coca-Cola Femsa, as mentioned above. This enables them 
to build on complementarities between the advantages of 
the former —brand and marketing know-how, financial 
capital, product range— and those of the latter —local 
market knowledge, production capacity, distribution 
infrastructure (ECLAC, 2006). Some local partners are 
now taking on a more important role in such partnerships. 
As well as its joint acquisition of Jugos del Valle, in 2007 
Coca-Cola Femsa bought the bottler Refrigerantes Minas 
Gerais (Remil) in Brazil, one of the few bottlers owned 
by The Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola Femsa, 2007a) 
16  Fiat, Ford, General Motors, Peugeot, Renault and Volkswagen have flexfuel vehicle development and manufacturing centres in Brazil. KPMG 
forecasts that such vehicles will represent three quarters of the Brazilian market by 2010 (KPMG, 2007). PSA is to export Citroën C3 and 
Peugeot 307 models from Brazil to Europe. GM appears to be developing capacity to make a new generation of small vehicles to be sold in 
Latin America and other developing countries. Ford has broadened its engineering base in South America (América economía, 2007b, 2007c; 
PSA Peugeot-Citroën, 2007b).
17 Also worthy of note owing to the sheer volume of the transaction (US$ 1.1 billion) was Philip Morris’s purchase of additional equity in its 
partnership with the Carso group in Mexico. Philip Morris of Mexico also announced investments in upgrading facilities, clean industry and 
optimization of operations (Expansión, 2007d).
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(see section D). The shareholders in Vonpar Refrescos, 
another Brazilian bottler, bought Coca-Cola’s 49% stake 
in the firm (Valor econômico, 2008a).
Other local firms have been able to fill gaps left 
by TNCs. In Costa Rica, the local firm Florida Ice and 
Farm bought Pepsico bottling and distribution businesses 
from SABMiller, which had acquired them as part of 
its purchase of the Colombian brewer Bavaria in 2005. 
SabMiller bottles Coca-Cola products in other markets, 
including El Salvador and Honduras, which explains its 
interest in withdrawing from the distribution of Pepsico 
products. The Costa Rican firm had previously purchased 
the operations of another TNC, Ebro Puleva, in Central 
America (Nación, 2007; Fifco, 2007). 
(iii)  Retail trade: concentration, expansion and 
diversification
In the retail trade sector, the major players have 
been expanding through acquisitions (leading to market 
concentration) and investments in expanding networks 
and diversifying services. In parallel to TNCs from other 
regions, Chilean and Mexican firms, too, have been 
internationalizing regionally (see section D).
The market structure in Brazil, the region’s largest 
market, is fragmented in comparison with that of the other 
Latin American countries. This, combined with the good 
perspectives stemming from an increase in consumer 
credit, the incorporation of lower-income groups into the 
consumer market, an increase in real wages and the drop 
in the prices of imported products due to local-currency 
appreciation, has made the Brazilian market more attractive 
to foreign investors (Business Latin America, 2007c). In this 
context, Carrefour, the second-largest supermarket firm, 
bought Atacadão, the biggest bulk retailer, strengthening 
its presence in the low-income segment and making it 
the largest retail chain in Brazil. The opportunities of 
the Brazilian market also encouraged the Chilean firm 
Cencosud to acquire GBarbosa supermarkets, in the 
north-east of Brazil (as well as the Peruvian firm Wong 
—see section D).
In Colombia, market concentration was driven by 
local firms. Almacenes Éxito acquired control of its 
competitor Carulla Vivero, a defensive step against the 
possible arrival of Wal-Mart and the Chilean retail chains 
(América economía, 2007d). In Chile, the attempt to 
merge D&S and Falabella —which was blocked by the 
competition regulator in February 2008— was presented as 
a step towards expanding the firms’ international presence 
(América economía, 2007e).
Foreign firms have also invested in organic expansion, 
that is opening up new branches and plants rather than buying 
existing spaces, networks and factories. In particular, Wal 
Mart, the largest retail chain in the region, announced that 
it would open new stores in Brazil, Mexico and Central 
America. Mexico, in particular, is seen as a key market 
for the firm, as part of its strategy of ensuring a good mix 
of mature and emerging markets (Expansión, 2007e).
In terms of diversification, those responsible for 
retail chains are taking advantage of the outreach of their 
commercial structures and consumer confidence in their 
brands to offer financial services and move into specialized 
retail segments, such as pharmacies. Providing multiple 
services, in turn, increases the attractiveness of their core 
business. TNCs are following a pattern that has, until now, 
been used in the region mainly by Chilean retailers. In 
Mexico, Wal-Mart opened its own bank and began to sell 
generic medicines at low prices. Local operators Soriana, 
Chedraui and Comercial Mexicana are following this 
trend too, either independently or in partnership with 
other firms. In Brazil, the three major actors, Carrefour, 
Wal-Mart and Grupo Pão de Açúcar (in which the French 
group, Casino, owns a share) are competing intensively 
in the medicines segment. 
(iv) Banking: more players, more competition 
As well as investments in financial services associated 
with retail consumption, in 2007 there were major 
investments in a range of other financial services, mainly 
banking.18 Strategic acquisitions and alliances took place 
in addition to the extension of new operating licences and 
organic expansion programmes. Businesses have sought to 
take advantage of economic growth and the opportunities 
of a growing region that has low bank penetration rates. 
Greater competition in this segment could have important 
knock-on effects in other sectors too, thanks to the 
incorporation of new segments of the population in the 
housing, motor vehicle and other markets.
Banco Santander was one of the main players in 
2007. Latin America is an important part of the Spanish 
bank’s growth strategy, as it has matured its approach 
to the region by focusing on retail banking and making 
purchases in large markets, while growing organically in 
18 There were three large operations in other financial services: the acquisition of 65% of Serasa, a credit information firm in Brazil, by Experian 
of the United States; the purchase of 10% of the Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange by the private equity fund General Atlantic; and 
the purchase of ARX Capital Management by Bank of New York Mellon. Another large transaction was the acquisition of the Santander group’s 
pension fund administrators by ING Groep. 
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others (Latin Finance, 2007b). The bank’s directors wish to 
promote the incorporation of SMEs and individuals alike 
into the banking market. As a result of its participation 
in the consortium of European banks that bought the 
Netherlands bank ABN Amro, Santander gained control 
of Banco Real in Brazil, and thus became the country’s 
second-largest private bank in terms of assets. Its 
representatives announced investments in the organic 
expansion of its Latin American operations, with US$ 2 
billion to be spent on opening some 1,000 new offices by 
2010 in different Latin American countries. Four years 
after its decision to withdraw from the Peruvian market, 
where it operated in the retail banking and mutual funds 
segment, Santander obtained a licence to open a branch 
to lend financial and investment banking services to the 
corporate sector. The operation went through at a time when 
HSBC, Deutsche Bank and Scotiabank are also entering 
Peru, as are regional institutions linked to commercial 
retailers. Santander has divested pension fund operations 
to finance its international expansion (Valor económico, 
2007a; Business Latin America, 2007d). 19
Two of the sector’s largest acquisitions in 2007 took 
place in Chile: the strategic alliance of Banco de Chile 
with Citigroup and the purchase of Banco del Desarrollo 
by Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank) of Canada.
In 2007, prior to the losses generated by the crisis in 
the United States mortgage market, Citigroup entered into 
a strategic partnership with Banco de Chile. Similar to the 
strategy used for the purchase of Banamex in Mexico in 
2001, Citigroup’s strategy in Chile consisted in building 
on its own capacity and advantages in global products and 
Banco de Chile’s advantages in terms of brand name, local-
market experience and distribution platform.20 (Citigroup 
Inc., 2007; América economía, 2007f). Citigroup’s other 
significant operation in the region was the purchase of 
Banco Cuscatlán in El Salvador, which was announced 
in 2006 and carried out in 2007.
Scotiabank, meanwhile, took over Banco del 
Desarrollo to expand its lending operations in Chile to 
middle-income consumers and small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The bank also signed an option agreement 
to purchase a controlling share in Banco de Trabajo in 
Peru (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007f). Latin America now 
represents 70% of Scotiabank’s international operations. 
The region’s young population and the increasing numbers 
of people using the banking system is constantly opening 
up business opportunities, and Scotiabank is trying to 
penetrate niches, such as microfinancing (including 
consumer lending operations), in which the big banks 
—Santander, BBVA, Citibank— are not major players 
(Latin Finance, 2007c, Scotiabank, 2007a, interview with 
staff at headquarters in Toronto) (see chapter IV).21
Another Canadian enterprise, Royal Bank of Canada 
(RBC), conducted the largest transaction in the banking 
sector in 2007 when it bought RBTT Financial Holdings, 
which is headquartered in Trinidad and Tobago. RBC has 
been involved in the Caribbean for several decades, and this 
acquisition complements the other operations it has in the 
subregion. Despite having pulled out of retail banking in 
Latin America, where it had an extensive branch network, 
in the wake of the financial crisis of the 1980s, and selling 
its capital in RBTT at the end of that decade, RBC always 
maintained its commercial and retail banking operations 
and its private banking operations in the Caribbean. The two 
banks complement one another geographically within the 
Caribbean and in terms of the services in which they hold a 
competitive edge (see table I.3). One of the advantages RBC 
can offer RBTT is the experience it has gained in providing 
financial services to the energy and farming sectors in its 
home market (see chapter IV) (Latin Finance, 2007d).
19 The assets include subsidiaries in Mexico (Afore Santander), Chile (AFP Santander), Colombia (AFP y Cesantía Santander), Uruguay (Afinidad 
AFAP) and Argentina (Orígenes AFJP pension fund and Orígenes Seguros de Retiro insurance company) (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007e).
20 The same logic that led to the alliance between Citigroup and Banco de Chile was applied in the purchase by GE Money of 39% of Colpatria 
in Colombia. This transaction could represent the first step towards the acquisition of a controlling share and one of the first incursions of a 
foreign financial institution in the Colombian banking market (Semana, 2007). 
21 Scotiabank Group also signed an agreement to purchase a controlling share in BBVA Crecer AFP, which is the largest pension fund manager in 
the Dominican Republic, and its insurance affiliate, BBVA Seguros (Scotiabank, 2007b).
 Table I.3
COMPLEMENTARITIES BETWEEN THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA AND RBTT FINANCIAL GROUP
RBTT RBC
Advantages Retail, commercial and investment banking, assets management Consumer, retail, commercial banking, mortgages, capital 
management 
Product range Broad range of products in the individual and corporate banking 
market. Market leader in credit card services in Trinidad 
Products for individual, corporate and institutional customers 
Market leader in Trinidad and Tobago, Netherlands Antilles, Suriname, Aruba Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Barbados
Presence in Barbados, Eastern Caribbean, Jamaica Eastern Caribbean
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of RBC and RBTT report, “A New Caribbean Leader”, 2 October 2007.
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In Mexico, the banking authorities have issued new 
operating licenses to boost competition in the banking 
sector. Increased competition is expected to accelerate 
incorporation of new customers into the banking system 
and lower the costs of banking services. The recently 
opened Banca Wal-Mart, for example, is targeting first-
time users of bank services and is one of several banks 
connected with local retail chains in Mexico, such as 
Azteca (Electra), Bancoppel (Coppel) and Banco Fácil 
(Chedraui). Prudential Financial and UBS are among 
the transnational corporations who entered the Mexican 
banking market in 2007. Compared with major-league 
players, such as BBVA Bancomer, Banamex, Santander, 
HSBC, Banorte and Scotiabank Inverlat, these new entrants 
represent only a tiny fraction of the banking market. They 
have, however, been responsible for a significant amount 
of the expansion of the banking network in the country 
(see table I.4). 
Table I.4
EXPANSION OF THE NETWORK OF THE MAIN NEW PARTICIPANTS 
IN THE MEXICAN BANKING SYSTEM a
(Number of branches)
Institution 2006 2007 2007/2006
I II III
Ve por Más 2 2 2 2 --
Autofin 7 9 9 11 4
Ahorro Famsa -- 15 44 62 62
Banco Multivia -- 5 10 15 15
Banco Regional -- 1 1 1 1
Banco Fácil -- 1 1 1 1
Compartamos 1 1 1 1 --
Prudential -- -- 1 17 17
Bancoppel -- -- 34 124 124
Banco Amigo -- -- 3 3 3
Total (10 banks) 10 34 106 237 227
System total 8 411 8 509 8 717 8 996 585
Participation of 
new entrants
(percentages) 0.1 0.4 1.2 2.6 38.8
Source:  Condumex, on the basis of information provided by the National Banking and 
Securities Commission.
a  During the third quarter of 2007, Banca Wal-Mart, which is expected to be one of the 
larger players among the new banks in Mexico, had still not started up operations 
and was therefore not included in this table.
Volkswagen Bank has also been authorized to 
operate in Mexico with an innovative form of direct 
banking format, in addition to car loans for the purchase 
of Volkswagen vehicles (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007g; 
Expansión, 2007f).
In Central America, after the wave of acquisitions in 
2006 (ECLAC, 2007a), the banks in the subregion have 
consolidated and expanded their operations in 2007 in an 
effort to ward off the competition. The most notable moves 
include the merger between Banco General (Panama) 
and Banco Continental (Costa Rica), the acquisition by 
Banco Industrial (Guatemala) of Banco de Occidente, 
Banco de Comercio, Banco del Quetzal and Banco del 
País (Banpaís) of Honduras and the expansion of regional 
groups such as Promérica and Lafise. The most active 
transnational banks in the subregion are HSBC, Citigroup 
and Scotiabank, as well as Bancolombia. El Salvador is 
the Central American country with the largest foreign bank 
presence, followed by Panama (Fitch Ratings, 2007). In 
2007, much of the increase in FDI in El Salvador was 
related to transactions in this sector.
(v)  Electricity: changing hands
Changes of ownership have characterized FDI 
operations in the electrical sector. Some TNCs, especially 
United States companies, shed some of their assets in 
Latin America and the Caribbean or pulled out of the 
region entirely, either because they had to strengthen their 
positions in their home markets, or their risk exposure was 
too high or they needed to improve their financial structure 
(Latin Finance, 2007e). Local or other transnational 
corporations snapped up the opportunity to fill their shoes, 
however, drawn by the long-term profits to be obtained 
from investments in markets that enjoyed good growth 
prospects and acceptable levels of risk. Many TNCs also 
increased their investments in renewable energies in the 
region as part of their global strategies.
The departure of United States companies played 
a considerable role in the change of hands in the sector. 
Corporations, such as Public Service Enterprise Group 
(PSEG), CMS Energy, PPL Corporation, Mirant, and NRG 
Energy, sold their assets in the region to improve their 
risk profile, limit their non-strategic operations and lower 
their debt levels. (PSEG, 2007; Business Latin America, 
2007e; CMS Energy, 2007; PPL, 2007). 
One of the most notable departures was triggered by 
the decision of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to 
nationalize Electricidad de Caracas, which resulted in AES 
Corporation selling its share in the electrical company for 
US$ 739 million. This was an isolated operation, however, 
and AES redirected its attention towards other countries in 
the region. It expanded its operations in Mexico, buying 
two companies that supply thermoelectric energy to Cemex 
and the mining company Peñoles, and undertook projects 
in Chile and Panama (AES Corporation, 2007).
Assets sold by United States corporations were 
either acquired by local companies —CGE in Chile, 
CPFL in Brazil, PDVSA in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela— or other TNCs. 
One of the most active TNCs in this respect was AEI 
(formerly Ashmore Energy International). The company 
was founded in 2005. In 2006, it bought Prisma Energy, 
the company that handled the former Enron’s international 
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assets. In 2007, it undertook several acquisitions of assets 
of departing transnational corporations at modest prices, 
accepting lower returns in anticipation of a forthcoming 
surge in the importance of electricity in the region. It made 
several acquisitions under this strategy (América economía, 
2007g). Most notably, it bought shares in Chilquinta 
Energía SA (Chile) and Luz del Sur (Peru) from CMS and 
a controlling interest in Distribuidora de Electricidad del 
Sur (El Salvador) from PPL. It also increased its stake in 
Puerto Quetzal Power in Jamaica. AEI also sold its stakes 
in two companies: Vengas in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, as a result of the nationalization policy there, 
and Bahía Las Minas Corp. in Panama (which was acquired 
as part of the purchase of Prisma) to comply with national 
regulations about the simultaneous ownership of electricity 
generation and distribution operations. AEI today has a 
large assets portfolio in the region. It holds interests in 
electricity generation and distribution, the transportation 
of natural gas, natural gas services and fuel distribution. 
In addition to its large investment portfolio in Colombia, 
it has investments in Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama and Peru.
The Canadian transnational Brookfield Asset 
Management is also expanding its interests in the electrical 
sector in the region. In 2007, it bought the hydroelectrical 
company Itiquira in Brazil from NRG Energy. Brookfield 
(formerly Brascan) has a history of investing in the 
electricity sector in Latin America. In 2006, it bought a 
controlling share in Transelec in Chile. It invests mainly in 
renewable energies (especially hydroelectric power) and 
electrical power transmission. These operations generate 
attractive cash flows for the corporation. They require high 
initial investments, but have low maintenance costs. The 
long-term returns are good, and the profit margins are 
guaranteed (because they are regulated or fixed in long-
term contracts) and increase over time (interview with the 
company).22 With this latest acquisition, Brookfield now 
has 28 hydroelectric plants in Brazil and six other projects 
under construction (Brookfield, 2007, and interview with 
the company) (see chapter IV).
EDF is one of the few European companies among the 
TNCs in the electrical sector that has opted to pull out of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. This French corporation 
sold all its five plants in Mexico as part of a strategy started 
several years ago to redirect its attention towards Europe and 
invest more in renewable and nuclear energy (EDF, 2007). 
The British corporation Globeleq also sold its interests in 
the region as part of the reduction of its global investments 
in electrical operations (Reuters, 2007b).
The other large European TNCs continued to invest in 
the region through acquisitions and greenfield investment 
(Latin Finance, 2007e). Gas Natural bought the assets 
owned by EDF and Mitsubishi in Mexico (five natural gas 
power plants and a gas pipeline) to become the country’s 
second largest private operator in the electricity generation 
segment (see figure 1.14).23 This also makes the company 
the only gas and electricity operator in Mexico. The 
company has pursued a global strategy of making gas and 
electricity generation activities converge. The operation 
has been viewed as a stepping stone for further growth 
in Mexico —where new opportunities are opening up 
for private enterprise— and in the rest of North America 
(Gas Natural, 2007).
Figure I.14
GENERATING CAPACITY OF PRIVATE OPERATORS IN MEXICO
(Percentages)
22 Using the same logic (investing in infrastructure with dependable long-term returns), the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund (OTTP) bought a controlling 
share in Empresa de Servicios Sanitarios del Bio-Bio S.A. (ESSBIO) and Aguas Nuevo Sur Maule, S.A. (ANSM) (see chapter IV).
23 27% of total electricity generation is privately owned in Mexico (Gas Natural, 2007 and CFE, 2007).
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Gas Natural, “Creación de una plataforma energética en México”, 
presentation, 25 October 2007.
Endesa, which is the largest TNC in terms of 
installed capacity and number of distribution customers 
in the region, underwent a significant ownership change 
in 2007 when it was bought out by Acciona and the 
Italian electric-power company Enel. Endesa’s extensive 
presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, where 
the regulatory framework is seen to be improving, was 
one of the features that made it a particularly attractive 
purchase according to its buyers (Enel, 2007). They 
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euros in organic growth in Latin America between 
2008 and 2012 (Enel, 2008). In 2007, Endesa was one 
of the companies to buy assets from CMS (shares in 
GasAtacama in Chile and the hydroelectric plant El 
Chocón in Argentina). The company’s directors also 
announced renewed investment in Argentina after the 
rate increase for Edesur was authorized, and showed a 
growing interest in Brazil, where it joined a consortium 
to build a hydroelectric facility in the country (Latin 
Finance, 2007f; Reuters, 2007a; Endesa, 2007; Business 
News Americas, 2007a).
Two other Spanish companies, IBERDROLA and 
Unión Fenosa, continued to expand their operations in 
the region. Unión Fenosa announced a plan to invest 
approximately 1.65 billion euros between 2007 and 2011 
in renewable (eolic and hydraulic) energies. One of its 
largest projects will be the construction of a wind park 
in Mexico, close to the United States border. As part of 
the process, the company acquired 50% of Zemer, its 
partner in the project. Unión Fenosa also started building 
a combined cycle plant in Mexico, which will represent 
an investment of approximately US$ 400 million, and 
announced other investments in Costa Rica, Panama and 
Colombia (Unión Fenosa, 2007, 2008). IBERDROLA, 
for its part, spent US$ 1.3 billion on organic growth and 
is contemplating further acquisitions in Latin America 
between 2008 and 2010. Most of its operations are 
currently located in Mexico (where it is the largest 
private energy supplier —see figure I.14) and Brazil 
(where, together with local partners, it has become 
the single most important electricity distributor in the 
country). IBERDROLA is also the largest electricity 
distributor in Guatemala and a major player in the 
Chilean distribution market, where it holds hydraulic 
and water distribution assets (IBERDROLA, 2007). In 
addition, IBERDROLA has expanded its engineering 
and construction activities and been awarded significant 
building contracts in Latin America, such as the generator 
replacement project at the Angra I nuclear power plant 
in Brazil (IBERDROLA, 2008).
Suez, for its part, has concentrated on electricity 
generation, LNG and the sale of gas to the industrial 
sector. In Latin America, it has focused on its operations 
in Brazil and Chile, and to a lesser extent in Peru, which 
are all considered to be markets with considerable growth 
potential (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007h; Suez Energy 
International, 2007). The sale of Cálidda in Peru to AEI 
was a swap for the shares held by AEI in Bahía Las Minas 
in Panama. Following the merger with Gaz de France, 
which is due to take place at the beginning of 2008, the 
company is expected to award priority to its European 
operations and then pay attention to its high-growth 
markets, such as Brazil (Gaz de France, 2007).
Companies from other developing countries also 
invested in the region’s electricity sector. Israel Corp, in 
a partnership with the Indian enterprise DS Construction, 
bought the Latin American operations of Globeleq 
(Reuters, 2007b). 
One of the challenges in this sector is to develop the 
transmission network and improve connections between 
countries and subregions. Greater institutional coordination 
could improve the efficiency of the electricity system. 
Progress has been made in this respect in Central America, 
where a 1,800 km transmission line was built from Panama 
to Guatemala by a consortium made up of the Colombian 
firm ISA, Endesa and other companies. The power line is 
intended to be eventually connected up with Colombia at 
one end and Mexico at the other (AméricaEconomía.com, 
2007i; Ruiz Caro, 2007). ISA could play an important role 
in this process as it already has experience of carrying out 
projects in Colombia and Central America, as well as in 
Peru and Brazil. After buying Companhia de Transmissão 
Elétrica Paulista (CTEEP) in 2006, the company was one 
of the winners of the transmission contracts awarded in 
Brazil in 2007.
(vi) Construction: the driving demand for real estate and 
infrastructure 
Investments in real estate in the region have boomed in 
a number of sectors, including housing, tourism, commerce 
and infrastructure. More and more transnational and 
local companies have increased their capacity to take on 
projects that involve managing not only the engineering 
and financial aspects, but also the services associated 
with the physical infrastructure (the sale of residential 
properties, commercial real estate, tourism projects, public 
services, etc.). The growing interest in these kinds of 
projects has been triggered by the opportunities that have 
been arising in the region as a result of economic growth 
and improved access to credit, the region’s attractiveness 
as a tourist destination, and the plans underway in several 
countries to upgrade their logistics infrastructure and 
basic services.
Some of the largest construction firms in the region 
are Spanish companies which, flush with the liquidity 
generated by the burgeoning Spanish real-estate market, 
have turned their attention overseas and diversified into 
different sectors (ECLAC/SEGIB, 2007). Some of these 
companies have ventured into the Latin American market 
directly. Others have bought into utility companies that 
have a solid presence in the region.24 As far as financing is 
concerned, private equity funds, pension funds and asset 
management companies have shown growing interest in 
the region, while local construction companies (such as 
the Brazilian firm Odebrecht) have increased their capacity 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)44
to obtain financing for their projects on the international 
market (Latin Finance, 2007g). The development of the 
Latin American and the Caribbean markets encouraged 
companies to invest in the services sector (tourism, real 
estate, commerce, infrastructure). In summary, increasing 
numbers of companies are able and willing to invest in 
construction projects in the region despite the complexity 
and high levels of financing involved and despite having 
to wait a long time for the returns.
A number of factors, in addition to economic growth, 
have created opportunities for construction companies: 
greater institutional stability; the gradual development of 
financial markets, which has improved access to credit 
and financing schemes for both individuals (mortgages) 
and enterprises; and the promotion of investment in 
infrastructure as part of strategies to enhance a country’s 
competitiveness and universalize access to basic services 
(Latin Finance, 2007f).
Several countries have made particular efforts to 
attract capital investment in the electrical energy and 
logistics sectors. Logistics (transportation, ports, airports) 
is a key sector for improving competitiveness. Spanish 
firms have been particularly active bidding for road 
construction contracts. 
In Brazil, one of the main goals of the Growth 
Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do 
Crescimento (PAC)) has been to increase investment in 
logistics, energy, and social and urban infrastructure. Taxes 
on machinery and equipment purchases for infrastructure 
work were lowered, and targeted investment funds were 
set up (MDIC, 2007; see also box I.3). In a major step 
to further the PAC, in 2007, the Brazilian Government 
auctioned contracts for the construction of 2,600 km of 
roads. The Spanish company OHL came out as the main 
winner with contracts for five of the seven sections put 
up for bid, representing investments of about 6.5 billion 
euros. Another Spanish company, Acciona (the company 
that bought Endesa with Enel), also won a bid for one 
section (representing an investment of about 700 million 
euros).25 The fierce competition during the bidding process 
reflects the strong interest that both national and foreign 
investors have in these kinds of projects, which ultimately 
benefits the user (Portal Fator Brasil, 2007; Portal Exame, 
2007a).26 The boom in Brazil is opening up opportunities 
to companies that had traditionally focused their efforts 
on other countries in the region.
In Mexico, the consortium consisting of ICA and 
Goldman Sachs was awarded a contract to build 548 km 
of roads under the National Infrastructure Programme. 
Mexican and Iberian companies, one Brazilian and one 
Australian company also competed through partnerships 
or individually in the bidding process. Another partnership 
between ICA and the Spanish company Fomento de 
Construcciones y Contratas (FCC) won a smaller concession 
to build a stretch of road between the states of Puebla 
and Veracruz. Apart from roads, the main investment 
opportunities in infrastructure in Mexico are in electricity, 
telecommunications, drinking water and water sanitation 
(Infrastructure National Programme, Mexico, 2007).
In real estate, the fastest growing segments have been 
residential areas, shopping centres and tourism. There 
has also been some investment in car parks, shops and 
institutional facilities, but on a far smaller scale. 
The economic and demographic features of Latin 
America have attracted companies seeking to complement 
their business interests in their countries of origin to 
invest in the housing market in the region. Some Spanish 
companies, such as Grupo Lar and Fadesa, have invested 
heavily in Mexico, where there is a young population 
and a significant housing shortage, for example, as a 
way to diversify their portfolio now that the Spanish 
market, though solid, has only limited growth prospects. 
(Expansión, 2007g).
Shopping centres have cornered investment in the 
commercial segment. New establishments have been built, 
and existing shopping centre chains have been bought for 
expansion and development. For investors from developed 
countries, the region’s economic growth and the expansion 
of the local market for demographic reasons represents a 
potential that contrasts sharply with the minimal growth 
prospects back home (Shopping Centers Today, 2007). 
GE Real Estate has been particularly active in Mexico, 
where it plans to open 13 shopping centres. The Canadian-
backed Brascan, meanwhile, has been investing heavily 
in this segment in Brazil (Expansión, 2007h). 
Brascan, which is the Brazilian subsidiary of Brookfield 
Asset Management, has recently been investing in Brazil 
by buying up establishments that offer possibilities for 
24 The main examples of this are Acciona’s purchase of a stake in Endesa, the purchase by ACS of shares in IBERDOLA and Unión FENOSA and 
the purchase by Sacyr Vallehermoso of shares in Repsol YPF. IBERDOLA, for its part, has taken advantage of its experience in engineering and 
construction to expand its services to third parties, as mentioned earlier.
25 One factor accounting for the Spanish companies’ success are the Financial Trade Fund subsidies granted by the Spanish Government to Spanish 
companies for their activities abroad (O Estado de São Paulo, 2007). 
26 Other Spanish companies are active in highway construction. Abertis bought the interests of another Spanish company, ACS, in January 2008, 
in the construction of the central highway and Pacific routes in Chile, for approximately US$ 1.03 billion. Abertis already had stakes in other 
highway projects, as well as airports, car parks and logistics parks (AméricaEconomía.com, 2008a).
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physical expansion, rather than by undertaking new 
construction projects. In just slightly over one year, the 
company acquired 15 shopping centres, and, in 2007, it 
invested US$ 2 billion in this segment alone in Brazil. 
Brascan is banking on the continued expansion of a 
growing economy that has a young population and, so far, 
a relatively inadequate supply base with a small number 
of shopping malls considering the size of the population. 
In addition to Brascan, the Canadian companies Cadillac 
Fairview (a subsidiary of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension 
Fund) and Ivanhoe Cambridge have also been investing 
in this sector (see chapter IV) (Shopping Centers Today, 
2007; Brascan, 2007).27
The tourism segment has witnessed new investments 
in the expansion of urban networks and tourism complexes, 
as well as in dual-purpose establishments that combine 
hotel facilities with residential apartments. The companies 
dominating investment in this segment include the Spanish 
enterprises Sol Meliá, NH, Riu and Barceló, the Portuguese 
companies Pestana and Vila Galé, and hotel chains like Accor 
(France), and the United States companies Thunderbird, 
Holiday Inn, Intercontinental and Starwood hotels. Portuguese 
and Spanish companies have a particularly strong presence 
in the tourism complexes segment, drawn as they are by 
the natural attractions of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
their shared linguistic and cultural roots and the rising cost 
of tourism in their home markets. Large regional investors 
in this segment include the Mexican group Posadas and the 
Jamaican enterprise Sandals. Tourism property development 
has, in relative terms, become highly important in Central 
America. In Costa Rica it has been among the main FDI 
recipient sectors in the country over the past few years 
(CINDE, 2007).28
(b)	 Natural-resource-seeking	FDI
The natural resources sector of Latin America and 
the Caribbean benefited once again from a year of rising 
demand in the international market, especially in China. 
This boom has not, however, shaped FDI trends uniformly 
in the mining and hydrocarbons sectors.
The increases in foreign investment have been more 
notable in the mining sector than in the hydrocarbons sector, 
where local State oil companies have a strong presence 
and changes in the regulatory framework have made FDI 
more volatile (see figure I.15). This holds true for other 
parts of the world as well: the largest mining companies 
in the world are smaller than their counterparts in the oil 
business, but TNCs invest more in mining operations owing 
to the heavy involvement of the State in the hydrocarbons 
sector (UNCTAD, 2007). 
Figure I.15
FDI FLOWS IN MINING AND THE EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION OF HYDROCARBONS: COUNTRIES  
FOR WHICH DATA ARE AVAILABLE a
(Millions of dollars)
27 The investments made by Chilean construction companies, shopping centre operators and retailers are mentioned in section D. 
28 In the tourism sector, investments have also been made in aviation: Banamex (Citigroup) bought controlling shares in Aeroméxico; a group 
of private Argentine and Uruguayan investors bought the Uruguayan company Pluna (which for years was controlled by Varig), through the 
company Leadgate Investment Corp.; and the Brazilian company Ocean Air plans to set up operations in Paraguay. In Brazil, after an important 
concentration of the market as a result of Varig’s purchase of Gol and the bankruptcy of one of the smaller operators, BRA, the Government is 
once again considering eliminating the restriction on the participation of foreign capital in airline companies (currently limited to 20%). The 
Spanish group Marsans, meanwhile, has increased the operations along the cabotaje and regional routes of its companies Air Comet in Chile 
and Austral in Argentina, and there is talk of a possible sale of its shares in Aerolíneas Argentinas (Live from SCL, 2008).
29 There has been a certain amount of buying and selling of assets among TNCs, especially in the mining sector. These transactions do not 
necessarily generate FDI flows, which might therefore not reflect the true level of activity in the industry. Recent examples of these transactions 
include the purchase of Glamis (United States) by Goldcorp (Canada), in 2006, and of Meridian (United States) by Yamana (Canada) in 2007 
(see chapter IV). Chile has been one of the main recipients of FDI in the mining sector. Most of these flows were profit reinvestments, however, 
that are not taken into account in the official figures for the sectoral distribution of FDI in Chile. According to the authorities’ estimates of the 
size of these reinvestments, the increase in FDI in mining in the region was far more pronounced than reported.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures available as at 31 March 2008.
a Excludes some types of profit reinvestment in Chile. Data for Argentina excluded 
as of 2005. As in the case of Chile, data for Peru relate to a fraction of the total 
investment recorded in the balance of payments.
The aggregated data also shows that the increase in 
FDI was heavily concentrated in just a few countries: Chile 
and Brazil in mining, and Colombia in hydrocarbons (see 
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Figure I.16
FDI FLOWS IN MINING: COUNTRIES FOR WHICH  
DATA ARE AVAILABLE a
(Millions of dollars)
for alternative fuels, such as ethanol, to be adopted on a large 
scale and worldwide, which has encouraged foreign companies 
to invest in the alternative fuels sector in Latin America, as 
well as in the mining and hydrocarbons sectors.
(i) Mining
The mining sector flourished in Latin America as 
part of the transformation in the industry worldwide. The 
emerging economies, especially China, accounted for much 
of the rising demand, and supply entered another phase 
of consolidation. Latin America and the Caribbean was a 
favourite destination for FDI in the mining industry, both in 
the form of acquisitions, as part of the ongoing consolidation 
of the industry, and as investments in exploration and 
production activities. Some companies pursued diversification 
and economies of scale, others sought to improve their 
position in the metals that are used as stores of value. The 
main challenges facing mining companies that operate in 
the region stem from the legal uncertainty that prevails 
in certain countries and infrastructure, human resources, 
engineering, and construction problems.
As mentioned, according to official statistics and 
estimates, Chile and Brazil benefited most from the mining 
boom in 2007. Increasingly large volumes of investment, 
however, have also been pouring into countries that have 
not been important destinations for mining investment in 
recent years, particularly Mexico (see figure I.16). 
Mining companies tend to pursue one of two strategies: 
produce basic products and try to diversify that production; 
or produce gold and silver and try to expand production 
of those metals.30 In both cases, the large companies are 
seeking to increase the scale of their operations in order 
to tackle the growing consolidation of the industry and to 
have access to resources that will allow them to develop 
their reserves.
Those pursuing the first strategy —diversification— 
include BHP, Freeport McMoran, Anglo American 
and Xstrata (the international operations of the main 
Latin American mining companies are described in 
section D).
BHP, whose base-metal production activities are 
concentrated in Chile and Peru, is investing in exploration in 
Colombia and Guatemala and developing a bauxite project 
in Suriname. The goal of its forthcoming investments in 
Brazil is to add value to its production. The company 
is investing in the expansion of the Alumer aluminium 
refinery and in a third iron pellet plant at the Samarco 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 30 April 2008.
a  No data available for Argentina from 2005 onwards.
Figure I.17
FDI FLOWS IN EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION IN THE 
HYDROCARBONS SECTOR: COUNTRIES FOR  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 30 April 2008. 
a  No data available for Argentina from 2005 onwards, nor for Trinidad and Tobago 
from 2006 onwards.
It is likely that Argentina and Peru have also received 
substantial amounts of FDI in these sectors. However, 
official figures have not been published on the sectoral 
distribution of FDI in Argentina, and the information 
available for Peru reflects only a fraction of the volume 
of FDI registered in the balance of payments.
High oil prices and technological advances, especially 
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30 In many cases, due to the nature of metal reserves, gold and silver production is linked to the production of other metals as well.
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mine. In addition to investments in mining activities per 
se, in Chile, BHP has invested in the energy —through 
LNG regasification plants— and water supply services 
for its mining operations in the country. In addition to 
being a major player in the mining sector, BHP is also 
active in the hydrocarbons sector and currently has gas 
projects in Trinidad and Tobago (BHP Billiton, 2007). 
Freeport-McMoran (which bought Phelps Dodge) has 
concentrated on its organic growth, and the company’s 
main expansion projects in Latin America are at the El 
Abra mine in Chile and the Cerro Verde mine in Peru 
(Business News Americas, 2007b).
The goal of Anglo American, which produces base 
metals, coal and ferrous metals in Latin America, is to 
be the company with the highest value added in the base 
metals segment. The world demand for copper is expected 
to outstrip supply over the next decade, and the company 
is therefore looking to expand its copper, zinc and nickel 
operations. It has taken on new projects in Chile (Los 
Bronces), Brazil (where in addition to discovering an 
important nickel reserve, it bought the mining company 
MMX Minas Rio Mineração e Logística) and Peru (where it 
was awarded the contract to work the Michiquillay copper 
concession) (Valor econômico, 2008b; Anglo American, 
2007; AméricaEconomía.com, 2007e).
Xstrata increased its investments in the coal mining 
operation it had bought in Colombia in 2006 and poured 
more money into its copper and zinc operations in Chile 
and Peru and into its nickel mine in Brazil. The company’s 
South American operations generated 27% of its income 
in 2006 and 43% of its pre-tax profits (Xstrata, 2007). 
Of the gold and silver mining companies, the Canadian 
ones have been the most active in terms of acquisitions 
(see chapter IV).31 One of the many smaller transactions 
that took place was the purchase at the end of 2006 by 
Goldcorp (Canada) of Glamis (United States). Though both 
companies are based outside the region, the main target of 
this transaction was the Peñasquito mine in Mexico, which 
produces gold, silver, zinc and lead. The merger of the two 
enterprises made it possible to finance new investments in 
the mine. In 2007, Goldcorp revised its investment plan for 
the Peñasquito upwards and sold 25% of its silver production 
to Silver Wheaton. Barrick Gold, in the meantime, bought 
a controlling stake in the Cerro Casale mine in Chile from 
Arizona Star, and Rusoro Mines bought assets held by the 
South African company Gold Fields in Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela. All these acquisitions have been accompanied 
by heavy investments in exploration and production. In 
the gold mining sector, new deposits were discovered by 
Anglo Gold Ashanti (South Africa, United Kingdom) in 
Colombia (Miningmx, 2007).
The incursion of Asian investors in the regional 
market has been particularly noticeable in the mining 
sector. Despite the prospects of a major overhaul of the 
taxation of the mining industry in Bolivia, Jindal Steel of 
India went ahead with the development of the El Mutún 
project, which had been suspended in 2006 on account 
of the failure to reach an agreement about the gas supply. 
The project contemplates investments of up to US$ 2.1 
billion over eight years. On a smaller scale, the State-owned 
Korea Resource company announced the launch of a joint 
venture with Comibol (the Bolivian mining corporation) 
to exploit a copper mine in Bolivia (AméricaEconomía.
com, 2007j). Chinese investors in the region, meanwhile, 
include Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco), 
which bought Peru Copper, which in turn holds the rights 
to the Toromocho copper mining concession. Chinalco 
also announced new investments in a joint venture with 
Empresa Minera del Centro de Perú (Centromin). Peru 
Copper was one of the last independent copper producers 
in Peru and represented a strategic option for Chinalco to 
gain a foothold in the country. The Chinese consortium 
Zijin Mining bought Monterrico Metals in Peru, which 
owned the Río Blanco project. This has the potential 
to become the second largest copper operation in Peru. 
Estimated investments in the project stand at US$ 1.44 
billion (América economía, 2007h; AméricaEconomía.
com, 2007k). On a smaller scale, Bosai Minerals bought 
the Linden bauxite company in Guyana and announced 
plans to expand and build a refinery there, and MCC 
bought the Sierra Grande mine in Argentina.
Some of the challenges facing mining companies in 
Latin America stem from legal uncertainty in the region 
(especially regarding taxation) and from the handling of 
the effects that mining activities have on local communities 
and the environment.32 Though relevant worldwide, the 
impact of mining is a particularly sensitive issue in the 
region. In Ecuador, for example, the main known copper 
deposits, Mirador and Junín, are situated in highly vulnerable 
areas, both in environmental terms and from the viewpoint 
of local indigenous communities (América economía, 
2007i). Opposition to the Pascua Lama project on the 
border between Chile and Argentina has also been loudly 
voiced. Central America has a large mining potential, and 
mining could contribute to the economic growth of the 
countries there. The challenge lies in developing a regulatory 
framework to guarantee sustainable and responsible mining 
practices that both benefit local communities and produce 
31 The Toronto stock market is one of the main sources of financing for the mining industry. 
32 These challenges are not exclusive to Latin America and the Caribbean are were extensively described in UNCTAD (2007).
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sufficient profit to justify investment in the sector. Mining 
companies in Latin America in general face a number of 
obstacles, mainly rising costs and difficulties accessing 
key inputs in the region, such as energy, human resources, 
and engineering and building capacity, which hampers the 
expansion of operations.
(ii)  Hydrocarbons
The rise in FDI in the hydrocarbons sector was heavily 
concentrated in Colombia in 2007. Divestment in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, meanwhile, was down 
compared with 2006 (see figure I.17). Figure I.17 shows 
FDI flows in countries for which data is available. It should 
be pointed out that in the cases of Bolivia and Brazil, only 
investments received, and therefore no divestments, are 
taken into account, while the figures for the other countries 
reflect net investment received. Hence the negative amounts 
recorded in Ecuador (2006) and in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela (2004, 2006 and 2007).
There has been a change in the composition of the 
transnational corporations investing in the hydrocarbons 
sector, both in the upstream and the downstream segments 
of the industry (see box I.5). Regional operators and 
those from other developing countries have been gaining 
ground as some traditional TNCs have opted to divest a 
portion of their assets in the region. These changes and the 
shifting distribution of investment in the region were the 
direct result of the strategic decisions adopted in certain 
countries. New findings and good prospects in terms of 
regional demand have made the gas segment much more 
attractive in recent years.
Box I.5
FUEL DISTRIBUTION: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS HEAD FOR THE DOOR
Poor returns and regulatory problems 
have driven the large oil transnationals 
out of the fuel distribution and retail 
segment in Latin America. Regional 
enterprises are quickly stepping in to 
fill their shoes, however.
Royal Dutch Shell was the first large 
oil company to shed its distribution and 
commercialization assets when it sold its 
operations in Peru and Ecuador in 2004 and 
2005 to the Chilean company ENAP, and 
in Uruguay, Paraguay and Colombia to the 
Brazilian giant PETROBRAS. The possible 
sale of its operations in Argentina and Chile, 
aroused the interest of PETROBRAS, 
ENAP, PDVSA and Enarsa, although the 
transaction never went through. Royal 
Dutch Shell has not recently announced 
its intention of pulling out of Argentina, but 
recent events —especially the company’s 
shrinking profits, the high international crude 
oil prices and low local fuel prices, and 
the temporary shutdown of the company’s 
refinery for environmental reasons— have 
fuelled speculation in the press. 
In 2005, Chevron announced that it 
would be selling its fuel commercialisation 
operations in Peru to the local company 
Pecsa, and 15 service stations in Colombia 
to Combustibles de Colombia. In 2006, it sold 
a network of 65 service stations in Ecuador 
to the Colombian company Terpel, and in 
2007, it announced the sale of 90 stations in 
Uruguay to the State-owned DUCSA (which 
will operate under the name of Ancap).
Repsol YPF opted to dilute its assets 
and sales in South America and therefore 
decided to sell its Chilean subsidiary, which 
owns 210 service stations, to Terpel, the 
Colombian company that bought Chevron’s 
assets in Ecuador.
In April 2008, ExxonMobil announced 
the sale of its fuel distribution and 
commercialization assets in Brazil to the 
Brazilian group Cosan. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of CNNExpansion.com, “Esso saldrá del mercado de Argentina”, 30 August 2007; 
Global Insight Same Day Analysis, “ExxonMobil Considering Selling Up in Argentina, According to Report”, 31 August 2007 and “Shell Declares Force Majeure in 
Argentina”, 7 September 2007; AméricaEconomía.com, “Petrobras y Shell hacen oferta por activos de Exxon en Brasil”, 25 January 2008; Latin Counsel; AméricaEconomía.
com, “Terpel comprará activos Repsol YPF en Chile”, 25 October 2007; Diario Financiero, “Colombiana Terpel llegaría a Chile con compra de bencineras de YPF”, 25 
October 2007; “Cosan compra ativos da Esso por US$ 826 millões”, Valor econômico, 24 April 2008.
The nationalization of the hydrocarbons industry by 
the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and its takeover of four projects in the eastern Orinoco 
Belt, the nationalization process in Bolivia, announced in 
2006, the renegotiation of contracts with private companies 
and changes in the extraordinary income tax legislation 
for the hydrocarbons sector in Ecuador, and the tax on 
hydrocarbon exports in Argentina were some of the 
measures which, in aiming to ensure that the exploitation 
of oil and gas reserves generated more benefits for the 
local economy, made those countries less attractive to 
foreign investment. Although many TNCs have opted to 
stay, to renegotiate contracts with the Governments and 
to carry out new investments in those countries, it is true 
that many of the largest companies have decided to boost 
their presence in other countries and regions or in their 
home countries instead.
Elsewhere in the region, the policy goal has been to 
attract new investments in exploration and production 
activities. New bidding processes have been organised 
and measures have been taken in Colombia, Peru, Chile 
and Trinidad and Tobago to improve the attractiveness 
of the sector to foreign investment. In Colombia, foreign 
companies will be allowed to participate in the second 
public offer of shares in Ecopetrol, which is to be held 
in 2008 (Business Latin America, 2007f). Colombia 
—which was the country to receive the highest levels 
of FDI in the hydrocarbons sector in 2007— has also 
been the focus of interest of a generation of smaller oil 
companies that are attracted by the country’s favourable 
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regulatory framework (América economía, 2007j). The 
reduction of Trinidad and Tobago’s gas reserves has led 
the country to change the regulations governing oil and 
gas production contracts and to offer tax incentives for 
exploration activities. Under the new scheme, profits 
and losses in deep-water exploration activities can be 
consolidated, which lowers the tax burden for companies 
(Business Latin America, 2007g). 
In Brazil, despite the investment-conducive regulations, 
the predominance of PETROBRAS has been seen as an 
obstacle to the entry of TNCs in the hydrocarbons sector. 
Transnational corporations in fact showed little interest 
in the sale of exploration acreage held in November, in 
which the Government removed 41 blocks from the original 
auction plan. Paradoxically, PETROBRAS, which in 2007 
made new discoveries that significantly increased its 
reserves, did not play a large role in the auction either. The 
main winners in the process were other private Brazilian 
enterprises (Business Latin America, 2007h). Foreign 
investments in the hydrocarbons sector in Brazil may be 
increasing, but they are relatively small considering the 
size of the country’s energy potential. 
Some large TNCs opted either to sell their assets in 
Latin America, to pursue growth in other regions or to 
change the focus of their regional investments in 2007. 
Repsol YPF announced its decision to sell off assets 
in Latin America and declared Africa and the Middle East 
to be its new priority destinations.33 In December, the 
company signed an agreement to sell 15% of its Argentine 
subsidiary to the Petersen group for US$ 2.235 billion. 
The proceeds from the sale will be used to finance the 
expansion of Repsol YPF’s oil exploration activities, mainly 
in North Africa and the Middle East (América economía, 
2007k, 2007l). Repsol YPF also sold its fuel distribution 
subsidiary in Chile to the Colombian company Terpel (see 
box I.5). New gas discoveries in Bolivia and Peru could 
encourage the company to invest further in those countries, 
however (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007l, 2008b).
Unlike other companies, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhilips 
did not reach an agreement with the Government of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and turned down 
the contractual terms the Government proposed for 
continuing operations in the Orinoco Belt. The terms of 
the corresponding compensation are currently subject to 
arbitration in the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). This has significantly altered 
the position of the region and its countries in the investment 
plans of these two companies. None of ExxonMobil’s or 
ConocoPhilips’ most important projects are in now Latin 
America. ConocoPhilips sold its stake in gas fields in 
Argentina to PETROBRAS, but increased its holdings in 
Peru through its subsidiary Burlington Resources Peru 
(ExxonMobil, 2007; ConocoPhilips, 2007).34
For its part, Royal Dutch Shell, after selling its 
secondary manufacturing operations in Latin America 
to pursue greater growth in the same segment in China, 
India, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, acquired new 
concessions in Colombia and stated its intention to expand 
production at the BC-10 deep-water field in Brazil. In 
pursuit of the company’s goal to become a world leader 
in liquefied natural gas (LNG) production, the company 
has also invested in LNG regasification plants in Mexico 
(Royal Dutch Shell, 2007).
Companies from other developing countries have shown 
a growing interest in the region’s hydrocarbons sector. A 
joint venture undertaken by China National Petroleum Corp 
(CNPC) and Pluspetrol discovered oil in northern Peru and 
is currently assessing the find’s commercial viability. The 
assets of the Canadian company Encana in Brazil were sold 
to a consortium of Indian enterprises, Bharat Petroleum and 
Videocon Industries. A company from Qatar is contemplating 
investing in the crude oil refinery construction project being 
undertaken by the United States oil company Occidental 
Petroleum in Panama (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007m). 
In Argentina, New Times Group Holdings (Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region) bought two oil resevoirs 
for US$ 1.3 billion (Reuters, 2008b). In the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Sinopec and CNPC, two Chinese 
firms, signed memorandums of understanding to establish 
mixed-capital companies with PDVSA. Petropars (Iran), 
Petrovietnam and Bielorusneft are also participating in joint 
ventures with PDVSA for exploration and production in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (General Directorate of 
the Presidential Press, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
2007; AméricaEconomía.com, 2007n). 
The two largest Latin American oil companies that 
have an international presence, PETROBRAS and PDVSA, 
continue to expand their operations in the region. This 
expansion is discussed in section D. 
(iii)  Biofuels
The search for alternative energy sources to 
hydrocarbons has aroused great interest in biofuels among 
33 In February, the company announced its largest oil find ever in Libya.
34 Total and BP received compensation for relinquishing their operating rights in the Jusepín oil field, which the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
had controlled since April 2006. The two companies would not agree to switch to a mixed-capital joint venture in which the Venezuelan State 
would have held a majority stake. The compensation was paid in barrels of oil. 
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different kinds of enterprises (local and foreign, energy 
and agricultural enterprises, conglomerates, corporations, 
private equity funds) but not particularly among petroleum 
companies. Brazil has been the main destination for investment 
in biofuels, but other countries in the region are beginning 
to receive foreign investment in this segment too.
FDI in the biofuels segment has targeted various 
sections of the production chain, from the growing of 
sugarcane and other crops that are used as raw materials 
to the processing, production and commercialisation 
of biofuel. The major acquisitions in 2007 include the 
purchase of Dedini Agro by Abengoa (Spain). Brookfield 
Asset Management invested in the agricultural side of 
production. The French company Louis Dreyfus and 
Noble Group of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region bought refineries and ethanol production plants. 
The Carlyle and Riverstone Holdings funds (Singapore) 
invested in Companhia Nacional do Açúcar e do Álcool 
(CNAA) to expand its sugar and ethanol plants. Mitsui and 
Eni invested in a partnership with PETROBRAS, which 
in turn is investing in countries such as Colombia and the 
Dominican Republic with a view to taking advantage of the 
preferential access these countries have to the United States 
market (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007o). The United States 
companies Maple, Peru Biofuels and Adeco and the Spanish 
company Bioterra are also investing in the sector. 
Some countries have taken steps to promote the 
biofuel industry. In Mexico, the Senate is considering a 
law to facilitate biofuel production (AméricaEconomía.
com, 2007p). The protectionism in large markets and 
the volatility of world sugar prices, which in turn affect 
the price of alcohol, together with the gains made by the 
national currency in Brazil are all preventing investments 
in biofuels from really taking off, however (Valor online, 
2007b; Latin Finance, 2007e). There is also concern among 
public policymakers that encouraging farmers to produce 
biofuels could affect food prices (Razo et al., 2007).
(c)	 Efficiency-seeking	FDI	
The importance of the United States market to 
the countries of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin as a 
destination for their manufacturing exports makes those 
countries particularly vulnerable to any downturn in the 
United States economy. Investments in Mexico and the 
Caribbean Basin in fact rose in volume in 2007, but largely 
thanks to investments in non-manufacturing activities.35 In 
Mexico, investments in the automotive industry, however, 
were higher than in 2006, while investments in electronics 
remained stable, and investments in office, calculation and 
information processing machines were down, but higher 
than in 2004. Investments in textiles and clothing were 
also down compared to 2006, but this seems to be part 
of a long-term trend rather a reflection of the situation 
in the United States economy.
Several factors prevented the slowdown of the United 
States economy having more drastic effects on efficiency-
seeking investments in 2007 and ensured that they remained 
relatively stable. Firstly, economic growth in the United 
States was relatively robust during the first three quarters 
of 2007. Secondly, the short-term effects of the slowdown 
in the United States market on the export operations of 
transnational corporations in Mexico and the Caribbean 
Basin are likely to affect activity levels (production, 
employment) rather than investment levels, which take 
longer to adjust to new market situations. The epicentre of 
the crisis, the housing loan market, has most immediately 
affected sectors that are not heavily dependent on imports. 
The impact of the slowdown in the United States on FDI 
will therefore be more indirect and will depend on the scale 
of the recession and its effect on demand in general. Finally, 
growing demand within Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the entry into effect of the free trade agreement between 
Mexico and Japan and the appreciation of the euro, together 
with other factors, enabled the subregion to diversify its 
exports more. If the recession in the United States takes 
hold and worsens, however, foreign investments will be 
affected as of 2008. 
Beyond the short term effects of the slowdown in 
the United States, the operations of the transnational 
manufacturers in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin are 
undergoing a transformation process in an attempt to respond 
to the rising competition posed by Asia. Countries are 
striving to develop new sources of comparative advantages 
and to attract investment in new sectors, products and 
services with higher value added.
The automotive and electronics sectors continue to be 
the main destinations of efficiency-seeking investment in 
Mexico (see table I.5). The main trends in FDI in the Mexican 
automotive industry are analysed in subsection (i). Chapter 
II discusses the situation in the electronics industry, and the 
information and communications technology (ICT) sector 
in particular. Subsection (ii) examines the diversification 
of FDI in Central America and the Caribbean.36
35 On the basis of data available for El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico.
36 The aerospace industry is an example of the new sectors that are attracting FDI in Mexico. The sector’s attractiveness lies in its application of high 
technology and the use of intensive research and development activities, as well as its generation of products with high added value and, on average, 
larger returns. Mexico’s attractiveness lies in its ability to offer lower operating costs than the United States and Canada and human resources 
and experience cultivated in the automotive and the electrical/electronics industry, as well as geographical proximity. The country’s strategy for 
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Table I.5
10 LARGEST TRANSNATIONAL EXPORTERS IN MEXICO, 2006




1 DaimlerChrysler de México Germany 
Motor vehicles and 
auto parts 6 344 64.5
2 Volkswagen de México Germany Motor vehicles and auto parts 5 397 67.9
3 Ford Motor Company United States Motor vehicles and auto parts 5 193 59.8
4 Sanmina-SCI a United States Electronics 5 046 162
5 General Motors de México United States Motor vehicles and auto parts 3 279 27.7
6 Hewlett-Packard Mexico United States Electronics 2 919 76.2
7 Schneider Electric France Electrical equipment 1 008 78.7
8 Siemens Germany Electrical equipment 667 39.4
9 Molymex Chile Metals 383 94.1
10 Boehringer Ingelheim Germany Pharmaceuticals 275 43.3
 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of “Las 100 importadoras y exportadoras más importantes de México”, Expansión, 6 
to 20 August 2007; and the database of the magazine América economía.
a  Exports and imports include machinery and equipment.
promoting investment in the sector contemplates the progressive increase of the Mexican content of the final products. These products currently 
include turbines and the components for panels and processes, such as plastic injection. Labinal, Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell, GE, Snecma 
and other companies have projects to develop suppliers in Mexico. GE ITP, Bombardier and Honeywell are engaged in design engineering in the 
country. The sector’s exports have risen steadily since 2003 and reached US$ 1.6 billion in 2007 (ProMexico, 2007; Expansión, 2007i). 
37 The efforts to cut the costs of inputs, which led to the unilateral reduction of tariffs for more than 6,000 product categories in 2006 in 18 sectors, 
probably also contributed.
38 Exports to Asia rose over 900%, but continue to be minimal in absolute terms (approximately 12,000 vehicles in 2007).
(i) The automotive industry in Mexico: undergoing 
transformation
In 2007, motor vehicle production in Mexico remained 
at practically the same level as in 2006, increasing 2% to 
record an output of just over two million units. Despite the 
slowdown in exports in the second semester, 1.6 million 
vehicles were exported from Mexico in 2007, which 
represented a 5% increase on the previous year (AMIA, 
2008; see figure I.18). The economic downturn in the 
United States did not have a significant impact on Mexican 
exports as it only hit vehicle demand late on in the year. Two 
incipient transformations underway in the sector may also 
have contributed to the increase in exports: the diversification 
of its export markets and the expansion of investments in 
the low-cost and hybrid vehicle segments.37 
The appreciation of the euro and South American 
currencies and a growing demand in South America 
boosted Mexico’s exports to the subregion and Europe. 
The bilateral agreements between Mexico and Mercosur 
and between Mexico and European Union also helped 
increase and diversify the country’s exports. In fact, 
within an overall 5% increase in exports, sales to Europe 
rose 58.5% and to South America 73%, to represent 12% 
and 6% of total motor vehicle exports, respectively.38 
Volkswagen and Renault-Nissan accounted for most of 
these sales and were the two companies that increased 
their participation in Mexico’s vehicle production and 
export activities between 2006 and 2007 (see figure I.19) 
(Expansión, 2007j; AMIA, 2007, 2008).
Figure I.18








2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Production Exports
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data provided by the Mexican Association of the Automotive Industry 
(AMIA), “Resultados año 2007: récord en exportaciones y producción, 5% y 
2,2%, respectivamente; Caída en ventas internas del 3,5%”, 2008.
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Figure I.19
MEXICO: MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION AND  
EXPORTS BY COMPANY
(Percentages)
of it first Mexican plant in Tijuana, where SUVs will 
be assembled for export to the United States and other 
markets. Chamco-Auto plans to set up a plant in 2009, 
and Nissan is developing a car that will cost US$ 2,400 
and that it will produce in Mexico (Global Insight, 2007; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Automotive Institute, 2007c; 
Expansión, 2007k).
(ii)  Central America and the Caribbean: diversification 
towards greater value added39 
The clothing industry was traditionally the main magnet 
for efficiency-seeking investment in Central America 
and the Caribbean. The increased competition posed by 
Asia in the United States market, however, (in which the 
expiry of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing played 
an instrumental role) has meant that clothing exports, and 
consequently industrial exports, from these countries (and 
from Mexico) have been declining. This trend continued 
into 2007: Hanesbrands (United States) closed down several 
of its factories in Latin America and the Caribbean, with 
most jobs being lost in the Dominican Republic (2,500) 
and Mexico (2,200), and Fruit of the Loom shut down 
its operations in Honduras where it was employing 800 
people (Business Latin America, 2007i, 2007j; Global 
Insight, 2007). The subregion has therefore been pursuing 
the development of new advantages in the clothing sector 
and trying to diversify into other sectors.
The Central America-Dominican Republic-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) has given the 
clothing sector a new boost by improving the signatory 
countries’ access to the United States market. The increasing 
tendency towards synchronizing production with demand 
and specialization poses the best opportunities for developing 
new competitive edges in the clothing industry, and efforts 
have therefore been made to present the countries of the 
subregion as vertically integrated suppliers of “complete 
packages” that cater to niche markets that require rapid 
responses to changes in fashion trends and seasons (Padilla 
et al, 2008). In El Salvador, the existence of companies that 
handle each stage of the clothing and apparel manufacturing 
process enables the country to produce items of higher value 
added for specific niches, such as high-performance sports 
apparel, and to offer the flexibility needed to respond to 
seasonal changes in the clothing market (see table I.6). Some 
companies that had moved their production operations to 
Asia are now returning to El Salvador (Lacoste, Benetton, 
Adidas, Reebok, Under Armour, Land’s End, LL Bean and 
















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data provided by the Mexican Association of the Automotive Industry 
(AMIA) [online] www.amia.com.mx. 
Secondly, companies announced investments in the 
production of new models to meet the growing demand 
worldwide for smaller, cheaper vehicles that are less 
dependent on oil and pollute less. GM, for example, 
announced a US$ 500 million investment in Mexico 
to produce hybrid (petrol/electric) vehicles under the 
Saturn View name. The cars will be destined for the 
United States market and possibly sold in Mexico in the 
future (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007q). As sales dry up 
in the developed markets, companies find themselves 
forced to try to conquer the emerging markets and to 
shift their focus to the production of low-cost vehicles. 
Hybrids are one answer to high oil prices. The review of 
the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards 
currently underway in the United States and the initiatives 
taken by the European Commission to reduce carbon 
dioxide emission are two measures in the pipeline that 
will promote cars that pollute less (The Economist, 2007; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Automotive Institute, 2007a).
One advantage of Mexico is that its internal market 
could be large enough to provide a back-up for, and 
justify, investments in projects to manufacture new low-
cost vehicles for the United States and Canadian markets 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers Automotive Institute, 2007b). 
As mentioned in subsection (a), some companies are first 
investing in the local market with a view to later selling 
to the larger ones where low-cost vehicles are still only 
a niche market. In addition to the companies mentioned 
above, the Chinese company ZX announced the installation 
39 ECLAC expresses gratitude to Proesa, CINDE and Invest in Guatemala for their contribution to this section.
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Table I.6




Textile manufacturers Hanes, Duraflex, Petenatti
Regional distribution centres Fruit of the Loom
Packing companies Union Plastics
Decorative work (embroidery, 
printing, dye sublimation) Decotex
Design and product development 
centres 
Labelling 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of a survey answered by the National Investment Promotion Agency of 
El Salvador (PROESA).
The experience of the Canadian company Gildan in 
this sector is described in chapter IV. 
Investors from other developing countries, especially 
Asia and South America, have been highly active in the 
transformation of the clothing industry. In Guatemala, the 
largest investments in manufacturing have been announced 
by the textiles and apparel companies P&K Dye House 
(Republic of Korea), SML (China), Sandon Dyeing Textile 
(China, United States) (Invest in Guatemala, 2007). The 
Brazilian company Santista Textil invested heavily in 
Honduras, taking advantage of a new industrial park opening 
in the country (Central Bank of Honduras, 2007b).
Outside the clothing sector, Central America and 
the Caribbean have managed to attract investment in 
increasingly diverse sectors and raise the value added of 
their production (see table I.7). 
Table I.7
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DIVERSIFICATION OF EFFICIENCY-SEEKING FDI
Country Sectors Promising or priority sectors 
El Salvador Clothing, vehicle harnesses, software development, call 
centres, business support centres (business process 
outsourcing), shared service centres (an affiliate of a 
business group that provides financial, logistics, human 
resources or technological services to all the different 
entities of the group), electronics and spare parts.
Strategic services (distribution and logistics, outsourcing of business 
processes; call centres, software development, research and development, 
and the repair and maintenance of cruise ships, cargo ships and 
aeroplanes); electronics and spare parts (electronic components, domestic 
appliances, computer accessories, and cables); medical apparatus, 
spare parts for vehicles (bumpers, brakes, gear boxes, radiators, shock 
absorbers, hydraulic steering wheels, harnesses, safety belts, airbags, 
plastic injection); medical devices. 
Guatemala Call centres and business process outsourcing, clothing and 
textiles, ginseng processing, motorbikes, electronics, (assembly 
of MP3 pieces and plasma screens), and distribution.
Call centres and business set-up services, parts assembly. 
Costa Rica Electronics, semiconductors, plastic components and 
injection, administrative support services, software 
development, interpreting centres, debt collection, electronic 
components for vehicle transmissions, product sterilization 
(medical services), customer services, plastics industry.
Export services, medical devices, electronics and spare parts. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of a survey answered by the National Investment Promotion Agency of El Salvador 
(PROESA), the Costa Rican Costa Rican Investment Promotion Agency (CINDE), and Invest in Guatemala. 
Costa Rica has had the longest and most intense 
experience of diversification. Intel set up operations in the 
country 10 years ago. Various support industries developed 
around Intel: supply companies, telecommunications 
and electrical components manufacturers, consumer and 
industrial electronics firms, electrical assembly, engineering 
and design companies, circuit board repair facilities, service 
and support companies (producing replacement parts, 
moulds, tools, etc.), and plastic parts manufacturers. The 
country is now seeking to make another leap forward as 
an export base by taking advantage of a transition period 
defined by the ratification of CAFTA-DR and an extension 
of the deadline for dismantling export subsidies, as set out 
in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Compensatory 
Measures. Costa Rica is also encouraging investment in 
other sectors, such as parts for motor vehicles, electronics 
and medical instruments (CINDE, 2007).
Export services (call centres, business process 
outsourcing services, etc.) constitute an important area of 
new investment in several of the countries in the subregion. 
Part of the attractiveness of these activities for policymakers 
is their employment potential.40 Attracting investors in 
40 Recent data show that although India receives relatively little FDI, it is the country in which the highest number of jobs have been generated by 
TNCs (IBM Global Business Services, 2007). India has been the largest recipient of investments in business process services (business process 
outsourcing) and information services, which are labour-intensive activities even if they do not involve particularly large volumes of investment 
compared with other sectors.
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the sector requires the development of certain minimum 
skills, usually proficiency in more than one language and 
varying levels of computer literacy. Given that FDI in these 
services can also benefit a country indirectly by promoting 
the accumulation of knowledge and experience, specific 
measures have been taken to promote such investment in 
the subregion. In El Salvador, the Law on International 
Services, which came into effect in November 2007, 
provides tax incentives, special parks, service centres 
and guarantees for investors in the sector. Together with 
the education initiatives, these efforts are improving 
the prospects of El Salvador, together with Costa Rica, 
recording the highest number of jobs per capita in business 
services (IBM Global Business Services, 2007).41 
There is currently a window of opportunity for 
capturing investment in international services. Investors 
are turning their attention to new destinations because 
the countries that make up the traditional service centres 
circuit are showing signs of saturation and rising labour 
costs in those countries are pushing up operating costs. 
Lower costs, the availability of human capital and the 
prospect of reaping first-comes advantages are making other 
destinations attractive (MIGA/Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2007). Also, upon finding the situation less favourable in 
their home countries, some service providers have begun 
to seek out other destinations for their operations and to 
explore the advantages of diversity. In Guatemala, for 
example, of the 15 forthcoming investments in call centres 
and business process outsourcing services, two were 
announced by Indian enterprises and two by companies 
from the Philippines (Invest in Guatemala, 2007). 
There has also been a trend towards nearshoring, which 
means moving operations closer to the target market with a 
view to taking advantage of cultural affinities, similarities 
of accent and other characteristics not attributable to cost. 
There are various opportunities for nearshoring in the region. 
The English-speaking Caribbean has advantages over 
India, for example, for serving North American customers 
(MIGA/Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007). Similarly, 
the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America offer 
advantages for companies wishing to target the Hispanic 
community in the United States. In both cases, there is the 
added advantage that, compared with Asia, there is little 
or no time difference with the United States.
Investments have also been made in international 
services elsewhere in the region. In Chile, specific policies 
have been implemented to develop the sector, which has 
doubled in the past two years to almost 50 companies 
that together export US$ 150 million and employ over 
9,000 workers (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007m). Brazil, 
Argentina and Uruguay have also attracted FDI in these 
kinds of services.
One of the main obstacles to increasing investment 
in this sector and its higher value added activities (such as 
research and development) is a shortage of labour that is both 
skilled and proficient in another language, above all English. 
Chile and El Salvador have responded to this situation by 
promoting the English-language training of professionals 
working in technical fields. Another challenge is to mitigate 
the danger of foreign companies absorbing the limited 
supply of human resources in the sector and thus driving 
local technology-intensive enterprises out of business.
4.  Conclusions
Latin America and the Caribbean received an unprecedented 
volume of FDI in 2007. The boom was largely attributable 
to the persistent worldwide demand for the natural resources 
that are in abundant supply in the region and the good 
performance of its markets. 
Market-seeking investments were encouraged by the 
region’s solid economic performance and the increasing 
access of new segments of the population to more diverse 
goods and services, from consumer items to financial 
services and vehicles. TNCs have seized these opportunities 
to offer products and services specifically designed for 
the lower-income segments. They have consolidated their 
operations to boost their capacity to compete with one 
another and with an increasingly strong group of regional 
companies. In some cases, companies have decided to 
withdraw or reduce their presence in the region in the 
face of what seem to them to be prohibitive regulatory 
frameworks or levels of uncertainty. 
In terms of natural-resource-seeking investment, the 
region has been blessed by rising demand worldwide. 
Although, the mining and hydrocarbons sectors have 
been responsible for a large share of the increase, the 
41 India and the Philippines have the largest number of jobs in business services in absolute terms, while Costa Rica accounts for 2%, and El 
Salvador and Mexico for 4% each, of the jobs in this sector.
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distribution of FDI between these two segments and among 
the countries of the region varies widely. Countries are 
still struggling to strike a balance between the interests 
of local communities and guaranteeing mining and oil 
companies the profitability and regulatory stability they 
need. Regulation has moved in different directions in 
different countries, which has affected the distribution 
of foreign investment in the sector. 
The effects of the slowdown of the United States 
economy on efficiency-seeking investments in services 
for export to third markets did not make themselves felt 
in 2007, and the full extent of the possible repercussions 
in the near future are still unclear. Regardless of this 
situation, the growing importance of Asian competitors 
is already forcing the region to try to diversify into higher 
value added manufacturing activities and services. 
D. Outward foreign direct investment and 
 the trans-Latins
1.  Outward foreign direct investment flows in 2007
In 2007, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows 
from the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
were substantially lower than in 2006. Nevertheless, 
they still reached a historically high level of US$ 20.619 
billion (see figure I.20). 
The drop in OFDI in 2007 was not caused by a 
slowdown in the internationalization efforts of Latin 
American companies: it reflected a return to a more 
normal pace of growth after the exceptional high 
recorded in 2006, which was largely generated by the 
purchase of Inco (Canada) by the Brazilian enterprise 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD).42 A transaction 
of comparable magnitude was undertaken in 2007 as well 
(the purchase of the Australian firm Rinker by Cemex, 
of Mexico), but this operation was partially financed by 
the Mexican company’s subsidiaries outside Mexico.43 
The number of cross-border acquisitions performed by 
trans-Latins (see box I.5) reveals the ongoing dynamism 
of the international expansion efforts of the region’s 
large enterprises. The flows of OFDI from Latin America 
and the Caribbean were in fact higher in 2007 than in 
2004 and 2005.
 According to official figures, the Latin American 
country that invested the most abroad in 2007 was Brazil, 
followed by Mexico and Chile (see figure I.21).  Brazil’s 
OFDI was down in 2007 compared with the previous 
year because, in addition to the absence of transactions 
comparable with the Inco purchase, parent companies 
in Brazil were receiving significant debt repayments 
from their subsidiaries abroad in 2007. This meant that 
net outward investment flows were negative during the 
first semester.44 
42 Although this transaction was not completed until 2007, it was announced in 2006. Most of the corresponding payments were made during 2007.
43 The scope and quality of the data available on OFDI of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean restrict the explicative capacity of 
the ensuing statistics. Only 15 of the 24 countries that regularly publish data on FDI also publish data on their outward investments. Also, even 
in the most advanced countries in this respect, the statistics do not always accurately reflect the phenomenon. In 2004 and 2005, for example, 
some purchases of Latin American enterprises by companies from outside the region —financed with shares of the purchasing company or 
the merged entity equivalent to over 10% of capital— were recorded as OFDI when in essence they were operations whereby transnational 
corporations entered the Latin America market. This is due to the definition adopted in the fifth edition of the Balance of Payments Manual of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), according to which all investment corresponding to over 10% of a company’s capital shall be considered 
direct investment. The possibility of companies financing their operations abroad through subsidiaries in third countries tends to lead to the 
undervaluation of outward investments. These problems, which are by no means exclusive to Latin America and the Caribbean, make it essential 
to include the analysis of the main transactions and activities of trans-Latins in the interpretation of OFDI figures. This is done in the following 
subsections of this chapter.
44 Table I-A-5 in the annex presents data on OFDI by country of origin.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)56
Figure I.20
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:  
NET FLOWS OF OFDI, 1990-2007
(Billions of dollars)
In terms of GDP and the countries for which data are 
available, the largest outward investor country in 2007 was 
Chile, followed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Costa Rica (see figure I.22).
Only a few countries publish official figures on the 



























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 30 April 2008.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
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Figure I.22
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELETED COUNTRIES): RATIO OF NET OFDI TO GDP, 2006-2007
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 30 April 2008.
Figure I.21
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET OFDI FLOWS, MAIN 
INVESTOR COUNTRIES, 2003-2007
(Percentages)
by destination country and sector of the OFDI of Brazil, 
Chile and Colombia. Box I.6 shows that 6 of the 10 largest 
acquisitions abroad by Latin American enterprises 
targeted assets located outside the region (United States 
and Australia). 
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Box I.6
MAIN ACQUISITIONS BY TRANS-LATINS OUTSIDE THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN a
The main acquisitions by trans-Latins 
outside their countries of origin were 
made in the natural resources and the 
natural-resource-based manufacturing 
sectors: cement, steel and steel products, 
hydrocarbons, mining and petrochemicals 
(see the table below). Transactions in 
petroleum industry services, systems 
and software engineering, and the 
meat/refrigerated products segment, 
however, reveal the shifting focus of Latin 
American and Caribbean OFDI. 
Five of the nine transactions worth 
US$ 500 million or more, announced 
in 2007, were acquisitions in countries 
outside the region (Australia, the United 
States). Most of the investments between 
US$ 100 million and US$ 500 million were 
made in the region. 
The patterns in the cross-border 
acquisitions of trans-Latins reflect the 
driving forces behind their efforts to 
internationalize their operations. These 
are examined in the sections below. 
MAIN ACQUISITIONS BY TRANS-LATINS OUTSIDE THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, ANNOUNCED OR CONCLUDED IN 2007
Acquired by









Seller Country of seller
Announced 
value Sector
1 Gerdau Brazil Chaparral Steel United States 3 974 Steel
2 Ternium Argentina Grupo Imsa Mexico   3 187 Steel
3 Tenaris Argentina Hydril United States   1 994 Oil pipe connections 





5 JBS SA/Friboi Brazil Swift & Co. United States   1 400 Food - meat








7 Cia. Vale do Rio Doce Brazil AMCI Australia Australia   786 Mining coal
8 Techint (in partnership 
with Stella, James 
Jones and investment 
funds)
Italy/Argentina, 
Canada, France Sirti Spa Italy   747
Systems 
engineering




Peru   623 Retailing
10 Mexichem Mexico Grupo Amanco Brazil Nueva Holding Chile 500 Chemicals, petrochemicals
11 Votorantim Brazil Acerías Paz del Río Colombia   494 Steel
12 Cencosud SA Chile GBarbosa Holding Brazil
Acon 
Investments United States 430 Retailing









Brazil   351 Electricity - transmission





Brazil   351 Electricity - transmission
15 JBS SA Brazil Inalca Italy Cremonini Italy 329 Food - various
16 Votorantim Brazil US Zinc Corp United States TPG Inc. United States 295 Recycling
17 Techint Argentina Takraf Foedertechnik Germany VTC Germany 272
Machinery 
for the mining 
industry 
18 Gerdau Brazil Grupo Industrial Feld Mexico   259 Steel
19 Mexichem Mexico Petroquímica Colombiana Colombia   250 Petrochemicals
20 Celulosa Arauco y Constitución Chile
Stora Enso 
Arapoti Brazil Stora Enso Finland 208 Paper/pulp
21 Gerdau and Kalyani Brazil and India SJK India   170 Steel
22 Marfrig Brazil Quickfood Argentina   141 Food - meat
23 Sonda SA Chile Procwork Brazil   118 Computer services
24 Petrobras (Petrobras Energía) Brazil
Share in the El 
Tordillo and La 
Tapera deposits.
Argentina Noble Energy United States 118 Hydrocarbons
25 Gerdau Brazil Aceros Corsa Mexico   101 Steel
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Box I.6 (concluded)
Acquired by









Seller Country of seller
Announced 
value Sector
Operations announced prior to 2007 and concluded in 2007











United States 3 700 Telecommu-nications





Norsk Hydro Norway 545 Metallurgy
4 Alfa Mexico 6 aluminium foundries  TK Aluminum Bermuda 414 Metallurgy
Withdrawals





1 Bluescope Steel United States
Participation 




United States Ternium SA Argentina 730 Steel
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data provided by Bloomberg as at 14 January 2008. 
Note: The data on mergers and acquisitions refer to published amounts of the concluded and pending transactions announced each year.
a This section is based on data taken from Bloomberg’s financial information service. The data refer to the completed or pending operations announced each year in which 
the purchaser is a Latin American enterprise and the company or assets acquired are outside the country of origin of that enterprise.
Table I.8
BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA: OFDI DESTINATIONS, 2007
(Percentages)
Destination Sector
Millions of dollars Percentage Millions of dollars Percentage
Chile (investments made) 
Brazil 875 35 Commerce 1 016 41
Argentina 471 19 Manufacturing industry 818 33
Peru 396 16 Energy 198 8
Colombia 341 14 Construction 198 8
Other countries of 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
27 1 Other services 149 6
United States 258 10 Hotels and restaurants 99 4
Other 112 5    
Total 2 480 100 2 479 100
Brazil (investments above US$ 1 million, excluding goods and real estate) 
United States 3 548 30 Financial services 5 108 44
Financial centres of the 
Caribbean 
5 420 47 Metallurgy 1 660 14
Chile 689 6 Food and beverages 1 744 15
Argentina 528 5 Chemicals 853 7
Mexico 258 2 Commerce 644 6
Uruguay 229 2 Petroleum-based products 
and biofuels
276 2
Other countries of 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
131 1 Extraction of 
hydrocarbons and support 
activities 
239 2
Portugal 155 1 Construction 156 1
Other countries of 
Europe
633 5 Others 965 8
Others 54 0    
Total 11 645 100 Total 11 645 100
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Table I.8 (concluded)
Destination Sector
Millions of dollars Percentage Millions of dollars Percentage
Colombia (net flows – divestments taken into account) - 2006
United States 231 63 Financial services, real 
estate, corporate services 
337 91
Brazil 173 47 Commerce, restaurants, 
hotels 
167 45
Panama 101 27 Electricity, gas, water 175 47
Chile 23 6 Communal, social and 
personal services 
11 3
Peru -387 -105 Construction 4 1
Other countries of 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
45 12 Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 
2 1
Financial centres of the 
Caribbean
167 45 Mines and quarries 1 0
Others 18 5 Others -2 -1




   Manufactured items -317 -86
Total 370 100  370 100
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 30 April 2008.
2.	 The	main	trans-Latins
The lack of up-to-date and comparable public figures 
on the sales, assets and jobs held abroad by a significant 
number of companies makes it difficult to accurately 
identify which are the largest trans-Latins in terms of the 
size of their foreign operations.
The largest Latin American and Caribbean companies 
and groups in terms of sales that invest outside their home 
countries are listed in table I.9. The degree to which they 
have internationalized their operations, however, varies 
considerably. A large portion of Cemex’s sales, for example, 
are based on the production of its subsidiaries, while 
Codelco, which is similar in size, has limited its activities to 
exploration projects and serves the external market through 
its exports from Chile. In the meantime, Ternium has taken 
over control of several steel producers outside Argentina, 
while Usiminas, another steel company, has only bought 
minority stakes through partnerships with Ternium.
Table I.10 shows how, among the companies listed 
in table I.9, the importance of outward investments varies 
considerably. It also shows the geographical distribution of 
the OFDI of these companies (in and outside the region). 
45 According to the Global 500 classification system used by Fortune magazine, which measures companies by sales, but not necessarily by sales 
outside the country of origin, eight Latin American companies (all in Mexico and Brazil) are among the 500 largest corporations in the world.
In addition to the companies listed in the table 
above, several financial institutions with comparable 
sales volumes, including Banco Itaú and Bancolombia, 
have been expanding their international operations in 
varying degrees.
How relevant though are these companies on a 
worldwide scale? According to UNCTAD data for 2005, 
just one Latin American company (Cemex) ranks among 
the 100 largest transnational corporations in the world in 
terms of overseas holdings, and only 11 Latin American 
companies stand among the top 100 transnationals from 
emerging countries.45 This is relatively few compared 
with other developing countries. In fact, 79 of the top 
100 companies from emerging economies are Asian, 
and 8 are South African. The Latin American enterprises 
among the group operate in the natural resources or 
natural-resource-based manufacturing sectors (mining, 
hydrocarbons, cement, steel), telecommunications and 
food and beverages. The Asian enterprises, on the other 
hand, are involved in a broader range of sectors, including 
high-tech ones (UNCTAD, 2007).
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Table I.9
THE LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES AND GROUPS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, IN TERMS OF SALES, WITH 
INVESTMENTS OUTSIDE THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN
Company Country Sector
1 PDVSA Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) Petroleum/gas
2 PETROBRAS Brazil Petroleum/gas
3 AMÉRICA MÓVIL y TELMEX Mexico Telecommunications
4 CIA. VALE DO RIO DOCE Brazil Mining
5 CEMEX Mexico Cement
6 CODELCO Chile Mining
7 TECHINT, Tenaris, Ternium Argentina Various, steel, steel pipes, construction 
8 GRUPO VOTORANTIM Brazil Various, cement, mining, steel
9 FEMSA y Coca-Cola Femsa Mexico Beverages
10 GERDAU Brazil Iron and steel/metallurgy
11 ODEBRECHT Brazil Various, construction
12 ENAP Chile Petroleum/gas
13 GRUPO ALFA Mexico Various
14 GRUPO MÉXICO, Southern Copper Mexico Mining
15 BRASKEM Brazil Petrochemicals
16 GRUPO BIMBO Mexico Food
17 CENCOSUD Chile Commerce
18 USIMINAS Brazil Iron and steel/metallurgy
19 GRUPO SALINAS, Grupo Elektra Mexico Various, commerce
20 FALABELLA Chile Commerce
21 CSN Brazil Iron and steel/metallurgy
22 EMBRAER Brazil Aerospace industry
23 GRUPO CAMARGO CORRÊA Brazil Various
24 ANTOFAGASTA Chile Mining
25 SUDAMERICANA DE VAPORES Chile Transportation/logistics
26 TAM Brazil Transportation/logistics
27 GRUPO ELEKTRA Mexico Commerce
28 LAN Chile Transportation/logistics
29 GRUPO MASECA Mexico Food
30 CMPC PAPELES Y CARTONES Chile Pulp/paper
31 ORGANIZACIÓN TERPEL Colombia Petroleum/gas
32 MOLYMET Chile Steelworks/metallurgy 
33 GRUPO JBS (FRIBOI) Brazil Food
34 EMPRESAS ICA Mexico Construction
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data provided by the magazine América economía.
Table I.10
TRANS-LATINS: PROPORTION OF SALES MADE BY SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD, IN AND OUTSIDE LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
(2006 FIGURES)




sales made by 
subsidiaries abroad
Percentage of sales 
by subsidiaries abroad 
made in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
1 América Móvil Mexico Telecommunications  22 410 55 90
2 Companhia Vale do
Rio Docea
Brazil Mining  19 651 51 n.a.
3 Cemex Mexico Cement  18 249 80 11
4 Telmex Mexico Telecommunications  16 167 27 99
5 Gerdau Brazil Steel  10 973 59 17
6 Grupo Bimbo Mexico Food 6 155 31 26
7 Cencosud Chile Commerce  5 880 35 100
8 Falabella Chile Commerce 4 375 20 100
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the companies’ annual reports.
a  Data for the period prior to the purchase of Inco.
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How relevant are these companies regionally? 
Though few in number in comparison with the large 
number of TNCs, trans-Latins are increasingly being 
ranked among the most important companies in other 
countries in the region. América Móvil/Telmex, 
PETROBRAS, Techint and Cencosud are among the 
60 largest transnational corporations in the region in 
terms of sales (excluding sales in the country of origin) 
(see table I-A-4 of the annex). América Móvil and 
Femsa are market leaders in more than one country 
(in addition to their country of origin) (see table I.11). 
Some companies have a huge presence in a particular 
country although they do not figure among the region’s 
largest companies as presented above. This is the case 
of the Synergy group, for example, which controls 
Avianca in Colombia. 
Table I.11
TRANS-LATINS THAT FIGURE AMONG THE LARGEST COMPANIES IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
 Company Country of origin Sector
Argentina (among the largest 1 000 companies) 
5 Grupo PETROBRAS Brazil Hydrocarbons
18 CTI/CTI Móvil (Grupo Carso) Mexico Telecommunications
59 Cencosud/Jumbo (Grupo Paulmann) Chile Retailing
70 Loma Negra (Grupo Camargo Correa) Brazil Cement 
77 Alto Paraná (Grupo Arauco) Chile Pulp
94 Pride Internacional (acquired by GP Investments 
in 2007)
Brazil Technical services for the petroleum 
industry 
111 Coca-Cola Femsa Mexico Beverages
146 Friboi (Swift Armour) Brazil Refrigerated products
158 Lan Airlines Chile Airlines
164 Grupo CMPC Chile Paper
209 Falabella Chile Retailing
224 Easy (Grupo Paulmann) Chile Retailing
236 Masisa (Grupo Nueva) Chile Wooden boards
243 Telmex (Grupo Carso) Mexico Telecommunications
305 Constructora Norberto Odebrecht Brazil Construction
355 Coca-Cola Polar Chile Beverages
366 Faplac (Grupo Arauco) Chile Wooden boards 
396 Ipiranga Brazil Sale of chemicals
393 Santista Têxtil (Grupo Camargo Corrêa) Brazil Textiles
453 Petrolera Cono Sur (bought by PDVSA 
in 2006)
Venezuela Hydrocarbons
567 Lan Argentina Chile Airlines
636 Ferrosur Roca (Grupo Camargo Corrêa) Brazil Railway transport
816 Bimbo Mexico Food
956 Sadia Brazil Food
Colombia (among the largest 200 companies)
12 Avianca Brazil Airlines
13 PETROBRAS Brazil Hydrocarbons
20 Coca-Cola Femsa Mexico Beverages
27 Cemex Colombia Mexico Cement 
31 Mabe Mexico Domestic appliances
153 Cemex Concretos de Colombia Mexico Concrete
Mexico (among the largest 500 companies)
61 Terniuma Argentina Iron and steel and metallurgy 
169 Farmacias Benavides (FASA) Chile Sale of medicines 
211 Grupo Techint Argentina Construction
224 Molymex Chile Mining
Brazil (among the largest 500 companies)
36 Claro (América Móvil) Mexico Telecommunications
174 Coca-Cola Femsa Mexico Beverages
191 Rio de Janeiro Refrescos (Andina) Chile Beverages
195 Kaiser (Femsa) Mexico Beverages
232 Transmissão Paulista (ISA) Colombia Electricity transmission 
264 Americel (América Móvil) Mexico Telecommunications
393 Ficap (Madeco) Chile Fibre optic cables
427 Amanco (Mexichem) Mexico Construction
456 Officer Brazil-Chile Wholesale commerce
Chile (among the largest 100 companies)
83 Itaú (assets acquired from BankBoston) Brazil Banking
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data obtained from “Las 1000 empresas que más venden”, Mercado, June 2006 
(Argentina); “500 - Las empresas más importantes de México”, Expansión, 25 June; “Las 100 empresas más grandes de Colombia” and “Las otras 900”, Semana, 30 de 
abril de 2007; “Melhores e Maiores – as 500 maiores empresas do país”, Exame, August 2007; “Top 100: Las mayores compañías en ventas”, Revista capital No. 202. 
a  The ranking of this company in Mexico will be substantially higher in 2007 as result of its purchase of Imsa, which is ranked 45 on this scale. 
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In short, many of the largest Latin American companies 
invest abroad, but the relative weight of these investments 
in each company’s operations varies considerably. Trans-
Latins are relevant at the international level, but are far fewer 
in number and have a far smaller international presence 
than companies from the emerging Asian countries. At 
the regional level, they hold some notable positions in 
the some of the main markets, but as a group are still 
lightweights compared with local companies and the 
transnational corporations from outside the region. 
3. The main sectors in which trans-Latins invest
The major trans-Latins continue to invest mainly in basic 
products (hydrocarbons, mining and metallurgy, and cement) 
(see subsections (i) to (iii) and in telecommunications 
(see chapter III). They also invest less heavily in food 
and beverages (see subsection (iv) and retailing (see 
subsection (v)). A group of well-established trans-Latins 
already have a leading position, or at least a stronghold, in 
each of these sectors at the regional or international level. 
These companies continued to expand their interests in 
2007. Some took their foreign investments to new levels 
by participating more actively in worldwide consolidation 
processes, others ventured into new markets and products, 
generally in the pursuit of increased value added. On the 
other hand, some of the main trans-Latins were bought out 
by other trans-Latins or by companies from other regions, 
as is the case of Jugos del Valle, which was bought by 
Coca-Cola Femsa and Coca-Cola, and Imsa, which was 
bought by Techint.
Companies operating in non-traditional sectors 
have also expanded their activities abroad. The Chilean 
enterprise Sonda, which is a software and information 
and communications technology (ICT) services company, 
made its largest investment abroad ever in 2007 when 
it bought the Brazilian company Procwork. Sonda’s 
purchase of Procwork for US$ 118 million represents 
a decisive step towards conquering the region’s largest 
ICT services market. The transaction is by no means the 
first investment the company has made outside Chile: it 
already has operations in several Latin American countries, 
including Brazil. Procwork is its largest acquisition to 
date, however, and the volume of the transaction places 
it among the largest carried out in the region (see box I.5) 
(Portal Exame, 2007b).
In the chemicals and petrochemicals sector, the 
purchase of Petco and Amanco by the Mexican company 
Mexichem was equally noteworthy.46 Mexichem first 
ventured outside Mexico in 2004 when it purchased Atofina 
in Colombia. It started producing in North America in 
2006 when it bought up the Bayshore Group. The boldest 
leap beyond its borders, however, was recorded in 2007, 
when it made two major acquisitions: Petco (a PVC resins 
producer) in Colombia and the Amanco group in Brazil. 
This group has a wide network of operations in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. It also obtained authorization 
from the Government of Colombia to acquire the pipe 
manufacturer Pavco and announced more acquisitions for 
2008 (Mexichem, 2007; Expansión, 2007l).
(i)  Hydrocarbons
The main trans-Latins in the hydrocarbons sector are 
PETROBRAS and PDVSA. While PETROBRAS seems 
to be actively pursuing the expansion of operations outside 
the region, PDVSA is redirecting the focus of its foreign 
production towards Latin America and the Caribbean.
Despite significant acquisitions in petrochemicals, 
the rising importance of biofuels and new oil and gas 
discoveries in Brazil (factors which could distract the 
company from its internationalization efforts), PETROBRAS 
has continued to expand its operations around the globe. 
Many of the company’s new foreign investments were made 
in other regions. PETROBRAS has adopted a pragmatic 
approach in Latin America and the Caribbean, carefully 
weighing regulatory risks, on one hand, and making sure 
not to miss any opportunities, on the other.
PETROBRAS’ entry into the refining sector in Asia 
marked a new direction in the company’s expansion strategy. 
After buying 50% of the Pasadena refinery in Texas in 
2006, PETROBRAS bought a controlling share in 2007 in 
an oil refinery in Japan. This refinery has a terminal that, in 
addition to serving as the refinery’s entry point for crude, 
could be used for the sale of biofuels to the Asian market. 
This investment is in keeping with the company’s strategic 
goal of increasing its refining capacity outside Brazil.
46  Mexichems’ purchase of Dripsa, an Argentine irrigation company, and of 70% of Plastubos in Brazil confirm the dynamism of the company’s 
expansion process.
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Most of PETROBRAS’ investments in exploration 
and production were made in the Gulf of Mexico. The 
company will exploit its competitive edge in deepwater 
and ultra-deepwater drilling to develop the 26 new blocks 
it was awarded there. It is also involved in exploration 
activities in Tanzania, Iran, Libya, Turkey, Pakistan and 
Portugal (PETROBRAS, 2007a; América economía, 
2007m; Business News Americas, 2007b). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the company 
has proceeded with caution, but not without interest. In 
Colombia, it was awarded 13 of the blocks auctioned 
under the 2007 Caribbean Round by the National 
Hydrocarbons Agency. PETROBRAS announced new 
projects in Ecuador and Argentina (where it also bought 
ConocoPhilips’s share in gas fields). In Peru, it discovered 
new gas reserves in a joint venture with Repsol YPF and 
Burlington Resources. In Bolivia, despite the nationalization 
of the country’s refineries at the beginning of the year 
and a temporary freeze on investments, the company 
announced new investments in a partnership with YPFB 
of between US$ 750 million and US$ 1 billion to step 
up gas production in the country (PETROBRAS 2007b). 
In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, PETROBRAS 
accepted new contractual arrangements and maintained 
its investments in its partnership with PDVSA, but at the 
time of writting, it had yet to confirm the investments 
it had previously announced in the Carabobo field 
(PETROBRAS 2007c).
PETROBRAS has also expanded its international 
interests in the petrochemicals industry. Braskem, in 
whom PETROBRAS holds shares, and Pequiven entered 
into a partnership to set up a refinery in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. This operation poses an opportunity 
to diversify the company’s sources of raw materials and 
obtain them at competitive prices. 
PDVSA, on the other hand, has continued to forge 
closer ties within the region. As part of its strategy to lower 
its exposure to the United States market, the company has 
pursued an ambitious expansion plan to consolidate its 
refining capacity in the region (see table I.12). 
Table I.12
PDVSA: REFINING CAPACITY EXPANSION PROJECTS
Year in which 
due to begin Country Project
Amount of investment (in 
millions of dollars)
2007 Cuba Reactivation of the Cienfuegos refinery 44
2008 Jamaica Expansion of the Kingston refinery 197 (50% PDVSA)
2010 Uruguay Conversion of the La Teja refinery to process extra-heavy crude 600
2011 Brazil Construction of a refinery to process 50% crude oil from the Orinoco 
Belt and 50% Brazilian crude 
3 000 (50% PDVSA)
Ecuador Construction of a refinery in the province of Manabí, in partnership 
with Petroecuador
5 500
Nicaragua Refinery in Nagarote 2 500
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECALC), based on PDVSA, “Planes estratégicos” and América Economía, “Negociado y firmado”, 6 August 
2007, “Chávez instala refinería en Nicaragua”, AméricaEconomía.com, 23 July. 
Several companies from the region have shown interest 
in the assets sold by transnationals in the fuel distribution 
sector. This sector is closely linked to the hydrocarbons 
industry but obeys its own logic. Distribution capacity 
and marketing are key factors. The Colombian company 
Terpel has been active in this respect (see box I.5). 
Among the smaller trans-Latins operating in the 
hydrocarbons sector, the Chilean firm ENAP renewed 
its investments in southern Argentina, and the State-
owned company Ecopetrol of Colombia ventured abroad 
for the first time with the signing of an agreement with 
PETROBRAS and Petroperú to explore the Peruvian 
Amazon. Meanwhile, the Argentine Pluspetrol continued 
to invest in Camisea and discovered new gas reserves in 
Bolivia (La Nación, 2008).
Activity in the hydrocarbons industry has also 
spurred the interest of trans-Latins in the oilfield services 
industry. GP Investments, a Brazilian private equity fund, 
competed with another private Latin American capital fund, 
Southern Cross, to buy the Latin American company Pride 
International. Pride controls about 60% of the Argentine 
oil services market. Some 50% of its billing corresponds 
to activities outside Argentina, in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico 
and Peru. The buyout included San Antonio, a company 
which Pride had purchased from Perez Companc (El 
Cronista, 2007).
(ii) Mining and metals
The mining and metals sectors, and the steel and steel 
products segment in particular, were the main targets of 
trans-Latin investments abroad. CVRD continued the 
strategy adopted in 2001 of diversifying its activities in 
the mining sector both geographically and product-wise 
(ECLAC, 2006, 2007a). The largest initiative taken 
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in this respect (and the largest international purchase 
made by a Brazilian company) took place in 2006 when 
CVRD bought Inco in Canada. In 2007, CVRD bought 
the Australian company AMCI, which participates in 
various joint ventures in coal production, especially in 
the production of metallurgical coal, which is used in the 
manufacture of steel. This is one of the few inputs for 
steel manufacturing that is not found in Brazil, and steel 
mills in Brazil have to import 100% of the metallurgical 
coal they consume. This acquisition, the takeover of 
Inco, and the healthy cash flow the company enjoyed as 
a result of the rising price of minerals enabled CVRD to 
enter (or return to) higher value added segments within 
the iron-steel production chain and to set up partnerships 
with transnational steel companies to increase its refining 
capacity in Brazil (see box I.4).
At the outset of 2008, CVRD attempted to purchase 
Xstrata, the sixth largest mining company in the world, 
but the transaction fell through. Had it come about, 
however, it would have taken CVRD to another level as 
a transnational in terms of size, geographical range and 
product diversity.
Whereas CVRD has focused its attention outside 
the region, two Mexican mining companies have been 
stepping up their investments in South America, and in 
Peru in particular. Faced with labour disputes with workers 
at the Southern Copper mine in Mexico, Grupo México 
transferred the resources it had earmarked for investment 
in Mexico to Peru, where they will be used to increase 
production capacity at its mines there. The company also 
bought mining concessions and has started exploration 
in Chile (Business News Americas, 2007d). The other 
Mexican company active in this respect was Peñoles, the 
world’s largest silver producer, which obtained permits 
to start exploration in Peru and is currently developing 
copper, zinc and gold deposits in Peru, Chile and Mexico 
(AméricaEconomía.com, 2007r).
Despite being one of the largest mining companies in 
the region, Codelco has opted to concentrate on Chile and 
the production of copper and related products, although 
it does have a few exploration projects in other parts of 
Latin America. In 2007, it sold its only significant finding 
abroad, copper and cobalt deposits in Boa Esperança, 
Brazil, to a local company. As this was only a medium-size 
find, the company decided not to develop it and to use 
the resources to fund its ongoing exploration activities in 
Mexico and Brazil instead (El Mercurio, 2007a). 
In the metallurgy sector, in 2007, the Brazilian firm 
Votorantim Metais bought the United States company US 
Zinc, one of the world’s largest recyclers of zinc secondaries 
and one of the world’s largest zinc metal and value added 
zinc product manufacturers (zinc dust and zinc oxide). 
US Zinc has five plants in the United State and one in 
China. It also engages in zinc marketing activities. With 
this purchase, Votorantim Metais has strengthened its 
position in the higher value added zinc products market 
and opened up commercialization channels for the output 
of the expansion of its zinc refinery in Peru (Votorantim 
Metais, 2007a). Votorantim Metais also bought a steel mill, 
Acerías Paz del Río, in Colombia, which represents an 
important step within the company’s strategy to diversify 
its operations geographically and to broaden its product 
range, as well as a strategic move to take advantage of 
the possibilities of growth in countries such as Colombia 
(Votorantim Metais, 2007b). The companies most actively 
involved in acquisitions in the steel sector, however, were 
the Techint group and Gerdau. 
Tenaris, the steel pipes subsidiary of the Argentine 
group Techint, bought the United States company Hydril, 
which manufacturers and markets connections and pressure 
control products for oil and gas drilling activities. This 
purchase, which comes on the heels of another acquisition 
of a United States company (Maverick) in 2006, will enable 
Tenaris to produce more value added products that offer 
its customers integrated solutions for highly complex 
applications. Hydril enjoys a good brand name and has a 
strong manufacturing capacity in North America, which 
complements Tenaris’ structure (Tenaris, 2007). 
Ternium, the flat and long steel subsidiary of Techint, 
bought Imsa in Mexico. This was one in a series of 
acquisitions that began in 2001. Techint’s incursion in 
the flat and long steel products sector is relatively recent, 
but of growing significance given the rise in world steel 
prices and how the move strengthens its international 
position. Unlike the strategy it has pursued in the steel pipes 
segment, Techint, in addition to investing in Argentina (in 
the flat-rolled steel producer Siderar), has concentrated 
on taking advantage of opportunities elsewhere in the 
region: in 1998, it acquired Sidor (Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela); in 2005, Hylsa (Mexico); and most recently, 
Imsa (also Mexico).47 
The acquisition of Imsa —itself an important 
trans-Latin (ECLAC, 2006)— will enable Techint to 
expand in Mexico, which, given the structure of the steel 
market, could create a barrier to potential competitors 
such as Gerdau. Although Gerdau entered the Mexican 
market with its purchase of Tultitlán (Sidertul), this was 
a relatively small acquisition compared with the assets 
47 In 2007, the group bought an additional share (4.85%) in Siderar, which was owned by CVRD.
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currently held in the country by Ternium (Expansión, 
2007m). The purchase of Imsa will also enable Techint 
to improve the integration of the group’s various units. 
Hylsamex receives steel sheets from the Sidor plant in 
Venezuela, converts them into value added products in 
Mexico and then sells them on the United States market. 
Imsa’s role will follow the same logic. Once the expansion 
of Siderar’s plant in Argentina is complete, steel sheets will 
be sent from there to Mexico for processing and export 
by Imsa as higher value added products for the United 
States automotive and domestic appliance industries. With 
Imsa, Ternium will be able to improve its standing in the 
United States market, which will account for 60% of its 
sales. The United States represents larger profits than the 
South American market, and by increasing its production 
capacity in Mexico, Ternium reduces its exposure to 
the uncertainty in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(Expansión, 2007m).48 Ternium also announced the sale 
of its non-essential assets in the United States, namely 
Imsa’s shares in Steelscape Inc. (excluding the steel mill), 
ASC Profiles Inc, Varco Pruden Buildings Inc., and Metl-
Span LLC (Ternium, 2007b).
The Brazilian company Gerdau accounted for 4 of the 
24 acquisitions worth over US$ 100 million made by trans-
Latins outside their countries of origin in 2007 (see box 
I.6). These were a continuation of the company’s strategy 
to ensure it plays a leading role in the steel industry’s 
expansion worldwide. Historically, the company has always 
expanded gradually into new markets. Having bought up 
small steel mills in the Americas in the past and acquired 
a plant in Europe in 2006, the company has now begun to 
extend its foothold in Asia as well. In Latin America, it is 
using its acquisitions in Mexico, the Dominican Republic 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to explore the 
markets that are growing rapidly thanks to improvements 
in the regional economy and the growing demand for 
investments in infrastructure. The company continues to 
pursue greater value added in its products and to diversify 
its portfolio (Gerdau, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). 
Gerdau’s largest acquisition in 2007 was Chaparral 
Steel, the second largest producer of steel structures in 
North America. This purchase will allow the company to 
diversify its products portfolio and offer its customers a 
broader range of steel products produced in small factories 
(Gerdau, 2007d). 
Gerdau’s bid of US$ 1.458 billion for the steelworks 
of Quanex Corporation in the United States falls in with 
the company’s strategy to consolidate its position as a 
world supplier and open up new growth possibilities. 
Quanex, through its steel division MacSteel, is the 
second largest producer of special bar quality (SBQ) 
steel in the United States and a worldwide supplier of 
SBQ long steel products for the motor vehicle and auto 
parts industry. Gerdau’s acquisition of Quanex will 
increase the group’s presence as a supplier of special 
long steel products in the globalized motor vehicle 
market (Gerdau, 2007e).49
Gerdau’s joint venture in India aims to exploit the 
opportunities generated by the country’s economic growth 
and its increasing importance as a consumer and producer 
of steel. India is also a low-cost location for the production 
of steel and has good quality iron-ore deposits (Gerdau, 
2007f). This series of acquisitions has enabled Gerdau to 
keep up the pace of its national and international growth. 
During the past decade, the company has invested more 
outside than inside Brazil (see table I.13).
Table I.13
GERDAU’S INVESTMENTS: 1997-SEPTEMBER 2007
(Billions of dollars)
Brazil 4.2 + debt
North America 6.1 + debt
Latin America 1.3 + debt
Europe 0.7 + debt
Asia 0.07 + debt
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of a presentation made by Gerdau at the Apimec meeting, Porto 
Alegre, 26 November 2007, São Paulo, 30 November 2007.
Another trans-Latin steel corporation, CSN, halted 
its internationalization process after its attempts to buy 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh (United States), Corus (United Kingdom-
Netherlands) and Acerias Paz del Río (Colombia). The latter 
was bought by another Brazilian company, Votorantim 
Metais. CSN’s strategy had been based on acquiring small 
and medium-sized assets to process and distribute its steel 
sheets in the United States and Europe. In light of these 
failed purchases, CSN opted to make new investments in its 
mining and its raw steel production capacity in Brazil and 
to expand its existing foreign operations. It announced an 
48 One of the points of conflict with the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has been the destination of Sidor’s production. In 
August, Ternium announced an agreement between Sidor and the Venezuelan Government, whereby the company would increase its participation 
in social programmes and intensify its efforts to develop the steel value chain in the country, with special emphasis on support for small and 
medium-sized enterprise. The company would use average export prices as a reference prices for the Venezuelan market (Ternium, 2007a). Early 
in 2008 the Government announced the nationalization of Sidor.
49 The purchase by Pacific Coast Steel, a joint venture of Gerdau’s United States subsidiary, of the assets of Valley Placers, Inc. (VPI) forms part 
of the strategy to access higher value added segments in the United States market.
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investment of 2.7 billion reais in its Portuguese subsidiary 
Lusosider to install a new rolling mill and expand the 
volumes that it sells in Spain, Portugal and the South of 
France. The company also announced investments in its 
operations in Kentucky, United States (AméricaEconomía.
com, 2007e; Latin Finance, 2007h). One of CSN’s 
competitive advantages at the global level is its privileged 
access to mineral resources in Brazil, an advantage that 
the company is working hard to boost. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that Madeco, a Chilean 
trans-Latin corporation with operations in Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru, as well as in Chile, sold its 
copper cable subsidiary to the French company Nexans. 
Madeco retained a 9% share in Nexans, however, which is 
a market leader in the copper cables market in the United 
State and Europe (Nexans, 2007). 
(iii)  Cement
The largest acquisition in 2007 by a trans-Latin 
corporation was the purchase of the Rinker group by 
Cemex (Mexico). Although the company is headquartered 
in Australia, much of the attraction, as far as Cemex was 
concerned, lay in Rinker’s significant presence in the 
United States, where it generates 83% of the group’s 
profits. The two companies complement each other in 
the United States market both in terms of product (see 
table I.14) and geographical location. 
Table I.14
SALES VOLUME AND RANKING IN THE CEMENT, PRE-MIXED CONCRETE AND AGGREGATES MARKET OF THE UNITED STATES
Sales/ranking in the United States Cemex Rinker Cemex + Rinker
Cement
- Millions of metric tons 18 4 22
- Ranking Among the top 3 Among the top 10 Among the top 3
Premixed concrete
- Millions of metric tons 18 14 32
- Ranking Among the top 3 Among the top 3 Among the top 3
Aggregates
- Millions of metric tons 48 92 140
- Ranking Among the top 10 Among the top 5 Among the top 5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of CEMEX, “Summary transaction overview”, 27 October 2007.
The acquisition improves Cemex’s standing in three 
key segments (see table I.15) and furthers the company’s 
evolution from cement supplier to integrated building 
materials platform, along the lines of Lafarge and Holcim 
(Latin Finance, 2007i).
Table I.15
CEMEX: STANDING IN THE MAIN SEGMENTS OF THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN AFTER THE ACQUISITION OF RINKER
Cement 
(2005 millions of tons)
Premixed concrete 
(2005 millions of m3)
Aggregates 
(2005 millions of tons)
Company Capacity Company Sales Company Sales
Holcim 183 Cemex+Rinker 97 Cemex+Rinker 293
Lafarge 155 Cemex 76 CRH 253
Cemex+Rinker 97 Holcim 40 Lafarge 240
Cemex 94 Lafarge 39 Hanson 240
Heidelberg 86 Heidelberg 28 Vulcan 236
Italcementi 64 Italcementi 21 Martin Marietta 184
Anhui Conch 62 Rinker 21 Cemex 175
Taiheiyo 46 Hanson 20 Holcim 174
Buzzi 34 CRH 19 Rinker 118
Eurocement 31 Tarmac 8 Colas 101
Rinker 3 Vicat/Cimport 7 Heidelberg 98
Others ~1 750 Others ~2 900 Others ~18 000
 Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of CEMEX, “Summary transaction overview”, 27 October 2007. 
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The purchase of Rinker has, however, also made Cemex 
more vulnerable to the crisis in the United States housing market. 
Sales in fact dropped in 2007. Cemex’s broad geographical 
diversification, however, and the fact that there has been a 
sharp increase in demand in other markets, including those in 
South America and the Caribbean, thanks to higher levels of 
public spending on infrastructure, industrial and commercial 
development and housing construction, should cushion the 
impact of the downturn in the United States economy. The 
United States now accounts for a smaller proportion of the 
company’s sales, which have grown in Mexico, Europe and 
the rest of Latin America instead (CEMEX, 2007).
In addition to the purchase of Rinker, Cemex announced 
the start of a US$ 400 million investment project in a cement 
plant in Arizona, one area in the United States in which 
demand is expected to increase. Additionally, the company 
is expanding its production of clinker at the Bayano plant 
in Panama, with an investment of US$ 200 million. 
(iv)  Food and beverages
In the beverages segment, companies have been 
breaking into new markets, either competing or partnering 
with transnational players such as Coca-Cola. In the food 
segment, baked goods, candy and ethnic foods manufacturers 
continued to broaden their international client base, 
and, for the first time, there was a sharp increase in the 
international sales of refrigerated food items. 
Coca-Cola Femsa and Ajegroup have been among the 
main trans-Latin players in the beverages industry. Coca-
Cola Femsa, the second largest distributor of Coca-Cola 
products in the world, bought the Mexican company Jugos 
del Valle in partnership with The Coca-Cola Company. 
Jugos del Valle was an important trans-Latin corporation 
in its own right with plants in Mexico and Brazil and a 
strong market presence in both these countries, as well 
as in the United States. The takeover of Jugos del Valle 
is in the line with Coca-Cola’s ambitions to expand its 
penetration of the juice market. The non-fizzy drinks 
segment has in fact been growing rapidly, and Jugos del 
Valle is well positioned in that segment. Since entering 
the market, and thanks to the convenience of its points of 
sale, Coca-Cola Femsa has managed to conquer a part of 
the market previously served by non-industrialized juice 
producers. This transaction reveals the extraordinary 
growth capacity of companies like Coca-Cola Femsa. It 
also highlights how vulnerable independent trans-Latin 
corporations are vis-à-vis the large transnationals.
50 The trans-Latins in the baked goods, sweets and tortilla market continue to expand their operations. Bimbo bought Panifício Laura in Brazil 
for US$ 300 million, which strengthens its position in the Christmas cakes and Easter eggs segment (AméricaEconomía.com, 2007t). Maseca 
announced US$ 1 billion over the next five years for its expansion in Asia and Europe (América economía, 2006). Meanwhile Arcor invested 
with Bimbo in Mexico to produce confectionery and expand its presence in the Mexican and Central American markets (Expansión, 2007q).
Coca-Cola Femsa also bought The Coca-Cola 
Company’s share in the distribution company Refrigerantes 
Minas Gerais (Remil) in Brazil. This increases Coca-Cola 
Femsa’s operations in Brazil by over 33% and marks the 
first step in a plan to improve the company’s position 
(always within the Coca-Cola system) at strategic points 
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean (Coca Cola 
Femsa, (2007); América economía, 2007n). 
The Peruvian company Ajegroup has gained a solid 
advantage in low-cost products. Through its Mexican 
subsidiary, Ajemex, and the brand name Big Cola, the 
company has successfully competed with the giants of the 
beverages industry in their main market outside the United 
States. The company’s strategy is to sell low-cost products 
in a country where the price-sensitive population is large 
and open to new brands. Ajemex now corners 10% of the 
Mexican market. When Coca-Cola bought out Jugos del 
Valle, Big Cola Ajemex entered the juice segment in Mexico 
with its product Big Country. The company also launched 
a new energy drink and a brand of purified water. These 
moves were in direct imitation of the diversification strategy 
used by the large beverages companies, but Ajemex always 
concentrates on consumers at the base of the pyramid. It also 
has an advantage over the Coca-Cola and Pepsico bottling 
companies: it does not have to pay royalties. Ajemex operates 
through independent distributors who work on commission. 
Mexico was the fourth country in which Ajegroup started 
operating, in 2002. Since then the company has expanded 
into Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, 
Belize, Honduras and Thailand. 
The company’s directors are now considering breaking 
into other markets in Asia. Certain similarities between the 
developing Asian markets and the Latin American one, namely, 
low per-capita income levels, high per-capita soft-drink 
consumption rates and complex distribution arrangements 
and infrastructure, represent an advantage for Ajegroup in 
Thailand, and eventually in China (Latin Finance, 2007j). 
Ajegroup also entered the beer market recently with the 
launch of its brand Franca in Peru. The company shelved 
its plans to enter the beer market in Mexico, however, due 
to a tax on non-returnable bottles, which led the market 
leaders Backus y Johnson (SabMiller) and AmBev (InBev) 
to cut prices and launch new brands there. 
In the food segment, while the leading trans-Latin 
corporations thus far were concentrated on baked goods (breads, 
cakes and cookies), candies and ethnic foods (Bimbo, Arcor, 
Gruma), 2007 marked the international expansion of other 
companies, especially Brazilian ones, in the meat segment.50 
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The main Brazilian meat producers are Sadia and Perdigão. 
Having concentrated on the growing internal market, Sadia 
renewed its international expansion efforts in 2007, built a new 
plant in the United Arab Emirates and opened up production in 
Russia (Valor online, 2007c). Perdigão received considerable 
media attention during the year thanks to its failed attempt at 
a merger with Sadia, rumours of a possible takeover by Kraft, 
which were subsequently denied, and a local acquisition. The 
company’s production is still largely concentrated in Brazil, 
but the purchase of Plusfood in the Netherlands boosted its 
international presence. Plusfood manufactures poultry and beef-
based processed food products, and owns two well-established 
brands in the European market. Perdigão acquired one of these 
and may use the other for up to five years. Plusfood has plants 
in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Rumania. The 
goal of this purchase was to extend the company’s participation 
along the meat products value chain in Europe and to reach 
final consumers, especially in the retail and food services 
segments (Perdigão, 2007).
Beef producers like the Brazilian companies Friboi 
(and its controlling company JBS) and Marfrig have also 
stood out as international investors (América economía, 
2007o). Friboi had acquired Swift & Co.’s Argentine 
operations in 2005. In 2007, it took over the company’s 
global operations. This United States-based company had 
production plants in the United States and Australia and 
worldwide distribution activities. This transaction made 
Friboi the largest beef producer in the world, as well as the 
largest beef exporter, the largest Brazilian transnational in 
the food sector, and the third largest pork enterprise in the 
United States. All this will pave the way for the company’s 
future diversification. The advantages for Friboi include 
gaining access to two important trade blocks (the Atlantic 
and the Pacific) and the possibility of reducing the company’s 
exposoure to phytosanitary risks, exploiting the size of 
the local markets of its operations and lowering its capital 
costs. New opportunities for improving the company’s 
performance also arose in the ensuing overhaul of the 
company’s organization and through the exchange of good 
practices among units, which built on the experience gained 
with the purchase of the Swift’s Argentine unit (JBS, 2007a, 
2007b). In December 2007, JBS bought 50% of Inalca in 
Italy and thereby a controlling stake in the meat and meat 
products manufacturer Cremonini, which will give it access 
to important customers in the retail, food production and 
fast-food sectors in Europe.
Marfrig made a series of acquisitions in Argentina, 
Uruguay and Chile, mainly in the beef sector, but also in 
sheep operations. The costs of producing a kilo of meat 
in these countries are far lower than in the United States, 
Canada or Australia. The company bought Quinto Cuarto 
and Frigorífico Patagonia in Chile, Estancias del Sur, 
Best Beef (Vivoratá) and Quickfood in Argentina and 
Establecimientos Colonia in Uruguay. These acquisitions 
will boost the company’s market position and consolidate 
its position as the fourth largest beef and beef products 
supplier in the world. They will also ensure the company 
diversifies its activities in the region, which will mitigate 
the risks of an outbreak of cattle disease, and enable it to 
increase the scale of its operations. Some of the companies 
Marfrig purchased have well-established brand names and 
a significant client base, which includes supermarkets, 
international restaurant chains and food processing 
companies (Marfrig Group, 2007).51 
(v)  Retailing
In the retail sector, it was the Chilean trans-Latins 
that gained the most ground in the region’s large markets 
(Brazil, Mexico), as they simultaneously stepped up 
their investments in the other markets they had already 
penetrated (Colombia, Peru, Argentina). One Mexican 
company meanwhile expanded its operations into Central 
America and the United States. In each case, the key to 
success has been the integration of retail services and 
financial services.52
Cencosud was the most active Chilean corporation in 
this industry. The group first went international in 1982 
when it invested in Argentina. In 2007, it carried out three 
major transactions: it broke into the Colombian market in a 
partnership with the French company Casino and announced 
the opening of Paris department stores in Colombia; it bought 
the supermarket chain Gbarbosa in Brazil, and it purchased 
the Peruvian chain Wong. Gbarbosa is the largest chain store 
in north eastern Brazil, which, by regional standards is a 
market that still has considerable growth potential.53 These 
investments make Cencosud the third largest retail operator 
in Latin America after Wal-Mart and Carrefour. In Peru, 
51 In January 2008, Marfrig also bought Mirab, an Argentine meat processing company that has plants in Argentina and the United States. 
52 Parallel to this expansion in the retail segment, Chilean trans-Latins in the construction and real-estate sector (Salca, Invasco, Besalco, among 
others) have also been gaining ground. This sector was in fact the largest recipient of Chilean investment abroad in the first semester of 2007. The 
main geographic destinations of these investments were the United States, Argentina and Spain. In addition to investments in housing projects, 
these investments were often associated with the development of infrastructure for the retail industry, such as the construction of shopping 
centres and other kinds of retail facilities (CCS, 2007 and América economía, 2007p).
53 Cencosud bought Gbarbosa from a United States private-equity fund, Acon, which had bought the company from Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart had sold 
it in order to comply with fair competition rulings when it purchased the Brazilian assets of Royal Ahold (Netherlands) (Business Latin America, 
“Shops go shopping”, 26 November 2007).
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the company has multiple projects under way, in addition 
to the Wong chain of supermarkets (the largest retail chain 
in the country), and is planning to open Paris stores there 
too (El Mercurio, 2007b; Business Latin America, 2007k; 
La Tercera, 2007a). Cencosud made a bid for the Gigante 
chain in Mexico, but lost out to Soriana. 
Falabella is banking on economic growth in Chile, Peru, 
Argentina and Colombia and has extended its expansion 
plans in the region.54 The internationalization strategy of 
this group has focused on the “integrated” retail model, 
which involves taking advantage of synergies among the 
various aspects of the business (retail activities per se, 
financial services and real estate) (Calderón, 2006). The 
group has thus expanded and consolidated its international 
presence along these lines and opened new supermarkets 
in Peru, as well as Falabella, Sodimac and Tottus stores at 
the new Mall Plaza in the country (La Tercera, 2007b). 
The most important international transactions in 2007 
for another Chilean company, Ripley, whose operations are 
mainly located in Chile and Peru, were an agreement with 
Palacio de Hierro (Grupo Bal) in Mexico and the opening of 
a possibility in Colombia. The operation in Mexico involved 
the development of a chain of supermarkets targeting low-
income consumers (CNNExpansión, 2007). 
Retail-trade-related financial services have been 
instrumental in the expansion of Chilean companies, 
which made notable strides in this sector in 2007. Falabella 
transformed Financiera CMR in Peru into Banco Falabella, and 
Cencosud broke into the credit card market in Argentina. 
The Mexican group Salinas also used the link developed 
between retailing and financial services, in this case, 
between the retailer Elektra and Banco Azteca, in order 
54 One of the main arguments in favour of the merger with D&S, which was thrown out by the Chilean fair competition authorities, was that it 
would have granted the company the economies of scale and critical mass needed for its internationalization (Qué pasa, 2007). CorpBanca’s 
purchase of Unimarc and its proposal to merge the company with Deca in order to compete with the large players in Chile is also noteworthy. 
BCI, in turn, bought SalcoBrand (Business Latin America, 2007k).
to consolidate its international presence. Both companies 
were set up in Brazil in 2007. Like Cencosud, Salinas 
chose the North East as the entry point for its incursion 
in the Brazilian market. Less densely populated and with 
lower per capita income levels than in the other more 
economically developed regions of the country, the North 
East represents an important untapped market. Banco 
Azteca had had plans to penetrate the Brazilian market 
several years ago, but felt it necessary to make its entry 
coincide with the opening of Elektra stores in the country 
in 2007. The plan now is to inaugurate eight new Elektra 
stores in Recife and Fortaleza and 16 branches of Banco 
Azteca in 2008 and to then expand in the coming years 
into other states in northern and north eastern Brazil. 
The most striking features of Banco Azteca are the 
attention it pays to low-income customers and its capacity 
for credit management in the low-income sector. The 
company has a unique risk assessment system: instead of just 
recording data on loan applicants, the bank’s representatives 
go directly to their place of residence to determine whether 
their earning-power is compatible with the amount of the 
requested loan (Valor online, 2007d, e). Banco Azteca 
has also obtained authorization to open branches in El 
Salvador and Peru and is paving the way for its entry in 
Panama, Guatemala, Honduras and Argentina (Expansión, 
2007n, 2007o, 2007p). The bank also distinguishes itself 
from other financial institutions by setting up branches 
in regions in which traditional banks have shown little or 
no interest. Unlike other banks that target the low-income 
sector, Banco Azteca has the advantage of the commercial 
infrastructure of its affiliated retail stores. 
4.  Conclusions
Although the flows of outward foreign investment in 2007 
were smaller than in the previous year, it is clear that 
the largest Latin American companies are still actively 
consolidating their international presence and that a broader 
range of production sectors are receiving Latin American 
investment. The strong position of companies operating 
in sectors related to natural resources has enabled them to 
extend their operations geographically and, albeit slowly, to 
increase the value added of their products. Other companies 
have benefited from the growth of consumer demand in the 
region and have managed to build on the experience gained 
in domestic and neighbouring markets to conquer niches in 
new destinations and countries, in and outside the region. 
Given the current situation in the international market, 
operators in the natural resources sector have been behind 
the most notable expansion efforts. In the other sectors, 
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in which organic growth has been complemented with 
acquisitions, gradual expansion has been the key strategy 
for accumulating the necessary experience. In all cases, 
the constant challenge lies in maintaining the company’s 
foothold in the market in the face of increasingly fierce 
competition and aggressive consolidation. 
E. Final considerations
In 2007, Latin America and the Caribbean was the recipient 
of unprecedented levels of FDI. Whether this is a one-off 
situation or marks the start of a prolonged period of high 
investment levels will depend on the extent of the economic 
slowdown in the United States and its repercussions in the 
regional economy. The most vulnerable sector as far as FDI 
is concerned consists of the export-oriented manufacturing 
industries in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, which depend 
directly and to a great extent on demand in the United States 
market. The determining factor in other sectors will be the 
extent of contagion among the economies of the region 
(especially for market-seeking investment) and worldwide 
(for natural-resource-seeking investment). Investments 
could be affected in general by shrinking credit markets. 
These factors could also influence the outward investments 
of Latin American countries. 
More than the variations in the volumes of FDI 
entering the region, the critical issue is how they have 
evolved structurally. The extent to which FDI contributes 
to development in the region depends at least as much, 
if not more, on the quality, as on the volume, of that 
investment. In a globalized economy, attracting investment 
in activities that generate business capacity, innovation 
and jobs for skilled workers requires world-class levels 
of competitiveness because the competition for FDI 
(especially FDI with these characteristics) has become a 
worldwide one. Factors such as logistical performance, 
the availability of skilled labour, and the presence of, or 
capacity to develop, a supplier network are now key factors 
for improving the region’s position in the international 
production systems. This issue is addressed in light of 
ICT equipment in chapter II.
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Annex
Table I-A-1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
BY COUNTRY AND SUBREGION, 1998-2007




1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Anguilla 17.9 28.1 38.0 39.7 29.6 33.2 29.4 86.7 117.3 164.0 n.a.
Antigua and Barbuda 22.8 22.8 32.1 43.1 98.5 65.9 166.3 80.4 213.6 337.3 n.a.
Argentina 5 629.3 7 290.7 23 987.7 10 418.3 2 166.1 2 148.9 1 652.0 4 124.7 5 265.2 5 037.3 5 720.4
Bahamas 91.0 146.9 149.3 250.3 102.4 152.8 190.2 273.6 563.9 705.7 580.1 a
Barbados 12.4 15.8 17.4 19.4 18.6 17.4 58.3 -12.1 62.0 n.a. n.a.
Belize 26.2 17.7 53.6 23.3 61.2 25.4 -10.9 111.5 126.1 100.2 92.0 a 
Bolivia 370.3 949.3 1 010.5 733.9 703.3 674.1 194.9 82.6 -290.8 277.8 163.6
Brazil 8 014.6 31 913.0 28 576.0 32 779.2 22 457.4 16 590.2 10 143.5 18 145.9 15 067.0 18 782.0 34 584.9
Chile 3 332.1 4 627.7 8 760.9 4 860.0 4 199.8 2 549.9 4 307.4 7 172.7 6 983.8 7 357.7 14 457.3
Colombia 2 409.6 2 828.8 1 507.9 2 436.5 2 541.9 2 133.7 1 720.5 3 015.6 10 240.4 6 463.5 9 028.1
Costa Rica 343.3 613.1 619.5 408.6 460.4 659.4 575.1 617.3 861.0 1 469.0 1 888.8
Cuba 104.8 206.6 178.2 448.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica 25.8 6.5 18.0 17.6 17.1 20.1 31.5 26.2 19.2 26.8 n.a.
Dominican Republic 265.5 699.8 1 337.8 952.9 1 079.1 916.8 613.0 909.0 1 122.7 1 459.4 1 698.0
Ecuador 545.2 870.0 648.4 720.0 1 329.8 783.3 871.5 836.9 493.4 270.7 178.5
El Salvador 21.7 1 103.7 215.9 173.4 279.0 470.2 141.7 376.3 511.1 218.9 1 525.6
Grenada 22.0 48.7 41.6 37.4 58.8 54.5 89.2 65.0 70.2 85.2 n.a.
Guatemala 88.8 672.8 154.6 229.6 455.5 110.6 131.0 154.7 226.7 353.8 535.8
Guyana 72.3 44.0 46.0 67.1 56.0 43.6 26.1 30.0 76.8 102.4 n.a.
Haiti 2.5 10.8 30.0 13.3 4.4 5.7 13.8 5.9 26.0 160.0 n.a.
Honduras 64.8 99.0 237.3 381.7 304.2 275.2 402.8 546.7 599.8 674.2 815.9
Jamaica 148.4 369.1 523.7 468.3 613.9 481.1 720.7 601.6 682.5 882.2 n.a.
Mexico 10 680.9 12 416.2 13 712.4 17 942.1 29 506.8 21 152.9 16 589.3 22 777.1 20 960.2 19 211.0 23 230.2
Montserrat 3.5 2.6 8.2 2.3 0.5 0.6 2.1 2.3 0.8 2.2 n.a.
Nicaragua 99.6 218.2 337.3 266.5 150.2 203.9 201.3 250.0 241.1 282.3 335.3
Panama 501.8 1 203.1 864.4 623.9 467.1 98.6 770.8 1 012.3 962.1 2 574.2 1 825.1
Paraguay 140.1 341.9 94.5 104.1 84.2 10.0 27.4 37.7 52.8 110.0 142.2 a
Peru 2 443.4 1 644.0 1 940.0 809.7 1 144.3 2 155.8 1 335.0 1 599.0 2 578.7 3 466.5 5 342.6
Saint Kitts and Nevis 20.9 31.9 57.7 96.2 88.2 79.8 75.6 46.1 93.0 110.4 n.a.
Saint Lucia 33.1 83.4 82.8 53.8 58.8 51.9 106.4 76.5 78.2 233.9 n.a.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 48.8 89.0 56.8 37.7 21.0 34.0 55.2 65.7 40.1 109.1 n.a.
Suriname -17.5 9.1 -61.5 -148.0 -26.8 -73.6 -76.1 -37.3 27.9 -163.4 n.a.
Trinidad and Tobago 509.8 729.8 643.3 679.5 834.9 790.7 808.3 998.1 939.7 882.7 n.a.
Uruguay 135.2 164.1 235.3 273.5 296.8 193.7 416.4 332.4 847.4 1 319.1 532.8
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2 111.0 4 985.0 2 890.0 4 701.0 3 683.0 782.0 2 040.0 1 483.0 2 589.0 -590.0 646.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. The data considered are based on the most recently available official 
figures as at 30 April 2008.
a  Extrapolation based on data for the third quarter.
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Table I-A-2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
BY DESTINATION SECTOR, 1998-2007 a
(Millions of dollars) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina 
Natural resources 1 324 17 845 2 736 898 1 133 -278 2 265 … … …
Manufactures 1 147 1 950 1 487 49 988 1 145 1 221 … … …
Services 3 648 3 153 4 750 1 260 -461 539 123 … … …
Others 1 173 1 038 1 445 -42 489 246 665 … … …
Bolivia 
Natural resources 582 472 441 566 721 356 168 288 390 431
Manufactures 16 152 93 87 91 62 90 58 52 89
Services 427 386 299 224 187 149 126 58 140 219
Brazil
Natural resources 142 423 649 1 494 638 1 487 1 073 2 194 1 542 4 751
Manufactures 2 766 7 002 5 070 7 001 7 555 4 506 10 708 6 527 8 462 13 481
Services 20 362 20 147 24 157 12 547 10 585 6 909 8 485 12 915 12 702 16 073
Chile 
Natural resources 2 528 1 374 354 1 153 2 006 403 350 595 1 140 434
Manufactures 530 829 253 809 218 234 430 199 91 69
Services 2 980 7 023 2 432 3 058 1 157 649 3 856 1 003 1 938 867
Colombia
Natural resources 85 -47 123 1 044 915 905 1 741 3 282 3 585 4 476
Manufactures 785 505 556 261 308 289 188 5 518 803 1 516
Services 1 959 1 049 1 758 1 236 910 526 1 086 1 441 2 075 3 036
Costa Rica …
Natural resources 42 50 -11 1 -9 -36 51 37 66 -9
Manufactures 438 366 308 237 486 395 456 374 432 709
Services 129 200 126 223 182 211 284 450 967 1 146
Others 2 3 -14 0 0 6 4 -1 4 39
Dominican Republic
Natural resources 0 0 0 7 23 78 60 31 96 -170
Manufactures 177 183 154 167 223 103 321 199 206 181
Services 0 41 43 73 45 45 100 175 131 74
Others (includes free zones) 492 1 067 673 796 600 326 448 718 1 014 1 619
Ecuador
Natural resources 769 605 682 1 139 503 198 458 222 -69 -396
Manufactures 30 8 10 59 67 79 115 75 90 369
Services 71 36 29 132 214 594 264 196 250 206
El Salvador
Natural resources 23 -16 -11 30 9 -2 22 0 29 10
Manufactures 91 18 32 65 47 48 41 317 17 21
Services 914 210 133 159 143 12 313 191 182 1 315
Others (maquila) 77 3 19 26 10 71 31 4 0 101
Hondurasb
Natural resources 3 113 81 49 59 81 107 74 96 13
Manufactures 23 47 168 59 21 69 254 227 164 168
Services 72 78 82 123 122 144 183 294 408 444
Mexico
Natural resources 79 226 292 86 344 96 193 206 360 1 198
Manufactures 5 010 9 166 10 017 5 850 8 716 7 551 13 042 11 772 9 417 9 808
Services 3 277 4 342 7 693 23 591 13 956 8 944 9 641 8 845 7 649 8 723
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Nicaragua
Natural resources 31 25 8 7 0 1 1 0 15 11
Manufactures 26 32 72 55 70 48 33 87 63 121
Services 138 243 186 89 134 153 216 155 209 203
Panama
Natural resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 … …
Manufactures -43 34 0 316 -76 3 41 -62 … …
Services 1 364 632 396 217 98 566 1 092 1 693 … …
Others 39 5 228 -66 76 166 -32 -696 … …
Paraguay c
Natural resources … … … … … … … 19 -2 -36
Manufactures … … … … … … … -1 -17 96
Services … … … … … … … 10 53 51
Peru
Natural resources 193 336 37 65 53 1 244 283 735 262
Manufactures 132 130 70 162 713 22 -82 13 429 30
Services 528 935 2 563 558 245 29 -280 -273 329 228
Trinidad y Tobago
Natural resources 585 449 614 787 695 710 867 813 … …
Manufactures 11 7 -38 -13 13 12 17 15 … …
Services 16 18 2 30 43 30 49 47 … …
Others 119 169 102 31 40 56 65 65 … …
Uruguay … … …
Natural resources … … … -15 48 198 142 264 … …
Manufactures … … … 12 54 40 23 26 … …
Services … … … 281 145 149 145 248 … …
Others … … … 18 -53 29 22 310 … …
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) … … …
Petroleum 1 790 1 919 1 206 2 016 532 -25 -529 1 007 -1 958 -180
Finance 604 41 590 403 526 181 335 413 401 673
Others 2 591 930 2 905 1 264 -276 2 487 1 712 1 537 417 41
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures available as at 30 April 2008. 
a  These data are based on official figures of Argentina (National Directorate of International Accounts (DNCI) of the National Statistics and Census Institute (INDEC), net income); 
Bolivia (Central Bank, gross income); Brazil (Central Bank, gross income); Chile (Foreign Investment Committee, investments made); Colombia (Bank of the Republic, net income); 
Ecuador (Central Bank, net income); El Salvador (Central Reserve Bank, net income); Honduras (Central Bank, net income); Mexico (Department of the Economy, net income); 
Nicaragua (Central Bank, net income); Nicaragua (Central Bank, net income); Panama (General Comptroller of the Republic, net income); Paraguay (Central Bank, net income); 
Peru (Proinversión, net income); Uruguay (Central Bank, net income); Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Central Bank, net income); Dominican Republic (Central Bank,net income) 
and Trinidad and Tobago (Central Bank, net income). Data do not necessarily coincide with balance of payments.
b  Includes maquila from 2004 onwards.
c  Extrapolation based on data for the third quarter of 2007. 
Table I-A-2 (concluded)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Table I-A-3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1998-2007 a
(Millions of dollars)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina
Netherlands 1 073 424 378 1 302 -436 -170 983 … … …
United States 920 1 307 947 533 342 -251 618 … … …
France 1 310 1 536 656 521 -624 -185 389 … … …
Germany 486 272 69 -100 381 112 336 … … …
Chile 277 201 96 -245 22 24 171 … … …
Others 3 227 20 245 8 273 155 2 464 2 121 1 777 … … …
Bolivia
United States 357 339 368 351 289 189 131 … … …
Netherlands 96 106 47 58 12 5 53 … … …
Spain 46 10 46 59 268 63 40 … … …
United Kingdom 7 21 25 56 50 63 27 … … …
Colombia 0 2 0 3 3 4 26 … … …
Others 523 532 344 349 377 242 86 … … …
Brazil
Netherlands 3 365 2 042 2 228 1 892 3 372 1 445 7 705 3 208  3 506  8 129 
United States 4 692 8 088 5 399 4 465 2 615 2 383 3 978 4 644  4 522  6 073 
Luxemburg 1 807 2 115 2 035 1 755 1 554 1 910 1 522 1 078  1 974  1 604 
Spain 5 120 5 702 9 593 2 767 587 710 1 055 1 220  1 564  2 202 
Germany 413 481 375 1 047 628 508 795 1 388 867  1 801 
Others 7 169 8 717 9 318 9 114 10 019 5 943 5 206 10 097 7 328 7 857
Chile
Canada 1 022 518 744 142 913 188 368 84 1 833 334
United States 1 337 1 389 788 1 808 551 373 123 -15 337 266
Colombia 1 0 -1 19 0 0 0 24 2 194
Spain 896 4 620 643 386 248 160 3 742 207 75 107
Australia 422 17 39 663 128 51 135 286 206 105
Others 2 361 2 681 826 2 001 1 541 513 269 1 214 715 366
Colombia
United States 413 545 120 223 784 274 874 1 399 1 525 1 266
Brazil 2 -1 5 1 10 1 7 8 19 529
Panama 125 180 259 129 40 135 10 208 240 477
Mexico 34 6 23 12 21 19 16 1 063 31 340
Spain 469 154 479 161 107 155 136 599 492 289
Others 2 165 1 444 2 379 1 145 717 615 917 4 845 865 870
Costa Rica
United States 486 346 280 257 328 354 557 532 695 1 025
Netherlands 1 -1 1 -1 219 26 15 0 26 247
Germany 11 8 10 3 1 58 16 7 25 76
Switzerland -1 2 2 3 16 12 31 -11 10 66
Spain 0 0 22 26 0 8 7 14 11 57
Others 116 266 88 170 98 118 180 297 701 419
Dominican Republic
United States 180 181 202 433 382 462 177 457 685 796
Spain 206 457 190 193 35 -13 127 215 229 258
Canada 128 95 133 10 18 -23 274 111 137 163
Switzerland 8 17 14 2 4 6 18 48 7 80
United Kingdom 23 76 17 2 0 -25 21 95 70 78
Others 156 513 398 438 477 206 291 197 333 322
Ecuador
United States 364 230 235 317 441 -47 79 -77 -160 79
France 4 0 0 0 84 70 15 -1 8 78
Panama 19 14 11 74 39 85 94 76 67 72
Spain 1 0 86 85 1 3 1 3 7 72
China 16 20 -8 -20 12 60
Others 412 336 309 770 203 743 661 511 336 -184
El Salvador
Panama … 7 7 6 15 -1 2 42 68 841
United States … 143 110 107 146 63 -5 23 322 499
Mexico … -14 0 2 4 11 531 33 7 59
Costa Rica … 17 5 16 6 -1 0 -1 3 34
Spain … 39 0 52 38 2 34 0 0 10
Others … 24 52 95 0 55 -155 418 141 -9
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Hondurasb
United States 35 112 100 98 171 195 192 303 339 354
United Kingdom 7 3 16 11 1 -3 61 48 49 83
Mexico 1 5 0 7 1 4 36 45 38 82
Canada 12 52 18 19 22 22 79 17 108 40
France 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 16 3 21
Others 43 65 196 95 7 76 181 173 139 44
Mexico
United States 5 467 7 426 12 694 21 410 12 935 9 281 8 528 10 487 11 021 9 340
Netherlands 1 071 1 089 2 683 2 620 1 495 892 3 332 2 435 3 016 2 979
Spain 345 1 042 2 113 2 730 4 427 3 004 7 450 1 498 979 1 903
France 128 168 -2 483 394 352 530 170 435 701 1 413
Canada 215 625 700 1 024 221 262 490 414 533 780
Others 1 150 3 354 2 073 1 328 3 325 2 607 2 893 5 529 1 171 3 290
Panama
Argentina 6 4 2 -5 0 0 5 19 … …
Colombia -4 -19 -49 30 361 26 12 -283 … …
Costa Rica -5 -8 3 11 13 -1 -6 13 … …
Ecuador 6 -36 -12 -2 -15 0 4 3 … …
Mexico 52 138 173 -70 -19 29 -9 -28 … …
Others 1 244 1 217 535 684 90 28 739 1 185 … …
Paraguayc
United States … … … … 20 28 2 25 68 85
Panama … … … … 0 -2 -3 -7 5 25
Brazil … … … … -4 -18 0 10 32 13
Netherlands … … … … 14 -11 0 15 21 12
Argentina … … … … -2 12 -7 9 2 11
Others … … … … -20 15 35 -16 -17 -3
Peru
United States 206 246 120 -89 -136 37 165 262 408 180
United Kingdom 258 749 163 238 78 86 -323 0 505 151
Germany 12 12 12 17 7 0 1 1 2 54
Spain 31 24 1 971 -26 42 2 -400 -314 -9 52
Colombia 34 9 1 7 534 2 0 5 42 49
Others 311 364 403 638 484 -75 440 68 545 33
Trinidad and Tobago
United States … 275 316 372 353 376 698 694 … …
United Kingdom … 232 255 307 291 297 170 165 … …
Germany … 8 14 37 35 36 43 41 … …
India … 57 11 21 20 20 24 16 … …
Canada … 9 2 7 7 12 3 1 … …
Others … 63 82 91 85 68 61 22 … …
Uruguay
Argentina … … … 14 -28 270 182 397 … …
Brazil … … … -6 40 0 38 203 … …
Panama … … … 103 37 31 28 106 … …
Paraguay … … … 77 14 -3 2 35 … …
Bahamas … … … 20 29 8 0 29 … …
Others … … … 90 101 110 82 78 … …
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Cayman Islands 1 206 196 44 77 6 18 0 400 … …
United States 144 78 115 116 71 997 176 369 … …
Spain 15 22 60 24 6 11 21 31 … …
Netherlands 29 74 84 448 74 51 9 26 … …
Panama 29 35 30 22 7 21 4 11 … …
Others 185 538 294 365 180 85 293 25 … …
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 30 April 2008. 
a Data based on official figures of Argentina (National Directorate of International Accounts (DNCI) of the National Statistics and Census Institute (INDEC), net income); Bolivia 
(Central Bank, gross income); Brazil (Central Bank, gross income); Chile (Foreign Investment Committee, investments made); Colombia (Bank of the Republic, net income); Ecuador 
(Central Bank, net income); El Salvador (Central Reserve Bank, net income); Honduras (Central Bank, net income); Mexico (Department of the Economy, net income); Panama 
(General Comptroller of the Republic, net income); Peru (Proinversión, net income); Paraguay (Central Bank, net income); Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (data obtained from 
the publication Petróleo y Otros Documentos Estadísticos of the Office of the Superintendent of Foreign Investments (SIEX), net income); Dominican Republic (Central Bank, 
net income) and Trinidad and Tobago (Central Bank, net income). Data do not necessarily coincide with balance of payments.
b Includes maquila from 2004 onwards.
c Extrapolation based on data for the third quarter.
Table I-A-3 (concluded)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Table I-A-4
LATIN AMERICA: TOP 60 NON-FINANCIAL TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
BY CONSOLIDATED SALES, 2006
(Millions of dollars)
Ranking Corporation Country Sector Consolidated sales Main subsidiaries
1 General Motors United States Automotive 26 430 Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina
2 Wal-Mart United States Commerce 24 882 b Mexico, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica Honduras, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Argentina
3 Telefónica de Spain Spain Telecommunications 23 166 Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador
4 Volkswagen Germany Automotive 17 884 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
5 Repsol-YPF Spain Oil/Gas 16 900 Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia
6 Telmex/América 
Móvil a
Mexico Telecommunications 15 400 c Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic 
7 DaimlerChrysler United States Automotive 15 111 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
8 Ford United States Automotive 11 170 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
9 Nestlé Switzerland Food 9 768 Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile
10 Royal Ducth-Shell Netherlands/United 
Kingdom
Oil/Gas 9 757 d Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) p
11 Cargill United States Agro-industry 9 609 Brazil, Argentina
12 Endesa Spain Energy 8 920 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru
13 ExxonMobil United States Oil/Gas 8 208 e Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of), Argentina p
14 Carrefour France Commerce 7 825 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
15 Nissan Japan Automotive/Auto parts 7 820 f Mexico, Brazil
16 Chevron United States Oil/Gas 7 532 e Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of), Argentina, 
Trinidad and Tobago p
17 AES Corp United States Electricity 7 200 Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Panama
18 Delphi United States Automotive/Auto parts 6 763 Mexico, Brazil
19 Arcelor Mittal Luxembourg/India Iron and steel/Metallurgy 6 747 g Brazil, Mexico
20 BHP Billiton Australia/United 
Kingdom
Mining 6 746 Chile, Brazil, Peru, Colombia
21 Hewlett Packard United States Electronics/Computing 6 532 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
22 Anglo-American United Kingdom Mining 6 433 Chile, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
23 Unilever Netherlands/United 
Kingdom
Consumer goods 6 428 Brazil, Argentina, Mexico
24 Fiat Italia Automotive 6 323 Brazil, Argentina
25 Bunge United States Agro-industry 6 100 h Brazil, Argentina, Mexico
26 Italia Telecom Italia Telecommunications 5 572 Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Cuba, Bolivia
27 General Electric United States Electrical equipment, 
Machinery, Computing
4 922 Mexico, Brazil
28 PETROBRAS a Brazil Oil/Gas 4 437 i Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of), 
Bolivia, Mexico
29 Siemens Germany Electrical equipment/ 
Electronics/Computing
3 911 Mexico, Brazil
30 Techint a Argentina Iron and steel/Metallurgy 3 761 j Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of), Colombia, 
Guatemala, Ecuador
31 Caterpillar United States Machinery/Equipment 3 600 Brazil, Mexico
32 British American 
Tobacco
United Kingdom Tobacco 3 552 Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of), Argentina, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago
33 PepsiCo United States Beverages/Alcoholic 
beverages
3 470 k Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
34 Peugeot-Citroën France Automotive/Auto parts 3 212 Brazil, Argentina
35 Dow Chemicals United States Petrochemicals 4 401 d Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia
36 Sanmina SCI United States Electronics 3 110 l Mexico, Brazil
37 Procter & Gamble United States Hygiene/Cleaning 3 100 m Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica, Venezuela (Bol. 
Rep. of)
38 IBERDROLA Spain Electricity 3 035 Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia
39 BP Group United Kingdom Oil/Gas 2 782 n Colombia, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of), Bolivia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Argentina
40 Portugal Telecom Portugal Telecommunications 2 777 Brazil
41 IBM United States Computing 2 762 h Brazil, Argentina, Mexico
42 Avon United States Hygiene/Cleaning 2 743 Brazil, Mexico, Colombia
43 Philip Morris United States Tobacco 2 677 Mexico, Brazil
44 Basf Germany Chemicals/
Pharmaceuticals
2 626 Brazil, Mexico
45 The Coca-Cola Co. United States Beverages/Beers 2 450 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
46 Électricité de France France Electricity 2 376 Mexico y Brazil
47 Honda Japan Automotive/Auto 
parts
2 347 g Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
48 Samsung Corp. Republic of Korea Electronics 2 336 Brazil, Mexico




2 200 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
50 Sonae SGPS Portugal Commerce 2 067 o Brazil
51 Cencosud a Chile Commerce 2 058 c Argentina q
52 Renault France Automotive/Auto 
parts
2 047 g Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico
53 Bayer Germany Petrochemicals/
Chemicals
2 042 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
54 Honda Japan Automotive/Auto 
parts
1 861 g Brazil, Mexico
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55 Kimberly Clark Co. United States Pulp/Paper 1 858 l Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
56 Danone France Food 1 808 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
57 Lear United States Automotive/Auto 
parts
1 803 l Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
58 Intel United States Electronics 1 800 Costa Rica
59 Nokia Finland Electronics 1 769 g Brazil, Mexico
60 Bosch Germany Automotive/Auto 
parts
1 737 g Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the annual reports of each company, América economía (2007), Expansión (2007), 
Portal Exame (2007), Gazeta mercantil (2007), Semana (2007) and Mercado (2007).
a  Company whose origins are in Latin America (trans-Latin).
b  This figure corresponds to its sales in Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala and Argentina.
c  This figure corresponds to its sales in Latin America but outside its country of origin.
d  This figure corresponds to its sales in Brazil and Argentina.
e  This figure corresponds to its sales in Brazil, Colombia and Argentina.
f  Estimated sales. Calculated on the basis of information on the number of vehicles sold and sales in 2005. Only information on the number of vehicles sold is available for 2006. 
g  This figure corresponds to its sales in Brazil.
h  This figure corresponds to its sales in Brazil and Argentina.
i  This figure corresponds to its sales in Argentina.
j  This figure corresponds to the sales of its subsidiaries: Tenaris in Brazil, Ternium in Mexico and Techint E&C in Mexico and Brazil.
k  This figure corresponds to its sales in Mexico y Argentina.
l  This figure corresponds to its sales in Mexico.
m  This figure corresponds to its sales in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.
n  This figure corresponds to its sales in Colombia and Argentina.
o  In October 2006 the company sold 50% of Sonae Sierra Brasil.
p  Localization of upstream petroleum operations and exploration and production activities.
q  Since 2007 the company also has operations in Brazil, Colombia and Peru.
Table I-A-5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FLOWS OF OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,  
BY COUNTRY, OFFICIAL FIGURES, 1998-2007
(Millions of dollars) 
1993-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina 1 693.7 2 325.5 1 730.3 901.0 160.9 -627.1 773.8 676.0 1 311.0 2 119.0 1 196.0
Barbados 2.1 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.5 3.9 9.2 3.0 n.a.
Belize 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 2.0 0.6 1.2 a
Bolivia 2.1 2.8 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.0
Brazil 697.4 2 721.0 1 690.0 2 281.6 -2 257.6 2 482.1 249.3 9 807.0 2 516.7 28 7 067.0
Chile 938.6 1 483.4 2 557.9 3 986.6 1 609.7 343.2 1 606.3 1 563.1 2 182.7 2 875.6 3 830.3
Colombia 356.5 796.0 115.5 325.3 16.1 856.8 937.7 142.4 4 661.9 1 098.3 370.3
Costa Rica 5.0 4.8 5.0 8.5 9.5 34.1 26.9 60.6 -43.0 98.0 227.5
El Salvador 0.5 1.0 53.8 -5.0 -9.7 -25.7 18.6 -53.3 112.9 -26.4 99.8
Honduras 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.8 -6.2 1.0 0.6 1.0
Jamaica 53.8 82.0 94.9 74.3 89.0 73.9 116.3 60.0 101.0 85.4 n.a.
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 404.0 890.8 1 253.5 4 431.9 6 474.0 5 758.5 5 478.9
Paraguay 3.2 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.8 -2.0 5.5 6.0 6.4 4.0 7.6 a
Peru 15.2 62.0 128.0 0.0 74.4 0.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0 0.0 264.1 25.2 150.0 106.4 225.2 25.4 341.0 370.0 0.0
Uruguay 2.6 9.3 -3.0 -0.6 6.2 13.7 15.1 17.7 36.3 -2.4 3.5
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 479.8 1 043.0 872.0 521.0 204.0 1 026.0 1 318.0 619.0 1 167.0 2 076.0 2 237.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the most recent official figures available as at 2 April 2008. 
a  Extrapolation based on data for the third quarter.
Table I-A-4 (concluded)
Ranking Corporation Country Sector Consolidated sales Main subsidiaries
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Chapter II
The information and communications 
technology hardware industry in  
Latin America: investments and  
business strategies
A. Introduction
This chapter analyses the global changes that have taken place in the information and communications 
technology (ICT) hardware industry, the effects of those changes on the sector’s leading firms and 
on foreign investment patterns, and the effects thereof on the host economies.1
The electronics industry, in which ICT hardware is 
increasingly important, has made a significant contribution 
to the economic growth and development of many Asian 
economies, thus demonstrating the industry’s great capacity 
in that regard (Schipper and de Haan, 2005; Cassen and 
Lall, 1996; Krugman, 1994; Rodrik, 1995; Ernst, 2004). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the potential of this 
industry as a source of foreign currency, employment, and 
technological know-how, has been recognized, so substantial 
resources and efforts have been devoted to attracting FDI 
into the ICT hardware sector.
The electronics industry has undergone far-reaching 
changes over the last two decades. Trade liberalization, rapid 
technological change, particularly the development of ICTs, 
and lower transport costs have changed the behaviour of 
the sector’s large transnational enterprises and, hence, its 
industrial organization. One of the most significant changes 
in the global industry, which has been particularly forceful 
in the electronics sector, has been the rise of international 
systems of integrated production (ISIPs).
In this new setting, transnational enterprises seek global 
integration; on the basis of costs, available skills and the 
1 In this chapter, ICT hardware is defined as encompassing any equipment, product or component that is used to transmit, process or store information 
and data, namely: (i) telecommunications and telephone network equipment; (ii) personal computers; (iii) television sets; and (iv) their basic 
components, both active (semiconductors, integrated circuits, microprocessors and memories) and passive (printed circuits) and displays.
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business climate in different locations, they may decide 
to establish their operations anywhere in the world. The 
strategies employed by the leading ICT hardware firms 
aim to consolidate their leadership under these new sets 
of conditions.
These transformations in the industry and these new 
business strategies have had an effect on developing countries. 
Nonetheless, the repercussions are not uniform because the 
capacity for attracting FDI, and its effects on the receiving 
economy, depend on the skills and characteristics of each 
country. It is therefore important to analyse the impact that 
changes in the global ICT hardware industry have in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries and to attempt to determine 
how they can benefit or take better advantage of new trends.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section B 
describes and analyses how the global ICT hardware 
industry has changed, focusing particularly on ISIPs; 
Section C reviews the key repercussions of these 
changes worldwide; Section D addresses the current 
situation of the ICT hardware industry in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and assesses the regional effects of 
the global changes, particularly in the cases of Mexico 
and Brazil, which account for the majority of ICT 
hardware exports and FDI entering the region. Lastly, 
Section E sets out conclusions and identifies the main 
challenges facing the region, presenting a number of 
policy implications.
B. Changes in the global industry
Over the last two decades, the electronics industry, and 
hence the ICT hardware industry, has undergone far-reaching 
changes. This section focuses on one of the most important 
of such changes, given its repercussion on FDI, namely 
the de-verticalization of production chains and consequent 
emergence of ISIPs.
Three phenomena in particular have facilitated and 
encouraged the emergence and development of ISIPs. The 
first is trade liberalization, which has opened up national 
markets and promoted the expansion of FDI.2 The second is 
rapid technological change and, particularly, the development 
of communication technologies. Internet use, in particular, 
has drastically cut the costs of long-distance information 
exchange (Ernst and Kim, 2002; UNCTAD, 2002; van Liemt, 
2007). The third phenomenon is the growing competition 
in the international manufacturing market, which has 
fuelled a search for new forms of industrial organization 
allowing for cost reduction (efficiency-seeking), access 
to markets under better conditions (market-seeking) and 
access to specialized resources (strategic-assets-seeking 
investments).
Apart from the major repercussions that the emergence 
of ISIP has had on FDI flows, its spillover effects on local 
economies also need to be taken into account. Understanding 
the logic and functioning of ISIP is not only essential to 
understand the business strategies that promote FDI, but 
also to identify the challenges and opportunities for the 
region’s countries, in the face of this relatively new global 
industrial organization.
1.	 International	systems	of	integrated	production	(ISIP)
The concept of ISIP is closely related to that of global value 
chains;3 it entails a division of the links of the production 
chain among various subsidiaries, associated firms, or plants 
of a given firm throughout different geographic locations. 
The way in which a country or region participates in the 
different links of the global chain has far-reaching implications 
2 Liberalization includes four elements: liberalization of trade, capital flows and foreign investment policies; and privatizations. The overall 
effect of these four elements can be summarized as a substantial reduction in the costs and risks of international transactions, and increasing 
international liquidity. Global corporations have benefited enormously from these changes (Ernst and Kim, 2002).
3 The value chain concept relates to the wide range of activities that firms undertake to produce a given product, ranging from its conception 
through to its use by the customer. The chain includes activities such as design, production, marketing, and after-sales service. These activities 
can either be done by a single firm or else distributed among several. The links into which the value chain can be broken down vary substantially 
from industry to industry (Kaplinsky, 2000).
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in terms of economic and social development, because the 
activities associated with each link use resources (capital, 
technology, labour or natural resources) with different 
degrees of intensity. They also have different possibilities 
for productive linkage and, therefore, imply different 
alternatives for local capacity development.4 Analysis of the 
global value chain is also useful for identifying the power 
relations or hierarchy, which has direct repercussions on 
the industry’s global organization, and the spaces assigned 
to the countries that participate in those chains.
ISIPs are established to optimize production, 
marketing and innovation activities by locating products, 
processes or functions in different countries or regions 
(Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang, 2004, p. 2).5 ISIPs link 
transnational firms with their own subsidiaries, affiliated 
enterprises, suppliers and partners, through strategic 
alliances that encompass transactions and coordination 
agreements within firms and between them (Ernst and 
Kim, 2002). These systems or networks are associated 
with spatial separation of activities of the value chain, 
namely the separation of the design, development and 
marketing of the product from manufacturing processes 
(Ernst and Lüthje, 2003). Nonetheless, the characteristics 
of the networks vary between the different industrial 
sectors and even within them.
ISIPs are characterized by defined hierarchical 
relations between the participants, for which Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz (1994) identified two general principles:
ISIPs dominated by producers involve transnational 
firms in which power is exercised vertically from 
the parent company down to its subsidiaries, 
e.g. automotive industry systems dominated by 
assembly firms.
ISIPs dominated by buyers are normally developed 
by large brand-name retailers which determine the 
specifications of the products in question and their 
•
•
marketing, but subcontract production activities 
to independent enterprises. An example of such 
systems is the global textile and garment industry 
dominated by large retailers such as Wal-Mart and 
JCPenney.
What distinguishes ISIP from previous productive 
organization strategies implemented by transnational firms 
is the accentuated global integration of participants and 
the emphasis on overall systemic efficiency (Kaplinsky, 
2000). In other words, competition on the international 
market occurs increasingly between production systems 
directed by transnational firms rather than between 
individual enterprises (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 121).
The leading ISIP enterprises concentrate on the activities 
they consider decisive for creating and strengthening their 
competitive advantages, such as product development, 
marketing and brand management, while also setting and 
supervising technical and quality standards throughout the 
network (Sturgeon, 2002; UNCTAD, 2002). The leading 
firms “de-verticalize” their internal activities, outsourcing 
manufacturing processes. This trend is particularly clear 
in the electronics industry.
The geographic dispersion of the links in the value 
chain has also affected research and development (R&D) 
activities. Although most of such activities are still 
undertaken in developed countries, there is a growing 
trend to shift them to subsidiaries in the developing world, 
and even outsource them to locally owned firms in such 
countries (UNCTAD, 2005; Ernst, 2006). An example 
is provided by R&D activities in India undertaken by 
General Electric (aircraft turbines, consumer goods 
and medical equipment), and by leading firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry such as AstraZeneca, Novartis 
and Pfizer, among others. Another example are textile 
industry production activities undertaken by Chinese and 
Korean firms (ECLAC, 2007a).
4 The spatial dispersion of production allows the factor intensity of each component, rather than the average factor intensity of the end product, 
to determine the location of production (van Liemt, 2007, p. 4).
5 The specialized bibliography has used different concepts to study ISIP. For example, Sturgeon (2002) defines the concept as “modular production 
networks”, while Ng and Yeats (1999) refer to it as “international production sharing”. Ernst and Kim (2002) refer to global production networks, 
which is possibly the most widespread term. ECLAC has used the term international systems of integrated production (ECLAC, 2004).
6 See Padilla-Pérez (2005), for a more thorough description of these characteristics of the electronics industry.
2.		 International	systems	of	integrated	production		
	 in	the	electronics	industry
Fierce international competition in the electronics 
industry, together with increasing product complexity and 
sophistication, pressure for continuous cost reductions and 
the ever-shorter product lifecycle have generated increasing 
demand for advanced capacities in manufacturing and 
related services.6 Whereas previously, transnational firms 
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could be vertically integrated and remain competitive, 
nowadays it takes a great deal of time, money and energy 
to be an expert in all links of the value chain. For that 
reason, the leading ISIP firms in the electronics industry 
increasingly concentrate on the spheres in which they do 
best (usually the most knowledge-intensive activities): 
creating innovative products and services, managing 
customer relations and developing brand loyalty (Sturgeon 
and Lester, 2002; van Liemt, 2007).
The electronics industry value chain is characterized 
by its high capacity for fragmentation or divisibility. The 
various links or activities have different characteristics in 
terms of scale, knowledge and technological needs; and 
their production can be located in different places (Padilla-
Pérez, 2005). Moreover, the capacity of the electronics 
industry to fragment its activities has increased as a result 
of new communication and transport technologies (Lall, 
Albaladejo and Zhang, 2004). Consequently, product 
design and development (undertaken by specialized firms 
with recognized brands, but without manufacturing assets, 
such as Apple) have become increasingly separated from 
physical production (performed by firms that manufacture 
on a contract basis) (Ernst and Lüthje, 2003).
Figure II.1 shows the supply chain of the electronics 
industry and the level of value added generated in each 
of its links. It displays a U-shaped curve: value added is 
high in research and development and in the design and 
production of strategic inputs; it is lowest in assembly, 
and then rises in after-sales service and brand and market 
development. Generally speaking, the industrial activity 
of developing countries is concentrated in the lower 
value-added links: production of generic inputs, assembly 
and packaging, and distribution and logistics.
Figure II.1
VALUE ADDED IN AN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY SUPPLY CHAIN
ISIPs in the electronics industry have four main categories 
of participant: original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), 
contract manufacturers (CMs), suppliers and design firms 
(see figure II.2).
Figure II.2
GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS IN THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of PRODUCEN (Centro de Inteligencia Estratégica), “Presentación 























































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of R. Padilla-Pérez, Estudio sectorial de la industria electrónica en México, 
Mexico City, Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), 2005.
OEMs, also known as global flagships, are the centre of 
the ISIP and provide strategic and organizational leadership. 
Their advantages are based on greater resources and skills to 
innovate and coordinate transactions and knowledge exchange 
between network elements (Ernst and Kim, 2002).
Contract manufacturing differs from the traditional 
subcontracting of manufacturing or assembly processes, 
which usually make intensive use of labour that is closely 
controlled by the contractor. In contrast, CMs have the 
capacity to develop and undertake complex production 
processes on a global scale (Padilla-Pérez, 2005). They 
also set up their own international production systems to 
supply components and products to OEMs.
In recent years, increasing competition has squeezed 
profit margins in the traditional manufacturing activities of 
CMs. In response, these firms have offered a wider range 
of services, particularly those offering a better chance of 
appropriating value added, e.g. prototype design, component 
and product testing, materials purchase, and even services 
such as product design and supply chain management (van 
Liemt, 2007). In short, this represents a process of “re-
verticalization” or reintegration of the industry.
Outsourcing to CMs enables OEMs to obtain the 
benefits of experience and specialization of the pioneers 
in design, manufacturing and supply chain management. 
OEMs keep control over strategic aspects of administration 
and the supply chain, such as interaction with the customer, 
quality assurance, customer service and the introduction 
of new products (Omelas, 2004; van Liemt, 2007). The 
benefits obtained by OEMs from this strategy are as follows: 
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reduction in operating costs and capital investment, access 
to world-class manufacturing processes, global scale 
manufacturing of the product itself, using the plants of 
CMs located in various countries, and the possibility of 
focusing on key competencies.
Among suppliers (the third category of participant 
in ISIPs) a distinction can be made between leaders and 
secondary suppliers. The first fulfil an intermediation 
function between CMs and secondary suppliers and 
own valuable assets (including technology). In contrast, 
secondary suppliers base their comparative advantages on 
low-cost, speed and flexibility (Ernst and Kim, 2002).
The fourth participant in the electronics industry 
ISIPs are the design houses. These offer highly specialized 
knowledge-intensive services to the first three participants in 
the network (OEMs, CMs and leading suppliers). Recently 
there has been a major boom in design houses in the wake 
of the increasing vertical specialization of R&D activities. 
For complex systems, such as integrated circuits or software, 
development of the product technology is becoming 
increasingly modular, i.e. certain activities in the design 
and development process (mainly routine ones) are done 
as standard procedures and can be outsourced to specialist 
firms such as design houses (Ernst and Lüthje, 2003).
Nonetheless, the different ISIPs in the electronics 
industry have their own characteristics. The greatest network 
development has occurred in the telecommunications 
and computer hardware sectors. For example, IBM’s 
decision to use standardized components in its computers, 
manufactured by other firms, was a key factor in the 
development of contract manufacturing in the electronics 
industry (Lüthje, Schumn and Sproll, 2002). Similarly, 
the decision by CISCO in the 1990s to outsource its 
manufacturing processes had a notable effect on the 
industry by demonstrating the potential benefits to be 
obtained (Lynn, 2005). American-owned OEMs (Hewlett-
Packard, Apple, Cisco and others) make greater use of 
contract manufacturing than their Asian competitors (van 
Liemt, 2007).7
Lastly, participation or integration in ISIPs offers 
major potential benefits to developing countries, such 
as the transfer of advanced knowledge in manufacturing, 
process engineering and product design, together with 
access to international markets (Ernst, 2000 and 2006; 
Mortimore, 2001). ISIP increases the complexity and 
scale of the value chain, thereby creating spaces for 
participation by specialist suppliers (Ernst, 2000). 
Participation by locally owned firms is initially possible 
in assembly or manufacturing activities; but there is 
also increasing potential for participation in design and 
R&D activities. In this regard, the vertical specialization 
of R&D activities opens up new entry possibilities for 
developing countries. For example, in semiconductor 
design, many global specialist suppliers have emerged 
throughout the value chain, ranging from assembly and 
testing through to the manufacture of chips and design 
instruments, thereby generating opportunities to participate 
in the chain for countries that are not at the technological 
frontier (Ernst, 2004).
Nonetheless, the benefits for developing countries 
are not automatic, nor is their participation in the more 
knowledge-intensive activities of the value chain. As 
considered in greater detail in the following sections, 
local capacity needs to be developed through investment 
in human capital and science and technology —areas in 
which public policies have a key role to play.
7 Canadian-owned firms, such as Nortel, also use a high level of CM outsourcing (see section D).
C. Implications of the changes in the global industry
1.	 The	change	in	ICT	hardware	industry	trade	patterns	
The emergence of ISIPs and contributory factors, analysed 
in the previous section, have had very major repercussions 
in terms of the reallocation of value chain resources and 
tasks in the ICT hardware industry. This has occurred not 
only at the enterprise level, but also between countries, as 
can be seen by reviewing trade patterns over the last decade 
(see table II.1).
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Table II.1
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ICT PRODUCTS
(Billions of dollars)
Exports 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
China 17.2 43.5 52.3 75.5 117.9 171.8 226.0 287.3
Japan 93.9 108.2 82.8 81.2 90.1 102.4 98.0 99.5
United States 104.6 153.4 126.7 109.1 112.5 121.3 125.7 136.8
European Union 63.8 81.3 73.9 68.3 75.7 89.2 130.6 116.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 15.5 38.0 37.7 35.4 35.0 37.1 43.8 52.8
Mexico 14.4 34.0 34.4 32.2 31.2 36.2 38.0 46.6
Brazil 0.9 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 3.7 4.0
Costa Rica 0.0 1.7 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.7 2.0
Imports 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
China 13.9 44.4 49.6 66.4 96.3 128.7 160.5 197.9
Japan 43.4 60.9 52.6 49.3 54.5 64.3 67.0 68.7
United States 140.7 215.5 172.8 173.2 180.5 212.9 233.1 253.7
European Union 100.2 162.3 130.5 140.2 145.2 169.3 190.6 210.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 25.6 45.5 45.8 39.9 30.9 39.6 63.0 64.1
Mexico 11.5 29.0 29.8 28.3 28.0 34.4 36.1 42.4
Brazil 6.1 7.6 7.0 4.8 4.9 6.9 8.8 11.0
Costa Rica 0.2 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.6 2.1 2.4
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
Note:  Data for the European Union exclude intra-regional trade.
One of the most outstanding changes has been the 
rapid growth of exports from China. In 1996-2006, China’s 
exports grew by 1,500%, far outpacing export growth in 
industrialized countries: Japan, 6%; the United States 
31%; and the European Union 83%. It is clear that a large 
proportion of production has shifted to this country in a 
short space of time. The fragmentation of production and 
ISIPs have been decisive in consolidating China as the 
world’s number one supplier of ICT products.
China is currently the world’s largest producer, attracting 
large volumes of FDI as a result of its advantages in terms 
of domestic market size, infrastructure, production costs and 
Government support (Amighini, 2005; Lazonick, 2004). As 
a result, it is particularly attractive for efficiency-seeking 
investment in order to export to third markets. This can be 
seen in the correlation that exists between its exports and 
imports during the period under analysis. China’s trade surplus 
has grown over the years, which may be indicative of the 
evolution of Chinese industry into component production.
The changes that have taken place in the industry have 
also been felt in Latin America and the Caribbean, despite 
the region’s low specific weight in international trade. 
During the period 1996-2006, ICT exports from the region 
increased by 240%, outpacing growth in industrialized 
economies. The main beneficiaries were Mexico and, to 
a lesser extent, Brazil and Costa Rica. While these three 
countries accounted for nearly all exports in 2006, there 
are differences between them. The correlation between 
imports and exports in the cases of Mexico and Costa 
Rica demonstrate the export vocation of both countries, 
based on imported inputs. Both countries are attractive 
for efficiency seeking investment, so China is their major 
competitor. In the case of Brazil, however, its persistent 
trade deficit in ICT products shows that most of its 
imports are used in the domestic market; so, unlike its 
Latin American counterpart, Brazil is attractive mainly 




The aggregate changes in international trade and the 
industrial organization of the ICT hardware sectors 
(described in the previous section) reflects a collective 
change in behaviour and business strategies at all ISIP 
levels: OEMs, CMs, suppliers (both leading and secondary) 
and design houses (see figure II.2).
Table II.2, below, identifies the leading OEMs in the global 
ICT hardware industry, in its four most important segments.
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Table II.2
THE 10 LARGEST PRODUCERS OF ICT GOODS, 2005-2006















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Fundación Telefónica and ENTER, DigiWorld América Latina 2007, Editorial Ariel, 
2007 for columns 1, 3 and 4; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Information Technology Outlook 2006, Paris, 2007, for column 2; 
various sources for column 4.
a   The data does not include all mergers and acquisitions and reorganization operations that took place in 2006.
b   In 2005, Lenovo (China) purchased IBM’s computer production capacity. 
c   There are different classifications in the sector, so the enterprise ranking shown here may not coincide with other sources.
As can be seen, the nationality of the main network 
producers is distributed similarly in three geographic 
areas: North America (4), Europe (3) and Asia (3). The 
absence of European firms in the computer sector is 
notable: the market is divided between the United States 
(5) and Asia (5). In the telephony sector, most of the 
firms are Asian (5), followed by those of North America 
(3) and Europe (2). Asian firms (8) clearly dominate the 
television sector.
Broadly speaking, transnational firms have 
passed through three stages. In the first stage, during 
the nineteenth century, firms concentrated their 
productive capacity in their country of origin, from 
which they exported to other parts of the world. In the 
second, following the emergence of the transnational 
enterprise as traditionally conceived, the firms had 
their headquarters in their country of origin but set up 
smaller versions of themselves in other parts of the 
world. The third stage consists of the appearance of a 
modern and globally integrated transnational enterprise, 
which sets up operations in any part of the world based 
on costs, available skills and the business climate in 
the receiving countries. The strategies of many large 
ICT hardware firms are tending to move towards this 
new reality.
The repercussions of the changes described are not 
homogeneous but vary across regions and countries. A 
glance at the broad trends of the business strategies of 
ICT hardware industry leaders reveals the different effects 
these changes have had, and the areas of opportunity 
for developing countries wishing to enter or strengthen 
their position in ISIPs. The analysis of the strategies 
presented here does not claim to be exhaustive, but to 
cover the key trends of the leading OEMs in the ICT 
hardware industry.
(a)	 Reorientation	and	specialization	of	OEMs
One of the clearest changes in business strategies 
has been the specialization of leading OEMs in higher 
value-added activities, and their gradual abandonment of 
manufacturing. Accordingly, many firms have refocused, 
specializing on specific segments of the value chain. Two of 
the most emblematic examples of this trend are IBM and HP, 
both of which have refocused towards services and higher 
value-added and more differentiated products. While this 
has afforded them larger profit margins in each product or 
service, it also demands higher investment in R&D activities 
to maintain their leadership in a market that is subject to 
constant technological change (see boxes II.1 and II.2). 
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Box II.1
SUCCESS BASED ON REINVENTING ONESELF: IBM
The creator of the personal computer, IBM, 
has probably been the most emblematic 
firm in the information technology field. 
It was created in 1911 in Binghamton 
(United States) as a result of a merger 
between the Tabulating Machine Company 
and Computing Scale Corporation and 
International Time Recording Company. The 
enterprise that resulted from the merger 
was called the Computing Tabulating 
Recording Corporation (CTR). The original 
CTR enterprises made a wide range of 
products, from employee control systems 
to automated meat carving equipment. In 
addition, they manufactured equipment 
for operating punched cards, which would 
prove to be a key element of computers 
in the future.
In 1924, CTR changed its name to 
International Business Machines Corporation 
(IBM). During World War II, IBM placed all 
its facilities at the disposal of the United 
States Government, but also took its first 
steps towards computing. The Automatic 
Sequence Controlled Calculator, also 
known as Mark 1, was completed in 1944. 
In the 1950s, IBM introduced the first large 
computer based on vacuum tubes, which 
transistors began to replace in 1959. One 
of the first transistor-based IBM computers 
was the IBM 7090. In that decade, IBM 
created the first disk-based computerized 
storage system; and in 1964 it introduced 
System 360, which was the first family of 
computers to use interchangeable software 
and peripheral devices. In 1971 it introduced 
the floppy disk, which became the standard 
product for storing personal information 
on computers.
In 1981, IBM created the PC, the 
most successful personal computer of all 
time, thereby initiating its entry into homes, 
small businesses and schools. The PC 
had 16 kB of memory (expandable to 256 
kB), one or two floppy disk drives, and an 
optional colour monitor. When it designed 
the PC, IBM outsourced the production of 
its components to third parties for the first 
time: the processor was made by Intel and 
the operating system by Microsoft. This 
decision to outsource fundamental activities 
would mark the future of the industry.
As IBM did not have control of the key 
components, other firms gradually started 
to manufacture IBM compatible machines. 
In 1993, the firm announced losses running 
into millions of dollars, largely due to 
the fierce competition it was facing. It 
began a major restructuring process to 
strengthen its customer orientation, but 
also to gradually move towards service 
activities and thus reduce its economic 
reliance on computer sales. This latter 
trend peaked in 2005 with the sale of its 
computer manufacturing division to the 
Chinese firm Lenovo.
In 2006, IBM reported total revenues 
of US$ 91 billion, with operations in 170 
countries, employing 355,000 people 
throughout the world. The firm has 
abandoned the basic product segments, 
such as computers and hard disks, and 
has strengthened its position in higher 
value-added segments of the industry, 
such as service-oriented architecture, 
business process services, modular 
systems and information on demand, 
among others. In terms of regions, 45% 
of its revenues came from the American 
continent, 35% from Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa, and 20% from Asia and 
the Pacific.
IBM provides a wide range of services 
in three broad areas: (1) services, which 
encompass consulting, systems integration, 
applications management, maintenance, 
integrated technology services and 
strategic outsourcing, among others; 
(2) software, which includes operating 
systems, software for manufacturing, 
software to assist computer-based design, 
intermediate software, and others; and (3) 
systems and technology, including printers, 
microelectronics, storage systems and 
servers, among others. In 2006, 37% of 
its revenues came from the services area, 
40% from software, and 23% from systems, 
technology and financing.
With the new business model 
(oriented towards high value-added 
services), in 2006 IBM reported record 
profits (US$ 13 billion before tax), with 
a gross profit margin of 41.9%. This has 
enabled it to make significant investments 
including the purchase of strategic assets 
and the R&D area (it has invested over 
US$ 28 billion in that sphere over the 
last five years).
IBM has manufacturing plants in North 
America (the United States and Mexico), 
Europe (Ireland, Hungary and France) 
and Asia (China and Singapore), where it 
makes printers, microelectronics, storage 
systems and servers, which are generally 
higher value-added products that are 
not produced on such a massive scale. 
For other manufacturing operations, IBM 
largely uses contract manufacturers. It also 
has research laboratories in the United 
States, India, Japan, China, Switzerland 
and Israel. As a result of its aggressive 
R&D strategy, it obtained 3,125 patents 
in 2007 alone.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of IBM annual reports.
Box II.2 
HEWLETT-PACKARD (HP): FROM MANUFACTURING TO SERVICES
HP was created in 1939 by Bill Hewlett 
and Dave Packard, classmates at Stanford 
University. The company’s first product was 
an audio oscillator, used in electronic testing. 
In the 1940s, the firm expanded its range 
of electronic products, which were in great 
demand by the Government of the United 
States during World War II.
In the 1950s, they continued to innovate 
in the electronics area, including testing 
and measurement products. In 1959 the 
firm became a global enterprise, setting 
up a manufacturing plant in Germany and 
a marketing office in Geneva. In 1966 it 
entered the computer market with its first 
computer, and in 1968 it created the first 
desktop scientific calculator.
The 1970s saw significant growth in 
terms of jobs and profits, together with the 
introduction of a new variety of computers. 
In the following decade, HP became a 
leading player in the computer industry, 
supplying a wide range of products, from 
desktop personal computers to powerful 
minicomputers. HP also linked its computers 
with electronic measurement devices and 
medical instruments; and it entered the 
printer market in the 1980s.
In the 1990s, HP made new advances 
in the field of portable computers and 
continued to invent new image and printing 
solutions. In 1999, it decided to hive off its 
measurement activities and chemical and 
medical analysis equipment, creating a new 
firm called Agilent Technologies. At the start 
of that decade, HP focused on supplying 
a wide range of products to its customers, 
covering printing, personal computers and 
ICT infrastructure. In 2002 its merger with 
Compaq Computer Corporation made HP 
a world leader in products, technologies, 
solutions and services for individual and 
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business consumers. In the ensuing years, 
HP made a series of acquisitions that 
enabled it to increase its presence in the 
software, printing and computer markets.
 In 2006, the firm reported total sales 
of US$ 91.7 billion and had 156,000 
employees worldwide. Its operations 
are organized in the following market 
segments: (1) storage and servers, 
encompassing a wide range of industrial 
servers and data storage equipment; (2) 
HP services, with technological services, 
consulting, integration and outsourcing; (3) 
software, consisting of software solutions 
for managing information technology 
infrastructure, operations, applications 
and business processes; (4) personal 
systems, covering personal computers, 
workstations, portable devices and digital 
entertainment, among others; (5) image 
and printing, with printing hardware, 
scanners, digital image products and 
printing accessories; (6) financial services, 
consisting of financing, leasing and asset 
recovery; and (7) corporate investment, 
including research laboratories and new 
business incubation projects.
Revenues in 2006 came mainly from 
the following segments: personal systems 
(31.8%), image and printing (29.2%) and 
storage and servers (18.9%). The services 
and software spheres generated 17% and 
1.4% of its total annual revenue, respectively. 
HP makes intensive use of CMs and Original 
Design Manufacturing (ODM) throughout 
the world to manufacture and design its 
products. Its use of CMs aims to generate 
cost efficiency and reduce market delivery 
times for certain HP-designed products. 
In addition, by contracting ODM, HP 
purchases finished products which it sells 
under its own brand name. Nonetheless, 
it also continues to make products and 
components itself.
HP is highly committed to innovation, 
with efforts focused on the design and 
development of new products, services and 
solutions. R&D expenditures in 2006 totalled 
US$ 3.6 billion. Its product development 
and manufacturing centres are located in 
the United States, Puerto Rico, Europe 
(Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain 
and the United Kingdom), the Middle 
East and Asia (Israel, China, Japan and 
Singapore). It has R&D laboratories in 
California (United States) India, Israel, 
Japan and the United Kingdom.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of HP annual reports.
Box II.2 (concluded)
This transition to higher value-added activities means 
dropping others that are considered less strategic, to free 
up resources and focus on activities with greater future 
potential, particularly in dynamic markets where R&D 
activities are fundamental. An example of this is the 
sale by Nortel of its third-generation (3G) mobile phone 
technology division, to focus on next-generation (4G) 
products (see chapter III).
Other firms have decided to target specific segments. 
Siemens, sold its network production area to Nokia 
and its cellphone production to BenQ, to concentrate 
on services with a capacity to respond to mega-trends, 
such as population ageing and large cities. Philips also 
altered its strategy, abandoning the ICT hardware domain 
(except for television sets) to target the medical area, 
audiovisual products, lighting, and domestic appliances. 
Similarly, Siemens, Philips and Motorola have abandoned 
semiconductor production, which requires a financial 
and operational commitment that is incompatible with 
the structures of large-scale operations.8
A major repercussion of this trend, as a derived effect, 
is productive restructuring of a number of plants located 
in developing countries. IBM provides a good example: 
the transition from manufacturing to service activities 
occurred not only in its corporate offices, but also in 
several plants that previously engaged in manufacturing 
in developing countries. At present, IBM has 53,000 
employees in India and also has major centres working on 
services and software development in Brazil, China and 
Russia (The Economist, 2007a). Unlike manufacturing, 
those activities normally require higher paid staff with 
university or postgraduate studies. Moreover, these are 
more knowledge intensive activities, so they offer greater 
potential benefits in terms of technological learning for 
the receiving economy.
(b)	 Outsourcing	 of	 production	 and	 the	 emergence	
of	CMs
One of the major industrial organization changes in the 
ICT hardware market, which has been fundamental in the 
relocation of production worldwide, has been production 
outsourcing and the emergence and expansion of CMs. 
OEMs need to be flexible to respond rapidly to changes in 
technologies or demand, without this significantly affecting 
manufacturing costs. While outsourcing generally enables 
them to satisfy those conditions, CM outsourcing also 
gives them access to world-class manufacturing processes 
with a global footprint. This enables OEMs to reach final 
markets more quickly and satisfy local demand (Schipper 
and de Haan, 2005).
The level of outsourcing in the ICT hardware industry is 
high and continues to rise. In 2004, just 27% of manufacturing 
activity was outsourced, but by 2006 the figure had risen 
to an estimated 73% (Pick, 2007). Thus, the function of 
CMs in global production has grown significantly.9 In this 
8  From those three operations, Infineon emerged as an offshoot of Siemens; NXP from Philips, and Freescale from Motorola. These three 
semiconductor producers are ranked among the 15 largest in the world.
9  Historically, the most important location for the initial growth of contract manufacturing was Silicon Valley (Lüthje, 2003), where the major 
North American contract manufacturers were located (Solectron, Flextronics, Sanmina, Celestica and Jabil). The first and largest operations to 
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group, the leading firms in terms of sales are: Foxconn 
(Taiwan), Flextronics-Solectron (United States), Jabil 
Circuit (United States), Sanmina-Sci (United States), 
Celestica (Canada), Elcoteq (Finland), Benchmark 
(United States), Venture (Singapore) and Universal 
Scientific (Taiwan).10 Most of these enterprises are 
United States-owned, although the Asian presence is 
increasing.
The following table shows the concentration of 
revenue earned by the top 10 CMs in 2006, accounting 
for 70% of the subcontractor manufacturing market. 
The firms are divided into two groups: EMS (electronics 
manufacturing services), which only produce for OEMs 
on the basis of the latter’s designs, and ODM (original 
design manufacturing), which also design products for 
which they retain the intellectual property.
Table II.3
REVENUE CONCENTRATION OF THE TOP 10 CMs (EMS AND ODM) IN 2006
(Millions of dollars)
CM type Top-10 by sales Total market sales Top-10 by market share
EMS 110 592 157 006 70.4%
ODM 72 819 99 960 72,8%
Source:  iSuppli Corp, 2 March cited in Adam Pick, “Big contract manufacturers get bigger” 2007 [online] http://www.emsnow.com/npps/story.cfm?id=25825.
It is important to note that the increased outsourcing 
of activities does not have the same repercussions in all 
regions. The location strategy of most CMs depends on 
the technological intensity of the products supplied. North 
America and Europe specialize in high technology services, 
while Asia and Latin America offer the advantages of low 
production costs.
Generally speaking, the expansion and use of CMs by 
the leading OEMs is a distinctive characteristic of the ICT 
hardware industry. All leaders of the network, computer 
or telephony hardware industries (see table II.2) use CM 
contracting to a greater or lesser extent. The television 
industry is a notable exception, however.
Unlike OEMs in other ICT hardware sectors, the 
market leaders in the television segment remain closely 
involved in their manufacturing operations, and they 
themselves assemble their final products. Television market 
leaders outsource part of the intermediate production, 
which includes making components or sub-assemblies, 
but not through CMs.
The television industry has also changed significantly 
as a result of digital television, and the strategies of the 
leading firms are also changing accordingly (ECLAC 
2007a). Previously, television could be considered a 
relatively stable product in terms of price and market 
acquire entire OEM plants included those of IBM, Cisco and Sun Microsystems (Schipper and de Haan, 2005). The relation between OEMs 
and CMs, which has grown continuously and is a key element of global production networks (Ernst, 2003), currently has its major development 
centres in China, in the Pearl and Yangtze river deltas. Asia in general has emerged as an advanced manufacturing region in the sector (UNCTAD, 
2002), where there are also important CM clusters in Malaysia and Thailand.
10 Classification based on Emsnow.com [online] www.emsnow.com.
11 Based on interviews held with a number of leading OEMs in the television sector, with manufacturing plants in Latin America.
share. R&D focused mainly on materials, design and 
aesthetic changes. Nowadays, technology and product 
lifecycles are shorter, and more intensive competition 
has squeezed profit margins. In that setting, product and 
content innovation has become an essential factor for 
competing in the market;11 and the need to focus more 
on R&D activities could cause sector leaders to outsource 
their manufacturing operations to a greater extent.
(c)	 The	de-verticalization	and	relocation	
of	R&D	activities
R&D is considered a strategic and fundamental activity 
to guarantee the competitiveness of the industries such 
as ICT hardware, which are subject to rapid and constant 
technical change. Many of the sector’s leading firms have 
increased their R&D spending; and, given the strategic 
nature of this activity, outsourcing levels tend to be lower 
than in the manufacturing segment. Nonetheless, in an 
effort to reduce the cost of processes and gaining access 
to specialized resources, transnational enterprises have 
relocated a number of activities. It is worth mentioning that 
another strategy used by firms to strengthen their position 
and R&D efficiency involves mergers and acquisitions 
(see box II.3).
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Box II.3
ALLIANCES, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AS A WAY TO ACQUIRE STRATEGIC ASSETS AND  
ACHIEVE SYNERGIES IN R&D ACTIVITIES
Alliances, mergers and acquisitions have 
been another of the strategies implemented 
by firms to strengthen their market position 
or penetrate specific areas that are seen as 
strategic. Nonetheless, the motive underlying 
a number of mergers, mainly horizontal 
ones, has not only been to gain access to 
strategic assets, but also to generate scale 
economies in R&D activities. The largest 
horizontal mergers, in terms of transaction 
value, include the following: Alcatel-Lucent, 
motivated by potential scale efficiencies in 
R&D activities and synergies in its product 
lines; Ericsson-Marconi, which not only 
could involve efficiencies, but could also 
strengthen several Ericsson segments, 
such as copper and fibre optic broadband; 
and Cisco-Scientific Atlanta, an acquisition 
that aims, among other things, to strengthen 
the presence of the new firm in the routers 
market (EE Times, 2005).
In addition, non-horizontal mergers 
or alliances tend to involve investments 
to acquire assets making it possible to 
gain access to specific market segments. 
Examples of this type of acquisition include 
the following: the purchase of Nuova Systems 
by Cisco, to penetrate the data centre market; 
or the acquisition of Loudeye Technologies 
by NSN to enter the digital music platforms 
and digital media distribution markets.
Strategic alliances with the content 
industry is another common practice, as a 
way of diversifying production in response 
to the demand for products and services 
stimulated by digital convergence. Examples 
of this trend include alliances between Phillips 
and Microsoft, or Motorola with Google, 
Kodak and Universal Music Group.
Generally speaking, there has been a 
great deal of merger and acquisition activity 
in the ICT hardware sector over the last 
decade. In 1997, there were 129 transactions, 
for a total value of roughly US$ 18 billion. In 
2006, the number of transactions reached 
2,872, worth about US$ 400 billion. In this 
interval, acquisition activities peaked in 2000, 
when the value of transactions reached 
approximately US$ 435 billion.a 
Mergers and acquisitions have not 
been exclusive to the leading OEMs in the 
ICT hardware sector. CMs have also used 
the strategy to build a global footprint giving 
OEMs the chance to minimize production 
and logistics costs on a global scale, while 
also increasing their revenues. An example 
of this is the acquisition of Solectron by 
Flextronics in July 2007. That operation 
enabled Flextronics to diversify its activities 
with its historical customers and, at the 
same time, expand its customer base, while 
increasing its capacity to respond to growing 
competition from Asia, such as Foxconn.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a ECLAC estimate based on Zephyr (Bureau van Dijk).
Many leading OEMs have relocated not only their 
manufacturing activities, but also their R&D, in an attempt 
to improve efficiency and reduce costs. Several leading 
firms in the network sector have research centres outside 
their countries of origin, in lower cost locations, such as 
Alcatel-Lucent in China (Alcatel-Lucent, 2006); Cisco in 
China, India, Israel and Ireland;12 and Ericsson in Brazil, 
China, Hungary, India and Ireland (Djuphammar, 2007). 
Nortel has research centres in Europe (France, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom) and in Asia (China); and more than a 
quarter of its 12,000 engineers are currently in China (The 
Economist, 2007b). This trend also includes the computer 
sector, as exemplified by Dell (China, India, Singapore 
and Taiwan); Toshiba (China, Europe and the United 
States) and Sun Microsystems (China, Czech Republic, 
Germany, India, Ireland, Japan and Russia).
In 2002, three quarters of the subsidiaries of United 
States transnational enterprises in Asian developing 
countries were undertaking R&D activities in the spheres 
of computing and electronic products. In contrast, very 
little of the investment entering Latin America and the 
Caribbean is directed towards R&D intensive activities, 
and what there is relates fundamentally to the adaptation 
of technology or products to local markets, although there 
are notable exceptions in Mexico and Brazil (UNCTAD, 
2005). In general, it can be said that Asia is the developing 
region to have benefited most from the modularization of 
12 Cisco Systems [on line] http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2006/eKits/cisco_corp_overview.pdf.
13 EDN.com on the basis of Thomson Financial and Reed Business Information [online] http://www.edn.com/index.asp?.
R&D activities and their relocation. This process has led 
to the emergence of design houses which, as will be seen 




The third group of ISIP enterprises —leading and 
secondary suppliers— includes semiconductor producers. 
The reason why this group is mentioned separately, is 
because it represents the main source of technological 
innovation for the final products (Jørgenson, 2004).
Leading semiconductor producers are: Intel (United 
States), Samsung Electronics (Republic of Korea), Texas 
Instruments (United States), ST (Europe), Toshiba 
(Japan), TSMC (Taiwan), Hynix (Republic of Korea), 
Renesos (Japan), FreeScale (United States) and NXP 
(Europe).13 The production and market of the top 50 
producers is equally distributed between the United 
States and Asia, although Asian production is biased more 
towards manufacturing goods of lesser technological 
content (see box II.4).
The modularization of production has had effects on 
the relocation of production plants particularly in Asia. 
Even some of the advanced design and R&D activities in 
the semiconductor segment have been located in Asian 
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developing countries (UNCTAD, 2005). None of the 
world leaders, except for Intel and Texas Instruments, 
which have plants in Costa Rica and Mexico, respectively, 
have production plants in Latin America. Nonetheless, the 
region has centres for testing, design and even R&D, such 
as those of Freescale (Brazil, Mexico) and Intel (Mexico), 
together with integrated microprocessor assembly plants, 
such as Smart (Brazil) and Skyworks (Mexico). The scant 
production of semiconductors is one of the characteristics 
of Latin America.14
Box II.4
THE GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR MARKET AND ITS TYPOLOGY
14 One of Latin America’s projects to attract capital intensive and high-technology industry, including semiconductors, is the Silicon Border Science 
Park. This consists of 10,000 acres located in the State of Baja California, on the border between Mexico and the United States. Nonetheless, 
despite the convenient location of the park and promotion efforts by the Federal and State Government, since the creation of the promoting 
group in 2001 no investment has actually been undertaken. This could be interpreted as evidence of the preferences of investors in this type of 
industry for locations outside Latin America.
15 The networks and telephony sector is one of the ICT hardware segments, along with computers, in which ISIPs have developed most. 
The market and production of the largest 
semiconductor enterprises are distributed 
equally between the United States and Asia. 
Of the 50 largest producers, nearly half are 
from the United States, four are European, 
and the rest are divided between Japan (12), 
Taiwan Province of China (6), the Republic 
of Korea (2), Singapore (1) and China (1) 
(Arensman, 2007). Nonetheless, there 
is a clear difference in the specialization 
pattern of United States and Asian firms. 
Asian manufacturers focus on goods of 
lesser technological content (semiconductor 
commodities), while their United States 
and European counterparts work mainly 
with proprietary technologies. For example, 
Hynix and Samsung Electronics specialize 
in the production of memories, while Intel 
specializes in producing processors. 
Another key difference is that the United 
States firms have historically shown 
great innovation capacity in computer 
technologies, while Japan has clear 
leadership in the entertainment segment 
(Edwards, 2006).
In the semiconductor industry, the so-
called “foundry model” describes how firms 
have separated design from manufacturing 
processes to reduce costs and increase 
efficiency. This type of firm is divided into 
three groups: (a) “fabless” firms that do not 
have manufacturing capacity and focus 
on design and R&D activities; (b) firms 
producing under manufacturing contracts 
(chip contract manufacturers, also known 
as merchant foundries), which are restricted 
to manufacturing and testing services; and 
(c) integrated device manufacturers (or 
IDMs), which design and have their own 
production facilities.
Of the 10 leading semiconductor 
producers, all are IDMs except for the 
Taiwanese TSMC which belongs to the 
second group. The best-known of the other 
firms of this type are UMC, which is also 
Taiwanese, IBM, SMIC of China (Ernst and 
Lüthje, 2006), and Chartered, of Singapore. 
In 2006, UMC was ranked 22nd among the 
top 50 producers worldwide, SMIC was 47th 
and Chartered 45th. IBM was in 18th place 
based on its classification as an IDM, which 
also includes contract production activities. 
Firms focusing on design (the third group) 
include Qualcomm, NVidia and Sandisk, 
Marvell and Xilinx, all of which are United 
States-owned and ranked among the top 
40 producers worldwide.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of John Edwards, “A mix of strategies in what propels the winners to the top spots”, 
Electronic Business, May 2006 and data of EDN.com on the basis of information from Thomson Financial and Reed Business Information.
3.	 Repercussions	on	the	telecommunications	network	segment	
The networks and telephony sector can be seen as the link 
between the ICT hardware industry and the telecommunications 
operator sector, analysed in chapter III. This sector plays 
a key role in the type, quality and price of the service that 
telecom operators can provide to consumers. The technology, 
cost and hardware provided by network producers largely 
determines the behaviour and strategies adopted by telecom 
operators. Similarly, the strategies and economic conditions 
of the operators sector have major repercussions on the 
strategies pursued by hardware suppliers. For example, when 
competition in the operator sector increases, pressure to 
reduce prices for consumers shifts to network and telephony 
producers in the form of pressure to lower prices, reduce 
costs and increase their flexibility.
In view of that important connection function between 
the ICT hardware industry and telecom operators, the 
following analysis focuses on the repercussions of global 
changes and the strategies of the leading OEMs in the 
networks and telephony sector.15
The globalization of production and emergence of 
ISIPs has caused a major relocation of production in 
the networks and telephony sector, also allowing for the 
emergence of major exporting enterprises in developing 
countries. Figure II.3 shows the trend of market shares in 
imports of network and telecommunications equipment 
in the United States market.
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Figure II.3
MARKET SHARES IN UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF NETWORK  
AND TELEPHONY EQUIPMENT
(Percentages)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the software Module for the Analysis of 
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The drastic reduction in Japan’s share of United 
States imports is one of the most notable developments, 
having fallen from 35% in 1990 to less than 5% in 2006. 
In contrast, four countries have substantially increased 
their share of United States imports of network and 
telephony equipment: China, Malaysia, Mexico and the 
Republic of Korea. These four countries started from a 
similar base, with a market share of around 5%, but each 
has evolved differently.
Mexico was the first to take off, driven by the signing 
of NAFTA, and it achieved a peak market share of 21% in 
2001, before falling back below 15%. This decline may 
be related to the takeoff of its three competitors China, 
Malaysia and the Republic of Korea. In the 1990s, there 
were no major changes in the market shares of those 
three countries in the United States imports of network 
and telephony equipment. China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 served as a trigger for 
its exports to the United States market, which rose from 
a market share of 8% in 2000 to 30% in 2006. Malaysia 
and the Republic of Korea also achieved take-off in 2001, 
the first peaking in 2004 with a market share of around 
20%, before dropping back below 10% in 2006, while 
Malaysia grew to a market share of 20% in 2006.
The intense competition in the ICT hardware industry 
exerts constant pressure on firms to improve their efficiency, 
lower costs, or adopt strategies to increase their profit 
margins. This has been aggravated recently mainly by 
two factors. The first is that the wireless network market 
has started to mature, with repercussions on demand. For 
example, a number of operators in the United States have 
postponed equipment purchases, while several operators 
in Europe have granted concessions to virtual operators, 
which has postponed network upgrading and thus affected 
the profits of network producers. The second factor stems 
from the major competition from two Chinese firms: 
Huawei and ZTE (see box II.5). The cost structure of those 
two enterprises enables them to offer prices up to 40% 
cheaper than their western counterparts, which obviously 
has eaten into the revenues of the leading OEMs in this 
sector. Consequently, and with the aim of responding to 
the competition from Chinese firms, telecommunications 
equipment producers are transferring much of their 
manufacturing and R&D activities to low-cost countries, 
including China (The Economist, 2007b).
The above has accelerated the trends mentioned 
earlier: the specialization of OEMs in higher value-added 
activities, production outsourcing, and the de-verticalization 
and relocation of R&D activities. The patterns seen in 
figure II.3 reflect one of these trends.
Interviews held with leading OEMs in the sector 
(Alcatel-Lucent, Cisco, Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia 
Siemens Networks (NSN) and Nortel) confirm the 
trend towards specialization in higher value-added 
activities and intensive use of R&D. In that process, 
the firms in question have gradually abandoned their 
manufacturing activities, and all of them report a high 
level of CM outsourcing, along with manufacturing plants 
in developing countries with lower production costs. 
Sony-Ericsson produces one third of its telephones in 
China, while the rest are produced by CMs distributed 
across Asia, Latin America and Europe (Ericsson, 
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2006, p. 124). Alcatel-Lucent has production plants in 
China; NSN has plants in China and India; Motorola 
produces networks in China and Malaysia and outsources 
production to CMs in Asia, while its telephones are 
produced in China, Singapore and Brazil; Samsung 
Electronics produces telephone equipment in Asia 
and the Pacific (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam), Europe (Hungary, 
Slovakia) and Latin America (Brazil, Mexico).
There is also a clear trend to shift R&D activities to 
lower-cost areas, particularly Asia. Several of the sector’s 
leading OEMs have R&D centres in developing countries: 
Alcatel-Lucent (China), Cisco (China, India, Ireland 
and Israel), Ericsson (Brazil, China, Hungary, India and 
Ireland), Nortel (China and Ireland), NSN (China and 
India) and Sony-Ericsson (China).
In general, Asia, and particularly China, has been 
the region benefiting most from the modularization and 
relocation of manufacturing and R&D activities.16 But this 
begs the question of what has happened in Latin America 
and the reasons that have prevented the region taking 
better advantage of the opportunities provided by these 
new industry trends. The following section attempts to 
answer that question, while proposing policy alternatives 
to enable the region to make the most of opportunities in 
the ICT hardware industry.
16 The growth of the Chinese industry is one of the factors that has significantly increased competition in manufacturing. In 2005 China reported sales 
of nearly US$ 500 billion, representing an increase of around 30% on the previous year’s figure. Since 2001, its exports have outweighed those of 
Mexico or Eastern Europe; and since 2004 they have also surpassed those of Japan, the European Union and the United States (OECD, 2007).
Box II.5
THE NEW MAJOR COMPETITORS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT MARKET: HUAWEI AND ZTE
HUAWEI
Founded in 1988, Huawei is a high-
technology enterprise specializing in 
the production, R&D and marketing of 
communications equipment, while also 
providing custom-made network solutions 
for telecom operators. It is the largest 
telecommunications enterprise in China 
and employs over 10,000 professional 
workers.
In 2006, it obtained revenue of US$ 
8.5 billion, representing a 42% increase on 
the previous year’s figure (The Economist, 
2007b). In that year, sales contracts amounted 
to US$ 11 billion, 34% up on the previous 
year, Of these, 65% come from international 
market, which has become the main engine 
of sales growth. In 2007, the proportion was 
expected to reach 72%.
Huawei has achieved balanced 
development between products, solutions 
and fundamental technologies. It has 
formed product lines encompassing mobile 
networks, broadband, data transmission, 
optical networks, applications, services and 
terminals. Those products and solutions have 
been widely used in European countries, 
including France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. The firm 
has also made significant progress in Japan 
and the United States.
Recently, Huawei has acquired key 
technology enabling it to support future 
network development. In addition, the firm 
assigns roughly 48% of its labour force and 
10% of its annual revenues to R&D activities, 
of which 10% involves advanced research. 
The firm has 12 R&D centres, located in 
several parts of the world: United States 
(Dallas, Silicon Valley), India (Bangalore), 
Sweden (Stockholm), Russia (Moscow) 
and China (Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, 
Nanjing, Xian, Chengdu and Wuhan).
Huawei has also entered long-term 
cooperation partnerships with the world’s 
leading operators, thereby strengthening 
its market position. As of 2006, 31 of the 
50 leading telecom operators, including 
Vodafone, BT, Telefónica, FT Orange 
and China Mobile, had chosen Huawei 
as their strategic partner. The firm has 
also established partnerships with direct 
competitors, e.g. the R&D centre in the 
universal mobile telecommunications 
(UMTS) system which it operates with 
Motorola; and a joint venture with Siemens 
for R&D, manufacturing and sales, and time 
division-synchronous code division multiple 
access (TD-SCDMA) services.
ZTE
ZTE was founded in 1985 with Chinese 
capital, and is now a world leader in the 
telecommunications equipment and network 
solutions markets. It supplies its products and 
services in over 100 countries, employing 
more than 4,000 people in Asian, North 
American, European, Latin American and 
Commonwealth countries. It has a wide range 
of products encompassing each sector of 
the wireless, wired, terminal and services 
markets. ZTE supplies innovative products 
and services to meet the needs of the main 
telecom operators around the world.
The firm supplies world-class 
development and manufacturing services 
for technological products in the wireless, 
access, optical transmission, data, 
telecommunications software and handsets 
segments, providing “end-to-end” solutions 
configured in accordance with its customers 
needs. ZTE allocates roughly 10% of its 
annual revenues and 40% of its labour force 
to R&D activities, and plays a key role in a 
wide range of international organizations that 
develop standards for the telecommunications 
industry. It has 15 R&D centres located in 
China, France, India, Pakistan, Sweden 
and the United States.
The firm has made strategic alliances 
with other leaders in the telecommunications 
sector such as Portugal Telecom, France 
Telecom, Alcatel, Ericsson and Nortel in 
the area of “next generation networking” 
and mobile systems; with Hutchison in 
third-generation (3G) equipment; and with 
Marconi in optical transmission systems. ZTE 
has also set up joint laboratories with Texas 
Instruments, Intel, Agere Systems, IBM, 
Microsoft (China), Qualcomm, Huahong 
NEC and the University of Tsinghua. The 
firm has undertaken joint technological 
research projects with 50 academic 
institutions in China.
The surprising growth and ability to 
penetrate international markets shown 
by Huawei and ZTE has enabled these 
two firms to become leading players in 
the telecommunications sector. Their 
low cost structure, effective and efficient 
R&D processes, and competitive prices 
have turned them into major rivals of 
global telecommunications equipment 
producers.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the firms and the annual reports published by Huawei 
and ZTE.
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D. The industry in Latin America: the  
 experiences of Mexico and Brazil
This section briefly summarizes the historical development of 
the ICT hardware industry in Mexico and Brazil, describing 
its current situation and analysing the repercussions of the 
global changes in the industry and the strategies pursued 
by the sector’s global leaders in those two countries.
The analysis focuses on the cases of Mexico and 
Brazil, since these countries account for about 96% 
of the total value of ICT hardware exports from Latin 
America.17 They also receive the majority of investment 
entering in the region through the sector’s leading OEMs 
and CMs. Nonetheless, Costa Rica is also one of the 
region’s leading exporters, although the value added by 
its industry is way below that of Brazil or Mexico (see 
table II.3 and box II.6).
Box II.6
FDI ATTRACTION POLICY IN THE ICT HARDWARE INDUSTRY OF COSTA RICA
The Costa Rican experience is interesting 
because of the country’s ability to develop 
a national strategy to channel foreign 
investments into certain sectors, in which 
the Costa Rican Coalition for Development 
Initiatives (CINDE), a non-profit institution 
founded in 1982, has played a crucial role. 
The institution’s main objective has been to 
collaborate with development efforts in the 
local economy, for which it has promoted 
and facilitated the entry of major foreign 
investments into the country. Its status 
as a non-governmental organization 
has enabled it to implement a long-term 
strategy, without being significantly affected 
by political changes.
In 1993, CINDE selected three basic 
subsectors (electricity, electronics and 
telecommunications) in which to target its 
investment attraction efforts. The work done 
by CINDE, in conjunction with the efficiency-
seeking strategy pursued by transnational 
firms to capture export markets, began to 
bear fruit in 1995. In that year, the United 
States enterprises DCS Communications 
Corporation and Sawtek Merrimac set up 
business in the country (ECLAC, 2004). In 
1996, Costa Rica became host to a subsidiary 
of the world’s largest microprocessor 
producer, Intel. This firm has continued 
developing up to the present, attracting 
smaller investments and also developing 
a local suppliers network.
Intel’s choice of Costa Rica to set up 
its microprocessor testing and assembly 
plant was based not only on the country’s 
competitive labour costs, but also on the 
presence of skilled labour, streamlined 
bureaucracy, easy access to the United 
States market and a firm commitment by 
the State. The Government adopted very 
specific measures to facilitate Intel’s arrival: 
amendment of the study programme of the 
Costa Rica Technology Institute; construction 
of two electric power substations and the 
establishment of special electricity rates; 
various projects to improve highway 
infrastructure; and an open skies policy to 
increase the frequency of flights between 
Costa Rica and the United States.
Intel’s investment has had positive 
effects on the Costa Rican economy at large, 
including its industry, the education system 
and business culture. In Costa Rica, there 
are 55 electronics enterprises (42 of them 
foreign-owned), which are competitive and 
dynamic, generating roughly 12,000 jobs and 
exporting over US$ 1.65 billion per year.
Despite its renowned successes, 
however, 10 years later Intel remains the 
only large-scale investment in Costa Rica. It 
has thus far been impossible to replicate the 
experiences of Shanghai, Malaysia, Singapore 
or Ireland, for example. The reasons for this 
include an inability to develop networks or 
strong links between investors and suppliers, 
compounded by a lack of incentives for 
suppliers themselves (Ciarli and Giuliani, 
2005). Many international firms, such as HP, 
IBM or Dallas Semiconductors, have shown 
interest in setting up plants in Costa Rica, but 
those interests have not materialized.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank Group, “The impact of Intel in Costa Rica. Nine years after the 
decision to invest”, Investing in Development Series, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 2006; Tommaso Ciarli and Elisa Giuliani, “Inversión extranjera 
directa y encadenamientos productivos en Costa Rica”, Heterogeneidad estructural, asimetrías tecnológicas y crecimiento en América Latina, project documents, 
No. 35 (LC/W.35), Mario Cimoli (ed), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2003 (LC/G.2226-P), Santiago, Chile, 2003. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. S.04.II.G.54.
1.	 Brief	history	of	the	ICT	hardware	industry	in	Mexico	and	Brazil
The ICT hardware industries in Mexico and Brazil have 
very different vocations. Whereas in Mexico, favoured 
by proximity to the United States, the industry focuses 
on production for the United States market, the Brazilian 
ICT industry concentrates on supplying goods for the 
domestic market. In fact, Mexico is Latin America’s 
17  The value added by ICT industries in Brazil and Mexico varies between US$ 6 billion and US$ 7 billion in each country, equivalent to about 
95% of industry value-added regionwide. These two countries are followed far behind by Argentina (US$ 200 million) and Colombia (US$ 
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140 million). The evaluation of economic variables in the sector suffers from a great lack of precision (ECLAC, 2008); for example, the value 
added by Intel in Costa Rica has been estimated in a range of US$ 90 million to US$ 500 million per year, according to different methodologies 
(World Bank Group, 2006, p. 16).
18 This classification includes the export of telecommunications, computer, telephony, and audio and video equipment. The classification shown 
in figure II.3 only includes telecommunications equipment.
19 The market reserve in Brazil consisted of measures favouring local enterprises in public procurement processes for ICT equipment, or the 
restriction of purchases to nationally owned firms. In the information technology domain, the granting of licences to locally owned firms excluded 
transnational enterprises from the country’s mini- and microcomputer segments (Dahlman, 1990 and Adler, 1986).
20 This programme is commonly known as the maquila industry programme.
21 Despite originally being conceived as a duty-free export zone, in practice, ZFM always had the domestic market as its main target. It has achieved 
notable success by attracting a large group of firms to the Amazon region, including research and development centres, given the demands of 
incentives programmes. Nonetheless, the predominant pattern was, and continues to be, assembly based on foreign technology and components. 
Some analysts consider that ZFM hindered the development of an industry with greater local technological content in other parts of the country 
(Baptista, 1988, cited in Ariffin and Figueiredo, 2003; interviews with the firms).
22 In 1991, Brazil eliminated the market reserve and established a structure of tax incentives conditional on certain stages of the productive process 
being undertaken in the country. More than openness in itself, the greatest boost to the entry of new firms was the expansion of the Brazilian 
market, especially from 1994 onwards.
23 For a more detailed explanation of this situation see Peres (1990), FINEP/MCT (1993) and Frischtak (1990).
leading producer and exporter of ICT hardware, and the 
second largest supplier of ICT hardware to the United 
States market, after China.18 Brazil is the region’s second-
largest producer and exporter of ICT hardware; but the 
sales of firms established in Brazil are targeted on the 
national market and exports are secondary. Nonetheless, 
the historical evolution of the two industries has been 
very similar.
In both countries, ICT hardware assembly and 
manufacture began in the 1940s and 1950s, following the 
installation of nationally-owned and foreign plants in the 
consumer electronics segment (radios and televisions). 
The industries of both countries were greatly boosted 
during the post-war years, by the import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) policy. This not only gave incentives 
for the emergence of enterprises based on national capital, 
but also —despite market reserves being imposed for 
certain products— it encouraged the entry of foreign-
owned firms seeking to fulfil ISI requirements and supply 
the growing Mexican and Brazilian markets.19
At the same time, from the mid-1960s onwards, 
both countries implemented programmes based on 
tariff advantages and production incentives in certain 
regions. In the case of Mexico, the programme favoured 
industrialization of the country’s northern border.20 In 
Brazil, consumer electronics was one of the sectors 
benefited by the establishment of the Manaus Free Zone 
(ZFM), as part of a development policy for the Amazon 
region.21
In the early 1980s, new development incentives 
were introduced for the ICT hardware industry. The 1981 
promulgation of the Mexican programme to promote the 
manufacture of computer systems, including their main 
modules and peripheral equipment, resulted in the arrival 
of major firms from the computing area (IBM and HP), 
and from telecommunications (NEC, AT&T and Mitel); 
and the State of Jalisco emerged as one of the key areas 
for the development of Mexico’s ICT hardware industry. 
In Brazil, introduction the Information Technology Act 
in 1984, heralded the start of a regime of tax incentives 
for production and R&D in this sector, which, with far-
reaching changes through time, persists to the present 
day alongside the ZFM incentives.
As a result of the crises of the 1980s, both countries 
were forced to abandon ISI and opened up their economies 
to foreign trade and investment.22 Trade liberalization and 
foreign investment exposed weak national industries to 
international competition. This confrontation revealed 
that ISI had been a double-edged sword. Excessive 
protection and a failure to recognize the importance of 
technological development, among other things, had put 
the industry in a vulnerable situation characterized by: 
(i) lack of competitiveness in terms of price and product 
quality; (ii) insufficient production scale, particularly in 
parts and components; (iii) absence of innovation skills; 
and (iv) inability to enter international markets.23
Once exposed to competition, many Mexican- and 
Brazilian-owned firms either went out of business, were 
bought up by transnational enterprises, or else shifted 
their activities to other sectors. The components industry 
was affected particularly seriously, because final goods 
producers started to obtain spare parts and components 
from the competing Asian industry on a more intensive 
basis. The region’s low level of parts and components 
production would prove to be a pattern lasting until today. 
By the late 1970s, a large proportion of semiconductor 
assembly had moved to Southeast Asia (Scott, 1987).
As from the second half of the 1990s, a new FDI 
surge occurred in the ICT hardware sector, following 
trade liberalization, entry into force of NAFTA in 
Mexico, and the boost to the national market in Brazil 
(resulting from monetary stabilization and liberalization 
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of the telecommunications sector, among other things). 
During this period, major ICT hardware enterprises 
entered both Brazil (Motorola, Nokia, Nortel, Samsung 
Electronics, LG Electronics and others) and Mexico 
(LG Electronics, Samsung Electronics, Sharp, JVC 
and others).
Lastly, also starting in the second half of the 1990s, a 
group of firms that were fundamental for ISIPs arrived in 
both countries: CMs. The main global leaders of contract 
manufacturing (Foxconn, Flextronics-Solectron, Jabil, 
Sanmina-SCI, Celestica and others) now have manufacturing 
and assembly plants in both Mexico and Brazil.
This similar past has defined many of today’s challenges, 
which are common to the two countries: becoming more 
competitive in terms of price and quality, and leading their 
industries towards higher value-added activities.
2.	 Current	overview	of	the	ICT	hardware	industry	in	Mexico	and	Brazil
(a)	 Mexico:	assembly	for	the	North	American	market
In 2006, Mexico’s ICT hardware exports and imports 
amounted to US$ 46.6 billion and US$ 42.4 billion, 
respectively, i.e., a sector trade surplus of US$ 4.2 billion. 
Global changes have influenced Mexico’s ICT hardware 
industry, defining its function in ISIPs as an assembly and 
manufacturing centre for export markets.
In the early 1990s, imports outweighed exports, but 
this situation began to be reversed from 1992 onwards in 
the wake of trade liberalization. As from 1994, with the 
signing of NAFTA, major global OEM and CM leaders 
entered the Mexican market, seeking to reduce their 
manufacturing costs (pursuit of efficiency), to subsequently 
export, particularly to the United States. Since then, the 
sector trade balance has remained in surplus, with a high 
correlation between imports and exports, reflecting the 
industry’s heavy reliance on imported inputs.
Figure II.4
MEXICO: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF ICT GOODS
(In billions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
In 2001-2003, ICT hardware exports posted negative 
growth rates, resulting particularly from a contraction of 
demand in the United States and intense competition from 
Asian countries in that market. In contrast, 2004-2006 has 
been a period of vigorous expansion, thanks to the recovery 
of the United States market and growth in the production of 
goods of higher unit value, such as digital television sets.
By sectors, exports of audio and video equipment 
accounted for 42.3% of Mexico’s total ICT hardware exports 
in 2006, while 31.1% corresponded to telecommunications 
equipment, and 26.6% to computer hardware. Changes in 
the shares of these three sectors reflect recent developments 
in the industry in Mexico (see figure II.5). Between 2000 
and 2004, audio and video equipment exports lost market 
share, declining from 40.2% to 33.4% of total ICT hardware 
exports. In 2005 and 2006, they posted a very sharp expansion 
(rising from US$ 12.1 billion to US$ 19.8 billion), and 
their market share grew to 42.3%. Telecommunications 
equipment exports gained market share between 2000 
and 2006, rising from 24.1% to 31.1%, while the share of 
computer hardware fell back from 35.8% to 26.6%.
Figure II.5
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from Secretariat of Economic Affairs, Mexico.
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Figure II.6
MEXICO: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE ICT  
HARDWARE INDUSTRY (AVERAGE 2000-2006)
(Percentages)
The initial drop in the market share of audio and 
video equipment, along with its sudden expansion, reflect 
the technological changes that occurred in the industry. 
In 2000-2004, the production of analogue television sets 
gradually declined and their market price fell, while in 
2005 and 2006, the production of digital television sets 
(high-priced items) increased substantially. The loss of 
export share by computer hardware is largely explained by 
IBM’s and HP’s decision to hive off their manufacturing 
activities and, consequently, downscale or eliminate such 
activities in Mexico.
Between 2000 and 2006, Mexico received US$ 5,019 
million in FDI destined for the ICT hardware industry. The 
computing sector accounted for 42.4% of that investment, 
followed by the telecommunications equipment sector 
with 32.2%, and audio and video equipment with 25.4% 
(see figure II.6). FDI inflows between 2001 and 2003 (the 
annual average was US$ 528 million) were significantly 
smaller than in the second half of the 1990s —particularly 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 






1999, when ICT hardware FDI amounted to US$ 1.57 
billion. Between 2004 and 2006, there was a major recovery 
in relation to the three previous years, with the average 
annual inflow rising to US$ 913 million.
Figure II.7
MEXICO: MAIN GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTERS IN THE ICT HARDWARE INDUSTRY, 
BY SECTOR SPECIALIZATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of R. Padilla-Pérez, Estudio sectorial de la industria electrónica en México, Mexico 
City, Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico, 2005.
Note:  The consumption sector includes: television sets, video cassette players, DVD recorders and other items. Computing encompasses personal computers and computer 
peripherals such as printers, memory units and others. Telecommunications equipment covers cellphones, conventional telephones, networks, fax machines and others; 
Electronics components include semiconductors, circuit boards and others. Industrial and medical equipment includes control and instrumentation equipment, signalling 




















DF and Mexico State:
Consumer electronics and 
industrial appliances and
telecommunications
Mexico’s ICT hardware industry is grouped in various 
industrial clusters in the border states of Baja California, 
Chihuahua, Tamaulipas, Sonora and Nuevo León, and in 
the interior in the states of Jalisco, Querétaro and Mexico. 
Some of these clusters have a clear sector orientation, 
e.g. the Baja California industry, which is heavily biased 
towards the audio and video sector. The leading OEMs 
in that state include Hitachi, LG Electronics, Panasonic, 
Samsung Electronics, Sanyo, Sharp and Sony.
In the State of Chihuahua, unlike Baja California, 
there is no dominant sector, and the industry produces 
television sets, monitors, telecommunications equipment 
and computer hardware. Apart from OEMs such as 
Philips and Motorola, the State has large contract 
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manufacturers, such as Jabil, Flextronics-Solectron, Sanmina-
SCI and Foxconn, and others. In Nuevo León, Sonora and 
Tamaulipas there is also no clear sector specialization, but 
ICT hardware industry OEMs such as LG Electronics, 
Nokia, Motorola and Panasonic are all present.
Among the country’s interior states, Jalisco stands 
out because its ICT hardware industry is focused on 
the manufacture and assembly of computer hardware, 
peripherals and telecommunications equipment. This 
State hosts many of the world’s largest CMs, including 
Flextronics-Solectron, Jabil, Foxconn, Sanmina-SCI and 
USI, among others. Leading OEMs, such as HP and IBM, 
which are currently focused on software and services, 
are also in the region, along with firms producing basic 
components, such as Intel and Freescale.24
Lastly, the ICT hardware industry in Mexico displays 
considerable heterogeneity in terms of its productive and 
technological characteristics. Exhaustive surveys and studies on 
this industry25 reveal the assembly and subassembly activities 
that make intensive use of unskilled labour, coexisting with 
other capital-intensive activities along with design and R&D. 
The Mexican industry is concentrated in the manufacturing, 
assembly and subassembly links of the chain, whereas design 
and R&D activities are less in evidence. Successful cases of 
technological upgrading can be found, such as the design 
and R&D departments of Intel and Freescale in Jalisco, and 
those of Sony and Plantronics in Baja California.
In short, Mexico has received large FDI flows in the ICT 
hardware sectors, which have contributed to the development 
of regional industrial clusters, in some cases with a clearly 
defined sector specialization. In those clusters, firms with 
different productive and technological characteristics coexist, 
although it can be said that most of them are concentrated in 
the assembly and packaging links, along with the production 
of generic inputs, which also determines Mexico’s role of 
in ISIPs. Most of the FDI entering the country in the ICT 
hardware industry is efficiency seeking, i.e. low-cost production 
for subsequent export, mainly to the United States.
(b)	 Brazil:	a	large	internal	market
Brazil’s ICT hardware exports and imports in 2006 
amounted to US$ 4.0 billion and US$ 11.0 billion, respectively, 
i.e. a trade deficit in this activity of US$ 7.0 billion. Brazil’s 
permanently negative sector trade balance (see figure II.8) 
is explained by two factors. Firstly, production costs are 
relatively high, which undermines export competitiveness 
(further compounded by its distance from the large consumer 
centres, unlike the case of Mexico).26 The second factor is 
the weakness of the components industry, which limits the 
potential for productive linkages.27 These factors have restricted 
the industry in terms of scale and composition, confining it, 
with few exceptions, to final goods assembly.28
Figure II.8
BRAZIL: INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ICT GOODS
(In billions of dollars)
24  Intel and Freescale do not have manufacturing plants in Mexico, but testing, design and R&D centres.
25 See, for example, Padilla-Pérez (2006) and Carrillo and Gomis (2004).
26 The reasons most often given by manufacturers for high production costs are as follows: the tax burden and complexity of the tax structure; 
uncertainty over legal interpretation of the regulations; infrastructure shortcomings; logistics costs, particularly for production in Manaus; high 
labour costs; lack of skilled labour; problems of market access (currently Brazil only has tariff preference agreements with a few neighbouring 
countries); and costly and slow-moving bureaucracy and customs procedures (ECLAC, 2006). Since 2003, the appreciation of the local currency 
has aggravated export competitiveness problems. Although the cost of imported inputs has fallen, the net effect has been to raise the dollar cost 
of the final product.
27 Over the years, the incentives structure benefited final goods to the detriment of components; and when attempts were made to give incentives 
to components, particularly semiconductors, through protection mechanisms and technology transfer requirements, this had the perverse effect 
of moving national manufacturing away from the technological frontier at a time of rapid growth.
28 Component producers include the capacitor manufacturer Epcos, previously associated with the Siemens group, which exports much of its 
production to Europe. There are a small number of semiconductor producers, such as Smart, which only undertakes the encapsulation stage in 
Brazil. Freescale, the enterprise that resulted from the divestment of Motorola’s semiconductor unit, operates as a design house in the latter’s 
premises, but production is done in other units of the group. Lastly, the Centre for Excellence in Advanced Electronics Technology (CEITEC) is 
currently being implemented in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, and will have capacity to undertake the whole production process for Application-
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs). This centre is premised on the basis of technology transfer by the Motorola semiconductor division (now 
Freescale), which is now several years out of date. Apart from creating capacity it is expected to help develop niche products for which access 
to more advanced microprocessors is not essential.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
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In the period 1990-2006, although Brazilian ICT 
hardware imports and exports both followed rising trends, 
import growth occurred earlier and was much greater 
than that of exports, thereby worsening the sector trade 
deficit. Imports started to increase in the early 1990s, 
in the wake of market liberalization, the arrival of new 
firms, growth of the ICT hardware sectors among already 
established domestic enterprises, and the increasing need 
for components that were not competitively produced 
in Brazil in final-good assembly operations. Within 
the rising trend, variations also reflect the dynamism 
of domestic demand and fluctuations in the exchange 
rate.29 In addition, the trend of exports is explained by 
the export capacity of recently established enterprises 
that exported their surplus production (particularly 
cellphones). Despite the gradual increase, Brazil’s share 
in world ICT hardware trade is minimal.
By sectors, the majority of exports consist of 
telecommunications equipment (75%), mostly cellphones, 
followed by components (13.5%), computer and information 
technology hardware (9.8%) and television sets (1.7%). 
Imports almost tripled exports in value terms, reaching 
US$ 11.0 billion in 2006. Most imports consist of 
components (78.1%) followed by computer and information 
technology hardware (11.4%), telecommunications 
equipment (10.2%) and television sets (0.3%).
The scale and density shortcomings mentioned above 
partly explain the scant participation of the ICT hardware 
industry in aggregate economic indicators. The information 
technology and electronics and telecommunications material 
categories account for 0.1% and 0.3% of total value-added, 
respectively (MDIC, 2007). Those two segments jointly 
account for 1.4% of manufacturing industry employment, 
a proportion that has changed very little between 2000 
and 2006 (MDIC, 2007).
The FDI boom in the ICT hardware sector in Brazil 
occurred in the late 1990s. Information technology 
hardware and electronics and telecommunications 
material received 1.5% of FDI in 2006 (4% of total FDI 
received by the manufacturing sector), having peaked 
between 1999 and 2001, when it received between 
4% and 6% of total FDI, equivalent in value terms to 
between 16% and 17 % of FDI in the manufacturing 
sector (see figure II.9). Between 1997 and 2006, 20% 
of investments were channelled into the information 
technology sector, and the remaining 80% went into 
electronics and telecommunications.
29 The monetary stabilization, which was accompanied by an appreciation of the local currency and an increase local demand, triggered a new import surge 
in 1994, which then subsided substantially following the 1999 depreciation, before rising again in 2003. Starting in 2005, a policy to give incentives to 
local computer assembly (mostly using imported components), and increased control over illegal imports, stimulated component imports.
30 In many cases, CMs entered Brazil by purchasing assets and plants from OEMs, particularly from 2000 onwards. The Information Technology 
Law allows OEMs to fulfil the conditions on incentives through the CMs.
Figure II.9
TREND OF FDI IN MANUFACTURING AND IN THE  
ICT HARDWARE SECTOR AS A PERCENTAGE  
OF THE TOTAL
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Central Bank of Brazil.
These investments resulted from the entry of the 
sectors main leaders, both OEMs and CMs. In fact, 
some of the main OEMs, such as Nokia, Motorola, 
Nortel, Lucent, Dell, Samsung Electronics and LGE, 
set up business between 1995 and 1999, and made 
significant investments in the ensuing years. In addition, 
following the liberalization of the telecommunications 
market and the popularization of mobile telephony and 
computers, firms that had entered the market many 
decades earlier, such as Siemens, Ericsson, IBM and 
HP, expanded their product lines and increased their 
capacity. Lastly, many of those firms outsourced their 
production, wholly or partially, to CMs, particularly 
from 2000 onwards.30
It is worth noting that some companies with a 
long-term presence, such as Siemens and Ericsson, have 
developed advantages, namely established facilities, the 
cost of which had been amortized earlier. This enabled 
them, unlike other OEMs that entered the country 
more recently, to use their facilities to competitively 
manufacture telecommunications equipment and networks. 
This fact is reflected in the low level of investment for 
network equipment production in the country by other 
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In terms of geographic distribution, the ICT 
hardware industry in Brazil is concentrated mainly in 
Manaus and in the State of São Paulo. While Manaus 
is a centre for the audiovisual industry,31 there is no 
clear sector specialization by region in the case of other 
products. In many cases, including cellular phones, 
the balance of incentives provided by the Manaus free 
zone and the advantages of producing in other parts of 
the country, closer to the main consumption centres, 
does not clearly favour either Manaus or the other 
regions. This is illustrated by the presence of Nokia in 
Manaus and Motorola in the State of São Paulo. This 
situation is giving rise to competition between regions 
for investments for the manufacture of certain products; 
for some higher value-added items such as portable 
computers, there seems to have been a convergence 
on São Paulo, given its logistics advantages, labour 
availability and market access.32
Figure II.10
BRAZIL: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE MAIN ICT HARDWARE PRODUCERS
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International Computer 
CMs: Jabil 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
31 These products are not currently covered by the Information Technology Law and depend on ZFM incentives, although the convergence between 
different types of equipment (particularly interactive television) has triggered a debate on their possible inclusion in the future.
32 For example, Dell initially (1999) set up in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, roughly equidistant between São Paulo and Buenos Aires, 
the two consumption centres mainly served by Brazilian production. As the Brazilian computers market strengthened compared to the Argentine 
one, the State of São Paulo became increasingly attractive, with better access both to imported inputs, and to the consumers of final products. 
Thus, the firm’s second plant, inaugurated in 2007, was built in Hortolândia (where IBM and Celestica facilities are also located). The medium-
term expectation is for manufacturing to concentrate in Hortolândia, with services and development in Rio Grande do Sul.
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In the case of R&D, the Information Technology Act, 
which benefits nearly all producers, whether OEMs or CMs, 
makes tax incentives conditional on firms devoting the 
equivalent of 5% of their sales of information technology 
and microelectronics products to R&D activities in 
Brazil; part of which must be invested in partnership 
with universities or research institutions that have no 
capital relationship with the firm. This requirement has 
encouraged the emergence of research centres both within 
and outside the firms, along with joint ventures between 
enterprise and university. Whereas some firms maintain 
research centres in Brazil with globally significant R&D 
activities, others have restricted their investments in 
that domain to the minimum required, claiming, as in 
manufacturing, that labour costs are high and there is a 
skill shortage.
In short, the incentives structure resulting from ZFM 
and the Information Technology Act has consolidated 
Brazil’s role in ISIPs: an industry based on the local 
assembly of imported components, mainly targeting the 
local market, and, secondly, exports generally confined 




Expansion of global production networks has had 
significant effects on the characteristics of Mexico’s ICT 
hardware industry, dominated largely by transnational 
enterprises, and the repercussions of this on the rest of 
the local economy. As can be inferred from the brief 
description of the industry provided in the previous 
section, Mexico has entered global networks mainly as 
an exporter of final goods to the United States.
The growth of the ICT hardware industry in Mexico in 
the second half of the 1990s, and in the period 2004-2006, 
has been fuelled by the expansion of contract manufacturing 
activities. Following several decades of participation in 
the industry, world-class manufacturing capacity has been 
developed in several regions of Mexico, and this has been 
exploited by CMs. Their presence in Mexico, moreover, has 
allowed for a continuation of manufacturing and assembly 
activities, following the exit of OEMs from those segments, 
and diversification towards a wide range of sectors and 
products in which CMs traditionally participate (e.g. 
electronic medical and automotive equipment).
Apart from generating exports and jobs, the presence 
of CMs in Mexico has also led to a strengthening of world-
class manufacturing capacity. CMs have a different effect 
than traditional assembly enterprises in terms of knowledge 
transfer. While the latter usually undertake assembly 
processes closely supervised by OEMs, CMs in contrast 
have full potential to develop and operate more complex 
products and processes (Sturgeon, 1999; Lüthje, 2003). 
Given the constant reduction in manufacturing activity profit 
margins, characteristic of the global electronics industry, 
CMs are expanding their range of activities, participating 
increasingly in design, distribution and supplier chain 
management activities, which in the previous section was 
referred to as reintegration or re-verticalization.
Interviews with CMs in Mexico revealed the trend to 
participate in a larger number of links in the value chain, 
which offer greater opportunities to appropriate value-
added. Representatives of one of the firms interviewed, 
Jabil Circuits, commented that, when the firm began 
its operations in Mexico, it focused on assembly and 
manufacturing activities; but recently it has taken on 
design activities (specifically design to verify that the 
product or component can be manufactured) and value 
chain management. As a result, local staff working for 
CMs can draw on knowledge transfer to carry out new 
activities. In general, however CMs in Mexico remain 
basically concentrated in the assembly and manufacturing 
links. Another outstanding issue is the strengthening of 
productive linkages between transnational firms and the 
local economy, which, as mentioned above, are weak.
De-verticalization of the production chain within 
global networks has caused OEMs established in Mexico 
to substantially alter their activities and focus on links 
that generate greater value-added. Such is the case of the 
IBM plant in Guadalajara, which hived off most of its 
manufacturing activities and is currently concentrating on 
software production. In addition, HP in Jalisco has outsourced 
its manufacturing activities, and is focusing on managing 
the supply chain and customer relations, together with the 
provision of management services to the corporation and 
other subsidiaries of the enterprise.33 In the north of the 
33 In 2003, HP Jalisco was also undertaking R&D activities. Having outsourced its manufacturing, the firm was left with a design and research and 
development department in the photocopier sector. Nonetheless, as part of a global strategy, HP decided to abandon that sector, and therefore 
closed the Jalisco department.
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a strong presence of foreign capital. The arrival of the new 
technology has meant that, initially, it is assembly activities 
that are undertaken in Mexico, while higher value-added 
components are imported (including displays).
The growing international competition, particularly 
from Asia, has also caused the ICT hardware industry in 
Mexico to alter its strategy to become more competitive. 
Several strategies explain the growth of the Mexican 
industry over the last few years.34
First strategy. Transition to “high-mix, low-volume” 
production regimes. This scheme consists of 
producing various types of products in low and 
medium volume, in contrast to the mass production 
of a single product type. Manufacture of a million 
units of the same type of mobile phone is an 
example of “high-volume, low-mix” production, 
while the manufacture of tens of models of servers 
configured according to specific customer needs, 
with a production run of a few hundred, is an 
example of “high-mix, low-volume”.
Second strategy. Exploit the shorter response time in 
comparison to Asia. Mexico's geographic proximity 
to the main international ICT hardware market offers 
advantages for operating under a flexible production 
scheme, since firms in Mexico can react rapidly and 
deliver new orders in response to changes in customer 
preferences or variations in estimated demand.
Third strategy. Focus on products of large physical 
volume: exporting products, such as large television 
sets, from Asia is very expensive. Geographic 
proximity provides major advantages to firms 
established in Mexico to assemble or manufacture 
large volume items.
Fourth strategy. Greater integration between the 
activities of the value chain and/or upscaling 
towards more knowledge-intensive activities, as 
mentioned above. Firstly, the reduction of profit 
margins in manufacturing, and the development of 
larger capacities has led firms in the ICT hardware 
industry in Mexico to engage in logistics activities, 
particularly product distribution. Secondly, the 
gradual development of technological capacities 
has enabled a small number of firms to participate 
in design and R&D activities.
In brief, many of the largest transnational ICT hardware 
producers —both OEMs and CMs— are present in Mexico. 
The presence of CMs has been a major source of knowledge 
transfer, which has strengthened manufacturing capacity 
in parts of local industry. Nonetheless, most of the CMs 





country, Plantronics has moved from the manufacture of 
earphones (wired and wireless) towards R&D activities, 
equipment design and packaging, and technical assistance 
to customers. In contrast to manufacturing, these new 
activities generally require staff with university and even 
postgraduate studies, and on average offer better pay. The 
new activities are also more knowledge intensive and thus 
potentially offer greater benefits to the receiving economy 
in terms of technological learning.
Another very important phenomenon associated with 
ISIP and the modularization of the value chain is the creation 
of locally owned design houses. The Jalisco industry is an 
example of the potential offered by this international trend 
to participate in the more knowledge-intensive links in the 
industry. In mid-2007, there were 21 Mexican-owned design 
houses in Jalisco, along with 10 foreign ones (CADELEC, 
2007). These design houses have emerged in a innovation-
friendly setting, consisting of universities, research centres, 
transnational enterprises and business chambers, supported 
by a Government that implements active promotion policies 
(Padilla-Pérez, 2006).
Generally speaking, design houses are microenterprises 
or small businesses that undertake design and R&D activities 
for various sectors of the electronics industry, including 
ICT hardware. Among these design houses, there is also 
significant specialization in the creation of embedded 
software. Their activities are knowledge-intensive, and a 
large proportion of their staff have postgraduate studies. 
The modularization of design activities has enabled other 
transnational firms in Jalisco, other Mexican States, 
and even abroad, to contract design and R&D projects 
from this group of enterprises. Through such projects, 
design houses gain access to new technologies, and their 
activities enable them to appropriate more value-added 
than is possible in the traditional manufacture of final 
goods and components.
The arrival of digital television has also transformed the 
ICT hardware industry in Mexico. Major FDI flows have 
been received to switch from manufacturing conventional 
television sets to digital ones. In 2004, seven of the largest 
television OEMs in the State of Baja California announced 
new investment projects to produce digital television sets 
and computer monitors for an amount of US$ 98 million, 
and this amount is expected to increase considerably in the 
near future (Hasso, 2004). Nonetheless, the transition to 
digital television has had a negative effect on technology 
transfer and productive linkages. For several decades, 
firms manufacturing conventional television sets in 
Mexico had been strengthening their capacity (including 
design) and had set up local supplier networks, albeit with 
34 For further details of these strategies, see Padilla-Pérez and others (2008).
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manufacturing links. The de-verticalization of production has 
caused a number of firms to move into higher value-added 
activities, and has led to the emergence of design houses. 
These have doubtless been significant achievements, but 
the number of successful cases is still small. All of this 
requires a set of strategies, to be implemented by both 
industry and Government, to be able to better exploit the 
opportunities offered by changes in the ICT hardware 
industry worldwide.
(b)	 Brazil:	 imported	 component	 assembly	 for	 the	
local	market
Technological change and the reorganization of 
the global industry has strengthened the model based 
on imported component assembly for the local market, 
which is highly dependent on tax incentives and the 
tariff protection in force in Brazil, while also posing 
new challenges.
As a result of Asian competition, Brazil no longer 
produces many of the low value-added electronics products 
in the audio and video segment. Moreover, the growth of 
the Asian components industry has raised entry barriers 
for higher value-added products of greater technological 
content, such as semiconductors.
Low export competitiveness makes it harder to 
exploit the opportunities created by the emergence of new 
products, particularly those associated with convergence, 
by preventing production on the minimum efficient 
scales. During the second half of the 1990s, when many 
of the hardware firms were originally set up, there were 
few models of each product, allowing for production on 
the minimum efficient scales. Now, however, increasing 
diversity of products and models limits scale benefits. For 
example, while some firms produce the new multifunctional 
products in the country, such as smart phones, others 
consider that the size of the domestic market would not 
allow operations on an efficient scale.35 This constraint 
could be complicated by the lack of definition, until 
recently, of the regulation of new services (e.g. Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX)).
Digital television and the revolution in the display 
technology has increased the demand for flat screen 
television sets and monitors, along with other products 
such as decoders. This has required relatively few 
35 When the research for this report was being undertaken, Motorola, HP and Palm were producing smart phones in Brazil, either directly or through 
CMs. Other firms take a more cautious view of the potential of the Brazilian consumer market for sophisticated products. For example, Nokia 
imports more sophisticated products and concentrates its local manufacturing activities on higher-volume and lower value-added products. A 
criticism that is made of the current system of the Information Technology Act is that with the wider diversity of products the production scale 
for each product decreases. The requirement to undertake certain stages locally for each product raises production costs.
36 Apart from hardware production, Brazil’s adoption of the Japanese digital television standard creates a window of opportunity for its firms to 
develop an export video coding technology and produce software and middleware (Gadelha, 2007).
investments in Brazil’s production structure, concentrated 
essentially in Manaus (Gutiérrez and others, 2006). The 
most significant change in this market is the progressive 
decline in domestically produced components, such as 
cathode ray tube (CRT) monitors. In CRT television sets, 
the domestic content amounts to 90%, whereas in liquid 
crystal (LCD) and plasma screen sets, the figure is 5%, 
which does not exceed the legal requirements for access to 
the corresponding incentives (known as “basic productive 
process” or PPB) (Suframa, 2007). Lastly, convergence also 
poses a challenge for the dichotomy between ZFM and the 
Information Technology Act. With the imminent arrival 
of interactive television, an argument could be made for 
the inclusion of those products in information technology 
goods category, which would reduce the attractiveness 
of Manaus as an exclusive hub for the manufacture of 
television sets, one of its main products.36
The de-verticalization of production and the growing 
importance of CMs in Brazil have had greater effects 
on the ownership of assets and the nature of the agents 
than on production activities. CMs have increased their 
presence in a number of markets, purchasing plants 
from OEMs and continuing the latter’s manufacturing 
processes. The strategies of OEM firms on CM use in 
Brazil vary from case to case. Some OEMs outsource 
the entire manufacturing process for all, or nearly all, of 
their products; others use CMs to manufacture certain 
products only. Some firms use CMs for certain stages 
of the production process, such as the surface mounting 
of circuit boards (PCB surface mounting). CMs enable 
companies to fulfil the requirements of the Information 
Technology Act (PPB and R&D investments), as is also 
revealed by the fact that some of them offer tax management 
services to their customers.
The reduction in manufacturing profit margins has 
required a reorientation of certain OEMs, in Brazil, towards 
specific services or segments. The country has shown that 
it has potential as a service centre in the form of business 
process outsourcing (BPO). Thus, IBM chose Brazil, 
Russia, India and China (the BRIC group) to concentrate 
its investments and promote enterprise growth, focusing on 
corporate services and solutions. The firm employs over 
6,000 people in service provision in the State of São Paulo, 
and since 2005 has had a global centre for outsourcing 
operations. IBM also has an advanced laboratory for “on 
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demand” solutions. In addition, between 60% and 70% 
of employees at HP, a firm that undertakes most of its 
production through CMs, are focused on services. The 
decisions taken by Siemens to abandon the production of 
cellphones and networks, by Philips to concentrate on other 
segments of the electronics industry that do not belong 
to ICTs, and by Siemens, Philips and Motorola to stop 
producing semiconductors, have been reflected in their 
operations in Brazil, which they sold to third parties.
Lastly, with regard to the de-verticalization and 
relocation of R&D activities, although some transnational 
firms maintain global research centres in Brazil, the 
country has not been a priority destination in relocating 
these centres. 37
In this scenario, Brazil faces a dilemma that is by no 
means trivial. The system comprised of a combination of 
ZFM incentives and those of the Information Technology 
Act, currently require the production stages from surface 
mounting onwards be undertaken in the country for the 
main products. The obligation to use national inputs 
is limited to products of low technological content, 
such as batteries and chargers. Representatives of the 
firms, both foreign and national, interviewed for this 
study, stated that they seldom did more than what 
was required. The dilemma is that if the law required 
the local production of strategic components, such as 
semiconductors, it could become unviable even to produce 
37 Beyond what is established in the legal requirements.
final goods, owing to the high costs of production on 
a relatively small scale. Thus, as long as exports are 
uncompetitive, it may not be possible to achieve scales 
that are compatible with efficient production for a wider 
range of products; and it is unlikely that progress can 
be made towards greater local density in ICT hardware 
production chains. Nonetheless, reliance is being placed 
on the dynamic effects of the current policy (in particular 
the long-term effects of R&D activities), and parallel 
initiatives, such as those seeking to promote the creation 
of a semiconductor industry.
In short, while many of the largest transnational ICT 
hardware producers operate in Brazil, the domestic industry 
is limited by the size of its domestic market, its export 
competitiveness, and the production stages undertaken 
locally, owing to the weakness of the electronics component 
industry. These constraints explain the relatively small 
share of the ICT hardware sector in industry value-added 
and employment, and also the sector’s trade deficit. 
The absence of a components industry, particularly 
semiconductors, restricts local value-added and the 
development of innovation capacity (FINEP/MCT, 2004). 
Brazil is facing a major challenge: to generate policies 
that give incentives for the development of its components 
industry and which increase the value added of its industry, 
without this affecting the production of its final goods or 
further weakening its export capacity.
E.  Conclusions and policy implications
The economic liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s attracted 
large-scale investments into Mexico and Brazil through 
the leading OEMs and CMs in the ICT hardware sector. 
That investment grew significantly in the second half of 
the 1990s, following the signing of bilateral agreements 
(including NAFTA), and the growth of local and global 
demand for ICT products. ISIPs have encouraged the 
dissemination of technological know-how to Brazil 
and Mexico, providing new opportunities for capacity 
development in local enterprises, and the production of 
state-of-the-art goods for national markets, in addition 
to opening up new areas of opportunity that go beyond 
assembly and manufacture.
The main global changes in the industry have not 
substantially changed the motives and nature of FDI 
entering the hardware sector in Mexico and Brazil. While 
Mexico participates in ISIPs as a major ICT hardware 
producer, particularly for the United States market, Brazil 
produces essentially for its domestic market. In other 
words, FDI entering Mexico in this sector is essentially 
efficiency-seeking, while flows entering Brazil are primarily 
market-seeking investments. In both countries, the industry 
remains concentrated in the manufacturing, assembly and 
subassembly links of the chain, while design activities 
are still small and there is heavy reliance on imported 
electronic components.
The de-verticalization of the production chain has 
also enabled several firms to refocus and enter higher 
value-added links of the chain, examples being IBM and 
HP in Mexico and Brazil. Modularization, in conjunction 
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with the product digitalization, seems to have opened 
up a major area of opportunity for both countries: the 
production of embedded software.
The two countries face similar challenges to make 
the most of the benefits offered by integration in ISIPs: 
(i) the transition towards activities, within the supply 
chain, of higher value-added and technological content; 
(ii) the strengthening of productive linkages with the rest 
of the local economy, i.e. increasing local production of 
electronic parts and components; and (iii) greater linkage 
between ISIP enterprises (particularly the leading firms) 
and local universities and research centres.
Governments are playing a key role through the 
design and implementation of integrated policies to attract 
FDI,38 which are implemented as part of the countries’ 
overall development policies. When FDI attraction and 
development policies are coordinated and integrated, it is 
possible, firstly, to make the most of the conditions that 
make a country attractive for investors; and, secondly, 
take maximum advantage of the potential benefits of 
FDI (ECLAC, 2007a). Nonetheless, improvements in 
infrastructure, logistics and bureaucratic processes are 
essential for those integrated policies to have a greater 
effect, and to promote export competitiveness.
An extremely important element is the strengthening 
of technological capabilities in the FDI host country or 
region, through human capital training and investment 
in R&D. The training of professionals with university 
degrees and postgraduate qualifications is essential for 
participation in the more knowledge-intensive links 
of the value chain, which offer greater opportunities 
for generating value-added. The development of local 
capacity would make it possible to enter a virtuous circle 
in which FDI is attracted into more complex activities, 
such as R&D and design, which transfer new knowledge 
to the host country and thus strengthening its capacity. 
Similarly, the strengthening of links between firms in 
the ICT hardware industry and local universities and 
research centres would increase the dissemination of 
know-how in the local economy and strengthen the 
capacity of those organizations to offer high-quality and 
value-added services. One needs to be realistic, however. 
Policies to strengthen technological capacity have their 
limits, particularly in an industry of rapid technological 
change such as ICT hardware. These policies certainly 
help developing countries to move towards higher value-
added activities, but rapid technological change makes the 
convergence process difficult, so the manufacturing and 
R&D activities undertaken in the region are not generally 
on the technological frontier, and it is highly likely that 
this trend will continue.
Another element of integrated policies is the selective 
attraction of firms, i.e. placing special emphasis on attracting 
firms and activities that have greater potential to influence 
the host economy. Lastly, given the lack of productive 
linkages and high entry barriers for supplying components 
and intermediate goods to ISIPs, the opportunity arises of 
supporting the development of services associated with 
the ICT hardware industry, particularly design, R&D, 
logistics, and the production of firmware.
The history of the ICT hardware industry in the 
region has shown how costly a protectionist policy that 
does not give incentives to domestic competition and 
innovation can be. The bill has been paid not only in 
terms of technological backwardness, but also in terms 
of a smaller variety of products at higher prices. This 
has restricted the supply of products and hindered the 
penetration of ICTs in the region. The major policy 
challenge facing Latin America and the Caribbean is to 
achieve access to ICT hardware goods in an economically 
efficient manner, without neglecting its industry’s transition 
towards higher value-added activities in the value chain. 
Nonetheless, the high entry barriers, represented by 
other regions’ accumulated investment in technological 
and industrial capacity, makes the task more difficult. In 
this setting, it is essential to make strategic choices, to 
identify competitive capacities in the sector, and perform 
a cost-benefit analysis of the possibility of implementing 
measures to overcome some of the region’s competitive 
shortcomings in the ICT hardware industry.
38 For a more thorough analysis of integrated policies for attracting FDI, see ECLAC (2007a).
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Chapter III
Telecommunications operators: investment 
and corporate strategies in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
A. Introduction
Eight years ago, ECLAC conducted a study on the telecommunications sector and on the strategies 
of the main operators worldwide and in Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2001). The 
scenario then was one of optimism stemming from technological change, the opening up and 
privatization of the sector and, above all, the expansion of a few operators that were poised to 
become leaders in a market rapidly being consolidated worldwide. When the dominant state-
owned enterprises in the region were privatized, much of the industry ended up in the hands of 
foreign (mainly European) companies, which were venturing outside their national borders for 
the first time. The new operators defined ambitious investment plans to modernize and expand 
their infrastructure and to meet much of the decades-long unsatisfied demand that existed in Latin 
American markets. Indeed, telecommunications was one of the main targets of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) during the capital-flow boom in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Nowadays, while the industry’s broad guidelines have 
not changed substantially, the corporate and market 
situation has become more complex. First, the crisis in 
the technology sector in the early part of this decade left 
a heavy mark on telecommunications operators. Second, 
the sudden emergence and spread of broadband Internet 
access altered traditional sources of income and redefined 
the industry’s frontiers, influencing the strategies of 
leading companies. Lastly, a poorly defined regulatory 
framework and uncertainty over the real potential market 
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raised doubts concerning telecommunication operators’ 
capacity to profitably deploy the new networks needed 
to offer more sophisticated services.
Although the epicentre of these changes has been 
a small group of industrialized economies, especially 
the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the 
European Union, the Latin American and Caribbean 
region has not remained untouched. This chapter 
analyses the factors determining the behaviour of the 
main global operators and describes the way in which 
Latin American companies, many of them subsidiaries 
of the main operators, have deployed their corporate 
strategies and are locking into the paradigm of the 
industry: convergence. 
B. Global market for telecommunications services: 
 an industry in the throes of change
1. Erosion of traditional sources of income
In the 1990s, the telecommunications industry 
underwent profound change as a result of technological 
innovation, increased competition, the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises and the international expansion 
of the main telephony operators. With the sudden 
emergence of the Internet, the sector experienced an 
unprecedented boom. However, when the trend for 
irrational overvaluation of the industry suddenly went 
into reverse early in this decade, it affected the vast 
majority of companies involved in information and 
communications technologies (ICT).1
The telecommunications sector then embarked on 
an intensive process of change. Technological change 
and the development of new services are influencing 
the core activities of telecommunications operators. The 
great challenge facing the companies in this industry is 
to reorient their activities towards emerging high value-
added services, which will call for significant investment 
in new network technologies.
Voice services continue to be the main driver of the 
telecommunications market. However, the voice segment 
and the industry’s income structure are changing in response, 
first, to the spectacular growth in mobile telephony and, 
more recently, to the development of broadband Internet 
access. Indeed, mobile telephony rapidly overtook fixed-
line telephony in terms of users and income. In 2006, 
mobile telephony services accounted for around half 
the revenues of the world telecommunications industry, 
and there were more than double the number of mobile 
telephony subscribers than fixed telephony subscribers 
(see figures III.1 and III.2).
Figure III.1
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE SUBSCRIBERS WORLDWIDE, 
BY SEGMENT, 1997-2007 AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2008-2011
(Millions of subscribers)
1 The sector’s spectacular crash in 2001 led to highly-publicized bankruptcies and cases of fraud, coupled with losses of around US$ 1 trillion of 
investors’ money (The Economist Survey: Telecoms Convergence, 12 October 2006).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information provided by the European Audiovisual and 
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Figure III.2
WORLD MARKET FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INCOME 
BY SEGMENT, 2002-2007 AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2011
(Billions of dollars)
and on the corporate segment. In addition, falling mobile 
telephony rates have induced increasing numbers of people 
to choose mobile telephony to the detriment of fixed-line 
alternatives. All this has led to a fall in average revenue per 
user (ARPU)3 for voice services in the developed economies, 
especially in countries like Japan that have experienced the 
highest growth in voice services (see figure III.4). 
Figure III.3
LEADING WORLD MARKETS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, 
BY INCOME, 2002-2007 AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2011
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information provided by the European Audiovisual and 
Telecommunications Institute (IDATE). 
Although developed countries dominate the world 
market for telecommunications services, they are gradually 
losing their supremacy. Between 2002 and 2006, the share of 
the sector’s total revenues held by the three leading markets 
(the United States, the European Union and Japan) fell from 
72% to 64% (see figure III.3). By contrast, the developing 
countries’ share of the world market grew from 20% to 
almost 30% during the same period. In addition, developing 
countries were responsible for almost 80% of the growth in 
global revenues in 2006 (IDATE, 2007, p. 15). This shows 
that the markets of industrialized countries are stagnating 
while emerging markets are growing in importance.
In the developed countries, growth in telecommunications 
services is slowing as a result of falling revenues from fixed-
line telephony and increasingly saturated mobile telephony 
markets. Fixed-line telephony has declined as the number 
of lines, traffic and rates have decreased. Basically, this 
decrease has been caused by increasing broadband Internet 
access and the growing substitution of fixed-line telephony 
by mobile telephony services (known as fixed-mobile 
substitution). The spread of Asymmetric Digital Subscriber 
Line (ADSL)2 and cable modem technologies has led to 
the systematic removal of second lines and the advance of 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology has pushed 
down the price of voice services. VoIP technology has had a 
particularly heavy impact on long-distance telephony services 
2 ADSL is a broadband Internet access technology that allows high-speed data transmission over the twisted-pair copper wires in conventional 
telephone lines. This technology is called asymmetric because the speed of data download (from network to user) is greater than that for uploading 
data (from user to network). An ADSL line carries three communication channels: a downstream channel for sending data, an upstream channel 
for receiving data and a channel for normal voice telephone calls. Improved versions of this technology are now being rolled out (ADSL2 and 
ADSL2+) with the capacity to deliver high-quality television and video services over the telephone.
3 ARPU is an indicator widely used by telecommunications operators that reflects the average revenue per user obtained over a period of time by 
a service company with a wide user base. It is calculated by dividing the company’s total revenue received during the period by the total number 
of customers providing that revenue. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information provided by the European Audiovisual and 
Telecommunications Institute (IDATE).
Figure III.4
AVERAGE REVENUE PER USER FROM VOICE AND MOBILE 
TELEPHONY SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2002-2006
(Dollars per month)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
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In developing countries, the number of fixed-line 
telephony subscribers is still increasing, albeit with signs 
of stagnation. The limitations of basic infrastructure 
are also reinforcing the trend towards fixed-mobile 
substitution, leading mobile telephony to play a highly 
prominent role. Between 2002 and 2005, the total 
penetration of telecommunications (fixed and mobile) 
in these markets doubled, from 20% to 40%. Mobile 
services account for more than 80% of this increase 
(IDATE, 2007, p. 28).
Most of the increase in the number of mobile telephony 
subscribers has occurred in developing countries. In 
late 2006, two thirds of the world’s mobile telephony 
subscribers came from developing countries, compared 
with 50% in 2003. In 2006, developing countries were 
responsible for around 85% of the net world increase in 
the subscriber base. The growth was particularly strong 
in the leading emerging economies of Asia (China, India, 
Indonesia and Pakistan) and Latin America (Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico).
In the industrialized countries, the gap between the 
United States and the European Union (EU) partly reflects 
the more widespread use of prepaid services in Europe. 
The EU countries continue to have some of the highest 
penetration rates in the world, in some cases exceeding 
100% (the Czech Republic, Italy, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) (see figure III.5).
Figure III.5
PENETRATION OF MOBILE TELEPHONY, BY REGION, 2004-2007 
AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2011
(Number of mobile telephony subscribers per 100 inhabitants)
The rapid expansion of broadband services, driven 
by the increasing numbers of users and services on offer, 
has consolidated growth in the data services and Internet 
market, first by means of fixed platforms and, more 
recently, by incorporating networks that offer mobile 
communications. This growth has been particularly 
intensive in the industrialized economies, especially the 
United States, some Asian countries (Australia, Japan, 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China and 
the Republic of Korea) and Northern Europe (Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands), where there are high 
penetration rates and the largest number of users. Among 
the developing countries, the Latin American region has 
made the greatest strides, particularly Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico. At present, this segment represents a little 
over 16% of total revenues from the telecommunications 
services market and its share could increase to around 
20% by 2010 (IDATE, 2007) (see figure III.2).
In the data segment, the increase in traffic has 
been offset by a steady fall in prices and a migration 
towards new broadband solutions in Internet Protocol 
(IP) technology. The increase in the number of high-
speed Internet connections is one of the main reasons 
why technologies such as VoIP have had such a heavy 
impact on the market, especially in the fixed-line 
telephony segment. Moreover, transmission technologies 
have become ever more efficient, which has allowed 
voice-service quality to be improved. At present, the 
most commonly-used technology is ADSL, which has 
become the primary means for increasing the number 
of subscribers to broadband Internet access services 
worldwide, including in the United States, where cable 
television operators play a very prominent role.
In summary, the world market for telecommunications 
services continues to grow, although it is starting to show 
clear signs of stagnation in the traditional segments, 
especially in the industrialized economies. Mobile 
services are still driving growth in the market as a whole 
and new income streams from broadband access services 
have helped to offset the decline in fixed telephony 
services. In an industry dominated by a small group of 
major operators, the emergence and dissemination of 
VoIP services and the widespread introduction of mobile 
services, driven by the convergence process (voice/data, 
fixed/mobile), are calling into question the business 
model of many of these companies and introducing new 
challenges for the future.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
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2. End to the industry’s traditional segmentation and the sudden 
 emergence of new challengers to the dominant operators
traditional segmentation, in which there were separate 
networks for the different services. In fact, the gradual 
transition from circuit-switched telecommunications 
networks to Internet protocol networks is expected to 
break down the barriers between the segments. The 
outright supremacy of the dominant operators is therefore 
beginning to be challenged by the sudden advent of other 
stakeholders operating in similar commercial areas which, 
until recently, had been entirely separate. The first were 
cable television operators which, predicting future trends 
in the industry, made early investments in infrastructure 
to enable them to offer television, Internet access and, 
more recently, voice services, simultaneously. This 
struggle for supremacy is clearly observed in the United 
States market.4 
Over a short period, the main providers of Internet-
based content and applications (Yahoo!, Google, 
Microsoft’s MSN, America Online (AOL), eBay and 
Amazon) have also become key stakeholders in the 
telecommunications and IT industries, a segment where 
United States companies are particularly dynamic 
(Fransman, 2007). In addition to being major brands, 
all the above companies were quick to gain significant 
advantage in the content market by adding technological 
value to web-based services and applications. To speed 
up their development, Internet companies have had to 
offer new services, either developed by the companies 
themselves or purchased from others. As exclusive, 
entirely new services are few and far between, a number 
of companies have replicated some of their competitors’ 
service offerings in order to capture market share or to 
destroy their value.5 Partnerships have also been formed 
to protect certain market segments.6
During their short lifetime, Internet-based companies 
have structured their business model around advertising 
and have endeavoured to be present in the services, 
content and applications fields, where advertising is the 
main source of income (search engines, aggregation of 
Operators have been the main drivers of change in the 
telecommunications services industry. In little more than 
20 years, the situation has changed from one of local 
monopolies in basic telephony (many state-controlled) 
to integrated private companies, some with a marked 
international presence, which provide a wide range of 
telecommunications and multimedia services. These 
changes were accompanied by sweeping regulatory 
changes and an intensive process of geographical and 
sectoral consolidation led by an unprecedented wave 
of major mergers and acquisitions. A large share of the 
industry’s revenues, profits, customers and innovations 
are now in the hands of a small group of United States, 
European and Asian companies. In 2006, the 10 leading 
telecommunications operators earned 53% of the sector’s 
world revenues (see figure III.6).
Figure III.6
LEADING TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES, BY SALES, 2006
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Fortune Global 500, 27 July 2007.
However, the sudden emergence of the Internet and its 
conversion into the basic medium for providing services via 
fixed and wireless networks started to erode the industry’s 
4 The two main cable television operators in the United States, Comcast (which merged with AT&T Broadband in 2002) and Time Warner Cable, 
share more than 50% of the market for high-speed cable modem access.
5 MSN and Yahoo! have invested in search engines to compete with Google, which in turn has launched a messaging service (Gmail) with a greater storage 
capacity than those of its competitors. In addition, MSN and Google have started to compete with eBay in the classified advertisement segment.
6 MSN and Yahoo! have joined forces in the electronic messaging field, and Google and AOL in the field of search engines. In February 2008, 
Microsoft made an unsolicited US$ 44.6 billion bid for Yahoo! This was designed to increase Microsoft’s competitiveness in the area of online 
services, especially against Google and, if successful, would have been the sector’s largest acquisition since TimeWarner and AOL merged.
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news content, directories), especially in the corporate 
segment. However, with the boom in personal news 
content (YouTube, MySpace, Facebook), blogs (short for 
web logs) and community networks, Internet companies 
have begun to eye this market with growing interest 
(Gaptel, 2007).7 
As part of the convergence process, the Internet 
giants have also tried to expand their sphere of 
operations by tackling segments dominated by traditional 
telecommunications and media operators. As a result, 
they are posing an increasing threat to traditional voice 
service operators. For instance, e-Bay recently purchased 
VoIP technology leader, Skype, valued at US$ 2.6 billion, 
and MSN and AOL have launched new computer-to-
telephone voice services. The leading Internet companies 
have also entered the television segment, another pillar 
of the new convergent service packages (like triple 
play),8 by developing video search engines and video on 
demand (VoD) services. For instance, Google acquired 
YouTube for US$ 1.65 billion. This has turned the 
Internet giants into either direct competitors (VoD) or 
value-destroyers (VoIP) of traditional operators. In both 
cases, they offer their services using the infrastructure 
of traditional operators.
Although this threat is mitigated for the time being 
by the advantages that traditional operators enjoy, it is 
nonetheless real. Indeed, the Internet giants could have 
a heavy impact on the business models of traditional 
telecommunications operators which, in turn, would 
influence the growth of the Internet giants.9 Moreover, 
in some segments where the Internet giants are breaking 
new ground, traditional operators have been forced to 
form partnerships to limit their own investment and take 
advantage of their partners’ dominance in key services 
(Yahoo!-AT&T (formerly SBC), MSN-Vodafone, iTunes-
AT&T (formerly Cingular Wireless), Google-T-Mobile and 
Skype-Eplus are examples of such partnerships). Internet 
companies have also benefited from these partnerships 
and have stolen a lead over their competitors by entering 
new market segments. This would appear to have led to 
a segregation of functions between telecommunications 
operators and Internet giants: while telecommunications 
operators develop access to and profit from this market, 
Internet giants add value to Internet content and profit 
from advertising (Fundación Telefónica and ENTER, 
2007, p. 36). 
As content owners (publishing companies and 
music, movie and video-game producers) have, for the 
time being, refrained from distributing their products 
directly over the Internet, major specialized providers 
have emerged which distribute, store and manage such 
resources. In general, these specialist companies operate 
like umbrella organizations and grant content licences 
to smaller providers, telecommunications operators and 
Internet giants. A number of providers have emerged that 
provide music content (Rhapsody, Napster, MediaNet, 
PlayNow, Apple-iTunes), video content (CinemaNow, 
Movielink, Apple-iTunes) and games content (Pogo, 
Zylom, WorldWinner). In general, content providers have 
not developed uniformly across all sectors and, although 
they are highly developed in the music market, in the 
movie market they are still in their infancy.10 However, 
content (especially video content) will doubtless be one of 
the main drivers of demand for broadband in the coming 
years (Gaptel, 2007) and content distributors would be 
required to play a key role in developing markets for 
broadband Internet access.
In summary, the gradual transition towards IP networks, 
which allows a wide range of telecommunications services 
to be offered, has transformed the traditional market. In the 
past, telecommunications operators provided only fixed-
line telephony, whereas now they are required to deliver 
new integrated services, including voice services, in an 
ever more competitive environment. This new scenario 
is certain to present great challenges to the industry’s 
key stakeholders: operators, regulatory and competition 
authorities, national government policy-making authorities 
and telecommunications service users. 
7 Such sites currently receive more visits than general portals and hold enormous potential for new advertising revenue. 
8 Triple play offers three telecommunications services simultaneously: television (on demand or conventional), high-speed Internet access and 
an outgoing and incoming voice call service using a single access infrastructure.
9 In the recent debate on network neutrality, the Internet giants have baulked at the possibility that telecommunications operators could constrain 
other stakeholders’ use of the new broadband Internet access networks (Gaptel, 2007).
10 Legal music downloading is, to a large extent, replacing the sale of compact discs, whereas there is still no competitive business model for films. 
In 2007, the sale of digital music worldwide grew by 40%. Between 2004 and 2007, the digital music share of the music industry’s total sales 
rose from 0.4% to 15%, primarily owing to the success of Apple iTunes and Amazon (La Tercera, 29 January 2008).
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C. Operators’ response: opting for convergence?
in real time with a service quality that compared 
favourably with fixed-line telephony.
(ii) Increased competition, as the convergence process 
intensified in both networks and services. Convergence 
means interconnecting different types of network 
(telecommunications, television and mass media), 
which allows consumers to obtain the same services 
from various platforms. Telecommunications operators, 
cable television companies, content providers and 
Internet companies soon started to offer bundled service 
packages that included telephony, Internet access and 
television, known as triple play. This convergence 
increased competition and seriously undermined 
the revenues and profits of telecommunications 
operators.
In addition to the above two factors, regulation affected 
the performance of telecommunications operators. The 
trend that forced dominant operators to provide competitors 
with access to their networks has hit them hard (Fransman, 
2007). In a number of industrialized countries, the 
liberalization of “last mile” connections to the customer 
(local loop unbundling) has transformed the competitive 
environment and enabled a variety of providers to offer 
telecommunications services over the same network.12 
Moreover, competition based on infrastructure, usually 
between cable and telecommunications networks (fixed 
and wireless), has prompted operators to enter areas where 
their competitors traditionally operated, and this has led 
to a drop in consumer prices.
The situation became exceedingly complex 
when the market for wireless voice services (mobile 
telephony) began to show clear signs of saturation in 
many developed countries, hitting the revenues and 
profits of the dominant operators. In response, the 
major telecommunications service companies started 
to establish new strategic guidelines to enable them to 
maintain and even increase their market share. 
In the early years of this decade, the crisis was predicted 
to lead to a reorganization and consolidation of the sector. 
In short, the market’s oligopolic structure was expected to 
become further entrenched, which would swell the coffers 
of the dominant operators (Fransman, 2007). However, 
the complex financial situation in which most operators 
found themselves following the risky gambles they had 
taken in the period leading up to the crisis, together 
with structural changes in the market, meant that these 
predictions did not come to pass.11
In a context where new funding was difficult to raise, 
owing mainly to stock-market distrust, companies took 
measures to reduce their debt. These included operational 
improvements, investment cuts and the disposal of assets 
that the companies did not consider to be strategic. As a 
result, most operators managed to considerably reduce their 
level of indebtedness in a relatively short time. Integrated 
operators could also rely on their mobile telephony 
subsidiaries, whose revenues and profits continued to 
climb fast. However, the market trend and technological 
advances meant that these benefits were not as lasting 
as had been hoped. 
The increase in mobile telephony sales and falling 
prices reduced revenues from fixed-line telephony, which 
accentuated a process of fixed-mobile substitution. Moreover, 
sudden technological change undermined revenues from 
fixed-line telephony on account of two factors:
(i) The emergence of the upstart VoIP technology, 
which gave consumers cheaper access to voice 
services, rapidly eroded revenues from fixed-line 
telephony, especially in the long-distance telephony 
segment. Even though the first commercial version 
of the VoIP application dates back to 1995, it took 
years to be become widely established owing to 
the complementary technological change that was 
occurring with broadband Internet access. VoIP’s 
high connection speed allowed calls to be set up 
11 Their gambles basically involved huge-scale mergers and acquisitions, together with entry into new market segments, by means of expensive 
third-generation mobile telephony licences in Europe, for example.
12 Other synonyms for the term “last mile” connection are local loop or subscriber line, that is to say, the existing wiring between the telephone 
exchange (switch) and the user. Local loop unbundling consists in making available to competitor companies the dominant operators’ copper 
wires, to enable them to provide different types of telephony service and data network access.
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1. Regional consolidation: search for economies of scale and  
 components for integrated service provision
13 The original seven regional operators formed from the dismantling of AT&T in 1984 that provided telephone services in the United States 
were: Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Nynex, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell and US West. In 2005, MCI Inc. and AT&T, the two main 
operators in the long-distance telephony segment, were acquired by Verizon Communications and SBC respectively. In March 2006, AT&T Inc. 
(as AT&T was rechristened) acquired BellSouth, the third most important local telephony operator in the United States. Its purchase of BellSouth 
gave AT&T Inc. total control over the United States’ largest mobile telephony operator, Cingular Wireless. Paradoxically, Verizon’s purchase of 
MCI resulted in the disappearance of the plaintiff in the antitrust cases that had led to the restructuring of AT&T.
14 AT&T Inc. controls the largest mobile telephony operator in the United States, Cingular Wireless. In addition, Verizon Communication (55%) 
and the British company, Vodafone (45%), created the joint venture, Verizon Wireless. Sprint, formerly the third largest long-distance telephony 
operator, decided to focus its efforts on the mobile telephony market (by merging with Nextel and creating a new mobile telephony company 
called Sprint Nextel) and to transfer its fixed telephony assets (basically from local traffic) to the firm Embarq. Another major operator is T-
Mobile, a subsidiary of German company, Deutsche Telekom.
Recently, taking advantage of a more comfortable 
financial situation and the short memories of markets, 
operators have embarked on a new offensive to achieve 
economies of scale and supplement their service offering, 
in response to the industry’s efforts to achieve the new 
paradigm of convergence. This appears to have led to a 
new spate of mergers and acquisitions, focusing on the 
industrialized countries (see table III.1). While United 
States and Japanese companies have directed their efforts 
to strengthening their position in domestic markets, 
in Europe there is a more active trend for operators 
to strengthen their regional position, reinforcing their 
historical preference for internationalizing their activities 
(see figure III.7).
The United States market has changed significantly. 
Following an intensive process of consolidation, the major 
long-distance telephony operators have disappeared, and 
Regional Bell Operating Companies have gained new 
momentum with the re-emergence of the emblematic AT&T and 
the strengthening of Verizon Communications.13 In addition, 
concentration in the mobile telephony segment has increased 
significantly and AT&T Inc. and Verizon subsidiaries now 
control more than 50% of the market.14 This trend towards 
concentration is the response of telecommunications operators 
to intense competition from cable television providers, which 
continue to be the leaders in broadband access and triple play 
services. This has enabled operators to expand and complete 
their service provision, establishing synergies and getting 
ahead of competitors by offering more complex convergent 
packages, such as quadruple play, which provides mobile 
telephony in addition to fixed-line telephony, broadband 
access and television. 
Table III.1
LARGEST MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, 2003-2007
(Millions of dollars)
Year Company acquired Country Purchasing company Country Amount
2005 BellSouth Corp. United States AT&T Inc. United States 83 105
2004 Cingular Wireless United States AT&T Wireless Inc. United States 46 745
2007 Bell Canada Entreprises Inc. (BCE) Canada Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan and others Canada 42 435
2004 Nextel Communication United States Sprint Corporation United States 41 413
2005 O2 Plc United Kingdom Telefónica Spain 31 126
2007 ALLTEL Communication United States TPG / Goldman Sachs United States 27 149
2005 AT&T Corp. United States SBC Communications United States 22 333
2006 Vodafone subsidiary in Japan United Kingdom Softbank Corp. Japan 17 528
2005 TDC A/S Denmark Nordic Telephone Co United Kingdom 13 837
2007 Hutchison Essar Ltda. India Vodafone Plc United Kingdom 13 100
2005 Wind SpA Italy Weather Investments Egypt 12 501
2007 Maxis Communication Malaysia Usaha Tegas Malaysia 11 911
2005 Amena Spain France Télécom France 10 850
2005 Virgin Mobile United Kingdom NTL Inc. United Kingdom 10 266
2006 MCI Inc. United States Verizon Communications United States 7 541
2004 BellSouth assets in Latin America United States Telefónica Spain 5 850
2007 Telecom Italia Italy Telefónica and others Spain/Italy 5 666
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Bloomberg.
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Figure III.7
WORLD’S TEN LEADING OPERATORS: SALES BY MARKET, 2006
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information provided by the companies.
By contrast, when they met with increased competition 
in their domestic markets, European operators sought new 
growth opportunities outside their own borders.15 Even 
though they have not followed the same path, the key 
objective of most operators’ growth strategy has been to 
secure a large share of the continental European market 
(see table III.2). 
At first, with bold but intrinsically defensive strategies, 
the Mediterranean companies were the most active 
and focused their attention on acquiring fixed assets in 
emerging markets, mainly in Latin America. During this 
phase, Spain’s Telefónica was highly prominent, as were 
France Télécom and Italy’s Telecom Italia to a lesser 
extent. Indeed, Telefónica has invested around 100 billion 
euros over the past 10 years to create one of the industry’s 
largest companies, operating in 22 countries (The Wall 
Street Journal Americas, 16 July 2007).
Subsequently, with the wireless telephony revolution, 
Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile), Vodafone and France 
Télécom (Orange) considerably expanded their presence 
in Europe, the United States and some African and Asian 
markets via their mobile telephone subsidiaries. Deutsche 
Telekom has adopted a more cautious strategy, by avoiding 
non-continental emerging markets and focusing its operations 
on the United States and the United Kingdom, as well 
as on most of the new European Union Member States 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Following its less than 
gratifying experience in Latin America, France Télécom 
has targeted its operations on Spain, the United Kingdom 
and Poland. The company most active in this field was 
Vodafone, which has become Europe’s most globalized 
telecommunications company and the world’s leading 
mobile telephony operator. However, as the convergence 
process has intensified, problems have begun to emerge 
owing to Vodafone’s heavy concentration on the mobile 
telephony segment.16 
Table III.2













  Germany X X X X
  Spain X X X X
  France X X X
  Italy X X
  Netherlands X X X X X
  United Kingdom X X X
  Switzerland X X X X
Central and 
 Eastern Europe
  Bulgaria X
  Hungary X X
  Poland X X X
  Czech Republic X X X
  Rumania X X
United States X X X X
Latin America
  Argentina X X
  Brazil X X X
  Chile X
  Colombia X
  Mexico X
Africa
  South Africa X
  Botswana X
  Cameroon X
  Egypt X X
  Kenya X
  Morocco X
Asia
  Republic of Korea X
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information provided by the companies.
15 The level of internationalization among the leading European operators varies. Whereas Deutsche Telekom, France Télécom and Telefónica derive 
more than one third of their revenues from abroad, BT and Telecom Italia continue to focus heavily on their domestic markets (see figure III.7).
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Operators now seem to be endeavouring to secure 
a more balanced continental presence by combining 
their fixed and mobile assets. This is the case with 
Telefónica, which, with its broad and strong presence 
in Latin America in all segments and, following its 
traumatic gamble on third-generation mobile telephony, 
has stepped up its offensive on the European market, 
with costly acquisitions in Italy, the United Kingdom 
and the Czech Republic. Smaller companies appear to 
be trying to steal market share from dominant operators 
by offering multiplay services. They include British 
cable operator, NTL, which purchased mobile telephony 
company, Virgin Mobile (see table III.1). This could 
be the first sign of a rapid, mutually binding process of 
company consolidation.
In summary, United States and Japanese companies 
have focused their efforts on consolidating their position 
in their respective domestic markets. In contrast, the 
leading European operators have continued to step up their 
process of internationalization, focusing on the European 
continent. The wave of large-scale mergers and acquisitions 
has returned local telephony operators to prominence in 
their new role as providers of multiplay services. Of the 
leading operators, only Spain’s Telefónica has acquired 
a significant presence in Latin America and has become 
one of the region’s leading operators. 
2. Redefining the core business: convergence, connectivity, 
 mobility and speed
In the corporate organization sphere, the major operators 
are reversing the segmentation established in the late 
1990s to increase integration between the various business 
segments. It seems logical to assume that the companies 
which survive future changes will be those that manage 
to create deep synergies and maintain the right balance 
between the various voice, data and video services to 
enable them to cope with growing demand for multiplay 
services (see figure III.8).
Figure III.8
WORLD’S TEN LEADING OPERATORS: SALES BY SEGMENT, 2006
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information provided by the companies.
Many of the major telecommunications operators 
believe that the industry’s future lies in offering a 
wide range of value-added services on their “last 
mile” connections or wireless networks and in relying 
less on revenues from physical connections. Operators 
are beginning to see voice as a readily replaceable, 
homogenous commodity and acknowledge the need to 
find new sources of income to replace it. The trend in 
the industry demonstrates the importance of providing 
connection infrastructure and moving content across 
networks. Companies are expected to rapidly develop 
next-generation network (NGN) architecture, re-gearing 
their business towards IP applications (including voice 
services) and becoming global service operators in the 
process. Mobile telephony operators are expected to 
engage in a similar, albeit less intense, dynamic by rolling 
out new third-generation networks to provide data and 
multimedia services.
In contrast, other operators have decided to concentrate 
on offering connectivity via fixed or wireless infrastructure. 
This requires them to abandon the applications market, 
including telephony, and to reduce their business of 
providing access or transmitting packages and applications. 
Instead, companies are focusing on the development of 
high-capacity networks to transmit content and to the 
provision of cheaper and more effective data services. One 
of the problems this raises is to maintain income levels 
when both access and transmission prices are subject to 
strong competitive pressure.
Their visions of the future of the telecommunications 
market will lead companies in different directions, based 
on different investment models. However, the time when 
all public operators had a similar structure and offered 
identical telephony services appears to be drawing to an 
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(a)	 Towards	the	provision	of	bundled	service		
packages:	multiplay
Broadband Internet access has profoundly altered the 
way in which telecommunications services are accessed 
and valued. This has turned telephony into just another 
Internet application and any IP applications provider can 
provide its users with voice services (VoIP), irrespective 
of the user’s access mode (ADSL, cable modem or third-
generation wireless network). Consequently, operators have 
been obliged to seek new solutions to stem the decline in 
revenues from traditional services, to progress towards 
new higher value-added money-making offerings and 
to endeavour to maintain, and if possible expand, their 
customer base. The first steps in this direction have been 
flat-rate access plans and convergence between fixed and 
mobile services.17 
However, the best results are being achieved by 
providing packages that bundle together telephony services, 
broadband Internet access and television, known as multiplay 
(double, triple or quadruple play). Their simplicity has 
made multiplay services highly attractive to consumers, 
as it gives them a consolidated account that costs less than 
paying separately for the different services. At present, 
most operators are either offering, or preparing to launch, 
multiplay services (usually triple play). 
Users are now able subscribe to different service 
combinations via a variety of platforms, since operators that 
formerly occupied separate markets have started to compete 
in the same markets. As a result, telecommunications 
operators, which focus primarily on telephony, are trying 
to broaden the range of services they offer to include, 
first, Internet access and, second, television. In addition, 
cable operators, which focus basically on the television 
market, have moved towards providing, first, Internet 
access services, and, next, telephone services.18 The 
progress being made in triple play services is prompting 
operators to add further services. Operators in the United 
States are pioneers in this field: in response to competition 
from cable television operators, Verizon and AT&T have 
been the first to offer quadruple play via their mobile 
telephony subsidiaries. Lastly, Internet services providers 
are gradually starting to target their efforts on the telephony 
and television sectors. The development of such packages 
has created intense rivalry among telecommunications 
operators, cable television operators and Internet service 
providers.19 This has led to the emergence of a number 
of alternative operators that are starting to challenge the 
leadership of the dominant companies.
Given the need to offer convergent services, companies 
have taken measures to reduce costs and to ensure viable 
network migration, which has enabled them to offer their 
customers new multiplay alternatives:
The sharp increase in the use of VoIP technology 
has obliged dominant operators to take action and 
to offer multiplay services too, as in the case of 
Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, Telecom Italia, Telefónica 
and British Telecom. Owing to the rapid decline in 
revenues from traditional telephony, those operators 
have had to secure a position in the market of 
residential VoIP services even though it might 
appear to be a strategy of self-cannibalism. 
In a number of markets, Internet Protocol television 
(IPTV) has gone beyond the experimental stage. 
In many cases, alternative operators have been the 
first to launch IPTV services in ADSL networks, 
usually as part of a triple play service, as in the 
case of Free in France, Fastweb in Italy and 
HomeChoice in the United Kingdom. Since 2005, 
some dominant operators have been deploying a 
more aggressive strategy in IPTV services, where 
Telecom Italia, France Télécom and Deutsche 
Telekom are performing well. In the United States, 
as part of a first phase, the main telephony operators 
(Verizon, AT&T, Qwest and SprintNextel) have 
concluded agreements with satellite operators. 
However, when next-generation networks are 
developed, these companies will have sufficient 
capacity to distribute IPTV audiovisual content 
over their own networks.
•
•
17 There are flat-rate plans for national and international calls from fixed lines, plus unlimited calls for mobile telephony customers to a group of 
preselected numbers. Flat rates are also common in broadband Internet access. A number of operators currently offer handsets that function as 
mobile telephones but become fixed telephones in the home. Even though such offerings are in their infancy, it is a sign that the gap between 
fixed and mobile telephony is closing.
18 In most countries, cable television operators that provide Internet access have found it easier to offer triple play than those using ADSL technology, 
owing to their strong links with audiovisual content. Traditional telecommunications operators have had to struggle harder to obtain content for 
their television services and have therefore taken longer to get launched and secure market share.
19 Some of the alternative operators that have launched packages include cable television operators that also have assets in the fixed telephony 
market, such as Auna, Telefónica’s main rival in Spain, Telewest in the United Kingdom, and Internet broadband access providers that have 
broadened the scope of their services to include television and voice. In late 2003, French operator, Free, launched an ADSL service that included 
VoIP and, for subscribers situated in the liberalized zones of the “last mile”, Internet Protocol television (IPTV). This company, which has burst 
into the broadband access market with a low-cost triple play service, has become France Télécom’s main competitor.
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A number of operators without the capacity to offer 
traditional mobile telephony operate as mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNO) in order to 
compete in the quadruple play segment.20 British 
Telecom is currently offering such services via 
BT Mobile.21 
However, operators have also encountered serious 
obstacles to defining strategies based on multiple play 
services:
In markets where there is little competition, 
dominant operators have endeavoured to delay the 
introduction of VoIP services to keep up their profits 
from voice traffic in switched networks. In fact, 
as long as telecommunications operators continue 
to view VoIP technology as a threat rather than an 
opportunity, no synergies will be created between 
local telephony and the Internet (Beca, 2007).
Dominant operators find it difficult to operate in 
market segments with high barriers to entry where 
they do not yet have a major presence. Deutsche 
Telekom in Germany and BT in the United Kingdom 
have been unable to challenge the supremacy of 
cable operators, which has diminished their growth 
prospects in the pay-television market.
Regulation is still an obstacle. In Europe, the 
regulatory authorities can limit the capacity of 
operators with significant market power (SMP) to offer 
multiplay.22 In a number of states in the United States, 
telecommunications operators are required to obtain 
a cable television licence in every city or municipality 
where they wish to offer multiplay services. This 
long and costly procedure has prevented them from 
deploying their multiplay services. In Japan, NTT 
is not authorized to distribute its television offering 
directly, although it can do so using an IP platform.
Triple play and quadruple play represent the first 
phase in service convergence. The next phase should 
be to unify the networks over which these services are 
delivered. However, one of the problems is to guarantee 
continuous coverage for users. Recently there have 
been major strides forward in improving coverage and 
bandwidth, and in resolving mobility problems. In the 
industrialized countries, operators are expanding their 
third-generation (3G) networks to provide users with 
faster access and netsurfing speeds.
Lastly, the reduction of barriers between markets 





between similar and interchangeable services from 
several providers. At the same time, the removal of 
these barriers is forcing regulators to rethink regulation 
in specific markets. 
(b)	 The	 industry’s	 major	 bottleneck:	 network	
capacity
Obsolete networks and increased traffic call for 
substantial investment in two areas: (i) the fixed segment, to 
move on from subscriber-based copper loop technologies, 
like ADSL, towards fibre-optic networks, and (ii) wireless 
communications, to migrate from second-generation voice 
services to third-generation networks that allow advanced 
wireless mobile communications, with high-speed data 
transfer over the Internet (see figure III.9).
Figure III.9
TRAFFIC GROWTH: NEED FOR NEW NETWORKS
(Petabytes per month) a
20 A mobile virtual network operator is a company which, despite not owning its own network infrastructure for providing a mobile telephony 
service, sells the service under its own brand name using another operator’s network.
21 In the early years of this decade, a number of major operators, such as AT&T in the United States and British Telecom in Europe, sold off their 
mobile telephony businesses to try to alleviate the complex financial situation in which they found themselves. 
22 In Italy, Telecom Italia has not been able to offer bundled services. France Télécom has had problems in offering triple play services in France.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Mark Wegleitmer (from Verizon), presentation at the Bear Stearns 
18th Annual Technology/Communications/Internet Conference, New York, 
June 2007.
a A petabyte (PB) is a unit of information or computer storage equal to 1015 bytes. 
However, the difficult situation that telecommunications 
operators have experienced in recent years has done much 
to curb investment and the migration to next-generation 
networks. In fact, the investment in infrastructure of the 
world’s ten leading operators, as a percentage of their total 
volume of business, fell from 20.5% in 1996 to 10.9% in 
2005 (Fundación Telefónica, 2007). Producers of networks 
and hardware for telephony have also been affected.
Recently the trend seems to have begun to reverse. In 
spite of sluggish revenues, especially in fixed-line telephony, 
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of around 150 billion euros worldwide (Fundación Telefónica 
and ENTER, 2007). This is because telecommunications 
companies need to anticipate the gradual transition to 
optical fibre and to invest in order to maintain and defend 
their competitive and market position in the coming years 
(OECD, 2007). This is a key decision, since next-generation 
networks are able transfer much more information, which 
is crucial for the new uses and services that are emerging 
(such as high-definition television (HDTV) and video on 
demand (VoD)), which require higher bandwidth than 
current networks can provide (see figure III.9).
Most telecommunications operators today are evaluating 
plans for developing new high-speed networks. The 
pioneers in this field have been Asian and United States 
operators, while development in Europe has been more 
modest. These new advances will change the picture for 
broadband in the years to come (see figure III.10).
Figure III.10
BROADBAND ACCESS WORLDWIDE, BY TECHNOLOGY, 2000-2010
(Percentages)
High population density, price competitiveness and a 
strong political will have helped Japan and the Republic of 
Korea to take the lead in fibre optics.23 ADSL technology 
has been losing ground in those countries as next-generation 
networks (especially FTTX networks) have been deployed 
(see figure II.10).24 Moreover, in Japan optical fibre has 
been incorporated not only into basic networks, like in the 
United States and Europe, but also into the access network, 
and even reaches users via fibre to the home (FTTH) 
(Fransman, 2007). In Japan, the leading companies, headed 
by telecommunications operator NTT, have invested more 
than 38 billion euros in this new network architecture 
(OECD, 2007).25 By April 2007, NTT, which has a 67.5% 
market share, was operating more fibre-optic networks than 
ADSL lines, making fibre optics the most commonly-used 
method of broadband access (BMP Telecommunication 
Consultants, May 2007).
The Asian countries’ significant lead started to 
shrink when the United States Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) announced that operators were not 
obliged to share the new fibre-optic infrastructure with 
competitors (Bauer, 2005). This significantly boosted 
the investment of United States operators and they began 
to roll out a variety of FTTX network solutions to offer 
competitive services and so challenge cable operators’ 
dominance in the residential Internet market (see figure 
III.11). Verizon has invested more than US$ 20 billion to 
focus exclusively on FTTH architecture and on connecting 
some 14 million homes by the year 2010 (IDATE, 
2007b).26 However, AT&T Inc., via BellSouth and SBC, 
has invested some US$ 10 billion and has given priority to 
fibre to the node (FTTN)/VDSL2 technology as its core 
system, and to FTTH technology when rolling out new 
networks, as in recently-built apartment buildings.27 The 
company hopes to connect some eight million homes in 
the next five years.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Danny Goderis, Director Marketing, Alcatel Access Networks 
Division, “Is there enough bandwidth on tap?”, September 2006.
a  Fibre to the x.
b  Very High Speed Digital Subscriber Line.
23 The Republic of Korea’s strategy has relied on sound policies of personnel training and competition based on duplication of infrastructure 
and the reorganization of State services to include information and communication technologies (ECLAC, 2007). This has led to the Republic 
of Korea gaining one of the highest broadband penetration rates in the world. The country is also a leading innovator in mobile services and 
terminals. Crucial to this performance was the involvement of mobile telephony operators, equipment manufacturers (Samsung Electronics and 
LG Electronics) and the government, which has promoted the development of the mobile telephony industry.
24 FTTX (fibre to the x) is a generic term for any network architecture that uses optical fibre to replace all or part of the usual copper local loop 
used for telecommunications. 
25 Fibre-optic subscribers in Japan can download at a speed of 100 Mbits per second (10 times faster than average in the developed countries) 
and at the lowest price of all the countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Furthermore, Japanese 
fibre-optic subscribers can upload information at the same speed as they can download it, which is not possible with either ADSL technology 
or most cable modem options (OECD, 2007).
26 Verizon currently services around 81% of all FTTH subscribers in the United States, with the remaining 19% serviced by AT&T, Qwest, alternative 
operators and municipal initiatives (Gaptel, 2007).
27 Very High Speed Digital Subscriber Line 2 (VDSL2) is an access technology that exploits the existing infrastructure of copper wires and is the 
newest and most advanced standard in the ADSL family. VDSL2 is designed to support the wide deployment of triple play services (combining 
voice, video and data), high-definition television (HDTV) and interactive gaming. In addition, VDSL2 enables operators and carriers to gradually 
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Figure III.11
BROADBAND ACCESS PER 100 INHABITANTS, BY TECHNOLOGY, 
IN SOME DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, JUNE 2006
(Percentages)
will enable it to offer Internet protocol television. By the 
end of 2010, Deutsche Telekom expects to have around 
1.5 million IPTV subscribers (TV over Net, 2 March 2007 
[online] http://www.tvover.net). 
British Telecom has pioneered this field with its ‘21st 
Century Network’ project, in which it has invested some 
US$ 18.5 billion, and plans to replace its basic telephone 
network with a wireless fibre-optic network by 2008 (The 
Economist, 12 October 2006). It was a key decision for the 
British company, given its vulnerable situation following 
the sale of its mobile telephony subsidiary, which limited 
its ability to offer new multiplay products.
Lastly, a major debate is in progress on the future 
financing and ownership of the new fibre-optic networks. 
Municipal networks have recently joined the competitors 
in the telecommunications sector. “Wi-Fi hotspots” or “Wi-
Fi cities” have been established in a number of towns and 
villages in industrialized countries, or plans to establish 
them have been announced. These are areas with wireless 
access or fibre-optic networks designed to improve their 
residents’ connectivity.30 Some such networks have been 
built in accordance with rules on open access, which oblige 
network operators to provide access to any service provider 
under the same terms. In other areas, low-cost Wi-Fi and 
WiMAX networks are being promoted in order to improve 
public services and help to bridge the digital gap.
In summary, while operators agree that it is crucial 
to move in this direction because existing infrastructure 
will be unable to satisfy future demand for multimedia 
services, their great dilemma is to decide when and how 
to do so. The main driver of FTTX networks will be the 
video services that they provide to users, even though 
operators are still unsure how large this business will be, 
or what profits it will yield. This is creating uncertainty 
amongst them, as, while they are certain that it will be 
a very important segment in the future, it is extremely 
difficult to establish activities around fibre-optic access. 
Also, until the regulatory uncertainty over local loop 
unbundling (LLU) is resolved, operators will baulk at 
making the necessary investment. Regulatory bodies are 
currently evaluating the operation of fibre-optic networks 
to devise new measures that are bound to have a decisive 
impact on the deployment of FTTX infrastructure.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
OECD Communications Outlook 2007, Paris, 2007.
a Other broadband technologies include: satellite broadband access, fibre to the x 
(FTTX) and fixed wireless subscriber lines (with a downloading speed of more than 
256 Kbps).
European domestic markets have developed at an 
uneven rate, mainly on account of their differing situations 
in competition for the “last mile” and to the existence 
of possible challengers.28 Fibre optics are growing fairly 
fast and FTTN/VDSL2 networks, such as the one used 
by AT&T Inc., are expected to be the commonest form 
of network in the coming years. The countries that are 
most committed to FTTX technology are Denmark, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Sweden (see figure III.11). In many 
cases, the projects are headed by municipal authorities 
or local gas and electricity companies. 
The major European operators have announced 
investment plans to build their own FTTX networks to 
replace their fixed infrastructure. Some operators have even 
announced plans to step up the installation of fibre optics 
in access networks and to reach homes. This is the case 
with France Télécom, which seems to have opted for FTTH 
network architecture to deliver its future broadband services. 
Alternative operators like Free have also announced new 
FTTX projects.29 Favourable regulation enabled Deutsche 
Telekom to invest 3 billion euros to make it the European 
company with the highest deployment of VDSL2, which 
28 In Europe, European Union guidelines on the liberalization of telecommunications markets are currently being revised and an analysis is 
being made of the proliferation of new convergent services and the resulting overlapping of reference markets, as well as the conditions for 
implementing the obligation to open up networks, which lay the foundations for a competition model that includes investment incentives. This 
raises the dilemma of whether to choose a model based on differing access infrastructure or to recognize that the natural monopoly over access 
is a systematic feature that is here to stay.
29 Free’s deployment of its FTTH network is altering France’s competitive environment. It is more ambitious than any other European project put 
forward to date. Free’s FTTH project started in Paris in 2007 and is expected to have reached more than four million French homes by 2012, 
for an estimated investment of 1 billion euros (Gaptel, 2007).
30 Users in a “Wi-Fi (or wireless) hotspot” or “Wi-Fi city” have broadband Internet access anywhere within it, provided they have a personal 
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(c)	 The	ultimate	challenge:	unlimited	connectivity,	
mobility	and	speed?
Telecommunications companies have endeavoured to 
improve their wireless platforms and to progress to new 
solutions for delivering convergent services. Among the 
technology alternatives available, networks for advanced 
mobile communications, more commonly known as third-
generation networks (or 3G), seem to be becoming a good 
option in the current uncertainty facing fixed-network 
operators (see box III.1). First, it is the least costly solution 
for delivering voice, multimedia and data services using high-
speed broadband (see figure III.12). Second, it allows new 
applications to be created that could complement wireless 
voice services, the profits from which are starting to shrink 
markedly. Lastly, having operated in competitive environments 
since the very start, mobile communications would face less 
regulatory uncertainty than fixed options. 
Box III.1
THE TECHNOLOGICAL PATH OF MOBILE TELEPHONY
First-generation mobile telephony (1G) 
emerged in the 1980s, based on analogue 
networks with limited coverage and traffic 
capacity. In the early 1990s, second-
generation (2G) systems emerged that 
used digital communications. This increased 
spectrum efficiency, which in turn boosted 
the quality and supply of new services, such 
as text messaging (SMS). A number of 
technologies coexist in second-generation 
mobile telephony, including Time Division 
Multiple Access (TDMA), Global System 
for Mobile Communication (GSM), personal 
digital cellular (PDC) and Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA).a However, these 
technologies are mutually incompatible, 
which restricted the coverage of services 
to a single country or region.
In a context of rapid technological 
progress, it became apparent that traditional 
methods for establishing standards were 
limited. So, the leading competent bodies 
endeavoured to draw up a core set of 
definitions to devise a plan of action to 
support the globalization and technology-
convergence processes efficiently. The 
International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) laid down the technical requirements 
and rules for future advanced mobile 
communications, called third-generation 
(3G), in its global standard, International 
Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-
2000). These parameters were used to 
establish six basic standards for third-
generation telecommunications, from which 
two key development trends emerged, based 
on the most popular second-generation 
standards: GSM and CDMA.b Most operators 
adopted one of the two technologies, whilst 
the PDC and TDMA standards started to 
decline in importance.
At first, the CDMA standard pulled 
into the lead owing to its better services 
and performance, as well as to its ease 
of upgrading technology by reusing the 
spectrum and networks. However, despite 
stepping up investment in new CDMA 
network infrastructure, the European 
GSM standard quickly became the main 
platform for advancing towards third-
generation network technology. This trend 
was consolidated by the open nature of 
the GSM technology standard, its high 
market penetration, its global economies 
of scale, its facility for roaming and the 
greater availability of terminals.
In response to increasing demand for 
new services, technologies started to develop 
that could transmit data at higher speeds 
over second-generation networks, leading 
to what has been dubbed generation 2.5: 
GSM with a General Packet Radio Service 
(GPRS) network, and CDMA with CDMA2000 
1x. Lastly, both standards completed their 
transition to third generation by means of 
Enhanced Data Rates for GSM of Evolution 
(EDGE) —its offshoots, Wideband Code 
Division Multiple Access (W-CDMA) and 
the High-Speed Downlink/Uplink Packet 
Access (HSDPA/HSUPA)— and CDMA2000 
1x, with Evolution-Data Optimized (EV-DO) 
technology, respectively. These technologies 
allow high-speed data transfer, comparable 
to the speed of fixed platforms like ADSL or 
cable modem, which has made it possible 
to offer better services and interactive 
applications, including mobile broadband, 
online games, video on demand, and 
live content such as news, sports, and 
traffic and weather information. Fourth 
generation technology (4G) is currently 
in the experimental phase and the first 
commercial applications are expected to 
be available in Japan in 2010. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from The Global Mobile Providers Association (GSA) [online] 
http://www.gsacom.com; 3G Americas [online] http://www.3gamericas.com; GSM World [online] http://www.gsmworld.com; CDMA Development Group (CDG) [online] 
http://www.cdg.org/technology/3g/migration.asp; and Informa Telecoms & Media, World Cellular Information Service (WCIS).
a TDMA technology provides a digital wireless service by means of Time Division Multiple Access, which enables several users to use a single communication channel 
simultaneously without any interference. GSM uses narrow-band TDMA, which allows a larger number of simultaneous calls on the same radio frequency, in addition to 
other services such as instant messaging. PDC, which is used only in Japan, is also based on TDMA technology. CDMA is a digital technology that uses spread-spectrum 
techniques and does not assign a specific frequency to each user. Instead, every channel uses the full available spectrum. This technology allows many terminals to use the 
same frequency channel simultaneously.
b In 1998, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) promoted the creation of the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) based on GSM technology. 
Apart from ETSI, project partners include institutions from China, the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Despite initial talks between ETSI and CDMA technology 
promoters, the latter felt it appropriate to establish a parallel initiative called Third Generation Partnership Project Two (3GPP2) to support the dissemination of their own 
CDMA standard. At present, 3GPP2 partners include institutions from China, United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
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Figure III.12
COSTS OF THE VARIOUS TECHNOLOGIES FOR DELIVERING 
CONVERGENT SERVICES
2001, the introduction of third-generation technology gave 
renewed momentum to the Japanese mobile telephony 
market. NTT DoCoMo, Softbank Telecom and KDDI began 
to provide third-generation services under free licences, 
with an obligation to offer coverage to half the population 
within a five-year period.
By late 2007, around 300 million users worldwide 
were using CDMA2000 1x, the earliest version of third-
generation technology, compared to more than 190 and 
62 million subscribers respectively for the more modern 
technologies, W-CDMA and CDMA2000 1x EV-DO 
(Rev 0/A/B) (see [online] http://www.3gamericas.com 
and CDMA Development Group [online], http://www.
cdg.org/technology/3g.asp) (see figure III.14).
Figure III.14
SUBSCRIBERS TO THIRD-GENERATION MOBILE TELEPHONY 
WORLDWIDE, BY TECHNOLOGY, 2003-2007 AND
PROJECTIONS FOR 2008-2012
(Millions of subscribers)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
OECD Communications Outlook 2007, Paris, 2007.
a  Fibre to the x.
b Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access.
Figure III.13
MOBILE TELEPHONY SUBSCRIBERS WORLDWIDE,
BY TECHNOLOGY, 1995-2007 a
(Millions of subscribers)
31 Even though CDMA2000 1x is officially considered to be a third-generation standard, many believe that it is actually a generation 2.5 (or even 
2.75) technology. Although CDMA2000 1x far surpassed previous technological advances, its data speeds are much lower than using EV-DO 
technology. In January 2002, SK Telecom updated its network to CDMA2000 1x EV-DO Rev. 0.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of 3G Americas [online] http://www.3gamericas.com; Informa Telecoms 
& Media, World Cellular Information Service (WCIS) and Senza Fili Consulting 
LLC.
a  Wideband Code Division Multiple Access.
b  CDMA2000 1x with Evolution-Data Optimized technology.
c  Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access.
The number of third-generation users in Japan and 
the Republic of Korea has begun to exceed the number 
of second-generation users and this is expected to have 
become a worldwide phenomenon by 2011 (see figure 
III.15) (CDMA Development Group [online] http://www.
cdg.org/technology/3g.asp). Third-generation services 
could therefore surpass second-generation services in 
10 years, that is to say, five years faster than it took the 
second generation to surpass the first. It could happen 
even more rapidly, since the scarcity of radio frequency 
spectrum can be offset by converting the bands used for 
second-generation services.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of GSM World [online] http://www.gsmworld.com.
a Includes third generation updates.
Based on the most widespread second-generation 
standards, GSM and CDMA, the main operators started 
to define their technology path to obtaining better wireless 
and mobile services (see box III.1). In the early years of 
this decade, Japan and the Republic of Korea conducted 
ground-breaking commercial trials of third-generation mobile 
telephony. In October 2000, Korean operator, SK Telecom, 
launched a service that could transmit data faster than over 
fixed-line telephony networks, using CDMA2000 1x, the 
first official third-generation technology.31 The following 
year, Japanese operator, NTT DoCoMo, launched the first 
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Figure III.15
SELECTED DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND LATIN AMERICA: 
MOBILE TELEPHONY SUBSCRIBERS WORLDWIDE,
BY TECHNOLOGY, 2007
(Percentages)
expected to continue to shrink to 14%. Lastly, WiMAX 
technology should increase in importance, albeit slowly 
because of its higher cost (see figure III.12) (Press Release 
3G Americas, 11 November 2007).32 
Similarly, the world’s largest operators have tended 
to favour the GSM/W-CDMA family of technologies and 
its successors (HSDPA/HSUPA). Its most loyal followers 
are European companies, the vast majority of which have 
adopted this technology path from the very start.33 The 
mass-scale adoption of HSDPA technology has made it 
possible to increase the bandwidth of third-generation 
technology, and standardization of IP service platforms 
should foster the emergence of a more varied service 
offering in Europe. However, there is still little impact 
on operators’ revenues, as the high cost of Internet access 
from mobile telephones makes its use very limited at 
present (Fundación Telefónica, 2007). Moreover, even 
though CDMA2000 technology is firmly entrenched in 
Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea, the 
leading companies in those three markets (SK Telecom, 
NTT DoCoMo and AT&T (formerly Cingular Wireless)) 
have tended to favour the W-CDMA standard. 
Operators’ preference for the GSM family has not 
been limited to their domestic markets, as many have 
incorporated it into their internationalization strategies 
to achieve synergies and economies of scale, which has 
led the GSM technology option to grow in strength by 
the day. For example, Apple Inc., producer of iPhone, one 
of the most successful innovations of recent times, has 
concluded marketing agreements only with GSM operators 
that already have the EDGE standard.34 In 2007, iPhone 
burst into the market at the hands of AT&T in the United 
States, T-Mobile in Germany, O2 in the United Kingdom 
and Orange in France, and is expected to reach the rest 
of Europe and much of Asia in 2008.
Lastly, the processes of convergence between fixed 
and mobile telephony and of fixed-mobile substitution 
have forced telecommunications operators to explore 
synergies between the fixed and mobile segments. Mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNO) could be the answer 
for non-integrated companies (cable television operators 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information provided by the European Audiovisual and 
Telecommunications Institute (IDATE).
As a result of the strong leadership position achieved 
by GSM technology (see figure III.13), it is fair to assume 
that the evolution from GSM and EDGE to W-CDMA 
and subsequent upgrades will continue to dominate in the 
coming years (Press Release 3G Americas, 11 November 
2007). Indeed, large numbers of operators that formerly 
used CDMA standards have adopted GSM technology 
owing to CDMA’s declining market share. Although 
some operators have kept both technologies, the majority 
prefer all their customers to migrate to GSM. The vast 
majority of TDMA operators also decided to migrate to 
GSM. However, there are no cases of mobile telephony 
operators having abandoned GSM technology in favour 
of CDMA standards (GSA, 2007). 
The number of third-generation telephony subscribers 
is expected to rise from 250 million in 2007 to almost 
1.6 billion in 2012, and W-CDMA technology and its 
successors are predicted to dominate more than 80% of 
the world market (see figure III.14). The market share 
of CDMA2000 1x EV-DO Rev 0/A/B technology is 
32 Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is a wireless data transmission standard for providing fixed voice, Internet access 
and data communications services over private networks, together with video on demand. WiMAX offers connections at speeds similar to 
ADSL or cable modem, with a low installation cost. WiMAX is a good alternative technology for “last mile” solutions in metropolitan Internet 
access networks, facilitating connections in rural areas and offering alternatives for internal communications in the business sector. The WiMAX 
concept is very akin to Wi-Fi technology, although WiMAX has a greater range and bandwidth than Wi-Fi, which was designed for indoor use 
and has a range of only a few metres from the base station. Although WiMAX could offer services similar to third-generation technology, this 
is not feasible as yet, since WiMAX is unable to provide reasonably-priced mobile voice or data services on a mass scale (Fiscalía Nacional 
Económica, 2007). 
33 The leader in this field is Italy, where one third of subscribers have already migrated to third generation, followed by Sweden, Austria, France, 
Netherlands, Germany and United Kingdom (see figure III.15).
34 In 2007, the magazine ‘Time’ voted iPhone invention of the year. More than four million units were sold in 2007. A new iPhone version is expected 
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and providers of Internet-based content and applications) 
wishing to offer mobile services. The regulatory authorities 
have played a key role by encouraging, or even obliging, 
mobile operators to allow virtual operators access to their 
networks. Moreover, quadruple play services could help 
mobile operators to survive and grow in the coming years. 
In fact, mobile virtual network operators could become a 
serious threat to traditional mobile operators.35
Table III.3
MAIN OPERATORS: TECHNOLOGY PATH OF ADVANCED MOBILE 








W-CDMA HSDPA c HSUPA d
United States
AT&T 2004 2005 2007
Verizon 2002 2003 2007
Sprint 2002 2005 2006
Japan
NTT DoCoMo 2001 2006 2008




Sk Telecom 2000 2002 2003 2006 2007
KTF 2001 2002
LG TeleCom 2001 2007
Europe
Orange 2004 2006 2007
T Mobile 2004 2006 2007
TIM 2004 2006 2007
Movistar 2004 2006 2007
Vodafone 2004 2006 2007
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of CDMA Development Group (CDG) [online] http://www.cdg.org/
technology/3g/migration.asp; 3G Americas [online]  http://www.3gamericas.com; 
Informa Telecoms & Media, World Cellular Information Service (WCIS).
a  Code Division Multiple Access.
b  Evolution-Data Optimized.
c  High-Speed Downlink Packet Access.
d  High-Speed Uplink Packet Access.
The rapid process of technological innovation therefore 
enables new and varied services to be created and poses 
challenges to both established stakeholders and new ones 
interested in entering the telecommunications business. 
This has a clear impact on mobile communications, 
especially considering that the useful commercial life 
of these new applications and devices is some two years 
(3G Americas, 2007a).
As the Internet is growing in strength all the time, 
broadband access is crucial. Broadband connections 
have enjoyed spectacular growth, especially on fixed 
platforms. Nowadays, most users access the Internet 
via a computer connected to a fixed line (ADSL or 
cable modem). However, soon they are expected to start 
demanding permanent broadband services, irrespective 
of their location or type of device (Ericsson, 2007). 
Thus, by closing the gap between fixed and mobile 
broadband services (see figure III.16), wireless options 
are set to become the main mechanism for high-speed 
Internet access (see figure III.17).36 Under this scenario, 
the new third-generation mobile telephony technologies 
will grow in importance, delivering broadband services 
to the vast majority of the world market.
Although voice services will continue to predominate 
in the near future, pressure will grow for higher-quality, 
more diverse services, especially interactive multimedia 
applications.37 The great challenge for operators is to 
establish a mass market for this type of service. The 
leading companies in the sector are endeavouring to 
provide low-cost, easy-to-use services, geared to users’ 
needs and preferences.
Figure III.16
EVOLUTION OF BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS TECHNOLOGIES, 
FROM FIXED AND MOBILE PLATFORMS, 1995-2010
(Bandwidth, megabits per second, in logarithmic scale)
35 In the United States, this trend could intensify, owing to the strong position of cable television operators. Mobile virtual network operators, 
which are currently growing fast in the United States and the United Kingdom, could change future competitive conditions in the global market 
for mobile telephony, even though traditional operators continue to control the business value chain.
36 In many countries, pricing mechanisms for fixed and mobile broadband services differ: a flat rate is charged for the fixed broadband service, whereas 
the cost of the mobile broadband service varies according to the number of kilobytes transmitted (National Economic Oversight Body, 2007).
37 The voice-service share of the sector’s total revenues is predicted to fall from 93% in 2006 to 86% in 2012 (Pyramid Research, 2007).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Grupo de Análisis y Prospectiva del Sector de las Telecomunicaciones, 
“Opportunidades y desafíos de la banda ancha”, Madrid, 2007; 3G Americas 
[online] http://www.3gamericas.com; Teleco Informação em telecomunicações 
[online] http://www.teleco.com.br; and CDMA Development Group (CDG) [online] 
http://www.cdg.org.
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Figure III.17
USERS OF FIXED AND MOBILE BROADBAND WORLDWIDE,
2005-2012
(Millions of users)
by offering a wide variety of services, including voice over 
Internet protocol, advertising and mobile television, and 
differentiating their services by integrating presence, location 
and mobility (CDG, 2007b) (see figure III.16). Japan is already 
experimenting with fourth-generation technologies, with NTT 
DoCoMo at the forefront. The company has successfully 
conducted its first trials (reaching 100 Mbps at 200 Km/h) 
and hopes to be able to launch its first commercial fourth-
generation services in 2010. Fourth generation is expected 
to be established worldwide by around 2020.
These new technologies should, at least to some 
extent, reverse the downward trend in telecommunications 
operators’ average revenue per user (ARPU), especially in 
the voice segment. The advance of wireless data services 
could help to raise the ARPU in years to come. Wireless 
data services are thought to have increased some operators’ 
revenues by between 20% and 30% and have become the 
chief differentiating factor in a highly competitive mobile 
services market (CDG, 2007b). Telecommunications 
operators in developed countries are staking their future 
on such data services and, slowly but surely, the same is 
happening in emerging markets like Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Ericsson, “White Paper: HSPA, The Undisputed Choice for Mobile 
Broadband” [online] http://www.ericsson.com, May 2007.
The next step will be to introduce fourth-generation 
(4G) infrastructure that operates entirely under the Internet 
protocol, offering low latency, a very high-speed data transfer 
rate and advanced service quality. This will enable mobile 
operators to compete with fixed broadband access companies 
D. Latin America: operators gamble on mobility
1. Foreign operators and the mobile telephony boom
Latin America has not remained untouched by these 
major changes in the world telecommunications market. 
In the past 20 years, most regional markets have been 
liberalized and State operators privatized. Some of the 
industry’s leading international operators are playing 
a prominent role in this process. The reforms had a 
marked impact on the sector in terms of infrastructure 
investment, technology transfer, price reductions and 
improved service quality. 
In the late 1990s, fixed-line telephony grew sharply, 
becoming a very attractive business for telecommunications 
operators. In fact, companies that were subject to 
particular requirements as part of the privatization process 
met them in full, even before the agreed deadline. In 
addition, great strides were made in productivity and 
the resulting large cash flows meant that they recouped 
their investment in the space of three years (Beca, 2007). 
Their performance prompted capital markets to assess 
telecommunications operators favourably, enabling them 
to raise plentiful funding to finance their expansion and 
diversification plans, especially towards the wireless 
segment. The customer base for fixed-line telephony 
shot up from 25 million in 1990 to 72 million in 2000 
(see figure III.18).
The crisis early in this decade hit Latin American 
operators extremely hard, causing them to cut back 
almost all their investments in fixed-line telephony. As 
in the developed countries, the region experienced a 
slowdown, albeit not so rapid, in the growth of the number 
of subscribers and in the segment’s revenues, owing to 
falling prices and strong competition from mobile services. 
As a result, fixed-line telephony’s share of the industry’s 
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Figure III.18
LATIN AMERICA: TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE 
SUBSCRIBERS, BY SEGMENT, 1997-2006
AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2007-2010
(Millions of subscribers)
characteristics (customers of the prepayment system) 
and stiffer competition. Even so, just as in the rest of 
the world, Latin America’s mobile telephony sector was 
obliged to reflect its real costs because, unless it did, the 
sector’s obvious frailties would not herald a very promising 
future (Beca, 2007). 
Since the late 1990s, the leading regional operators 
have earmarked the vast majority of their investment 
for mobile telephony, in order to speed up migration 
between second-generation technologies and to expand 
and improve networks. The fact that most of the main 
regional operators were European contributed to the 
expansion of GSM technology, which has now attracted 
74% of customers (see figure III.20). So, despite the 
scarcity of frequencies and the cost of telephones, 
there has been a gradual migration to new generations 
of mobile telephony. Indeed, a number of operators 
have already put into operation 2.5-generation and 
third-generation services.
Figure III.20
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MOBILE TELEPHONY 
SUBSCRIBERS, BY TECHNOLOGY, SEPTEMBER 2007
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information provided by the European Audiovisual and 
Telecommunications Institute (IDATE).
Just as everywhere else in the world, there was 
explosive growth in mobile telephony in the region, 
replacing fixed-line telephony at an ever faster rate 
(see figure III.18). To a large extent, the growth in 
mobile services has stemmed from the success of the 
prepayment system, which represents more than 80% 
of the subscriber base, and from the operators’ strategy 
to subsidize terminal equipment. Consequently, mobile 
telephony subscribers almost treble the number of fixed-
line telephony subscribers and the segment has rapidly 
increased its share of the industry total, growing from 
30% in 2000 to 50% in 2006 (see figure III.19). However, 
this growth has been accompanied by a hefty reduction in 
operators’ average revenue per user, owing to customer 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Global Mobile Providers Association (GSA), “GSM/3G Market 
Technology Update: Mobile Market Development in Latin America” [online] 
http://www.gsacom.com/news/statistics.php4, 29 October 2007.
a  Code Division Multiple Access.
b  Time Division Multiple Access.
c  Global System for Mobile Communication.
Lastly, Latin America and the Caribbean is lagging 
somewhat behind in terms of broadband Internet access, 
owing to the scant coverage of the broadband Internet 
service, limited computer penetration, the population’s low 
income levels and the high cost of deploying the network 
infrastructure. However, this segment has recently grown 
faster than the world average. The lag stems from a lack 
of incentives for telephony operators to provide access 
using technologies like ADSL. For fixed-line telephony 
operators, the deployment of broadband access in their own 
networks represented a risk of switched telephone traffic 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information provided by the European Audiovisual and 
Telecommunications Institute (IDATE). 
Figure III.19
LATIN AMERICA: TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES MARKET, 
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being replaced by VoIP services, more than an opportunity. 
Moreover, the lack of triple play services did nothing to 
speed up the deployment of ADSL technology in local 
telephony networks. With the reduction in their traditional 
revenues, operators were forced to modernize their networks 
and to incorporate broadband access technology. At the 
moment, 74% of broadband access in the region is via 
ADSL connections (Fundación Telefónica, 2007).38
38 However, the cable modem market should continue to grow and to provide an alternative to ADSL, which is still controlled by traditional 
operators owing to lack of network openness. Wireless solutions, such as Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), could 
encourage greater deployment of broadband in the near future.
39 Telecom Italia has centred its Brazilian operations on the mobile telephony segment, in which it is ranks second on the market. Between 2004 
and 2006, it sold its mobile telephony assets in Chile, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In addition, in April 2007 the Bolivian 
Government announced the partial nationalization of ENTEL Bolivia. In Argentina, Telecom Italia has a stake in Telecom Argentina.
2. Companies reposition themselves: towards a regional duopoly?
As the Latin American telecommunications market 
changed, the main operators began to engage in an 
intensive process of consolidation. While some abandoned 
Latin America in response to stiff global and regional 
competition (especially United States companies 
like BellSouth, Verizon and AT&T, which sold their 
Latin American assets), others took advantage of the 
situation to strengthen their position in the region. 
The two clear leaders in this second group are Spain’s 
Telefónica and Mexican company, TELMEX/América 
Móvil, with Telecom Italia (TIM) a distant third (see 
table III.4).39 In parallel, smaller operators, including 
the Swedish-owned company, Millicom, and the Irish 
company, Digicel, secured a major presence in some 
smaller Central American and Caribbean markets (see 
box III.2).
Table III.4
AMÉRICA MÓVIL, TELEFÓNICA AND TELECOM ITALIA: OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, DECEMBER 2007
(Thousands of customers)
Telefónica Telecom Italia Telmex/América Móvil
Fixed Mobile Broadband Pay-television Fixed Mobile Fixed Mobile
Argentina 4 578 13 734 1 150 - 4 138 10 666  - 14 618 a
Bolivia - - - - 74 1 756  -  -
Brazil 11 960 33 484 b 3 289 231 - 31 268 2 674 30 228
Chile 2 172 6 283 687 220 - -  - 2 672
Colombia 2 329 8 372 200 73 - -  - 22 335
Ecuador  - 2 582 - - - -  - 6 936
Paraguay  -  - - - - 1 626  - …
Peru 2 782 8 129 623 640 - -  - 5 455
Uruguay  - 1 148 - - - -  - …
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)  - 10 430 - - - -  -  -
South America 23 821 84 162 5 949 1 164 4 212 45 316 2 674 83 284
Mexico  - 12 538 - - - - 17 800 50 011
Central America 125 c 5 278 c 22 - - - 2 197 8 157
Caribbean - - - - 973 d 153 d 1 340 e 3 496 e
Total 23 946 101 978 5 971 1 164 5 185 45 469 24 011 144 948
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Telefónica [online] http://www.telefonica.es; Telecom Italia [online] 
http://www.telecomitalia.it; and América Móvil [online] http://www.americamovil.com.
a Includes operations in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.
b Joint venture with Portugal Telecom, in which Telefónica owns 50%.
c Telefónica operates in the fixed-line and mobile telephony segments in El Salvador and Guatemala and in mobile telephony in Nicaragua and Panama. 
d Telecom Italia operates in Cuba.
e América Móvil operates in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.
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Box III.2
TWO SMALLER LEADERS IN A LAND OF GIANTS: MILLICOM AND DIGICEL LEAD IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
In some of the small economies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, operators 
have emerged that are unlike those 
dominating the region’s large markets 
and they have succeeded in setting up 
interesting subregional networks. In the 
English-speaking Caribbean, two operators 
lead the telecommunications sector: the 
British firm, Cable & Wireless, and Irish 
firm, Digicel. Whereas Cable & Wireless 
offers both fixed and mobile telephony 
services, Digicel concentrates on the 
wireless segment. In Central America, 
the Swedish-owned firm, Millicom, is 
emerging as one of the most important 
operators in El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras, in direct competition with 
the two regional leaders, América Móvil 
and Telefónica. Moreover, Millicom has 
started to increase its share of smaller 
South American markets like Bolivia and 
Paraguay and has recently strengthened 
its position by acquiring Colombia Móvil 
for US$ 480 million, which gave it access 
to the Colombian market with a customer 
base of 2.2 million.
With more than 6 million customers, 
Digicel has become the fastest-growing 
mobile telecommunications operator in the 
Caribbean. In 2001, it started operating in 
Jamaica and, since then, has expanded 
into more than 20 countries and territories 
in the subregion: Anguilla, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Aruba, Barbados, Bermuda, 
Bonaire, Curaçao, Dominica, Granada, 
Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Guyana, 
Haiti, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos 
Islands, Jamaica, Martinique, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago, in 
addition to El Salvador in Central America. 
Digicel has invested more than US$ 1.9 
billion in this expansion bid. 
In May 2006, Digicel entered Haiti, 
where it invested around US$ 260 million and 
captured 1.4 million subscribers in its first year 
of operation. This is the largest investment 
ever made by a foreign company in Haiti. In 
December 2007, Digicel obtained a licence 
to operate mobile networks in Honduras. 
Millicom has focused on the mobile 
telephony segment in the emerging markets 
of Africa (Chad, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone and Tanzania), Asia (Cambodia, 
Lao Democratic People’s Republic and 
Sri Lanka) and Latin America, where its 
main source of revenue is Central America. 
Millicom’s Tigo brand is leader in the El 
Salvador and Honduras markets, and ranks 
second in Guatemala, after América Móvil. 
In South America, it is the leading brand 
in Paraguay, the second in Bolivia and 
third in Colombia, where it is surpassed 
by América Móvil and Telefónica.
Like Telefónica and América Móvil, 
Digicel and Millicom have embarked on 
a mass migration to the European GSM 
standard and have started to roll out 
upgrades that have enabled them to offer 
new value-added services.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Millicom [online] http://www.millicom.com/operations/operations.
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There are some interesting similarities between 
Latin America’s current industry leaders, Telefónica 
Spain and TELMEX/América Móvil: both were sold as 
vertically integrated companies with the idea of creating 
a ‘national champion’ capable of competing with foreign 
operators in their domestic markets (Spain and Mexico 
respectively) and both based their growth strategy on 
internationalizing their operations with the focus on Latin 
America. However, there are also some marked differences 
between the two operators. At first, Telefónica prioritized 
fixed-line telephony assets in Southern Cone countries, 
later progressing northwards and entering new industry 
segments (mobile telephony, Internet and, more recently, 
pay-television). In contrast, TELMEX/América Móvil 
focused on the fastest-growing segments from the outset 
(mobile telephony, the corporate segment and Internet) 
and on the largest markets (Brazil and Mexico), later 
extending its operations to the entire region.
In the latter half of the 1990s, while Spain’s state-
owned telecommunications operator was being privatized, 
competition in the local market intensified. In anticipation 
of this, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented 
by the Latin American privatizations, Telefónica acquired 
assets in Argentina, Chile, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and concluded cooperation agreements with 
major European operators in order to improve its capacity 
to operate and survive in an increasingly competitive market 
(Calderón, 1999). In 1998, Telefónica made a key move 
in its internationalization strategy when it successfully 
participated in the privatization of telecommunications in 
Brazil. In the process, Telefónica acquired control over 
São Paulo city’s fixed-line telephony operator (TELESP), 
among other assets.
Early in this decade Telefónica exchanged assets in the 
Brazilian market with Portuguese company, Portugal Telecom 
(PT), and submitted a number of public tender offers on all 
the capital not controlled by its Latin American subsidiaries 
(ECLAC, 2007a). Telefónica invested around US$ 20 billion 
in ‘Operation Veronica’, roughly doubling its existing 
investment in the region. In addition, the Spanish company 
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entered the Mexican market after acquiring Motorola’s 
operations in Mexico. This was how Telefónica consolidated 
its position as the leading telecommunications operator in 
Latin America. It also defined ambitious investment plans, 
especially in the mobile telephony segment, by incorporating 
new products and services.
Faced with stiffer competition in Mexico, TELMEX (like 
Telefónica years earlier) decided that, in order to survive, it 
had to compete in the markets of its potential rivals.40 So, 
quite early on the company decided to internationalize its 
operations as the key platform of its growth and consolidation 
strategy. In the late the 1990s, following a failed attempt 
to enter the United States market, TELMEX acquired a 
number of mobile telephony and Internet assets in Brazil, 
Ecuador and Guatemala. Meanwhile, in Mexico, it was 
finding novel ways to attract new customers into the mobile 
telephony market, a segment where scale is very important. 
TELMEX was quick to realize the importance of scale 
and used prepayment mechanisms to attract low-income 
customers (ECLAC, 2006).
Taking advantage of its strong leadership position in 
the Mexican market, where it had a monopoly, TELMEX 
decided to boost its internationalization strategy, especially 
in the wireless telephony sector and, in September 2000, it 
split off some TELMEX assets to create América Móvil as 
a spin-off.41 The new company began to develop its own 
strategy to replicate its success in Mexico, taking advantage 
of the continuing low market penetration of mobile telephony 
in the rest of Latin America to achieve growth. 
América Móvil benefited from favourable circumstances 
when it entered the telecommunications business. First, 
the company had some US$ 2 billion in reserve for the 
acquisition of additional assets (ECLAC, 2006). Second, 
it pioneered the development of a new form of financing 
on the Mexican market, based on stock certificates, which 
enabled it to raise the additional capital needed to finance 
its aggressive international expansion strategy.
At first, the new company tried to form partnerships with 
other international operators in order to acquire the necessary 
experience and to spread the risk outside Mexico’s borders. 
In November 2000, América Móvil, Bell Canada Inc. and 
SBC Inc. created Telecom Américas. Based on its partners’ 
contributions and the new acquisitions, the consortium started 
to consolidate a major presence in a number of countries in 
the region, especially Brazil. However, although it got off 
to an enthusiastic start, the venture was short-lived, mainly 
owing to differences in the partners’ strategic vision. 
At the same time, Telefónica’s successful expansion 
into Latin America encouraged it to tackle the European 
market and it performed well in tenders for third-generation 
mobile telephony licences in Germany, Austria and Italy 
(ECLAC, 2001). However, owing to a downturn in the 
world and regional economic situation and to the industry’s 
difficult situation, the company was forced to reconsider the 
pace and depth of its international expansion process. 
In this new scenario of crisis in the industry, both Telefónica 
and TELMEX/América Móvil embarked on a new phase 
of regional positioning. First, thanks to their relatively good 
financial position, both companies were able to grasp the 
opportunities that other operators had cast aside when they 
decided that their Latin American assets were non-strategic. 
Second, Brazil became the main battleground, which was 
subsequently extended to include the entire region.
In 2002, América Móvil acquired its partners’ 
holdings and restructured Telecom Américas to concentrate 
exclusively on Brazil.42 After that, the company purchased 
other companies and licences, including BellSouth’s 
Brazilian assets, which gave it national coverage. In late 
2003, América Móvil integrated all its regional operators into 
a single brand: Claro. Meanwhile, TELMEX acquired MCI’s 
stake in Brazilian long-distance operator, EMBRATEL. At 
the same time as this was happening, Telefónica and PT 
created a joint venture which enabled them to expand their 
geographical coverage in the Brazilian market; the new 
firm acquired the largest cellular telephony company in 
west-central and northern Brazil (Tele Centro Oeste, TCO) 
and launched Vivo, which combined into a single brand 
all the mobile telephony operations of the two companies 
in Brazil. Thus, Vivo became the largest mobile operator 
in the southern hemisphere (ECLAC, 2007).
Between 2003 and 2006, América Móvil acquired the 
assets of a United States company, Verizon, in Argentina, 
Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, France Télécom’s 
stake in Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de El Salvador 
(CTE), the Telecom Italia subsidiary in Peru, and a company 
formed by Spanish firm, ENDESA, in Chile (Smartcom). 
TELMEX acquired the assets of AT&T in Latin America and 
other companies in Argentina, Chile and Ecuador. This gave 
it an immediate presence in a number of the main markets 
for fixed-line telephony, long-distance telephony and data 
40 Even though TELMEX had a monopoly in fixed telephony until the late 1990s, some international operators were starting to challenge the 
company’s position in other market segments, particularly in mobile telephony. In response, the company invested over US$ 13 billion to 
modernize, expand and diversify its telephony facilities in Mexico (ECLAC, 2006).
41 TELCEL in Mexico, TELGUA in Guatemala, Consortium Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. (CONECEL) in Ecuador and Algar Telecom 
Leste (ATL) in Brazil.
42 América Móvil continued to operate the service in Colombia and acquired other companies, which were merged in December 2004 to become 
Comunicación Celular (COMCEL). This new company provides wireless services to approximately 80% of Colombia’s population.
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transmission in South America. Moreover, Telefónica acquired 
all BellSouth’s mobile telephony operations in Latin America, 
which added a further 10.5 million customers and extended 
its regional coverage to Colombia, Ecuador, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Uruguay. After that, Telefónica 
unified all its operations, except those in Brazil, under a single 
brand, Movistar, which already existed in Spain and in other 
countries like Mexico. It also strengthened its position in 
the fixed-line telephony sector when it acquired Colombia 
Telecommunications (TELECOM) in 2006.
This has led both companies to secure a strong and 
widespread presence in the region (see table III.4 and 
figure III.21) and to focus their efforts on renovating 
and standardizing their infrastructure. Most progress has 
been made in the mobile telephony segment, where both 
companies have migrated en masse to GSM technology. 
This technology allows them to incorporate the industry’s 
new advances more easily and increases their bargaining 
power with equipment and technology providers. 
Figure III.21
LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OF THE LEADING OPERATORS IN THE 
MAIN REGIONAL MARKETS, BY SEGMENT, 2007
(Percentages)
which gave it access to the German and United Kingdom 
markets (see tables III.1 and III.2). In 2007, Telefónica 
tried to acquire control of 50% of Vivo in Brazil, a bid that 
was foiled by its Latin American rival, TELMEX/América 
Móvil.43 However, the Spanish company triumphed in the 
struggle to control Telecom Italia.44 Indeed, Telefónica’s 
acquisition of Telecom Italia served as a severe setback to 
TELMEX/América Móvil’s ambitions to enter the European 
market and become a global company. The agreement also 
dashed the Mexican group’s hopes of acquiring Telecom 
Italia’s mobile assets in Brazil. Brazil’s telecommunications 
regulator, ANATEL, adopted measures for cushioning the 
mobile subsidiary of Telecom Italia (TIM) from Telefónica’s 
influence (see box III.3).
In terms of physical (especially fixed) infrastructure, 
Telefónica has the great advantage of being the dominant 
operator in a number of the main regional markets, which, to 
some degree, has enabled it to ‘ration’ its investment in new 
facilities for providing more sophisticated services (see table 
III.4 and figure III.21). However, competitive pressure from 
alternative operators, like cable television operators, has pushed 
Telefónica to speed up its marketing of ADSL broadband 
access and to go straight into the television segment, where 
it has favoured the satellite alternative, with direct to home 
(DTH) technology for providing a variety of integrated service 
options, especially triple play.45 Telefónica has offered triple 
play services in Brazil and Chile since early 2008.
Although TELMEX/América Móvil has secured a large 
share of some of the industry’s fastest-growing segments 
(mobile telephony, broadband access and the corporate 
segment) by clearly separating its areas of activity, it has had 
problems in integrating its activities to meet new consumer 
demands. In all likelihood, the Mexican company will 
therefore move to complete its commercial offering with 
pay-television services and will integrate its operations to 
offer new multiplay services. In Brazil, TELMEX/América 
Móvil has taken a major step in this direction by acquiring 
a stake in the country’s largest cable television operator, 
NET. In Mexico, where it has significant market power, 
it has not succeeded in expanding its market share in pay-
television, the only element it needs to offer triple play. 
At present, the Mexican authorities are endeavouring to 
overcome regulatory problems and conflicts of interest, 
mainly between TELMEX and Televisa, to boost the market 
and allow convergent services to be deployed.
43 The controlling shareholder of América Móvil acquired 3.4% of Portuguese company PT, so preventing a public tender offer for PT from 
materializing, which would have enabled Telefónica to acquire 50% control of Vivo.
44 In April 2007, Telefónica joined the consortium that acquired Olimpia’s 23% stake in Telecom Italia. This enabled the Spanish company to outbid AT&T 
and América Móvil (some 4.8 billion euros) and to strengthen a new strategic link between Rome and Madrid. In fact, the preference for Telefónica 
owed much to pressure from the Italian Government. Telecom Italia is the first major privatized European operator not controlled by national groups.
45 DTH technology consists of transmitting radio signals from a satellite directly into the user’s home by means of a small satellite dish. The most 
popular DTH service is satellite television.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information provided by the companies.
Telefónica was more successful in the European 
market, following the complications arising from its gamble 
on third-generation licences. In 2005, it acquired 51% of 
Czech state-owned enterprise, Cesky Telecom, for some 
2.75 billion euros and launched a public tender offer for 
















































































Fixed telephony Mobile telephony Broadband access Pay TV
Telefónica Telmex/América Móvil TIM VTR Oi Others
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2007 129
Box III.3
TELEFÓNICA IN BRAZIL: A BATTLE FOR THE REGIONAL MARKET
Unlike other countries, Brazil has been an 
especially difficult market for Telefónica. 
The first reason was the cost of entering 
the country and, second, because it has 
found it hard to tie in its local activities with 
its regional strategy. 
In 1996, Telefónica entered Brazil by 
acquiring a large share in one of the few 
telecommunications companies not owned 
by the Federal Government, Companhia 
Riograndense de Telecomunicações (CRT). 
However, Telefónica’s big leap forward in 
the largest Latin American market was 
achieved when it successfully participated 
in the privatization of Telecomunicações 
Brasileiras (Telebrás), giving it control 
of the fixed-line telephony operator in 
the state of São Paulo (TELESP) and of 
mobile telephony companies, Tele Sudeste 
Celular and Tele Leste Celular. Crucial to 
this success was Telefónica’s strategic 
partnership with Portugal Telecom (PT), 
which grew in strength until a joint venture 
was created in the mobile telephony segment 
under the Vivo trade name (ECLAC, 2007a). 
At the start of the joint venture, Vivo had 
a market share of around 50% nationally 
and 57% in the concession areas.
However, Vivo began to lose market 
share to its chief competitors, Telecom Italia 
(TIM) and América Móvil (Claro). In a bid 
to reverse the situation, Vivo simplified its 
organizational structure and increased its 
stake in its subsidiaries to improve operational 
efficiency and create synergies. 
Apparently the main cause of Vivo’s 
decline was its loyalty to Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) technology in a 
market where the Global System for Mobile 
Communication (GSM) was becoming 
very popular. This prevented it from 
achieving national coverage and made it 
less competitive owing to the higher cost 
of CDMA terminals. Vivo tried to reverse 
the situation by advancing faster than other 
operators into the area of third-generation 
telephony and by developing upgrades 
to offer high-speed data transfer using 
CDMA2000 1x, in 2001, and Evolution-Data 
Optimized (EV-DO), in 2004. However, 
when it was unable to halt its competitors’ 
advance, Vivo decided to bring a new GSM 
network into operation in late 2006. Although 
Vivo currently uses both technologies, in 
the future it will probably switch the vast 
majority of its customers to GSM. 
Apart from the operational difficulties, 
in 2006, tensions arose between Telefónica 
and PT as a result of Telefónica’s stance 
to a hostile bid for PT. Since the launch 
of the public tender offer, there had been 
speculation that Telefónica would sell its 
share in PT and acquire PT’s assets in Brazil 
(50% of Vivo) in order to consolidate its 
corporate image in Latin America. Following 
the failure of the public tender offer, in which 
the intervention of TELMEX/América Móvil 
was decisive, both companies continued 
to administer Vivo, and even acquired 
new assets and third-generation licences 
which have enabled them to offer national 
coverage, although rumours of a change 
of ownership are rife. 
In August 2007, Vivo acquired 23% of 
Telemig and 19% of Amazônia Celular for 
around 470 million euros. In October 2007, 
Brazil’s telecommunications regulator, Agência 
Nacional de Telecomunicações (ANATEL), 
approved Vivo’s purchase of Telemig, since 
the company was not operating in the state of 
Minas Gerais. However, as the law prohibits 
a single company from having two mobile 
telephony licences in a single concession 
area, ANATEL forced Vivo to sell its share in 
Amazônia Celular. Lastly, in December 2007, 
it was announced that Brazilian operator, 
Oi, would be buying Amazônia Celular. 
Simultaneously, Vivo prepared a voluntary 
public tender offer for the entire capital of 
Telemig Celular and bought new frequencies 
in six north-eastern Brazilian states, giving 
it nationwide presence.
Speculation increased with the 
announcement of Telefónica’s stake in 
Telecom Italia, since it raised the possibility 
that the two companies’ Brazilian assets 
would be consolidated. In October 2007, 
ANATEL approved the operation with 
a few restrictions: Vivo and TIM had to 
remain separate, with their own corporate 
status, managers and business plans. This 
therefore precluded any merger, overlapping 
of licences or any form of administrative, 
technological or other imposition. In 
compliance with the ANATEL ruling, 
Telefónica and Telecom Italia have competing 
mobile telephony operations in several 
concession areas, which is something that 
is not permitted in Brazilian legislation for 
companies in the same group.
It is difficult to predict what will happen 
to one of the two largest telecommunications 
operators in Latin America, but its experience 
in the Brazilian market has clearly turned 
out to be more complex than expected.
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of TELECO, Informação 
em Telecomunicações [online] http://www.teleco.com.br, 1 February 2008.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
In summary, Latin America has been the scene 
of profound changes. In the 1990s, virtually all state-
owned telecommunications enterprises were privatized 
and the resulting private companies (most of which 
were foreign-owned) became the main operators in 
the sector. Following an initial burst of enthusiasm, 
the investment momentum, especially in the fixed-line 
telephony sector, was slowed by lack of competition, 
regulatory inefficiency and an economic downturn 
in many countries of the region. However, growing 
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demand for telecommunications services has fuelled 
rapid growth in the industry’s most dynamic segments, 
especially wireless telephony and, more recently, 
broadband Internet access.
In little more than 15 years, Telefónica has become 
one of the largest integrated operators in the world, thanks 
to its aggressive strategy of internationalization initially 
focused on Latin America (see figure III.6). Also, in less 
than a decade, América Móvil has become a larger and 
stronger company than predicted at the outset (see figure 
III.21 and table III.4). Both companies owe part of their 
success to their satisfactory performance in the plan to 
promote a ‘national champion’, although in some cases 
to the considerable cost of domestic consumers.
3. Latin America and convergent services: the role of 
 alternative companies
Even though commercial multiplay services are still in 
their infancy in Latin America, they already appear to be 
playing a major role in the corporate dynamics that are 
beginning to prevail in the region. The first commercial 
multiplay options have been seen in the same countries 
that spearheaded the reform process and are offered by 
fixed-line telephony or cable television operators. In fact, 
these commercial multiplay services have emerged in 
markets where competition has deepened and strengthened, 
guaranteeing the entry of new competitors into all market 
segments. However, a raft of structural obstacles remain 
that wholly or partially inhibit the development of such 
commercial multiplay services in the vast majority of 
countries in the region (Beca, 2007).46 
The first multiplay services Latin America were 
presented by cable television operators. This obliged 
dominant fixed-line telephony companies to respond 
by speeding up their deployment of ADSL technology 
to enable them to provide comparable bundled service 
packages and so stem their customer losses. No other 
stakeholders have yet been able to put together multiplay 
options. In fact, as long as mobile telephony revenues 
rely primarily on prepaid service subscribers, it will 
be difficult to modernize the original service across the 
board. Moreover, as fixed-service operators perform 
better financially than mobile-service operators, they 
have more capacity and funds to organize ventures of 
this nature.47
The first commercial experience of multiplay was 
in Chile in 2000, when cable television company, VTR, 
offered a triple play service that immediately attracted 
the interest of users and fixed-line telephony operators, 
spearheaded by the Telefónica subsidiary, which attempted 
to put together similar commercial packages (see box III.4). 
Indeed, Telefónica expedited its deployment of ADSL 
technology to provide broadband Internet access. However, 
all the stakeholders lacked at least two of the four elements 
needed to construct an integrated service package: mobile 
telephony and pay-television. This prompted the Chilean 
authorities to lay down clear regulations for providing these 
services;48 the authorities also stipulated requirements for 
cable modem and mobile virtual network operators in order 
to increase competition.49
Other countries in the region have taken longer to roll 
out multiplay services, owing to resistance from dominant 
operators and to regulatory constraints. 
46 Judging by the experience of the United States, where similar structural constraints were short-lived, it is reasonable to assume that much the same 
will apply to Latin America. The obligation to provide non-discriminatory facilities to wholesalers, in line with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and reinforced by the free-trade agreements that some countries in the region have signed 
with the United States, has helped to remove the restrictions that prevent some operators from accessing the services they need to construct their 
bundled service packages.
47 On average, the earnings of fixed-line telephony operators before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) more than double those 
of mobile telephony operators (Beca, 2007). As the EBITDA is calculated on the basis of the profit and loss account (not including tax, interest, 
depreciation and amortization), it is a good indicator of a firm’s profitability.
48 Chile’s telecommunications watchdog, Subsecretaría de Telecomunicaciones, and the Chilean Competition Tribunal have laid down clear 
provisions that progressively oblige the providers of the four basic services to offer facilities to wholesalers for reselling such services to their 
own customers. This means that operators must provide facilities to wholesalers for reselling fixed telephony services and for third-party use of 
subscriber lines.
49 Following its merger with cable operator, Metrópolis, the authorities obliged VTR to offer resale facilities for the provision of broadband Internet 
access by cable modem. Also, Telefónica was authorized to provide mobile telephony services via virtual operators after it had merged its mobile 
assets with those of BellSouth.
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Box III.4
VTR: CHALLENGING THE LEADERS
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of information from VTR [online] http://www.vtr.net.
a  In 2007, cable company, Liberty Global, operated a network that delivered services to 16 million customers in a number of cities, mostly in Australia, Chile, Europe and Japan. 
Since its inception, VTR has stood out for its 
ability to innovate and diversify in the Chilean 
telecommunications market. In the 1990s, it 
was granted one of the first cellular telephony 
licences and entered the pay-television 
segment, for which it acquired a number of 
regional cable television networks. 
In 1995, United States company, 
Southwestern Bell Corporation (SBC), 
acquired 49% of VTR and became a strategic 
partner of Chilean group, Luksic. In the 
following year, there was a strategic merger 
with another United States company, United 
International Holdings (UIH, currently Liberty 
Global Inc.), which also had cable television 
assets in Chile, and VTR consolidated a 
national pay-television network.a In 1999, 
Liberty Global Inc. acquired the holdings of 
its partners (Luksic and SBC), turning the 
company into VTR GlobalCom S.A.
In the latter half of the 1990s, VTR 
pioneered the development of its hybrid 
fibre-coaxials (HFC) in Latin America, 
first to provide local telephony services 
and, later, broadband Internet access. 
With an investment of around US$ 400 
million, this enabled VTR to consolidate 
a national broadband platform capable 
of providing integrated video, voice and 
data services. In the early years of this 
decade, VTR was the first Latin American 
company to put together commercial triple 
play services.
In 2005, VTR completed its merger 
with Chile’s second most important cable 
operator, Metrópolis Intercom S.A., thus 
strengthening its leadership in the pay-
television segment. VTR currently offers 
voice, data and video services and has 
become the chief rival to Chile’s market 
leader, the Telefónica subsidiary. VTR has 
endeavoured to introduce innovations, 
including Latin America’s first high-definition 
channel, which have helped it to maintain 
and even increase its market share.
In Mexico, the fact that there is little capacity to 
challenge the dominant operator (TELMEX/América 
Móvil) has caused the convergence process to lag roughly 
two years behind other countries in the region, like Brazil, 
Chile and Peru (América economía, 4 June 2007). Under 
the circumstances, it was not surprising that TELMEX/
América Móvil chose not to intensify its efforts to launch 
multiplay services but instead to use the time to observe 
and learn from other countries’ experience. In fact, Mexico 
has one of the most concentrated and highest-priced 
telecommunications markets in Latin America (Mariscal 
and Ramírez, 2007). However, more recently, the sudden 
emergence of new convergent service offerings by cable 
operators, particularly Cablevisión (of which Televisa 
owns 51%), coupled with the more proactive stance by 
the Mexican authorities to make such commercial options 
viable, could start reversing the situation.50 Under that 
scenario, TELMEX/América Móvil would be willing to 
negotiate permits to provide pay-television services via 
its telephone networks and thus widen the distribution of 
multiplay services in the Mexican market.51 
The situation is similar in Argentina, where the legal 
framework prevents telephony operators from broadcasting 
live television programmes (although this could change).52 
This has prompted some alternative operators, mainly 
electricity cooperatives, to deploy bundled service 
packages in the provinces, away from the capital. Insofar 
as legislation allows, television companies (the recently-
merged Cablevisión-Multicanal) and telecommunications 
operators (Telefónica and Telecom) are expected to roll 
out triple play services on a larger scale in 2008. For the 
time being, there appears to be a non-aggression pact in 
place: Telefónica is not entering the pay-television business 
and Cablevisión-Multicanal is refraining from making 
any move into voice services, despite being authorized 
to offer them. 
In Brazil, legal constraints prevent the dominant 
operators from providing mobile telephony services 
and pay-television simultaneously. Moreover, foreign 
companies are not permitted to own more than 50% of 
the capital of cable television companies. However, the 
leading companies in the industry appear to be planning 
moves to reverse the situation and to emulate the industry’s 
international trend. Brazil’s telecommunications operators 
have formed partnerships with cable television channels: 
TELMEX with Net Serviços, and Telefónica with TVA 
50 In late 2007, six of Mexico’s leading operators were offering triple play in Cuernavaca, Guadalajara, the Federal District of Mexico, Monterrey 
and Toluca, at a cost of between US$ 53 and US$ 73 a month. In its first two months of operation, Cablevisión managed to capture 6,000 new 
triple play subscribers in only 20% of the coverage area of the Federal District of Mexico.
51 In late 2007, Mexico’s government authorities tried to reach an agreement with TELMEX and Televisa to boost competition in the Mexican 
market. This would allow TELMEX to offer pay-television services to promote the provision of convergent packages. Another aim was to 
intensify competition for the “last mile” and to progress with number portability (allowing users to keep the same telephone number when 
changing providers).
52 In 2005, the Argentine Government signed an agreement with Telefónica and Telecom in which the companies agreed to withdraw the claims they 
had lodged with the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and to freeze their rates. In exchange, the Government 
would promulgate a new telecommunications act authorizing the companies to offer new services that had not been provided for hitherto (La 
Nación, 4 October 2006). However, to date the act is still going through the legislative process.
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Sistema de Televisão S.A (TVA). In addition, Oi and 
Brasil Telecom have announced their intention to merge, 
an operation that would secure Government backing 
since it would establish a strong national champion able 
to compete with the two regional giants: Telefónica and 
TELMEX/América Móvil.53
Lastly, the situation of pay-television is slightly different 
to that of the three other basic services. Telefónica has 
apparently chosen to configure its multiplay services to 
include a satellite television service with direct to home 
(DTH) technology. This has been a highly successful strategy 
in Chile, where Telefónica has already captured 10% of 
the market. In Brazil, it has rolled out a similar service in 
the city of São Paulo, which it has now extended to other 
cities like Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba and Porto Alegre, by 
virtue of a trading partnership with cable television operator, 
TVA.54 The service could be extended to Argentina, where 
Telefónica has submitted an application. So, for the time 
being at least, Telefónica appears to have decided against 
offering an Internet protocol television service, which 
provides much greater convergence with telephony and 
Internet than traditional television does. Moreover, it is 
unclear whether the market will prefer a television service 
with a traditional-style programming schedule or a more 
interactive service that can be programmed on demand.
In turn, TELMEX secured a strong position in Brazil 
following the entry of EMBRATEL into the country’s 
largest cable television channel, Net Serviços, which 
is present in Brazil’s largest cities: São Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Brasilia, 
Florianopolis and Goiania. Both companies launched the 
first triple play service in the Brazilian market in 2006. 
With this experience and, eyeing the growing trend towards 
internationalization, TELMEX/América Móvil boosted 
its international expansion strategy and focused on the 
provision of convergent voice, data and video services with 
national coverage in the region’s leading markets. To do 
this, it targeted cable television operators and acquired cable 
television companies in Chile (Zap and Canal del Fútbol), 
Colombia (CableCentro, Satel Caribe and Superview) 
and Peru (Mega Cable and Cable Express). There is also 
speculation that TELMEX/América Móvil is interested 
in the largest cable television channels in Argentina and 
Chile: the one formed by the merger of Multicanal and 
CableVisión, and VTR. In late 2007, TELMEX began to 
offer triple play with satellite television in Chile over a 
WiMAX wireless network.
To boost its operations outside the Mexican market, 
in late 2007, TELMEX grouped its foreign assets into an 
independent company called TELMEX International. 
In summary, owing to as yet limited progress towards 
convergent solutions in Latin American markets, the debate 
is highly unlikely to focus on network characteristics, as it 
has done in developed countries. Instead, it revolves around 
the regulatory changes needed to offer these commercial 
options. However, growing demand for traffic that delivers 
such multiplay services will force operators to consider 
moving towards next-generation fibre-optic networks, where 
Latin America is still lagging somewhat behind. However, 
the gap as regards wireless solutions is starting to close. 
53 At the end of April 2008, Oi announced the purchase of Brasil Telecom for US$ 3.5 billion. The transaction is awaiting a change in the legislation 
on the sector, however, since fixed telephony operators are prohibited from acquiring firms in other segments, as well as the approval of the 
regulatory bodies, the National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL) and the Administrative Council on Economic Protection (CADE) (Folha 
Online, 25 April 2008 [online] www.folha.com.br).
54 At the end of 2006, Telefónica bought the TVA Microwave Multipoint Distribution System (MMDS) operations in the cities of Sao Paulo, Rio 
de Janeiro, Curitiba and Porto Alegre, which were not subject to legal restrictions. It also came to control 100% of the preferential shares and 
some of the ordinary shares of the cable television operations of TVA in Sao Paulo, Curitiba, Florianopolis and Foz de Iguazú. 
4. Is there a market for mobile convergent services?
Mobile telephony operators in Latin America have 
basically been using three types of second-generation 
technology: Global System for Mobile Communication 
(GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) and 
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA). The GSM 
standard, which was the latest to be introduced and 
usually replaced TDMA, currently has the largest 
number of subscribers (see figure III.20). Between 1997 
and 2000, the majority of regional operators adopted 
the cdmaOne and TDMA technologies for their digital 
network infrastructure. Subsequently, faced with the 
need to introduce new data services, operators began to 
replace their TDMA networks with the General Packet 
Radio Service (GPRS) for GSM users, or to migrate from 
cdmaOne to CDMA2000 1x (Fundación Telefónica, 2007, 
p. 170). Lastly, the supremacy of European operators 
(Telefónica and Telecom Italia) and global trends led 
GSM technology to win by a wide margin. 
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In the middle of this decade, most Latin American 
and Caribbean countries were uncertain about deploying 
third-generation networks. First, the results of these 
technologies in Europe were not as promising as had been 
hoped. Second, the real size of the potential market for 
wireless data services in the region was unknown. Third, 
heavy investment would be required to fund these new 
services. Lastly, there was a real scarcity of frequencies 
suitable for providing third-generation services, especially 
for the standards developed in Europe and Japan. 
The majority of regional operators started cautiously 
advancing into providing data services via second-
generation networks. At first, some of the main operators 
began to offer generation 2.5 services on a CDMA2000 
1x platform, a technology that required less investment, 
improved existing networks, allowed the use of the same 
frequencies as for second generation and introduced 
a continual stream of innovations. However, stiffer 
competition, the expansion of prepayment systems, the 
fast spread of the GSM standard worldwide, the strategic 
options of the main operators (América Móvil, Telefónica 
and TIM), the need to conclude agreements on roaming, 
higher operating costs and the heavy dependency of 
CDMA networks on technology provided by a United 
States company, Qualcomm, led to a great change of 
strategy among regional operators, which migrated en 
masse to the European GSM standard. 
Companies invested heavily to make this strategic 
move and to deploy networks in parallel to the existing 
ones, where profits return could be made as there was still 
ample room for growth in the second-generation voice 
market in Latin America and the Caribbean. After this, 
the vast majority of regional operators moved towards 
third-generation technology using the available GSM 
network upgrades (General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), 
Enhanced Data Rates for GSM of Evolution (EDGE) 
and, more recently, Wideband Code Division Multiple 
Access (W-CDMA)). This meant that only a few operators 
continued on the CDMA2000 technology path, mainly 
targeting market niches for high-income postpaid users 
(see table III.5).55 
Operators’ strategies have been crucial to these changes, 
owing chiefly to strong consolidation in the regional market. 
América Móvil and TIM prioritized the GSM technology 
path from the outset, whereas Telefónica, in its rapid 
regional expansion, created a patchwork of technologies 
that included TDMA, CDMA and GSM, although TDMA 
and CDMA were somewhat more important (Telefónica, 
2007). Initially, this caused no major problems, since the 
technologies could operate simultaneously and overlap. 
In some countries, Telefónica deployed upgrades of its 
CDMA networks using CDMA2000 1x technology to offer 
higher-speed data services (see table III.5).56 However, 
faced with the need to improve its competitiveness and halt 
the advance of its main competitors, Telefónica decided 
to migrate its main Latin American subsidiaries en masse 
to GSM, which allowed it to achieve economies of scale 
and gave it more freedom to negotiate with providers of 
equipment, networks and technology solutions. This led 
Telefónica to start providing equivalent services to those of 
its rivals at competitive prices. However, Brazil continued 
to be a particularly complex market for Telefónica (see 
box III.3). All this has turned Latin America and the 
Caribbean into one of the highest-growth regions in the 
world for wireless GSM services. 
To some extent, these technology adjustments delayed 
the adoption of third-generation networks in Latin America. 
In fact, the main operators, taking advantage of their market 
power, endeavoured to recoup the costs of migrating their 
customers to second-generation GSM networks to reverse 
the fall in average revenue per user for voice services, before 
pressing ahead to a new phase of technological development. 
However, they did not totally neglect to upgrade GSM 
networks to increase data transfer capacity using GPRS 
and EDGE technology. From the perspective of GSM 
operators, EDGE had become an excellent opportunity to 
start familiarizing users with mobile wireless data services 
and also gave them the possibility of increasing their 
revenues (Press Release 3G Americas, 26 July 2007). In 
2003, Telefónica’s Chilean subsidiary (Movistar) was the 
first operator to deploy an EDGE network in Latin America. 
There are now more than 30 EDGE networks in the major 
countries of the region (3G Americas, 2007b). 
As a result of the leading companies’ relative delay in 
implementing change, the first to roll out more sophisticated 
commercial initiatives in the mobile telephony sphere 
were alternative operators, just as occurred in fixed-line 
telephony. Between late 2006 and early 2007, Entel PCS, 
the former Chilean subsidiary of Telecom Italia, which is 
now Chilean-controlled, and Telemig Celular, which was 
recently acquired by Vivo, were the first operators in the 
region to deploy a W-CDMA network in Chile and Brazil. 
This competitive stimulus prompted the main operators to 
start moving more decisively in this direction. 
55 Some operators felt that the supply of prepaid telephony and short message services was still insufficient to meet demand from large and medium-
sized companies and from more sophisticated consumers. 
56 Telefónica’s mobile telephony subsidiary, Movistar, rolled out CDMA2000 1x networks in Argentina, Brazil (via Vivo), Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Uruguay.
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Table III.5
LATIN AMERICA: TECHNOLOGY PATH OF THE MAIN OPERATORS’ ADVANCED MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
CDMA a
CDMA2000 Broadband (W-CDMA)
1x EV-DO b Rev 0 EV-DO Rev A EDGE c W-CDMA HSDPA d HSUPAe
Telefónica/Movistar
- Argentina 2003 f 2005 2007 2007
- Brazil (Vivo) 2001 2004 2007
- Chile 2004 f 2003 2007
- Colombia 2003 2006 2008 g
- Ecuador 2002 2008 g
- Guatemala 2003 2004




- Uruguay 2004 f 2007 2007
- Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2002 2005
América Móvil
- Argentina 2004 2007 2007
- Brazil h 2004 2007 2007
- Chile 2002 2007
- Colombia 2005 2008 g 2008 g
- Ecuador 2005
- Guatemala 2008 g
- Honduras 2008 g
- Mexico 2004 2008 g 2008 g
- Paraguay 2005 2007
- Peru 2004 2008 g
- Uruguay 2004 2007
TIM
- Argentina 2004 2007 2007
- Brazil 2004 2008 g
- Paraguay 2004
Other local operators
- Brasil Telecom (Brazil) 2005 2008 g
- Oi (Brazil) 2008 g
- ENTEL PCS (Chile) 2004 2006 2006
- Alegro PCS (Ecuador) 2003 2005
- Iusacell (Mexico) 2003 2005 2007
- Ancel (Uruguay) 2005 2007
- Movilnet (Venezuela, Bol. Rep. of ) 2002 2005
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of CDMA Development Group (CDG) [online] http://www.cdg.org/technology/3g/migration.
asp; 3G Americas [online]  http://www.3gamericas.com; Informa Telecoms & Media, World Cellular Information Service (WCIS).
a  Code Division Multiple Access.
b  Evolution-Data Optimized.
c  Enhanced data rates for GSM evolution.
d High-Speed Downlink Packet Access. 
e High-Speed Uplink Packet Access. 
f  Coverage pending.
g  The network is expected to become operational in 2008.
h  In Brazil, TELMEX has a stake in EMBRATEL, the operator that has been running a CDMA2000 1x network since 2006 and EV-DO technology, since 2007.
In 2007, third-generation services started to become 
really available in the region (see map III.1). Most of 
the initiatives have been centred on the Southern Cone, 
especially Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, where all 
operators offer third-generation services, and the initiatives 
were spearheaded by the leading companies in the region: 
Telefónica, América Móvil and TIM.57 In most cases, the 
new third-generation services have reused the available 
spectrum in second-generation GSM networks, by deploying 
W-CDMA technology. In late 2007, a dozen or so operators 
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were offering W-CDMA/HSDPA services in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Meanwhile, some operators that 
continued to be loyal to CDMA2000 technology, especially 
in Brazil and Mexico, made significant advances in third-
generation networks by upgrading their networks with 
EV-DO.58 If this trend continues, W-CDMA subscribers 
could number an estimated 15.3 million by 2009, triple 
the subscribers to CDMA2000 1x EV-DO (Rev 0/A/B) 
technology, of whom there are an estimated 5.2 million 
(Press Release 3G Americas, 20 November 2007). This 
rapid growth is certain to intensify as the price of terminals 
comes down.59
Map III.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ADVANCE OF THIRD-
GENERATION TELEPHONY AMONG OPERATORS OF THE
GSM FAMILY, DECEMBER 2007
While the majority of major operators plan to migrate 
to third-generation technologies, many of them must first 
establish new frequencies (1,900-2,100 MHz) or release 
spectrum in the current frequency ranges (850-900 MHz) 
before they can launch High-Speed Downlink Packet Access 
networks via the Universal Mobile Telecommunication 
System (UMTS/HSDPA). Brazil took the first step in this 
direction when it successfully tendered for new frequency 
bands for third-generation services in December 2007. From 
the Government’s perspective, the tender was a success, 
since all the licences were sold for a total of nearly US$ 3 
billion —after paying a 90% premium on the minimum price 
(Reuters, 20 December 2007). The big winners were the 
main regional operators: Vivo (50% owned by Telefónica) 
and América Móvil acquired licences in the nine auctioned 
areas and TIM, in eight. The remaining licences were granted 
to Brazilian operators Oi (5), Brasil Telecom (2) and CTBC 
(3). The only operator that tendered but was not granted any 
licences was United States company, Nextel. América Móvil 
was the operator that spent the largest amount on the tender 
(US$ 792 million), followed by TIM (US$ 736 million) and 
Vivo (US$ 637 million). The operators will need to invest a 
further US$ 2.2 billion to fund third-generation services in 
Brazil. In 2008, similar tenders are expected to be held in 
Chile, Mexico and some Andean countries.
In summary, most operators have tried to derive the 
maximum possible benefit from growth in the voice market 
in recent years, so it is not surprising that they should have 
introduced data services gradually using the updates available 
in second-generation GSM and CDMA networks. For the time 
being, these services have been limited to corporate customers 
and high-income population segments, on account of the 
steep cost of terminals and the high rates. However, pressure 
from falling average revenue per user is expected to prompt 
operators to step up the development of new data transfer 
services, especially mobile broadband. The challenge is to 
find the right applications for providing widespread access 
to these services in not particularly wealthy markets.
57 In 2007, a number of subsidiaries of the main operators in Latin America and the Caribbean began to offer third-generation services using W-
CDMA technology, including: Telefónica in Argentina and Uruguay, via Movistar, and in Monterrey (Mexico), via a pilot plan; América Móvil 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, via its Claro and CTI Móvil brands; and TIM in Argentina, via Telecom Personal. 
58 The main operators offering third-generation services, basically mobile broadband access on a CDMA2000 1x EV-DO platform include: Vivo in 
Brazil, Iusacell in Mexico, Movilnet in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Alegro PCS in Ecuador, and Movistar and Telgua in Guatemala (CDMA 
Development Group (CDG) [online] http://www.cdg.org/technology/3g/migration.asp). However, in 2007 Vivo started to operate a new GSM network, 
which, combined with the purchase of Telemig Celular, is a sign that it will speed up customer migration to the European standard. In late 2007, there 
were some 30 CDMA2000 1x networks in Latin America and the Caribbean, 11 of which use EV-DO technology ([online] http://www.cdg.org/cdg/
teams/Lat_Amer/latin_america.asp).
59 Although the frequency range of the radio spectrum for third-generation networks is between 400 and 3,000 Mhz, according to IMT-2000, 
telecommunications equipment is designed to operate in specific frequency bands. Owing to economies of scale in the hardware industry, the volume 
of sales has a significant effect on the end price of telecommunications equipment. This means that the decisions adopted in the major markets on 
























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from World Cellular Information Service (WCIS).
Note:  The boundaries and names figuring on this map do not imply that they are 
supported or officially accepted by the United Nations.
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E. Conclusions
(iii) promoting competition among services, basically 
in “last mile” connections, as in a number of European 
Union countries.
Figure III.22
THE INNOVATION-BASED VIRTUOUS CIRCE
The world telecommunications market is currently facing 
great challenges from fast technological change, regulatory 
complexities and the financial and competitive situation of 
companies in the sector. The latter factor has defined the 
sort of corporate strategies deployed by the main operators 
and the alternative companies that have started to compete 
with them for large segments of the market. Although the 
changes that will determine the communications of the 
future are being defined in a small group of industrialized 
economies including Japan, the United States, the Republic 
of Korea and a few European Union countries, they have 
begun to spread rapidly to much of the world, including 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Stiffer competition and the removal of the industry’s 
traditional frontiers have led to falling revenues for 
dominant operators in the fixed-line telephony sector, 
although this has been partially offset by the performance 
of wireless services and data traffic. This means that the 
sustainable growth of the telecommunications sector will, 
to a large extent, rely on its ability to generate additional 
revenues from such new interactive applications as 
Voice over Internet Protocol services, video on demand, 
Internet protocol television and mobile broadband. So, 
both dominant operators and alternative companies 
have surprised the market with innovative commercial 
services, including the bundled voice, data and video 
service package known as triple play. 
However, in responding to increasingly sophisticated 
market demand, operators have come up against constraints 
caused by the scarcity of available infrastructure. Vast 
amounts of funding are needed to deploy new fibre-optic 
networks for fixed platforms or third-generation networks 
for advanced mobile communications. Nevertheless, 
nobody knows for sure if it will be possible to achieve 
a return on this investment. Clearly the potential market 
for the new multiplay services and very high speed data 
transfer (fixed and mobile) applications is not a mass 
market, but rather a niche market of corporate customers 
and high-income subscribers. A variety of alternatives have 
therefore been proposed to try to encourage a ‘virtuous 
circle’ based on innovation as a catalyst of new services and 
a driver of demand (see figure III.22). These alternatives 
include: (i) forging public-private partnerships to support 
a national scientific and technological development 
strategy, as has happened in Japan and the Republic of 
Korea; (ii) encouraging competition between different 
types of infrastructure, as in the United States, and 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from MIT, The Broadband Incentive Problem, White Paper 
prepared by the Broadband Working Group, MIT Communications Futures 
Program (CFP), Cambridge University Communications Research Network, 
September 2005.
So, depending on the scenario in which they find 
themselves, operators are expected to deepen and 
expedite their investment and innovation strategies in 
order to restore the value of their fixed and mobile access 
networks and speed up the transition to partner networks, 
transforming themselves into suppliers of services, content 
and applications to Internet users. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the main 
operators have focused on expanding their customer base 
to achieve economies of scale and synergy, especially 
in the mobile telephony segment. Basically, this has led 
to the number of companies dwindling to two major 
regional operators: Telefónica and TELMEX/América 
Móvil. Apart from fierce competition between these two 
companies, alternative operators (mainly cable television 
channels) have also played a major role in intensifying 
competition and introducing technological innovations 
into infrastructure, equipment and applications. However, 
this has not happened on a wide enough scale. In fact, 
owing to regulatory loopholes, the inertia of industry and 
competition authorities, intense pressure from dominant 
operators and the lack of alternative operators, the benefits 
of the new technologies have taken a long time to reach 
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Uncertainty regarding the potential market for the new 
advanced telecommunications services is much greater 
in Latin America and the Caribbean than in markets in 
developed countries. However, just as elsewhere, traditional 
business areas are showing signs of saturation, obliging 
operators to seek new sources of income.
In investment terms, competitive pressures appear 
to have induced the main operators (most of which are 
foreign) to stake their future on providing commercial 
convergent services, for which they have deployed the 
necessary infrastructure. This is the case with ADSL 
technology on fixed platforms and third-generation standards 
for advanced mobile communications. Other operators 
have frozen their investments and skimmed the market 
in traditional services, or have gradually implemented 
new initiatives to get ahead of future competitors and 
legislative changes and so avoid losing market share. In 
this latter situation, operators have tended to postpone 
the commercial implementation of new technologies for 
as long as possible. 
Lastly, although technology is an exogenous factor 
for most Latin American economies, its deployment by 
means of modern, low-cost communications platforms 
could help to close the gap with developed countries. It 
is therefore essential to define a national development 
strategy in this area and to forge public-private partnerships 
to pass on to users the benefits of the rapid technological 
innovation process now under way.
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Chapter IV
Canadian FDI in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
This chapter deals with Canadian FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean and the experience of 
Canadian transnational corporations (TNCs) operating in the region. Section A briefly examines 
Canada’s development trajectory, with an emphasis on the country’s changing development 
trajectories and the role FDI has played in them. Section B looks at the corporate strategies 
linked to Canadian outward FDI (OFDI) in the sectors where it is most evident: finance and 
asset management, natural resources and manufactures. The OFDI strategies of Canadian 
companies operating in Latin America and the Caribbean (market-seeking, natural-resource-
seeking, efficiency-seeking) are examined in section C. 
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protect Canada’s domestic industry from foreign imports. 
Over time, however, the National Policy grew in scope to 
encompass the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
the settling of the Prairies, the development of ports and 
financial support for sea links to Europe and Asia to 
facilitate the export of Canadian goods. 
By the middle of the twentieth century the benefits of 
the National Policy were waning and a third development 
trajectory emerged, premised on fuller integration with 
the United States economy. Canada’s new closeness with 
the United States was facilitated mainly by investment-
led integration by private Canadian and United States 
businesses pursuing profit-maximizing strategies, as 
opposed to any formal policy-led initiative designed 
to enhance the relationship at that time.2 This was a 
natural outcome given Canada’s proximity to and cultural 
affinity with its southern neighbour, on the one hand, 
and the progress demonstrated by economic integration 
in competitor markets, such as the European Economic 
Community (EEC), on the other. As Canada’s economic 
relationship with the United States deepened, that with 
the United Kingdom weakened, although this country 
remained important in a political context. Subsequently, 
the integration of the North American continent was 
further enhanced by three formal trade agreements: the 
Canada-United States Auto Pact of 1965, the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989, and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 
1994, which incorporated Mexico. 
In the shift from the “go-it-alone” to the “integrate 
into North America” development strategy, the principal 
instruments of economic policy changed from nationalist 
A. Introduction
1.	 Canadian	development	trajectories
1 Although Canada was officially a colony of the United Kingdom after the Treaty of Paris in 1763, there were both English and French (among 
others) colonies in the territory known as Canada since the early 1600s.
2 The United States has been Canada’s principal export destination since 1942 and Canada has been the principal foreign market for United States 
exports since 1946 (U.S Commercial Service, 2008). 
Canada has experienced three principal development 
trajectories during its evolution. First, as a colony of 
the United Kingdom for over 100 years,1 Canada’s 
primary role was to supply the mother country with 
natural resources and fiscal income while providing a 
new market for British manufacturers and defending the 
British Empire. Contrary to the experience of the thirteen 
American colonies, which fought a revolutionary war 
with the United Kingdom for independence, Canada’s 
relationship with the British Crown was generally amicable 
and Canada was essentially granted independence at the 
time of Confederation in 1867, even though it did not 
have its own national court of final appeal until the 1930s. 
Canada maintains a special relationship with United 
Kingdom, in that the Queen of the United Kingdom is 
still the symbolic Head of State in her capacity as Queen 
of Canada represented by the Governor-General and 
Canada is an active member of the Commonwealth. In 
the colonial phase, Canada was sometimes viewed as a 
“hewer of wood and drawer of water” and as a consequence 
there was limited development of the Canadian economy, 
especially manufacturing industries. 
With Confederation, Canada shifted towards a 
second development trajectory which is referred to as 
the National Policy. Although Canada maintained strong 
links with the United Kingdom, the federal government’s 
focus soon turned to developing the national economy 
through this policy, which was put in place by the first 
Prime Minister, John A. MacDonald, and lasted until 
about the Second World War. The National Policy was 
nationalist and protectionist and was designed to promote 
Canadian industries. In essence, it erected trade barriers to 
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stock, on the other hand, remained between 5% and 
10% until 1980, but then made steady progress to reach 
30%-35% of GDP, eventually exceeding inward FDI 
stocks in the mid-1990s.
to regional and, increasingly, global ones; from hands-
on to hands-off instruments; from protectionism and 
industrial policy based on Crown corporations and 
regional development to free-market initiatives regarding 
international trade and foreign investment. Canada’s 
exports remain United-States-centric, since more than 
80% of the country’s total exports go there; however, the 
picture on the import side is quite different, with only 
about 50% of imports coming from the United States. 
With regard to inward FDI, United States investment is 
still dominant but less so than previously. Canadian OFDI 
originally focused on the United States market but is now 
more broad-based. 
Today, Canada is one of the world’s economic success 
stories, ranking eighth in terms of GDP and fifteenth in 
terms of per capita GDP. It is a large country (almost 
10 million square kilometres) with a relatively small 
population (about 33 million). It possesses an interesting 
combination of large endowments of natural resources, a 
highly educated labour force and a privileged relationship 
with its neighbour, the United States. At present, services 
account for approximately two thirds of total GDP while 
manufacturing accounts for less than 20% and natural 
resources less than 10%. Canada has evolved into an 
important trading nation and its foreign trade (exports 
plus imports) is equivalent to 70% of GDP (DFAIT, 
2007). Thus, Canada possesses the characteristics of a 
successful maturing economy.
In spite of past success, the Canadian economy is 
facing some significant challenges. First, the United 
States economy is cooling and losing some of its long-
term international competitiveness, which translates into 
reduced demand for Canadian exports at a time when 
Canada has yet to close the prosperity gap with the United 
States.3 Second, Canada’s initiatives as regards establishing 
a new innovation-based 4 development trajectory have 
been weak and their impact on national productivity and 
international competitiveness limited. Third, Canada’s 
efforts to shift from a development trajectory centred on 
the United States to more of a regional or international 
one (Lynch, 2007) have been only partially successful 
and the sharp appreciation of the Canadian dollar makes 
it increasingly difficult to pursue those goals based on a 
strictly trade-centric agenda.5 This suggests that FDI will 
continue to be central to Canadian development. Evidently, 
FDI will also be needed to complement the shift toward an 
innovation-based development trajectory and OFDI will 
be central to Canada’s increased global presence. 
The next section describes Canada’s recent evolution 
as both a recipient of FDI and an investor, and subsection 
(3) describes the nature of the debate and public policy 
measures in this area.
2.	 Canada	as	an	FDI	recipient	and	an	outward	investor
Figure IV.1 shows that FDI stock in Canada was usually 
in the range of 20%-30% of GDP during 1971-2007, 
which was relatively high by international standards, 
and has increased during the more recent period. OFDI 
3 According to James Milway, Executive Director of the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity (ICAP), the prosperity gap indicates 
that, with a similar endowment of natural, physical and human resources, Canadians are less successful at adding value to create goods and 
services for consumers in Canada and around the world. He suggests that governments need to step up their investments in physical and human 
capital; businesses need greater competitive pressure to encourage greater investment; and all Canadians need to invest in their own skills and 
productivity.
4 Canada’s innovation strategy is summarized in Innovation in Canada [online] http://www.innovationstrategy.gc. ca/go1/innovation/site.nsf/en/
in02314.html and Industry Canada [online] http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/ic1.nsf/ en/h_00231e.html.
5 Canada has implemented several free trade agreements, beyond CUSFTA (1989) and NAFTA (1994), most of which include investment chapters 
(with Chile in 1997, Costa Rica in 2002, the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) —Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland— and Peru, both in 2008) and is currently negotiating others (with the Republic of Korea, the European Union and others).
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Figure IV.1
CANADA: FDI AND OFDI STOCKS, 1971-2007
(Percentages of GDP)
rapid rates, outstripping those of trade and GDP growth by 
a large margin.6 The United States very much dominates 
these FDI stocks, both on the inward and outward sides; 
that dominance is waning, however. 
The shares of Canada’s direct investment, inward 
and outward alike, with the United States began to 
fall in the mid-1980s.7 This has been directly linked 
to reductions in trade barriers between the two 
countries. Prior to trade liberalization, market-seeking 
transnational corporations (TNCs) from each country 
had to locate inside the other country to avoid paying 
tariffs. The lowering of trade protection that followed 
successive rounds of GATT tariff reductions allowed 
TNCs in each country to consolidate production in their 
respective home market and access the other market by 
export. Trade liberalization was formalized under the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 
1989, and this arrangement was extended to include 
Mexico in 1994 with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).8 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from Statistics Canada.
Figure IV.2 provides information on the growth in 
Canada’s FDI in aggregate terms, as well as by region. 

















































6 Canada’s OFDI has grown at a compound rate of 13% and its FDI at 8% over the period 1970 to the present. Post-1990, OFDI grew at a compound 
rate of 11%, whereas FDI grew at 8%.
7 This trend in Canada’s FDI stands in contrast to patterns in trade, since the United States still accounts for a very large share of Canada’s exports. 
The proportion of Canada’s imports that come from the United States has not changed dramatically.
8 Of course, to be eligible for tariff-free access to the other member countries, goods produced inside North America must comply with important 
“domestic” content rules. NAFTA allowed each country to exempt several sectors, which remained protected. 
Figure IV.2
CANADA: FDI STOCK PATTERNS, 1970-2007
(Millions of Canadian dollars and percentages)
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In contrast to its relationship with the United States, 
Canada’s FDI relationship with Europe has grown, with 
Canada receiving roughly 30% of its FDI from Europe. 
This share is up from below 20% in the 1970s. Other 
regions, such as Asia and Oceania, Latin America and 
the Caribbean (including offshore financial centres) and 
Africa have not traditionally been important sources of 
FDI. However, in recent years, companies from these 
regions have made investments in Canada in the context 
of rising FDI from developing countries (UNCTAD, 
2006). See box IV.1 for a discussion of the case of Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
The United States and Europe have also dominated 
OFDI from Canada, but less so than is the case for FDI 
into Canada. Other regions —Asia and Oceania, Africa 
and, in particular, Latin America and the Caribbean— are 
becoming more important as destinations of OFDI from 
Canada. 
Box IV.1
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN INVESTMENTS IN CANADA
Latin American and Caribbean investments 
in Canada have usually been associated 
with Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) 
(see table). In fact, OFCs contributed 
82% and 76%, respectively, of total Latin 
American and Caribbean FDI into Canada 
in 1990 and 2000. However, this seems to 
be changing as companies from other Latin 
American countries have started investing 
directly in Canada. In 2006, largely as a 
result of one major acquisition —that of 
Inco by a Brazilian company, Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD)— 62% of total 
Latin American FDI into Canada came from 
Brazil and a further 2% from Mexico. 
LATIN AMERICA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA, 1990, 2000 AND 2007
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Country 1990 2000 2007
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
Argentina ... ... ... ... 119 0.7
Brazil 152 8.2 621 15.9 12 815 70.5
Colombia ... ... 3 0.1 4 0.0
Mexico -13 -0.7 215 5.5 294 1.6
Panama 118 6.4 93 2.4 80 0.4
Offshore financial centres a 1 599 82 2 966 76 4 862 27
   Bahamas 143 7.7 197 5.1 149 0.8
   Barbados ... ... 240 6.2 495 2.7
   Bermuda 1 302 70.2 2 065 53.0 3 007 16.5
   British Virgin Islands 12 0.6 94 2.4 581 3.2
   Netherlands Antilles 92 5.0 338 8.7 6 0.0
   Cayman Islands 50 2.7 32 0.8 624 3.4
Total 1 856 100.0 3 898 100.0 18 174 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from Statistics Canada.
a  Reporting countries.
Non-financial investments from Latin 
America into Canada go mainly to the mining, 
metals, and cement industries, where, 
as mentioned in chapter I of this report, 
a number of trans-Latins (transnational 
companies from Latin America and the 
Caribbean) have attained or are striving 
toward global status (see also ECLAC, 
2006). The acquisition of Inco by CVRD, 
which outbid Teck Cominco and paid 
US$ 16.7 billion, was the largest international 
acquisition by a trans-Latin outside its home 
country to date. Other large acquisitions 
in recent years include the purchase 
by Votorantim (Brazil) of cement plants 
previously owned by Lafarge (US$ 710 
million, in 2001); and by CVRD itself of 
Canico (US$ 678 million, in 2005). Other 
companies that have important operations 
in Canada are Gerdau (Brazil), with three 
steel mills and six scrap collection and 
processing facilities, and Tenaris (Argentina), 
with welded and seamless pipe plants and 
service centers. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The main motivation for FDI into Canada from the 
rest of the world appears to be natural-resource seeking, 
since energy, metallic minerals, and wood and paper are 
the largest recipient industries for foreign investment (see 
figure IV.3). These are followed by service industries, 
such as finance and insurance, services and retailing, 
where investments are most likely to be market-access-
seeking, since foreign TNCs need to locate in Canada 
in order to participate in Canadian services. Next 
are manufacturing industries such as machinery and 
transportation, in which investment is probably driven 
by efficiency-seeking motivations owing to the fact that, 
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since trade liberalization, tariffs are no longer a major 
factor in FDI (Hejazi and Pauly, 2005).9 Relatively little 
can be inferred from these figures about the impact of 
FDI on innovation in Canada.
Figure IV.3
FDI INTO CANADA, BY SECTOR
(Percentages)
Figure IV.4
OFDI FROM CANADA, BY SECTOR
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from Statistics Canada.
On the outward side, natural-resource-seeking 
investments, such as those in energy, metallic minerals, 
and wood and paper are among the principal components 
of Canadian investment abroad; however, the largest 
recipients of Canadian outward investments are service 
industries, such as finance services and insurance, and 
retailing, most likely driven by market-access strategies. 
Manufacturing is least significant (see figure IV.4).
In 1970, Canada held the equivalent of 15.7% of 
the world’s FDI stock. Over the subsequent 35 years, 
that share fell steadily to 3.2% by 2006. This relative 
decline on the inward side contrasts with the outward 
pattern, since Canada has been able to keep pace with the 
rapidly growing stocks of world FDI. Canada’s share of 
global OFDI stocks has increased somewhat, fluctuating 
between 3% and 5% over the past four decades. In other 
words, Canadian TNCs, starting from a small base, have 
expanded at a much faster pace abroad than foreign TNCs 
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9 Non-tariff barriers remain, hence some tariff jumping-like FDI still exists. This would certainly be supported by data indicating that a large 
fraction of Canada-United States trade does not take place under the NAFTA preference, but under the most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff. This 
happens when the costs of compliance with rules of origin, which some view as a kind of non-tariff barrier, exceed the MFN tariff rate.
10 It is important to note that although Canada’s share of inward FDI has fallen, the stock of FDI in Canada continues to grow. This is also the case 
on the outward side: although Canada is maintaining its share of the rapidly growing global outward stocks, its OFDI stock continues to grow. 
11 Canadian companies have been making increasing use of OFCs since 1990. Another distortion in Canada’s official FDI statistics has to do with 
the values registered. FDI data are recorded at book value, inclusive of all reinvestment of earnings into the affiliate. This method of valuation is 
different from market value. This implies that more recent FDI transactions (newer stocks) will better reflect market values, whereas older FDI 
transactions (older stocks) will likely be more undervalued (assuming, of course, that the assets underlying FDI appreciate over long periods of 
time). With regard to Canada’s FDI position, this means that, to the extent that OFDI is newer and FDI is older, the ratio of OFDI to FDI is not 
as extreme as portrayed earlier. A third limitation is that confidentiality requirements prevent the Canadian statistics agency (Statistics Canada) 
from making publicly available sectoral data with more detailed levels of disaggregation, although these are included in the regional and overall 
totals. Often, there are only one or two major Canadian investors in smaller economies and the confidentiality requirement prevents the release 
of amounts of FDI by industry in such cases, which severely limits serious analysis of the FDI phenomenon.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from Statistics Canada.
These trends indicate that, although Canadian OFDI 
has been able to keep up with the rapidly growing global 
stocks of FDI, Canada has not been able to attract FDI 
to the same degree as it did in the past.10 Furthermore, 
these patterns are no longer driven primarily by Canada’s 
special relationship with the United States. The United 
States is still by far Canada’s largest partner, followed 
by Europe, for both inward and outward FDI; as was 
mentioned, however, its relative importance in terms of 
shares of Canadian FDI —both outward and inward— has 
diminished significantly over the past few decades. 
An interesting aspect of Canadian investment is that 
the Latin American and Caribbean region, including OFCs, 
received 20% of Canadian OFDI, but was the source of 
just 3.4% of inward FDI in 2006. It must be stated that the 
share of FDI going through international financial centers 
has increased significantly and represents a very important 
distortion, because these flows of Canadian capital do not 
remain in OFCs, but go on to final destinations in third 
markets, mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, 
or the United States and Europe. Unfortunately, there is little 
information on where the capital moving through OFCs is 
ultimately invested. This is one of the principal distortions 
affecting Canadian official statistics on OFDI.11
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As a result of these distortions and limitations, the use 
of official OFDI statistics for analytical purposes needs to be 
complemented with an analysis of the corporate strategies of the 
dominant Canadian corporations. Before turning to that analysis 
in section B, the following subsection examines the nature of 
the debate and changing policies on FDI in Canada. 
3.	 The	debate	and	changing	policies	on	FDI	and	OFDI	in	Canada
Over the course of its development trajectories, Canada 
has experienced significant changes in FDI patterns. 
Especially in the context of the third development stage, 
starting in the mid-1960s, this has influenced public 
discussions on FDI policy, and consequently affected 
the Canadian government’s stances on the topic. On 
the one hand, high levels of growth in FDI into Canada 
have typically generated increased calls for restrictions 
to be placed on such investment. This was certainly the 
case in the early 1970s and is a phenomenon which has, 
to a certain extent, reappeared recently in relation to the 
foreign takeover of some of Canada’s biggest companies 
(Alcan, INCO, Falconbridge, Dofasco, Hudson’s Bay Co.). 
On the other hand, the surge in outward investment has 
generated new demands on the part of Canadian companies 
for increased protection and guarantees in the countries 
they invest in. Thus, it is sometimes difficult to strike a 
balance on direct investment as a whole.
With regard to FDI, in 1973, the Federal Government 
implemented the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA). 
FIRA was widely criticized as discriminatory towards 
foreign investors 12 and it resulted in an exodus of capital 
from Canada, as well as the country’s reputation at that 
time for having restrictive FDI policies.13 By the mid-
1980s, the Government of Canada changed course since 
the Canadian economy was experiencing significant 
difficulties, international prices for commodities were 
weak and the restrictive investment policies were 
straining Canada-United States relations. The passing 
of the Investment Canada Act of 1985 (ICA) saw the 
end of the era of restrictive policies on FDI and their 
replacement with a much more accommodating national 
policy environment for foreign capital and TNCs. 
Canada’s current inward foreign investment policy 
consists of a regulatory framework that does nevertheless 
allow the federal government to review large-scale foreign 
investments in Canada that exceed a given financial 
threshold.14 Approval of foreign acquisitions of Canadian 
companies is granted when the responsible minister is 
satisfied that the foreign investment is likely to be of “net 
benefit to Canada”. Outside the cultural sector, greenfield 
foreign investments, i.e., the establishment of a new facility 
in Canada rather than the acquisition of an existing one, 
are no longer subject to review, and the previous test of 
“significant benefit” was changed to one of “net benefit”. 
For the “net-benefit” test, ICA provides a list of factors 
to be considered by the Minister of Industry, including 
the effect of the investment on the level and nature of 
economic activity in Canada; the degree and participation 
by Canadians; the factors of productivity, efficiency, 
technological development and product; innovation 
and variety; competition in Canada; compatibility with 
national industrial, economic and cultural policies; and 
Canada’s ability to compete in world markets.15 According 
to Industry Canada, over time there has been a shift in 
the application of these criteria, towards an emphasis on 
issues of productivity, technology transfer and efficiency, 
and away from other issues, such as employment. 
12 Competition Policy Review Panel [online]  http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/en/00014e.html.
13 A regression of FDI into Canada over the period 1930 to 2006 on a time trend capturing the year-to-year growth in FDI and a variable reflecting 
the period over which the FIRA was in effect, yields coefficient estimates on the trend variable that are positive and highly significant, indicating 
that FDI into Canada has been growing year over year. On the other hand, the coefficient estimate on the FIRA is negative and highly significant, 
indicating that the rate of growth in FDI into Canada slowed over the period that FIRA was in place. 
14 Lower thresholds are set for activities considered more vulnerable or in which national security concerns are important, such as financial services, 
transport services (including pipelines), uranium and culture.
15 Five sectors in the Canadian economy have ownership restrictions: telecommunications, broadcasting, cultural industries, transport services and 
uranium production. These restrictions were introduced to protect aspects of the economy deemed essential to Canada’s sovereignty, cultural 
identity, national security and overall economic well-being. Other restrictions were imposed to deal with a perceived inability of market forces 
to support the development of domestic activity. Each sectoral regime is unique and is based upon a distinct policy rationale.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)146
Currently, a renewed debate is under way in Canada 
on the merits of both FDI and OFDI, sparked by the 
high-profile takeovers of the Canadian “icon” companies 
mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the dramatic rise in global 
energy prices has generated significant investments or 
expressions of interest in western Canada’s enormous 
reserves of oil and natural gas from foreign private 
companies and foreign State-owned enterprises, as well as 
sovereign-wealth funds. This has helped to fuel the public 
debate about the merits of FDI in the Canadian economy 
and implications for national control over key sectors. 
The interest expressed and foreign investments actually 
undertaken by many foreign State-owned enterprises, 
specifically from the Middle East and China, have resulted 
in the Canadian government announcing a review of 
its policies on FDI to possibly include the application 
of a national security test. The policy review currently 
under way in Canada is also tasked with reviewing the 
existing policies to ensure they serve to enhance Canadian 
competitiveness.
These new developments with respect to government 
policy have raised concerns about the renewal of a 
protectionist sentiment that Canada has not seen since 
the abandonment of FIRA in the early 1980s. Canada’s 
economic landscape has changed significantly as has the 
country’s position with respect to foreign investment. The 
difference between the debate today and that of the 1970s 
is that although today Canada has as “large” a stock of FDI 
as it did in 1970, it is counterbalanced by a voluminous 
stock of OFDI in the global economy. Restricting foreign 
investment in the country might have a direct impact on 
Canadian investments in the global economy, and this will 
likely temper any decision the government may come to 
as regards restricting foreign investment. 
In July, 2007, the federal government announced the 
creation of a Policy Review Panel that “will review key 
elements of Canada’s competition and investment policies 
to ensure that they are working effectively, allowing 
us to encourage even greater foreign investment and 
create more and better jobs for Canadians.” The Panel’s 
core mandate is to review two key pieces of Canadian 
legislation, the Competition Act and the Investment 
Canada Act, including the treatment of State-owned 
enterprises and the possibility of a national security 
review clause. The Panel will also examine Canada’s 
sectoral restrictions on FDI and the competition and 
investment regimes of other jurisdictions to assess 
reciprocity between their rules and Canada’s. Separately, 
the Panel will assess how Canada’s policies may further 
encourage OFDI. The Panel will report to the Minister 
of Industry, on behalf of the Government of Canada, by 
30 June 2008 with concrete recommendations to further 
enhance competition in Canada.
In addition to addressing issues as to whether ICA 
is the appropriate set of policies given changes in the 
competitive landscape over the past 20 years, the government 
is concerned about increasing foreign ownership stakes in 
Canada’s energy sector and would like to institute policies 
today that will allow it to shape foreign ownership in a way 
that would be consistent with economic prosperity in the 
country as well as political and strategic considerations. 
Increasingly, federal government officials seem to be 
recognizing that more proactive and targeted policies are 
required to attract priority FDI. 
With regard to protection and guarantees for OFDI, 
Canada has been very active internationally over the last 
decade or so. In the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Canada pushed hard for agreements in services and for 
the inclusion of investment matters among the Singapore 
issues. In the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the country was a strong backer 
of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and 
was quite active in promoting the MAI vision among 
developing countries. Moreover, Canada has encouraged 
bilateral investment treaties and FTAs with chapters on 
investment. In fact, Canada was reluctant to abandon 
the OECD MAI focus even though developed countries 
themselves were unable to reach agreement on it and OECD 
opted to promote a more development-friendly “Policy 
Framework for Investment” among developing countries. 
Canada has also endorsed more rigorous mechanisms of 
investor-State dispute settlement.
Thus, the debate on FDI is shifting in Canada and 
increasingly reflects the needs of the economy in terms 
of development trajectories, on one hand, and the needs 
of internationalizing Canadian companies, on the other. 
It is a dynamic debate reflecting changing conditions and 
contemplating new policy initiatives.
Section B deals with the dominant corporate strategies 
that underlie Canadian OFDI in the principal industries 
in which it occurs (services, manufacturing and natural 
resources). Section C analyses Canadian investment in 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of that 
challenge.
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B. The main corporate strategies associated with  
 canadian OFDI
The first part of this section identifies the principal companies 
operating in Canada and Canada’s global leaders in the 
international economy. There follows a review of the 
strategies implemented by firms in the main sectors from 
which OFDI has emerged, such as financial services and 
asset management, natural resources and manufactures.
1.	 The	main	companies	operating	in	Canada
A list of the 300 leading companies, by revenue, operating in 
Canada was constructed by blending two separate databases of 
the Financial Post 16 (see table IV-A-1). The top 300 universe 
broke down as follows: 223 national and 77 foreign firms; 
175 publicly-traded or stock-market-listed companies, and 
125 private enterprises. Table IV.1 gives an overview of the 
principal activities of this group of dominant enterprises, 
which are referred to hereinafter as the “top 300”.
Table IV.1
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOP 300 FIRMS OPERATING IN CANADA, BY REVENUE, 2006
(Billions of Canadian dollars, percentages and number of companies)











GRAND TOTAL 1,490.0 100.0 223 77 175 125
I. Services 928.7 62.3 138 39 89 88
1. Financial cluster 483.7 32.5 54 13 32 35
   (a) Insurance cluster 200.6 13.5 25 7 13 19
       - Life insurance 160.2 10.8 12 1 7 6
       - Property and casualty 
 insurance 40.4 2.7 13 6 6 13
   (b) Retail banking cluster 174.7 11.7 12 5 10 7
        - Banks 131.9 8.9 7 3 8 2
        - Financial and leasing 35.6 2.4 2 2 2 2
        -Trust, savings and loan 7.1 0.5 3 0 0 3
    (c) Management companies 85.9 5.8 7 1 7 1
    (d) Investment companies 22.6 1.5 10 0 2 8
         - Investment houses 16.0 1.1 6 0 0 6
         - Investment companies 3.6 0.2 2 0 1 1
         - Property management  
           and investment 3.0 0.2 2 0 1 1
2. Commercial cluster 246.0 16.5 29 17 23 23
    (a) Retail 205.1 13.8 21 7 16 12
         - Food stores 115.3 7.7 6 2 6 2
         - Specialty stores 61.6 4.1 12 2 7 7
         - Department stores 27.1 1.8 2 3 2 3
         - Clothing stores 1.1 0.1 1 0 1 0
     (b) Wholesale 40.9 2.7 8 10 7 11
16 The Financial Post 1000 largest publicly-listed companies and the Financial Post 350 biggest private firms. Government-owned companies 
were not included in the top 300 list.
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Table IV.1 (concluded)











3. Utilities cluster 79.0 5.3 17 4 10 11
    (a) Telephone 50.3 3.4 6 0 3 3
    (b) Gas 14.8 1.0 4 4 3 5
    (c) Electricity 14.0 0.9 7 0 4 3
4. Transportation 33.3 2.2 9 1 8 2
5. Telecom 29.3 2.0 5 0 3 2
6. All other services 57.4 3.9 24 4 13 15
II. Natural resources 304.0 20.4 53 11 54 10
1. Oil and gas cluster 205.0 13.8 27 7 30 4
    (a) Integrated oils 92.8 6.2 2 4 4 2
    (b) Oil and gas producers 79.4 5.3 16 2 16 2
    (c) Gas pipelines 13.4 0.9 2 1 3 0
    (d) Oil pipelines 11.9 0.8 2 0 2 0
    (e) Oil and gas field services 7.4 0.5 5 0 5 0
2. Mining cluster 55.5 3.7 12 2 12 2
     (a) Integrated mines 41.3 2.8 6 1 6 1
     (b) Precious mines 7.7 0.5 2 0 2 0
     (c) Metal minesa 3.6 0.2 3 0 2 1
     (d) Misc. mines (coal) 1.8 0.1 1 0 1 0
     (e) Mining services 1.1 0.1 0 1 1 0
3. Forestry 38.9 2.6 12 2 10 4
4. Agriculture 4.6 0.3 2 0 2 0
III. Manufacturing 257.3 17.3 32 26 31 27
1. Automotive 96.3 6.5 1 6 1 6
2. Food Processing 23.2 1.6 6 2 5 3
3. Publishing and printing 22.0 1.5 6 0 5 1
4. Chemicals 21.8 1.5 4 2 4 2
5. Transport equipment and
    components 21.4 1.4 3 1 3 1
6. Electrical and electronic 20.8 1.4 1 4 2 3
7. Steel 20.4 1.4 2 5 4 3
8. All other manufactures 31.4 2.1 9 6 7 8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Globe and Mail, “2007 Top 1000 companies. The Report on Business Magazine’s 
The Top 1000 Canada’s Power Book” [online database]  2007; “2007 Top 350 Private Companies. The Report on Business Magazine’s The Top 350 Private Companies” 
[online database] 2007.
a  Falconbridge, Canada’s largest metal mining company in 2005, does not appear on the 2006 list of the Financial Post, presumably because it was being acquired by XStrata (and 
de-listed) at the time. The importance of the mining industry among the top 300 firms in Canada is therefore underestimated.
This table provides us with a kind of x-ray of 
the largest companies operating in Canada in terms 
of principal activities. Fully 177 of the largest 300 
enterprises are found in the services sectors (62.3% 
of the total revenues for the top 300), especially in the 
finance cluster of activities (32.5%), which includes 
the insurance cluster (13.5%), retail banking (11.7%), 
management companies (5.8%), and investment companies 
(1.5%); the commerce cluster of activities (16.5%) which 
incorporates retail (13.8%), that is, mainly food stores 
(7.7%), specialty stores (4.1%) and department stores 
(1.8%), and wholesalers (2.7%); as well as utilities 
(5.3%), transportation (2.2%), telecoms (2.0%) and all 
other services (3.9%). Another 64 companies operate in 
natural resources (20.4% of the total revenues for the top 
300), especially the oil and gas cluster (13.8%); which 
includes mainly integrated oil companies (6.2%), oil and 
gas producers (5.3%); the mining cluster (3.7%), which 
covers primarily integrated mines (2.8%) and other mines 
(0.8%); and forestry (2.6%). Another 58 enterprises are 
manufacturers (17.3% of the total revenues for the top 
300), found mainly in automotive segment (6.5%), food 
processing (1.6%), publishing and printing (1.5%) and 
chemicals (1.5%). 
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The 223 Canadian-owned companies among the top 
300 dominate many financial services (especially life 
insurance and retail banking, management companies 
and investment companies), specialized commerce (most 
notably, specialty and food stores), natural resource 
extraction (particularly, oil and gas producers, integrated 
mines, other mines and forestry), other services (such 
as transportation, utilities and telecoms) and a few 
manufacturing activities (publishing and printing, food 
processing, and so forth). Canadian-owned firms in the 
financial sector (especially the insurance cluster and 
investment houses) and specialty stores tend to be privately 
owned, i.e., not listed on stock markets.
The 77 foreign firms in the top 300 are more prominent 
in some commercial activities (especially wholesalers), 
natural resources (most particularly integrated oil 
companies) and some other manufactures (such as the 
automotive, steel and electrical and electronic segments). 
Many foreign companies tend to be private rather than 
publicly-listed. 
A comparison of the top 25 foreign firms by 
revenues of 2006 with those of 1973-1974 17 shows 
that while eight of the companies from the 1973-1974 
list remain there in 2006 (General Motors of Canada, 
Imperial Oil, DaimlerChrysler Canada, Shell Canada, 
Husky Energy, Ford Motor Co. of Canada, IBM Canada 
and Dow Chemical Canada) fully 17 new firms have 
entered. The principal new entrants to the list of the top 
25 foreign companies operate in commercial activities 
(Costco Wholesale Canada, McKesson Canada, Hudson’s 
Bay Co., Home Depot Canada, Sears Canada, Canada 
Safeway, Best Buy Canada and Cargill Ltd.), steel 
(Dofasco Inc., Gerdau Ameristeel) and metal mining 
(Alcan and CVRD Inco), among others. At least five 
of the changes were the result of takeovers or buyouts 
(Hudson’s Bay Co., Sears Canada, Dofasco Inc., CVRD 
Inco and Alcan).18 The foreign firms that disappeared 
from the list of the 25 largest were found mainly in 
petroleum (Gulf Oil, Texaco Canada, BP Canada and 
Petrofina Canada) and manufacturing (Steel Company 
of Canada, Rothmans of Pall Mall Canada, Canadian 
General Electric, International Harvester Co. of Canada, 
Swift Canadian, Westinghouse Canada, Du Pont of 
Canada, Crown Zellerbach Canada, Union Carbide 
Canada, Canada Cement Lafarge, Hawker-Siddeley 
Canada and Kraft Foods). In 1973-1974, 37 of the largest 
companies in Canada were foreign, whereas by 2006 the 
figure had dropped to 25. While the United States was 
still the country of origin of most of the foreign firms 
operating in Canada, by 2006, firms from other source 
countries were becoming more evident. 
In 2007, the Institute of Competitiveness and Prosperity 
(ICAP) published a list of what it considered Canada’s 
global leaders for 2006. The calculations were based on 
the selection of Canada’s principal companies (stock-
market-listed and private but not government-owned) by 
2005 revenue. Global leaders were defined as firms on 
this list that the Institute considered to be among the top 
five in global market shares in their principal product line. 
The result was a list of 70 Canadian companies (foreign 
subsidiaries were not included), as shown in table IV.2. 
The ICAP list of global leaders was compared to the 
database of Canada’s top 300 largest companies, with a 
view to analysing the nature of the global leaders among 
the dominant companies in Canada. Thirty-nine of the 
global leaders are found among the largest companies, 
while thirty-one are not. The larger Canadian global 
leaders tend to be found in natural-resource extraction 
(Teck Cominco, Barrick Gold, Cameco, Fording, Canfor, 
Tembec and PotashCorp) and related services (Finning 
International, Shawcor and CHC Helicopters), as well 
as traditional services —financial (Manulife Financial, 
MacDonald Dettwiler and Atco), commercial (Weston 
Foods and Couche-Tarde) and transportation (CN Rail 
and Trimac)— and lower-tech manufactures —food and 
beverages (McCain Foods, Connors Bros. and Cott), 
paper (Abitibi Consolidated) and chemicals (Nova 
Chemicals, Agrium and Methanex). Exceptions to this 
rule are found in autoparts and transportation equipment 
(Magna International, Linamar and Bombardier), 
telecommunications equipment (Nortel, Research in 
Motion) and contract manufacturers (Celestica), among 
others whose activities relate primarily to medium- and 
high-tech manufactures. 
17 Information for 1973-1974 comes from Hughes (1975).
18 The purchase of Alcan by Rio Tinto was completed in 2007.
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Table IV.2
CANADIAN GLOBAL LEADERS,a 2006
Company size Canadian Global Leaders b (ordered by 2006 revenue)
Large companies
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity, Canada’s Global Leaders, 1985-2007, 
2007; Globe and Mail, “2007 Top 1000 companies. The Report on Business Magazine’s The Top 1000 Canada’s Power Book” [online database] 2007; “2007 Top 350 Private 
Companies. The Report on Business Magazine’s The Top 350 Private Companies” [online database] 2007; and official websites of the companies.
a  Global leaders are defined as firms that are among the five largest international market share holders of their principal activity.
b  Alcan was removed given that it was acquired by a foreign company, Rio Tinto, in 2007. 
c  Revenue for 2006 is not known. 
The great majority of Canada’s dominant firms 
are not global leaders. For the most part, the very large 
Canadian companies that are non-global leaders comprise 
the principal banks (Royal Bank of Canada, Bank of 
Nova Scotia, Toronto Dominion Bank, Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce, Bank of Montreal and National 
Bank of Canada), providers of financial services (Power 
Corp Financial, Great-West Lifeco, Sun Life Financial, 
Manufacturers Life Insurance, Great-West Life assurance, 
Onex, Canada Life Financial, London Life Insurance, 
Fairfax Financial Holdings), natural-resource-extraction 
companies and providers of related services (Petro-
Canada, EnCana Corp., Suncor Energy, Husky Energy, 
Canadian Natural Resources, Enbridge Inc., Talisman 
Energy, TransCanada Pipelines, Syncrude Canada) and 
commercial establishments (Empire Co. and Canadian 
Tire). Generally speaking, these companies’ overall assets 
reflect incipient or relatively weak internationalization 
processes, as most of their business activities take place 
in the Canadian or North American market. 
An examination of the smaller global leaders suggests 
that while several undertake relatively traditional activities, 
such as food processing (Coolbrands), apparel (Gildan), auto 
parts (Spectrum Premium Industries, Westcast Industries), 
mining (Timminco) and transportation (Trimac), most are 
associated with relatively sophisticated niche activities, 
such as contract manufacturing for pharmaceuticals 
(Pantheon), logistics (Chemtrade Logistics), software 
(Open Text), environment (Marsulex), telecoms (Mitel, 
Sierra Wireless), digital imaging (Dalsa), semiconductors 
(Zarlink), specialized financial services (Scotia Mocatta, 
and TD Waterhouse Ameritrade) and the like. This suggests 
that, broadly, the global leaders of Canada fall into two 
main groups: large companies that internationalize based 
on natural-resource extraction, traditional services and 
relatively low-tech manufactures, and smaller companies 
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whose internationalization processes are more linked to 
sophisticated niche activities. 
The international competitiveness of the largest firms 
operating in Canada has changed considerably during the 
last 15 years. A study by Rao, Legault and Ahmad (Industry 
Canada, 1994) identified the largest 447 Canadian-based 
companies in 1991 and separated them into 159 outwardly-
oriented (147 Canadian and 12 foreign) and 288 domestically-
oriented ones (238 Canadian and 50 foreign). A comparison 
of this information with that of the global leaders of 2006 
produces some interesting observations:
of the 33 firms that were large global leaders in 
2006, only 21 were considered outwardly-oriented in 
1991, whereas 12 were categorized as domestically-
•
oriented, i.e., 12 shifted to an outward orientation 
during the interim;
38 of the 2006 global leaders did not appear on the 
1991 list, suggesting that they were not as important 
in terms of sales and assets in 1991;
only 12 foreign firms were considered outwardly-
oriented compared to 50 which were defined as 
domestically-oriented and not one domestically-
oriented foreign company was converted into the 
equivalent of a Canadian global leader.
This suggests that a significant internationalization 
process was taking place, driven principally by relatively 
new Canadian firms, and in which foreign firms established 




The internationalization strategies of the principal Canadian 
companies differ according to activity. For that reason, 
financial services and asset management, natural resources, 
and manufactures will be examined separately.
(a) Financial services and asset management
During the 1990s, there was concern in Canada’s 
financial services sector about increasing global competition. 
In 1998, Harold MacKay, Chairman of the task force 
looking into that matter stated that: 
“Canada has a good financial services sector now. 
It is a source of real strength for the country. But 
it is facing enormous changes, driven by new 
technology, globalization and demography, and 
this is leading to big challenges, both for financial 
institutions and their customers. We believe 
that with the right public policies these changes 
will be converted to opportunities. If Canadians 
respond to the challenges well, the sector should 
be able to serve the needs even better in a more 
competitive and customer-oriented environment.” 
(Press Release, 15 September, 1998, “Task Force 
on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services 
Sector”, Department of Finance).
Measured in terms of OFDI, this industry has 
responded extremely well as it represented the largest 
increase in OFDI share, and by a large margin. In 
1983, only 15% of Canada’s OFDI came from the 
financial services industry, whereas by 2006 that share 
stood at 45%, that is, the share tripled over the period 
1983-2006.
As of April 2007, Canadian banks managed Cdn$ 
2.5 trillion in assets. There are some 72 banks operating 
in Canada; 22 are Canadian-owned and 50 are foreign-
owned. Nevertheless, Canada’s banking industry is 
dominated by the “Big Six” Canadian-owned banks: 
Royal Bank (RBC), Scotiabank, Bank of Montreal 
(BMO), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), 
National Bank of Canada, and TD Bank Financial Group, 
which together control roughly 90% of all banking 
assets in Canada.19 Of the 22 domestic Canadian banks, 
only these Big Six possess operations of note outside 
of Canada. They are much larger than the other banks 
operating in Canada by a large margin, both in terms 
of assets and bank capital.20 The performance of the 
Big Six, when measured by return on assets or return 
on equity, is significantly better than that for all banks. 
Therefore, the Big Six effectively dominate Canada’s 
financial services sector. 
19 The largest Canadian bank, as measured by bank capital, ranks in the top 60 banks globally.
20 Data from Hejazi and Santor (2005), and are derived from confidential bank-level data from the Bank of Canada covering 1994-2004.
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As was the case for Canada’s trade and FDI, the foreign 
operations of Canada’s banks are also centred on the United 
States, where more than 50% of these operations are found. 
The European Union and Japan represent approximately 
30% of Canadian banks’ foreign operations and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, under 15% (see figure IV.5). 
Total foreign claims (assets) held by Canadian banks reached 
approximately Cdn$ 250 billion in 1994. These foreign 
exposures peaked in 2002 at close to Cdn$ 600 billion, 
then fell back towards Cdn$ 400 billion in 2004.
Figure IV.5
EXPOSURES OF CANADIAN BANKS, BY REGION, 1994-2004
(Percentages)
Initially, major financial institutions, which dominate 
Canadian OFDI flows, limited the focus of their 
internationalization process to market-seeking strategies in 
the United States; however, some of the major banks, such 
as Scotiabank, Royal Bank and CIBC are now extending 
this process to include the rest of the Americas. Other 
institutions, such as management companies (Brookfield 
Asset Management) and pension funds (Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Fund) are also internationalizing by taking on 
many more direct investments involving the control of 
the companies in which they participate. 
(b) Natural resources 
TNCs in this sector typically follow strategies designed 
to identify, measure and extract natural resources. Many 
Canadian companies are found among the global leaders 
in the natural resource sector; however, the situation varies 
from industry to industry. For example, 52 of Canada’s top 
300 companies by revenue are in the extractive industry.21 
Twenty-four are oil and gas companies (12 in Canada’s 
top 100), 14 are forestry enterprises (three in the top 100) 
and 13 are mining companies22 (three in the top 100). The 
analysis in this section will focus on the oil and gas and 
mining industries, which are some of the sector’s riskiest 
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21 Ten more provide services to these activities as pipeline operators (five) or field service providers (five).
22 See footnote a of table IV.1.
Source: Bank of Canada.
Box IV.2
HANDLING RISK IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF MINING
Extracting natural resources is by its very 
nature a high-risk activity. According to the 2006 
Report of the Canadian Intergovernmental 
Working Group on the Mineral Industry, mineral 
development usually consists of four principal 
phases in terms of expenditures:
Exploration expenditures: all activities 
carried out to search for, discover 
and conduct the first delineation of 
a potential mineral deposit, or the 
re-evaluation of a known deposit 
to enhance its potential economic 
value in order to justify additional and 
more detailed appraisal work;
Deposit appraisal expenditures: 
all activities carried out to bring a 
delineated deposit to the stage of 
detailed knowledge required for 
the exhaustive bankable feasibility 
study that will fully justify and fully 
support a production decision and 
the investment required;
Mine complex development 
expenditures: all mine development, 




equipment), repair and maintenance 
expenditures carried out in a mine 
property that is in production or 
committed to production; and
Mine complex development: all work 
and support activities carried out on 
a mine site to define, block out, and 
gain access to the ore and prepare 
it for production (including drilling, 
rock work and support to extend the 
current ore reserves by exploring 
and appraising the immediate vicinity 
of the deposits). 
Huge expenditures have to be undertaken 
years before any profit is ever made.
The exploration activity is usually 
undertaken by at least two different kinds 
of companies: “majors” (or “seniors”) and 
“juniors”.a The large and often integrated 
mining companies known as majors tend to 
be managed by mining engineers who are 
generally risk-averse while the juniors tend 
to be managed by geologists who are most 
often risk-takers. For this reason, the majors 
tend to undertake their own exploration mainly 
•
close to their existing mines where they can 
benefit from economies of scale, have a higher 
probability of making a find and run a lower 
risk. Their principal concern is to feed their 
project pipeline with good projects at the 
right moment. The juniors undertake most 
of greenfield exploration and their principal 
interest is to make a significant discovery, sell 
it at a good price, and continue exploring. In 
periods of high international prices, the majors 
often contract or associate with the juniors 
to undertake more risky exploration or they 
simply purchase the juniors’ commercially 
viable finds.
The activities associated with profitability 
appraisal, construction estimates and 
construction, usually referred to as the order-
of-magnitude, pre-feasibility and feasibility 
stages, are often carried out, in full or in part, 
by contractors. Given the level of activity in 
mining in recent years, many mine owners 
opt for a package deal known as engineering, 
procurement and construction management 
with a sole contractor, rather than dividing the 
activities among various contractors. 
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The most successful major mining 
companies are those that are best able 
to evaluate risk in order to permanently 
feed their project pipeline with the best 
projects in the context of the life cycles 
of their existing mines. Given the huge 
quantities of resources involved, even the 
more successful mining companies often 
need to acquire financing to undertake their 
largest investments, which means that they 
must carefully protect their reputation and 
maintain close contact with the financial 
community. The way they handle risk is 
reflected in the opinion that investors and 
the financial community have of them.
Box IV.2 (concluded)
Source: Canadian Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry, “National roundtables on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the Canadian extractive industry 
operating in developing countries” [online] 2006 http://www.CSRExtractiveSectorRoundtables.ca. and interviews with mining companies and mining contractors.
a “Juniors” have been defined as exploration companies that are not recipients of significant income from producing mines or other businesses and that are financed mainly 
by exploration funds raised through the issue of treasury shares (Natural Resources Canada, Sept, 2007, p. 1).
The way the global mining industry has evolved 
has a fair amount in common with the global oil and 
gas industry, but there are many significant differences 
too. Both have enjoyed very strong international price 
surges in recent years (see figure IV.6). Real international 
prices of crude petroleum have recently surpassed the 
previous highs reached in the 1980s, whereas the recent 
real international prices of metallic minerals have only 
matched the highs reached in the 1960s. The international 
price of crude petroleum generally sustained an upward 
trend in the second half of the twentieth century (excepting 
1985-2000) whereas the international price of metallic 
minerals showed more of a long-term decline until about 
2003. Figure IV.6 also indicates some of the factors driving 
prices (wars, policy and competition) that affected the 
industries in different ways.
Figure IV.7 indicates the long-term real international 
price evolution of four different metals: gold, copper, zinc 
and nickel. As can be appreciated in this figure, the current 
price of gold is very high compared with the historical 
tendency but by end-2007 it was still lower than during 
the boom of the early 1980s. For copper, the current real 
price levels are superior to anything experienced during 
the twentieth century but down from the situation in the 
nineteenth century. In the case of zinc, the current real price 
is close to the twentieth-century peaks, which occurred 
in the 1950s and the 1970s, but considerably lower than 
that of the nineteenth century. Lastly, real international 
prices for nickel are not showing the same boom as other 
metals and represent a small fraction of nineteenth-century 
prices. Thus, even within the commodity bonanza, certain 
commodities have done far better than others. 
Figure IV.6 
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Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, 
Geneva, 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.II.D.9.
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Figure IV.7
LONG-TERM REAL INTERNATIONAL PRICE EVOLUTION OF GOLD, COPPER, ZINC AND NICKEL
(Constant 2007 United States dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of public records by Dr. U. Petersen, Professor Emeritus, Harvard University, and 
Dr. P. Bradshaw, President, First Point Minerals Corp. 
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Another difference between the oil and gas and 
mining industries is that increased exploration by oil 
and gas companies has produced a number of major 
new discoveries (such as Sakhalin Island, Russia, and 
offshore Brazil) and rising international prices have made 
feasible more costly known sources of crude petroleum 
or bitumen 23 (e.g., Alberta oil sands, Canada); in the 
metallic mining industry, however, the huge increase in 
exploration since 2000 has not resulted in many major 
discoveries, especially of world-class deposits.
TNCs play an important role in both industries, 
especially in developed country markets; however, trends as 
regards reserves and production are diametrically opposed. 
In the oil and gas sector of developing countries, where 
most reserves are found, the global trend favours State 
petroleum companies and increasingly limits the TNC role 
to production-sharing agreements or service contracts, 
rather than the traditional concessions which were more 
generous to TNCs. Effectively, TNCs no longer control 
global oil and gas reserves nor are they the principal 
producers.24 In 2005, the top 10 oil-reserve-holding 
firms of the world were all State-owned companies from 
developing countries, accounting for an estimated 77% 
of the total, while Russian petroleum firms controlled an 
23 Bitumen is the heaviest, thickest form of petroleum. The two largest known sources of bitumen (in Alberta and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) 
each contain more petroleum than the entire proven conventional oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. Synthetic crude oil produced from bitumen 
accounts for about 28% of Canada’s total oil production. Compared to conventional oil (obtained from traditional, easily accessible sources), 
however, synthetic crude from bitumen is expensive and complicated to produce. See The Canadian Encyclopedia (n/d).
24 Even in Canada, the provincial government of Alberta seems intent on implementing the recommendations of an Alberta Royalty Review 
Panel to significantly raise the provincial take from the Tar Sands. The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers considered that the Panel 
did not achieve the government’s objectives in finding the balance between a reasonable royalty and tax system and a healthy, sustainable 
oil and gas industry (CAPP, 2007). 
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additional 6%. The principal privately-owned developed 
country TNCs such as ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron and Royal 
Dutch Shell possessed only about 10% of reserves and 
a share in the joint ventures that made up the remaining 
7% (UNCTAD, 2007, pp.115-116).
In the mining sector, poor experiences with 
nationalizations in the 1960s and 1970s convinced many 
developing country governments thereafter to offer more 
generous concessions to promote TNC investment in 
mining, even though there has recently been a tendency 
to raise taxes on those operations (especially royalties). 
With few exceptions (Codelco of Chile and Alrosa of 
the Russian Federation), developed country TNCs such 
as BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Anglo American are still 
the dominant producers and refiners in the metal mining 
industry, which is, moreover, undergoing continual 
concentration.
In Canada, a major difference between the oil and gas 
and mining sectors is that while many of Canada’s largest 
companies are oil and gas producers, some with integrated 
operations, they are not particularly prominent in the global 
arena just now. None of the principal Canadian oil and 
gas extraction companies, such as Petro-Canada, EnCana 
and Suncor Energy, are found among the world’s largest, 
ranked by total production in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 
117). Another change concerns foreign ownership. During 
1973-1974, all four petroleum companies in the top 25 
firms were foreign-owned; by 2006, three of the four 
petroleum firms in that ranking were Canadian-owned. 
Even so, foreign petroleum companies tended to have 
integrated operations while the vast majority of Canadian 
companies within the top 300 did not. 
Canada is not currently a dominant force in the 
global oil and gas industry even though the Alberta oil 
sands have huge potential. According to the Mining 
Association of Canada (MAC, 2007, p.14), the oil sands 
contain an estimated 2.5 trillion barrels of bitumen of 
which existing technologies can extract about 300 billion 
barrels.25 Measured another way, the National Energy 
Board of Canada (2003, p. 52) estimates that the Alberta 
oil sands deposits contain 400 billion square metres of 
original bitumen, of which 12% is considered recoverable. 
About 10 billion square metres can be accessed by surface 
mining methods, whereas another 39 billion square metres 
could be obtained through in situ recovery methods.26 The 
National Energy Board of Canada (2006, p. 43) noted that 
the original goal of producing one million barrels a day 
from the oil sands by 2020 was surpassed in 2004. By 
end-2000, only 1% of Canada’s bitumen resources had 
been produced. Some of the principal oil sands projects 
are the following:
Syncrude (Canadian Oil Sands Trust, Imperial Oil 
and Petro-Canada) 350,000 barrels per day (bpd), 
to be expanded to 500,000 bpd by 2020;
Voyageur project (Suncor Energy) 260,000 bpd;
Athabasca Oil Sands Project (Shell, Western Oil 
Sands, Chevron Canada) 155,000 bpd, to be raised 
to 770,000 bpd;
Fort Hills project (Petro-Canada, Teck Cominco, 
UTS Energy) 170,000 bpd mine and extraction 
plant has been approved;
Northern Lights project (Synenco Energy and 
SinoCanada) 100,000 bpd is being built;
Kearl project (Imperial Oil Resources and Exxon 
Mobil Canada) 100,000 bpd mine is being built, with 
expansion to 345,000 bpd expected by 2018;
Horizon project (Canadian Natural Resources) 
110,000 bpd mine being built, with expansion to 
232,000 bpd expected by 2012.
Most of Canada’s largest companies have the Alberta 
oil sands at the heart of their investment strategies. The 
attention of the largest oil and gas companies operating 
in Canada has been taken up with the dynamics of the 
North American oil and gas industry, especially activities 
related to the Alberta oil sands. In that context, OFDI 
by these companies (excluding the United States) is 
relatively small in relation to the industry in which they 
operate. Thus, Canada’s main oil and gas companies 
concentrate on Canadian resources and, although they 
are large, dominant firms within the country, they are 
not considered global leaders in the international oil 
and gas industry. 
In the mining sector the situation is different. Canada, 
historically, has been a leading mining country and several 
Canadian mining companies are global leaders. The 
Mining Association of Canada (MAC, 2007) has described 









25 This represents more than the reserves of Saudi Arabia, which are 260 billion barrels.
26 About 80% of the oil sands in Alberta are buried too deep below the surface for open-pit mining. This oil must be recovered by in situ techniques. 
Using drilling technology, steam is injected into the deposit to heat the oil sand lowering the viscosity of the bitumen. The hot bitumen migrates 
towards producing wells, bringing it to the surface, while the sand is left in place (“in situ” is Latin for “in place”). Steam Assisted Gravity 
Drainage (SAGD) is a type of in situ technology that uses innovation in horizontal drilling to produce bitumen. In situ technology is expensive 
and requires certain conditions, such as a nearby water source. Production from in situ already rivals open-pit mining and in the future may well 
replace mining as the main source of bitumen production from the oil sands (Oil Sand Discovery Centre, undated).
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Canada received the biggest slice (19%) of global 
exploration expenditure in 2006;
Canada exported more than 1 billion Canadian dollars 
(Cdn$) of each of aluminum, gold, nickel, copper, 
zinc, iron ore, uranium, potash and diamonds;
Toronto has become the mining capital of the world 
and is the global leader for mining finance with 
38% of the world’s equity raised in 2006;
Vancouver is home to the world’s leading cluster 





Unlike the oil and gas industry, the dominant Canadian 
mining companies are global leaders: Falconbridge, Inco, 
Barrick Gold, Placer Dome and Teck Cominco were all 
found on the 2005 list of top 25 metal mining companies 
(UNCTAD, 2007, p. 109) even though the industry has 
since consolidated, including the sale to foreign TNCs 
of several of Canada’s largest mining companies (see 
box IV.3). Even so, the Canadian mining sector continues 
to be a major motor of OFDI. 
Box IV.3
THE DOUBLE WHAMMY IN THE CANADIAN MINING INDUSTRY SINCE 2001
The strong upswing in international metal 
prices after 2000 facilitated two huge 
changes to the structure of the Canadian 
metal mining industry; first, the appearance 
of new, large mining companies to challenge 
and elicit reactions from the existing leaders 
and, second, the purchase of several of 
Canada’s principal mining companies by 
major foreign TNCs.
With regard to the first phenomenon, 
Teck acquired 50% of Cominco for US$ 1 
billion in 2001 to become Teck Cominco, 
a zinc major; Barrick Gold purchased 
Homestake for US$ 2.3 billion in the 
same year and added Placer Dome for 
US$ 10.4 billion in 2005 to become a gold 
major; Goldcorp acquired Wheaton River 
for US$ 2.4 billion in 2004, added part of 
Placer Dome (from Barrick) for US$ 1.5 
billion and acquired Glamis Gold (United 
States) for US$ 8.7 billion in 2006, thus 
further challenging Barrick Gold. At the 
same time, the traditional leaders, such 
as Noranda, Falconbridge and INCO 
reacted by consolidating. Noranda acquired 
Falconbridge for US$ 2.5 billion in 2005, 
renaming itself Falconbridge. Inco tried to 
acquire Falconbridge for US$ 10.6 billion 
in late 2005 but could not complete the 
deal. Thus, a number of Canadian mining 
companies were moving up the list of the 
top 300 companies in Canada (see table 
1 of the annex);a by 2006, Teck Cominco 
was in fifty-ninth place, Barrick Gold was 
seventy-third, Inco was seventy-eighth and 
Goldcorp was 174th. 
As this consolidation was taking place 
among Canadian mining companies, foreign 
TNCs also became involved. In a period of 
about 16 months, three of Canada’s principal 
mining companies were acquired by foreign 
majors. Xstrata, a Swiss mining company, 
purchased Falconbridge for US$ 17.4 billion 
in 2006; CVRD of Brazil acquired Inco 
for US$ 17.2 billion the same year; and 
Rio Tinto of the United Kingdom —itself 
currently undergoing a possible takeover 
from BHP of Australia— took control of 
Alcan (eleventh in the top 300 in 2006) 
for US$ 42.9 billion in early 2007. Lastly, 
Norilsk Nickel of the Russian Federation 
acquired Lion Ore (255th in the top 300) 
for US$ 6.8 billion in 2007.
In other words, the double whammy to 
the Canadian mining industry consisted of 
the emergence of new leaders to challenge 
the existing ones, followed closely by a strong 
denationalization process in which several 
of Canada’s largest mining companies were 
acquired by foreign TNCs.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).
 a  Falconbridge, Canada’s largest metal mining company in 2005, does not appear on the 2006 list of the Financial Post 1000.
Although some of the biggest global mining companies 
are found in Canada, the Canadian mining industry is 
facing some serious challenges, including the sharp 
decline during the last 25 years in Canada’s proven and 
probable mineral reserves: 80% in the case of lead, zinc, 
molybdenum and silver and 50% with regard to copper 
and nickel (MAC, 2007, p. 16). Moreover, exploration 
expenditure27 crashed during the mid-1990s in Canada 
and has recovered only in the last few years. Many 
mineral exploration companies consider Canada to be 
well-explored compared to other countries, especially 
developing countries, which also possess “easier” finds. 
This, together with rising production costs in Canada, has 
led about 1,000 Canadian mining companies28 to explore 
elsewhere; as a consequence, Canadian companies currently 
account for a world-leading 40% of global exploration 
expenditure. The stock of Canadian OFDI in 2006 (Cdn$ 
61.5 billion) was double that of inward FDI and foreign 
properties rose from 25% of the total mineral property 
portfolios of companies listed on Canadian stock exchanges 
in 1992 to 48% in 2005 (Canadian Intergovernmental 
Working Group on the Mineral Industry, 2006, p. 165). 
27 Exploration expenditure can become a complex matter as it usually involves additional elements, such as deposit appraisal and mine complex 
development expenditures. See box IV.2.
28 Juniors now are responsible for a major slice of exploration activities both in Canada and worldwide. (See Metals Economic Group, The Mining 
Association of Canada, Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada).
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Box IV.4
CANADIAN MINING AT THE FOREFRONT OF GLOBAL ISSUES FACING THE MINING INDUSTRY
Originally, the main issues between 
mining companies and host governments 
concerned the nature of the economic 
impacts, both direct (financial and 
technological contributions, employment, 
export enhancement and government 
revenue generation) and indirect (production 
linkages and infrastructure development), 
of mining activity and their overall influence 
on macroeconomic variables (stability, 
growth and income distribution). By the 
1970s, a host of problems associated 
with acid mine drainage, surface and 
groundwater pollution, soil contamination 
and waste and tailings dumps, among 
others, brought environmental issues into 
the equation. The last decade and a half 
has witnessed the emergence of a host 
of new social and political issues, such 
as health and safety, local community 
development, human rights and corruption, 
conflict and others. The Canadian mining 
industry has been at the forefront of many 
of these discussions.
One instance of this was the Whitehorse 
Mining Initiative of 1992, in which the 
Canadian mining industry concluded 
that it needed support, assistance and 
advice within a non-adversarial framework 
to help it develop a new strategic vision 
and to create solutions for the twentieth 
century (Natural Resources Canada, n/d). 
That led to discussions among the mining 
industry, senior government officials, 
labour unions, Aboriginal peoples and 
the environmental community, which 
resulted in the Whitehouse Mining Initiative 
Leadership Council Accord of August 1994. 
While considerable progress was made 
in the four issue areas (finance/taxation, 
environment, land access and workforce/
workplace/community) formally dealt with 
by the initiative, growing criticism was being 
expressed about the operations of Canadian 
mining companies outside of Canada, 
especially in developing countries. 
That sentiment was manifest in the 
Report on Mining in Developing Countries 
and Corporate Social Responsibility 
produced by the Canadian Parliament’s 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade in June 2005. In 
response, a series of national roundtables 
on corporate social responsibility and the 
Canadian extractive industry operating in 
developing countries were held in Vancouver, 
Calgary, Toronto and Montreal between June 
and November of 2006. These culminated in 
a report to Parliament in December of that 
year. The extended list of issues included 
environmental concerns; community 
relations; human rights; security and armed 
conflict; labour relations; indigenous peoples’ 
rights; compatibility of resource development 
with national and local economic priorities; 
benefit sharing with local communities; 
ineffective legal systems; and the potential 
for corruption.
The Advisory Group Report (2007, 
p. 5) suggested that industry, government 
and civil society were broadly agreed 
that the extractive sector must effect 
a steady improvement in its corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) performance 
as a matter of fundamental importance. 
A proposal was discussed that the 
Government of Canada should adopt 
legislation to establish CSR standards for 
Canadian companies operating abroad. 
The reaction of the Canadian Chamber 
of Commerce was lukewarm: it suggested 
that the “corporate” be removed from the 
CSR concept and insisted that corporate 
initiatives remain voluntary, objecting to 
the idea of an independent ombudsman 
and any possibility for the extraterritoriality 
of Canadian law (Canadian Chamber of 
Congress, 26 July 2007). On the other 
hand, mining associations, such as the 
Mining Association of Canada (MAC), 
which reflects the opinions of the mining 
companies, and the Prospectors and 
Developers Association of Canada 
(PDAC), which reflects that of explorers, 
generally embraced the main aspects of 
the Report. In the first venture of its type 
by mining association, MAC has developed 
an initiative known as Toward Sustainable 
Mining, which requires the external 
verification of TSM performance (The 
Mining Association of Canada, Towards 
Sustainable Mining Progress Report, 2006). 
PDAC developed a special publication that 
summarizes 36 national and international 
CSR codes, standards and tools and it 
also offers its Environmental Excellence 
in Exploration (e3) toolkit to registered 
users (PDAC web page). 
Many of Canada’s extractive industry 
companies now produce formal annual 
sustainability reports and the actions of 
mining companies, such as Teck Cominco 
and Barrick Gold, among others, and 
petroleum and gas producers, such 
as Suncor Energy Inc. and Syncrude 
Canada Ltd., are highlighted in the 
Towards Sustainable Mining Progress 
Report, 2006. Many of these same firms 
are among the principal participants in a 
number of international initiatives, such as 
the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (Teck Cominco), the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (Barrick 
Gold) and the United Nations Global 
Compact, among others. Another factor 
contributing to this development is that 
financial institutions associated with the 
World Bank Group International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) have begun 
to condition their financial engagement 
in major natural resource projects to the 
sustainable development goals of the 
principal investors. For its part, the Canadian 
Export Development Corporation required 
an independent Environmental Impact 
Assessment of Barrick Gold’s Veradero 
project in Argentina before financing was 
granted. In this fashion, the concept of 
a “social licence” to operate has been 
inculcated in many of these major Canadian 
mining companies and reflects how many 
of them have come to the forefront of 
this debate. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, Mining 
in Developing Countries. Corporate Social Responsibility, June 2005; The Mining Association of Canada MAC), Toward Sustainable Mining Initiative- Progress Report 
2006 [online] http//www.minning.ca; Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada PDAC), official website [online] 2007 http://www.pdac.ca; G. Ross, “Mining: EDC’s 
approach, perspectives on making corporate social responsibility work in Argentina’s mining sector”, Buenos Aires, 29 September 2005 [online] http://www.infoexport.gc.ca/ 
iei/ieiSmartViewer.jsp?did=7946&sitid=81. 
In sum, the principal natural-resource-seeking 
companies of Canada are found mainly in the oil and gas 
and mining industries and their experiences have been 
quite different. The dominant oil and gas companies 
in Canada, such as Petro-Canada, EnCana and Suncor 
Energy, are very much focused on the opportunities 
presented by the Alberta oil sands and that has significantly 
influenced their international exploration and production 
activities, such that the oil and gas industry’s OFDI is 
small in comparison to the size of the industry. Quite the 
opposite occurs in the Canadian mining industry, in which 
better exploration and production opportunities outside 
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of Canada are driving huge OFDI flows by Canada’s 
global leaders in mining, such as Teck Cominco, Barrick 
Gold, PotashCorp. and Cameco, as well as by a host of 
junior explorers. The global commodity boom in mining 
is stimulating OFDI by Canadian mining companies, 
whereas investment in oil and gas is channelled more 
into investment opportunities in Canada, particularly the 
Alberta oil sands. In both cases, the companies involved 
have shown quite spectacular growth recently. 
Internationalization is, therefore, a fundamental 
strategy for many of Canada’s mining companies, which 
increasingly seek their natural resource inputs outside of 
Canada; however, that is not so true of Canadian oil and 
gas companies due to the fact that the Alberta oil sands 
play such a dominant role in their project pipelines.
(c) Manufacturing 
The international competitiveness of Canada’s 
manufacturing industry has been under stress for some 
time now. Full access to the United States market by way 
of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in 
1989, which was consolidated to include Mexico with the 
signing of NAFTA in 1994, helped to integrate Canadian 
firms into continental supply chains; however, global 
challenges have since emerged. The internationalization of 
most Canadian manufacturing companies did not extend 
beyond North America.
An initiative labelled Manufacturing 20/20 was 
undertaken in 2004-2005 by the Canadian Manufacturers 
and Exporters Association (CME).29 This was a 
huge undertaking, with 98 meetings involving 2,500 
manufacturers and stakeholders across Canada. Observing 
that Canada had dropped from fifth most prosperous 
country in the OECD to ninth over 15 years and that 
United States per capita income levels were 22% higher 
than Canada’s, CME suggested that in spite of the 
strong growth of manufacturing the industry was at a 
crossroads with regard to international competitiveness. 
Among the challenges mentioned were the intensified 
competition in international markets, the appreciation 
of the Canadian dollar, the emergence of China as an 
industrial powerhouse, trade and border problems with 
the United States and mounting competition with other 
countries around the world for investments and product 
mandates. Within Canada were escalating business costs, 
increased constraints on the energy supply, an ageing 
workforce and an erosion in the quality of Canadian 
infrastructure. The CME president opined that:
“Change is reshaping our industry, not only in Canada, 
but around the globe at an unprecedented pace. The result 
is the emergence of a new paradigm of manufacturing 
in which innovation instead of volume drives growth; 
where global business systems instead of production 
systems are employed; where companies do business not 
only across the country, but around the world and where 
competition is not among companies, but supply chains” 
(CME, 2005).
The Canadian manufacturing sector is a heterogeneous 
industry difficult to characterize in a few words. Broadly 
speaking, most companies have demonstrated three kinds 
of corporate strategy: (i) internationalization via FDI to 
establish export platforms to compete better in global markets 
(“efficiency-seeking” strategies); (ii) internationalization 
via FDI to establish a local affiliate in order to offer their 
products in the host-country market and, sometimes, that 
of its immediate neighbours (“market-seeking” strategies); 
and (iii) avoidance of internationalization by continuing to 
export from Canada or simply limiting survival strategies 
to competing against imports in the Canadian market. 
Canada’s manufacturing companies, for the most 
part, have faced an uphill struggle. Those implementing 
efficiency-seeking internationalization strategies, 
using FDI to establish export platforms for finished 
or intermediate goods in the businesses of auto parts 
or transportation equipment, have generally seen their 
growth and earnings slow; this includes global leaders 
such as Magna International, Linamar, and Bombardier 
Inc. Efficiency-seekers associated with electronics, such 
as global leaders Celestica and Nortel Networks, face 
outright crises. Some of those firms internationalizing 
via market-seeking strategies have done better —the 
experience of global leader McCain Foods is a good 
example— whereas others have not, such as Quebecor 
World, also a global leader. Within the manufacturing 
sector, pursuers of natural-resource-based manufacturing 
strategies appear to have adapted well, whether establishing 
an international system, like global leader Methanex Corp, 
or servicing a national or subregional market, like global 
leader Agrium Inc. 
Canadian OFDI will probably continue to rise in services 
and some natural resources (mining, not oil and gas). Conversely, 
29 CME members account for an estimated 75% of total manufacturing production in Canada and 90% of the country’s exports, according to 
http://www.cme-mce.ca.
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the problems now facing efficiency-seekers could portend a 
slowdown or decline in manufacturing OFDI.
In summary, the more dynamic elements driving Canadian 
OFDI appear to be associated with services, where market-
seeking strategies are prominent (especially financial services), 
and with natural resources (mining much more than oil and 
gas). Growth in manufacturing as a focus of Canadian OFDI 
seems to be somewhat stifled by the difficult experiences 
of the principal companies employing efficiency-seeking 
internationalization strategies, but this is less true of firms 
following market-seeking strategies, particularly those linked 
to natural-resourced-based manufactures. 
C. Canadian companies operating in Latin America and 
 the Caribbean
This section looks at Canadian companies in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the nature of their operations, 
from the perspective of the principal corporate strategies 
guiding their investment, i.e., natural resource-seeking, 
market-seeking or efficiency-seeking. 
Table IV.3 shows the data available on stocks of 
Canadian OFDI in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Confidentiality requirements prevent Statistics 
Canada from releasing data for many countries. According 
to this information, more than half of the stock of 
Canadian FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean is 
found in just three offshore financial centres (OFCs): 
Barbados 30 (30.9%), Cayman Islands (15.0%) and 
Bermuda (14.9%). Outside of OFCs, the main recipient 
countries of Canadian OFDI are Brazil (7.5%), Chile 
(6.0%), Mexico (4.2%), Argentina (2.1%), Peru (1.5%), 
Trinidad and Tobago (1.0%) and the Dominican Republic 
(1.0%). All other countries for which data are available 
receive less than 1% each. Thus, on the one hand, the 
huge concentration of investment in OFCs represents 
an insuperable distortion of the statistical information, 
since the final destination of this OFDI is unknown. On 
the other, these data suggest that Canadian OFDI in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is a recent phenomenon, 
taking place mainly in the 2000-2007 period; thus, 
the distortions from the perspective of historical cost 
valuation are smaller than in areas where Canadian 
OFDI has a longer experience. 
Thus, in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is difficult 
to obtain a clear overall picture of the nature and presence 
of Canadian OFDI. Moreover, many countries’ official 
statistics do not offer detailed information on Canadian 
investments due to the fact that they are not usually 
among the largest ones. Since official statistics on FDI 
are not a good guide for the purposes of the analysis in 
this section, it is necessary to resort to case studies based 
on interviews and secondary sources of information in 
order to form an idea of the nature of Canadian OFDI 
and the presence of Canadian TNCs in Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
Company-level information is becoming easier to obtain, 
in general, especially for companies listed on Canadian stock 
markets, although sometimes it is an arduous task to make 
diverse sources of information compatible. In this context, 
given the lack of better alternatives, an approximation of the 
principal investments of Canadian companies was created 
using the information available from Vecino 31 for 2003 
in combination with the information on net investments 
(acquisitions less divestments) during 2004-2007 available 
from Bloomberg. Thus a “ball park” or order of magnitude 
estimate was established (see table IV.4). Such a procedure is 
obviously insufficient since it leaves out greenfield investment 
by Canadian enterprises, as well as all acquisitions not 
captured by Bloomberg; nevertheless, there were no better 
alternatives. This analysis is complemented with a more 
detailed examination of the operations of specific Canadian 
companies in the region according to their dominant corporate 
strategy. Furthermore, the quality of the information on the 
facilities of Canadian mining companies operating in the 
region (see below) is considered to be much better as it is 
based on more solid data on assets collected by Natural 
Resources Canada. Thus, this first approximation should 
be considered as precisely that and will be reinforced with 
the analysis of specific company strategies.
30 It is interesting to note the asymmetry in Canada’s relationship with Barbados: whereas Canada had Cdn$ 38.4 billion invested through Barbados in 
2006, only Cdn$ 471 million was invested in Canada from or through Barbados.
31 The Ph.D thesis of Carlos Vecino at HEC Montreal contains a detailed examination of Canadian companies operating in the region up to the 
end of 2003 (Vecino, 2007, pp. 162-163).
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Table IV.3
STOCKS OF CANADIAN OFDI IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1970-2007
(Millions of Canadian dollars)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 2007 Percentage 2007
A. Latin American and Caribbean OFCs
Antigua and Barbuda n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Aruba n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Bahamas 187 426 1 950 7 006 n.d. 13 731 11.7
Barbados       2 11 1 453 19 668 38 623 36 238 30.9
Bermuda       136 1 003 1 758 9 482 22 570 17 439 14.9
British Virgin Islands       n.d. n.d. 28 279 949 765 0.7
Cayman Islands       n.d. n.d. 78 3 839 18 474 17 547 15.0
Netherland Antilles       6 153 72 121 105 98 0.1
Subtotal OFCs a 331 1 593 5 339 40 395 80 721 85 818 73.2
B. Latin American and Caribbean non-OFCs
Argentina n.d. n.d. 123 5 023 2 731 2 503 2.1
Belize n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Bolivia n.d. n.d. n.d. 52 87 105 0.1
Brazil 648 691 1 698 6 667 8 355 8 819 7.5
Chile n.d. n.d. 285 5 421 5 879 6 995 6.0
Colombia n.d. n.d. 24 898 351 739 0.6
Costa Rica n.d. n.d. n.d. 116 120 88 0.1
Cuba n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Dominica n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Dominican Republic n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 1 373 1 145 1.0
Ecuador n.d. n.d. n.d. 244 43 53 0.0
El Salvador n.d. n.d. n.d. 59 n.d. n.d. ...
French Guiana n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Grenada       n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Guadeloupe       n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Guatemala n.d. n.d. 5 3 n.d. 244 0.2
Guyana n.d. n.d. n.d. 145 26 34 0.0
Haiti n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 8 0.0
Honduras n.d. n.d. n.d. 9 67 78 0.1
Jamaica n.d. n.d. 337 592 n.d. n.d. ...
Mexico 45 165 245 3 857 5 069 4 950 4.2
Nicaragua n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 30 0.0
Panama 2 15 23 217 111 n.d. ...
Paraguay n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Peru n.d. n.d. n.d. 1 925 2 144 1 767 1.5
Saint Lucia n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Suriname n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. ...
Trinidad and Tobago n.d. n.d. n.d. 96 1 211 1 154 1.0
Uruguay n.d. n.d. n.d. 26 15 ... ...
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) n.d. n.d. 54 328 535 783 0.7
Subtotal non-OFCs 695 871 2 794 25 678 28 117 29 495 25.1
TOTAL 1 396 3 571 8 360 67 479 125 303 117 279 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from Statistics Canada.
Note:  n.d.= not disclosed.
a Reporting countries. 
Table IV.4 does permit a degree of analysis of the 
presence of Canadian companies in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. First, according to these numbers, the value 
of investments by Canadian companies in Latin America 
and the Caribbean more than doubled over 2003-2007, 
from US$ 18.3 billion to US$ 37.4 billion, which ratifies 
the view that the Canadian business presence in the region 
is in a marked process of renewal and expansion.
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Table IV.4
PRINCIPAL CANADIAN COMPANIES WITH INVESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2003,  
WITH ACQUISITION UPDATE TO END 2007 a
(Millions of United States dollars)
Rank Company Sector
Investment 











1 Goldcorp c Mining 292.0 7901.1 8 193.1 Argentina, Mexico, Brazil
2 Brookfield Asset Management d Finance 2 143.0 3 423.3 5 566.3 Brazil, Chile
3 Yamana Gold e Mining 402.5 3 403.8 3 806.3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Honduras, Nicaragua
4 Scotiabank Finance 1 639.5 1 733.3 3 372.8 Mexico, Chile, Peru, Costa 
Rica, Panama, El Salvador, 
Dominican Republic 
5 Royal Bank of Canada Finance 2 187.2 2 187.2 Trinidad and Tobago, 
financial centres in the 
Caribbean
6 Barrick Gold (including Placer 
Dome)
Mining 2 126.5 -3.0 2 123.5 Peru, Argentina, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, Mexico
7 Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce
Finance 1 299.9 1 299.9 Barbados, Jamaica
8 Ontario Teachers Pension Fund Finance 1 226.2 1 226.2 Chile, Brazil
9 Methanex Manufacturing 1 000.0 1 000.0 Chile, Trinidad and Tobago
10 Nortel Services 760.0 760.0 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
11 Teck Cominco (excluding Aur 
Resources)
Mining 520.0 -2.3 517.8 Peru, Chile, Panama, 
Mexico
12 Rusoro Mining Mining 506.6 506.6 Venezuela
13 Nexen Inc. Oil and gas 389.2 389.2 Brazil, Colombia
14 TransCanada Corp Oil and gas 148.8 190.2 339.0 Colombia, acquisition 
pending in Mexico 
15 Kinross Gold (including Bema 
Gold)
Mining 76.9 261.1 338.0 Brazil, Chile, El Salvador
16 PotashCorp Mining 279.0 40.5 319.5 Chile, Brazil
17 Agrium Manufacturing 236.6 236.6 Argentina
18 Onex Corp. Finance 255.2 -28.8 226.4 Mexico 
19 Quebecor World Manufacturing 211.5 211.5 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile
20 Finning International Inc. Services 180.0 180.0 Chile, Bolivia
21 Sun Life Financial Finance 163.6 163.6 Chile
22 Petrobank Energy & Resources Oil and gas 136.3 136.3 Colombia
23 Celestica Manufacturing 108.2 108.2 Brazil, Mexico
24 McCain Foods Manufacturing 106.5 106.5 Argentina
25 Transcontinental Inc. Manufacturing 100.5 100.5 Mexico 
26 HudBay Minerals Mining 100.0 100.0 Mexico 
27 Iberian Minerals Corp Mining 99.0 99.0 Peru
28 Peak Gold Mining 93.3 93.3 Brazil
29 Apotex Inc Manufacturing 90.0 90.0 Brazil, Mexico, 
30 Agnico Eagle Mines Mining 80.8 80.8 Mexico 
31 Gildan Activewear Manufacturing 75.0 75.0 Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Nicaragua
32 National Bank Finance 75.0 75.0 Chile
33 Pacific Stratus Energy Oil and gas 60.2 60.2 Colombia















34 CCL Industries Manufacturing 55.2 55.2 Brazil
35 Saputo Inc. Manufacturing 50.8 50.8 Argentina
 - Falconbridge Mining 1 569.0 sold to Xstrata (Switzerland) Chile, Peru, Dominican 
Republic
 - HydroQuebec Infrastructure 1 256.0 sold to Brookfield in 2006 Chile, Peru
 - Noranda Mining 1 161.8 sold to Falconbridge Peru
 - EnCana Oil & Gas 1 075.0 sold to CNOOC/Sinapec (China) Ecuador
 - Alcan Manufacturing 782.0 sold to Rio Tinto (United Kingdom) Brazil
 - Molson Manufacturing 645.0 sold to FEMSA (Mexico) Brazil
 - Fairmont Hotels & Resorts Services 99.3 sold to Saudi Arabian investor Mexico 
 - Total 18 254.7 22 527.8 34 194.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Carlos Vecino, “Foreign direct investment in Latin America: exploring host-country 
determinants and multinationals’ motives. Based on global and Canadian investors’ activities”, Ph.D. thesis, Bucaramanga, Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2007 and 
information from Bloomberg.
Note: The methodology used here was to add to the 2003 figures from Vecino (2007) all acquisitions or divestments of assets indicated by Bloomberg for 2004-2007.
a  Firms that should be on the list but for which data were not found include: Magna (Mexico, Brazil), Bombardier (Mexico, Brazil), Thomson (Argentina), SNC-Lavalin (Chile, Brazil), 
Linamar (Mexico), Fording (Mexico), Inmet (Panama), Sherritt (Cuba), IAM Gold (Surinam, Guyana), Breakwater Resources (Chile, Honduras).
b  Includes pending operations.
c  Includes Wheaton River, Glamis Gold. 
d  Includes acquisitions by Brascan (Brazil).
e  Includes Meridian Gold, North Orion Resources.
Second, it is apparent that up until 2003 mining companies 
dominated the list of Canadian companies operating in the 
region, with global leaders like Falconbridge and Noranda 
high on the list. Although investment by Canadian mining 
companies —especially gold companies such as Goldcorp, 
Yamana Gold, Barrick Gold and Teck Cominco— remained 
strong during 2004-2007, it was the combination of the 
sale of Falconbridge (and Noranda) to XStrata with very 
significant acquisitions by Canadian financial institutions 
—such as Brookfield Asset Management, Scotiabank, 
Royal Bank, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and 
the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund— that moved financial 
companies up the list of principal operations of Canadian 
companies in the region. Of the top 10 Canadian companies 
shown in table IV.4, five are financial and four are mining 
companies, although the mining firms tend to rank higher 
than the financial ones. 
Third, the list contains “old timers” that were present 
in 2003 but have not made major acquisitions since, such 
as Methanex, Nortel, Nexen Inc., Agrium, Quebecor 
World, Finning International Inc., Petrobank Energy and 
Resources, Celestica, McCain Foods, Transcontinental 
Inc., and “newcomers” that had no major presence in the 
region in 2003 but made significant investments during 
2004-2007, such as Royal Bank of Canada, Ontario 
Teachers’ Pension Fund, Rusoro Mining, Iberian Minerals 
Corp. and Peak Gold.
Fourth, there is a group of Canadian companies that 
were present in the region in 2003 and considerably upped 
their investments during 2004-2007, such as Goldcorp, 
Teck Cominco, Brookfield Asset Management, Yamana 
Gold, Scotiabank, Barrick Gold and Kinross Gold.
Fifth, aside from Falconbridge and Noranda, investments 
in a number of important Canadian firms were liquidated 
when those firms were acquired (Alcan, by Rio Tinto) 
or their assets were sold (HydroQuebec sold Transelec 
in Chile to Brookfield Asset Management, EnCana sold 
its assets in Ecuador to CNOOC/Sinopec, Molson sold 
control of its Brazilian subsidiary —Kaiser— to FEMSA, 
BCE sold its assets in Telecom America in Brazil and 
Andean countries to America Móvil of Mexico, and the 
Mexican assets of Fairmont Hotels were acquired by a 
Saudi Arabian investor).
Sixth, most of the investments are concentrated 
in only a few countries of the region, mainly Mexico, 
Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago and Peru. 
The financial companies’ investments have relatively 
widespread geographic coverage when taken together. 
The investments of mining companies are focused on 
Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Peru. The oil 
and gas investments are principally in Trinidad and 
Tobago and Colombia. Manufacturing firms tend to 
concentrate on the larger markets, that is, Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina. 
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1.	 Overview	of	case	studies	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean
and the Caribbean by Canadian companies became relevant 
with NAFTA and other measures liberalizing trade in apparel. 
Several leading Canadian firms set up efficiency-seeking 
plants in Mexico. The experience of some of the major 
Canadian electronics companies, such as Nortel Networks 
and Celestica, suggests that the NAFTA benefits did not 
compensate for the increased competitiveness of Asian firms 
in the North American market. Something similar seems to 
be taking place in the automotive industry, in which Canadian 
auto parts suppliers (Magna International, Linamar) are 
still largely dependent on United States automobile TNCs, 
such as GM, Ford and Chrysler, which are losing market 
share to Asian automobile makers, such as Toyota, Honda 
and Hyundai. Bombardier and Bombardier Recreation 
Products both set up efficiency-seeking plants in Mexico 
to manufacture aircraft components and recreational craft, 
respectively. While the apparel industry is usually considered 
to have been even more displaced by Asian competition, one 
Canadian company —Gildan Activewear— has proved to be 
the exception, by successfully establishing efficiency-seeking 
activities in the Caribbean Basin in order to compete better 
in the North American market. With the exception of Gildan, 
Canadian manufacturers’ efficiency-seeking investments in 
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin do not seem to have lived 
up to their promise.
Market-seeking manufacturers have established a 
presence too, with Quebecor World in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, McCain Foods in 
Argentina and Agrium in Argentina, as well as market-
seeking investments by firms like Nortel in Argentina 
and Brazil, Celestica and Magna International in Brazil. 
Most operations have been reasonably successful although 
QuebecWorld’s subsidiaries in the region had to endure the 
dislocation caused by the parent firm’s financial weakness. 
Firms operating in Argentina, such as McCain Foods, Nortel 
Networks and Agrium, were all hurt by the 2000-2001 crisis 
there. McCain Foods has not only overcome that bump in 
the road, it is even contemplating expansion into Brazil. 
Examples of natural-resource-seeking manufacturers are 
Methanex, which has facilities in Chile and Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Agrium, which set up a joint venture with 
Repsol in Argentina. Methanex exports around the world 
from its base in the region, while Agrium focuses mainly 
on the Argentine market with some exports to Brazil.
These cases will now be analysed in more detail, 
according to the principal corporate strategy guiding their 
investments in Latin America and the Caribbean.
As indicated in the last section, the two main corporate 
strategies driving Canadian OFDI are natural-resource-
seeking by mining companies and market-seeking by 
banks or financial service providers. Market-seeking 
OFDI by other Canadian companies seems to have slowed. 
Efficiency-seeking OFDI by Canadian manufacturers and 
natural-resource-seeking OFDI by Canadian oil and gas 
companies appears to be declining although the official 
information on this type of investment does not allow 
confirmation of that hypothesis. 
Latin America and the Caribbean is clearly a very 
important region for natural-resource-seeking Canadian 
mining companies, especially those in the precious metals 
sector. All classes of such companies —global leaders 
(Barrick Gold), seniors (Goldcorp), intermediates (Yamana 
Gold, Kinross Gold and IAM Gold) and juniors (Silver 
Standard Resources)— have concentrated their mining 
assets in the region. This is not so much the case of other 
Canadian global leaders in mining, such as Teck Cominco 
in base metals, PotashCorp. in industrial minerals or 
Cameco in energy minerals, although all have some assets 
in the region and Teck Cominco’s presence could increase 
substantially depending on the progress of its project 
pipeline (see below). Canadian exploration companies 
continue to invest heavily in the region. Mining is the 
single activity in which Latin America and the Caribbean 
in the most prominent region for Canadian OFDI. 
Canadian retail banks and providers of other financial 
services represent the other major group of firms investing 
in the region in recent years. Banks have done so in order to 
offer their financial services in local markets, as is the case 
for Scotiabank, throughout the Americas, and Royal Bank 
and CIBC, primarily in the Caribbean. Asset managers, 
such as Brookfield Asset Management, have acquired real 
estate or infrastructure assets in Brazil and Chile. Pension 
administrators, like Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, have 
invested in sanitation companies in Chile. Other market-
seeking service providers have built up a notable presence 
in the region, such as Finning International in the Southern 
Cone, SNC-Lavalin in Chile and Brazil, and Thomson in 
Argentina; however, these investments are far smaller than 
those undertaken by the retail banks and providers of other 
financial services mentioned above. 
Canadian manufacturers present in Latin America and 
the Caribbean have demonstrated three principal corporate 
strategies: efficiency-seeking, market-seeking and natural-
resource-seeking. Efficiency-seeking OFDI in Latin America 
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2.	 Canadian	companies	seeking	natural	resources
Canadian OFDI in natural resources in Latin America and 
the Caribbean has taken place mainly in the mining sector. 
Although there has been some Canadian investment in 
oil and gas in the region, it has declined sharply. 
(a) Oil and gas
Two principal factors, described in the following 
paragraphs, account for the decline of Canadian investment 
in oil and gas activities in the region: better opportunities 
in North America and changing regulation by host 
countries. A third factor was the harsh conflict between 
the Canadian major, EnCana (twenty-third on the top 300 
list), and the Government of Ecuador, which sent shock 
waves through the North American oil and gas industry 
and discouraged companies from further investment in 
the region (see box IV.5).
As noted earlier, the major oil and gas companies in 
Canada have increasingly focused their investment on the 
very significant opportunities available in North America, 
especially the Alberta oil sands; therefore, Latin America 
and the Caribbean has not been of such interest for these 
companies as it has been for the mining industry:
Petro-Canada 32 (nineteenth on the list of the 300 
largest companies in Canada) is the largest Canadian-
owned integrated oil company, though it is a mid-sized 
company by industry standards. Petro-Canada’s proven 
reserves at end-2006 were concentrated in Canada 
(74.3%), especially in the Alberta oil sands (39.4%), 
although its international reserves were not unimportant 
(especially the Buzzard field in the North Sea). The 
company’s International Business Unit was set up in 
2002 when it acquired the upstream operations of Veba 
Oil & Gas, although previous investments in exploration 
and production had secured it reserves in Algeria, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In Latin 
America, its operations are concentrated in upstream 
operations in Trinidad and Tobago and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. Petro-Canada’s proven reserves 
additions are almost entirely in Canada and even more 
concentrated in the oil sands. Moreover, four of the five 
32 Based on Petro-Canada ( 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2006a, 2006b).
33 Based on Encana (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2006 and 2002).
34 Concerns over the provincial take from the Alberta oil sands led the Alberta government to establish a commission on the matter. The Alberta 
Royalty Commission report concluded that the province’s take was small and should be increased, which sparked outrage by the companies 
—both national and foreign— that had already undertaken investments or were in the process of doing so. See CAPP (2007).
major development projects in Petro-Canada’s pipeline 
for 2008-2011 are in Canada and mostly related to the 
Alberta oil sands. 
EnCana 33 (twenty-third on the list of the 300 largest) 
refers to itself as a leading North American unconventional 
natural gas and integrated oil sands company. Its production 
is concentrated in gas in Canada (51%) and the United 
States (30%), and in conventional oil (15%); conversely, 
its Alberta oil sands production is just beginning (4%). 
EnCana explores in several parts of the world, such as the 
Middle East (Oman, Qatar), Greenland and France. In Latin 
America it had significant operations in Ecuador, but sold 
its production facilities (about 150 million barrels per year 
or 11% of its production) in the country in 2006, in what 
turned out to be a controversial transaction (see box IV.5). 
Following this, in 2007 EnCana sold its exploration activities 
in Brazil (as well as in other countries). Like Petro-Canada, 
therefore, it has focused its growth in North America. 
The second important factor in the decline of Canadian 
investment in oil and gas activities in the region is the sharp 
change of national policy by some Latin American governments, 
which have sought to increase their income from non-renewable 
natural resources, especially oil and gas. 
A number of Latin American governments shifted their 
policy stance in order to tighten rules and thus increase 
national returns from and control over foreign-owned 
operations for extracting natural resources. The changes 
were most drastic in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Ecuador.34 In the first of these countries, at the 
end of 2005, the government required private investors to 
accept the conversion of their operating agreements into 
joint ventures, with a majority share for the State petroleum 
company, PDVSA. Soon afterwards, the government proposed 
an increase in royalty taxes (which had also been increased 
in 2004) on projects for extra-heavy crude extraction from 
the Orinoco Belt. This operation was nationalized as of 
1 May 2007. The consortiums were converted into joint 
ventures, with a controlling share for PDVSA. Exxon Mobil 
responded in early 2008 by attempting to obtain court orders 
to freeze the international assets of PDVSA to ensure that 
it would be adequately compensated.
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Box IV.5
ENCANA AND ECUADOR: FROM PERFECT MATCH TO PERFECT STORM?
At the beginning, the firm and the country 
were well matched. On one side was Ecuador, 
a small, highly indebted developing country 
whose integration into the international 
market depended on a few commodities 
(crude petroleum, bananas, coffee, and so 
forth). Ecuador wished to expand its crude 
petroleum production and exports and was 
seeking foreign investment in exploration, 
production and a new heavy crude pipeline 
to achieve that goal. In 2001, it revised its 
Mining Law to eliminate royalties, reduce 
surface rights per hectare and simplify 
authorization procedures. On the other 
side was EnCana, a major Canadian gas 
company that already possessed important 
assets in Ecuador from its acquisition of 
Pacalta Resources in 1999 for US$ 973 
million. At that time, EnCana was looking to 
further diversify its international assets. 
The initial results were excellent. 
Between 2001 and 2005, Ecuador succeeded 
in increasing its crude production from 
about 150 million barrels to almost 200 
million barrels and exports from about 90 
million barrels to almost 130 million barrels. 
EnCana became the largest foreign investor 
in Ecuador, accounting for about 12% of 
national crude petroleum production, and 
came to assemble a significant portfolio of 
assets there. These assets included 100% 
of the Tarapoa block (38,000 bpd), 40% of 
Block 15 of Occidental Petroleum (30,000 
bpd), 75% of Block 14, 70% of Block 17 and 
100% of others (together adding 7,200 bpd) 
and 31% of the OCP pipeline (450,000 bpd 
capacity) with partners Repsol YPF (26%), 
Petrobras (15%), Occidental (12%), ENI-Agip 
(8%), Perenco (4%) and Techint (4%). 
But the relationship between EnCana 
and Ecuador turned sour. In 2006, EnCana 
sold its assets for US$ 1.42 billion to Andes 
Petroleum, a joint venture of two Chinese 
petroleum companies, China National 
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) and 
China Petrochemical Corp (Sinopec). In the 
process, EnCana lost US$ 47 million on the 
sale, had to pay another US$ 242 million 
in compensation and saw the failure of its 
international arbitration initiative against 
the Ecuadorian government. On the other 
hand, the government accused EnCana 
of selling its assets in Ecuador without 
authorization. What went wrong?
It might be said that EnCana ran into a 
kind of perfect storm as a host of separate 
factors seemed to combine fortuitously 
into a mix that poisoned the relationship 
between the Canadian oil and gas company 
and the Ecuadorian government. Some of 
the factors usually mentioned in this regard 
include the previously conflictive relationship 
between the Ecuadorian State and Texaco 
and the growing conflict with Occidental 
Petroleum; political instability; untimely 
elections; unresolved environmental, health 
and safety and community development 
issues; social mobilization on the part of 
indigenous groups; government policies 
that ended rebates and raised taxes; 
International Monetary Fund conditionality; 
the United States’ governments suspension 
of FTA talks with Ecuador; and Occidental 
Petroleum’s request for international 
arbitration at the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); 
among others.
There are factors that contradict the 
perfect storm thesis. One is the report 
by Robert Goodman of the World Bank, 
which found that EnCana had failed in 
four important areas as regards the World 
Bank’s criteria for approving the financing 
of the pipeline project: environment, natural 
habitats, involuntary resettlement and 
indigenous peoples —the subject of an 
award-winning documentary on EnCana’s 
role in Ecuador entitled “Between Midnight 
and the Rooster’s Crow”— and the fact that 
EnCana, like Occidental Petroleum before it, 
appears to have sold its assets in Ecuador 
without first receiving the approval of the 
Ecuadorian government.
Source: Department of the Interior, United States, “Ecuador”, US Geological Services 2005 Minerals Yearbook, June 2007; China Daily, “Oil consortium buys EnCana Ecuador 
assets”, 16 September 2005; Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, “EnCana sells Ecuador oil and pipeline business to Andes petroleum”, Company News: Latin 
America, vol. 10, No. 18, 28 September 2005; La Tercera, “Petroecuador crea estatal Petroamazonas para administrar campo que explotaba compañía de EEUU”, 
19 December 2007; International Herald Tribune, “Ecuador seeks to soothe U.S. ties amid asset feud”, 18 May 2006; Reuters, “EnCana CEO says Ecuador approved 
block sale”, 24 May 2006; EnCana, Sustainable Development Experience in Ecuador: the EnCana Case, La Jolla, California, Instituto de las Américas, 17 June, 2004; 
Business Week , “The heat is on oxy in Ecuador”, 24 April 2006; Marari Magazine, “Ecuador’s OCP Pipeline – A false promise of wealth”, 25 June 2007; L. Jermyn, 
“In whose interest? Canadian interests and the OCP crude oil pipeline in Ecuador” [online] 2002 http://www.globalaware.org; J. Klaszus, “Viewpoint- EnCana’s chief’s 
legacy far from flawless”, 2006 [online] http://www.FFWDWeekly.com; Pueblos en camino, “Canadian mining mischief in the Americas”, 18 January 2007 [online] 
http://www.en-camino.org; N. Drost, “Between midnight and the rooster’s crow - a film about EnCana in Ecuador”, 26 October 2005 [online] http://www.cbmwatch.ca 
and information from Encana, official website, 2007 [online] http//www.encana.ca.
In Bolivia, the Hydrocarbons Act of 2005 created 
a royalty of 32% in addition to the existing 18% tax. 
The law gave foreign investors 180 days to migrate to 
the new contracts. This period elapsed without changes 
being made in the contracts, although the investors were 
already paying the additional royalties to the government. 
When the nationalization of hydrocarbons was declared 
on 1 May 2006, an additional period of six months was 
allowed, this time for the companies to sign new operating 
contracts (which included transfer of ownership to the 
State) with higher tax rates that varied according to the 
characteristics of each project, up to a legal maximum of 
82%. In September, the nationalization of private refineries 
was announced. This measure affected mainly the interests 
of Petrobras (Brazil). The petroleum companies ultimately 
signed new contracts in October.
In Ecuador, as in Bolivia and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, the law on hydrocarbons was reformed 
in 2006 in order to give the government a greater share 
in revenues from petroleum and gas extraction. It was 
established that when crude prices exceeded the levels 
agreed in the contract with each private company, the State 
would receive 50% of the export income. In contrast to 
what occurred in the other two countries, the reforms in 
Ecuador did not require a transfer of ownership to the State, 
although a specific dispute with Occidental Petroleum did 
have that result after the contract was cancelled. 
Colombia was the principal exception to this tendency 
towards more restrictive natural-resource policies in the 
region. As of 1999, the government reduced the obligatory 
share of the State petroleum company, Ecopetrol, in joint 
ventures and made regulatory and institutional changes, 
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including the creation of a National Hydrocarbons Agency 
to promote new investment to achieve increased reserve 
levels. In 2006, Colombia privatized the Cartagena 
refinery and indicated that it would sell 20% of Ecopetrol. 
Colombia considered itself the second most attractive 
location for petroleum investment in Latin America after 
Brazil (El Tiempo, 2008). Most of the exploration and 
production operations of Canadian oil and gas companies 
are currently located in Colombia. This is the case of 
Nexen Inc. (ranked seventy-seventh), TransCanada 
Corp. (fifty-fifth), Talisman Energy Inc. (forty-second), 
Petrobank Energy and Resources, Pacific Stratus Energy 
and Adulis Resources Inc. TransCanada Corp. sold off 
its assets in the region (Argentina, Chile and Brazil) in 
2001, but has an acquisition pending in Mexico.
In the first survey of the petroleum industry conducted 
by the Fraser Institute in 2007 (Fraser Institute, 2007a), 
four of the last six ranks were occupied by Bolivia (fifty-
fourth), Venezuela (fifty-third), Ecuador (fifty-second) and 
Argentina (forty-ninth), while Brazil (thirtieth), Colombia 
(twenty-eighth) and Peru (twenty-fifth) did much better. In 
spite of the unfavourable opinions of oil and gas TNCs and 
the harsher new conditions, internationalizing petroleum 
companies from China, India, and other emerging markets 
have been active in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
sometimes showing interest in filling the spaces vacated 
by Canadian oil and gas TNCs.
(b) Mining
An unmistakable indication of the importance of Latin 
America for Canadian mining companies is the fact that 
between 2002 and 2007 the proportion of all exploration 
in the region done by Canadian companies rose from 35% 
to 50% (see figure IV.8). Another is that, since 1994, Latin 
America has been the principal destination of exploration 
expenditures by mining companies, with 24%, ahead of 
Canada (19%), Africa (16%), and the rest of the world 
(Metals Economic Group, 2007).
The presence of Canadian mining companies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is represented in table IV.5. 
The information in this table is based on mining assets 
(properties, plant and equipment, deferred exploration 
expenditures at cost —book value— less accumulated 
amortization and write-downs) as defined by Natural 
Resources Canada. There is some dissonance between 
these figure and table IV.4.35
Figure IV.8
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from Metals Economics Group.
This information demonstrates that only some of 
the Canadian mining majors (those with 2006 revenues 
over Cdn$ 1 billion) have a significant presence in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. These include Teck Cominco, 
Barrick Gold, PotashCorp, Goldcorp, Sherritt and Kinross 
Gold. Notable absentees are Cameco (except via Centerra 
Gold), Alouette, First Quantum and Hudbay Minerals.36 At 
the same time, several non-majors had extensive assets in 
the region in 2006, as is the case for Yamana Gold, IAM 
Gold and, to a lesser extent, Breakwater Resources. Some 
juniors also possessed assets, such as Silver Standard 
Resources, Intrepid Minerals and First Point Minerals. 
The significance of the acquisition of Canadian global 
leaders, such as Falconbridge,37 which possessed Latin 
American assets in the order of Cdn$ 4 billion (in Chile, 
Peru and Dominican Republic), and of Alcan,38 which 
had assets in the region worth about Cdn$ 125 million 
(in Brazil), cannot be over overestimated. In other words, 
the presence of Canadian mining firms, as measured by 
their assets in the region, has changed considerably in 
the last few years.
35 This stems mainly from the different amounts reported, which is partly because of the distinct concepts used (revenue, assets) and partly because 
table IV.4 includes 2007, which explains the presence of Rusoro Mining, Iberian Minerals Corp., Peak Gold and Agnico Eagle Mines there but 
not in table IV.5. 
36 It was not possible to confirm the figure of US$100 million given by Vecino for Hudbay Minerals investments in the region.
37 Falconbridge was among the top 10 global producers of both zinc and copper in 2005.
38 Alcan was among the top 10 global producers of aluminum in 2005.
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Table IV.5
PRESENCE OF CANADIAN MINING COMPANIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, BY ASSETS, a 2006








Latin America and Caribbean 
presence
Goldcorp Precious metals 
(gold)
1 900 Vancouver 13 726.2 Mexico, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, 
Brazil, Dominican Rep.
Barrick Gold Precious metals 
(gold)
6 400 Toronto 3 769.8 Chile, Argentina, Peru, Dominican 
Republic
Yamana Gold Precious (gold) 169 Toronto 2 345.3 Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Honduras, 
Nicaragua
Kinross Gold Precious (gold) 1 000 Toronto 941.2 Brazil, Chile, El Salvador
IAMGold Precious (gold) 377 Toronto 831.2 Surinam, Guyana, Peru, Ecuador, 
Mexico, others
Teck Cominco Base metals 
(zinc)
6 500 Vancouver 806.2 Peru, Chile, Panama, Mexico
Potash Corp of 
Sask
Other (potash) 3 829 Saskatoon 591.9 Chile (manufacturing plant in Brazil 
not included) 
Sherritt Base (nickel) 1 100 Toronto 260.5 Cuba
Silver Standard 
Resources
Precious (silver) n.a. Vancouver 164.1 Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Chile
Breakwater 
Resources
Base (zinc) 452 Toronto 138.0 Chile, Honduras
Inmet Base (copper, 
zinc)
1 100 Toronto 16.7 Panama 
Fording Coal Other (coal) 1 800 Calgary 16.2 Mexico 
Intrepid Mines Precious (gold) n.a. Toronto 6.0 Argentina, others
First Point 
Minerals
Precious (gold) n.a. Vancouver 4.8 Honduras, Nicaragua
Cameco Other (uranium) 1 800 Saskatoon 0.0 Peru (via interest in Centerra Gold) 
Subtotal 
Canadian Firms







Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by Natural Resource Canada and company reports. 
Note: n.a.= not available.
a  Defined as properties, plant and equipment, deferred exploration expenditures at cost (book value) less accumulated amortization and write-downs by NRCAn.
There has recently been a sharp shift in Canadian 
mining assets in favour of precious metals, especially 
gold (see box IV.6), which, coupled with the exit of 
Falconbridge and Alcan, has reduced the assets held 
by base metals companies in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.39 The extreme concentration of Canadian 
mining assets in the region translates, in this case, into 
the seven companies with assets over Cdn$ 500 million 
accounting for a very high proportion of the total assets 
of the 16 largest Canadian mining companies there and, 
notably, by 2006, five of those seven top companies 
were gold producers. This is also because the principal 
acquisitions by Canadian mining companies were in the 
gold industry, involving a very significant amount of gold 
assets in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The principal examples include Goldcorp’s acquisition 
of Glamis Gold for US$ 8.7 billion in 2006, which 
included huge assets in Mexico (over US$ 8 billion) and 
Guatemala (over US$ 1.3 billion) coupled with the previous 
purchase of Wheaton River for US$ 2.4 billion in 2004, 
which included gold assets in Chile, Brazil and Mexico. 
Barrick Gold purchased Placer Dome 40 for US$ 10.4 
billion in 2005, which included gold assets in Chile and 
the Dominican Republic. Yamana Gold acquired Desert 
Sun for US$ 505 million in 2006, and Meridian Gold 
for US$ 3.4 billion and Northern Orion Resources for 
US$ 856.2 million, both in 2007, which contributed assets 
in Chile and Argentina. In addition, Viceroy purchased 
other Argentine properties for US$ 460 million in 2006. 
Kinross Gold bought Bema Gold for US$ 2.9 billion in 
39 Teck Cominco’s acquisition of Aur Resources in 2007, which involved two copper mines in Chile as well as a mine in Canada, is not included 
in table IV.5.
40 Goldcorp subsequently purchased from Barrick Gold many of the Canadian assets of Placer Dome.
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2007, bringing it important assets in Chile to add to its 
purchase of Rio Paracatu Mineração for US$ 260 million 
in 2004, which had brought assets in Brazil. IAM Gold 
purchased Cambior for US$ 1.3 billion in 2007, which 
included assets in Bahamas, Suriname and Guyana. Teck 
Cominco acquired Aur Resources for over US$ 4 billion 
in 2007, which brought important copper and gold assets 
in Chile.
Box IV.6
CANADIAN MINING COMPANIES PURSUE EL DORADO IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Canadian mining companies have come 
to control many of the best gold mines and 
principal gold mine projects in the region 
precisely as the international price of gold 
has reached all-time highs. Barrick Gold 
is clearly the best positioned; however, 
others, such as Goldcorp, Yamana Gold, 
IAM Gold and Kinross Gold, also enjoy very 
competitive situations in the region. 
While Barrick has been a major for 
many years, Goldcorp made the transition 
to senior and Yamana Gold, Kinross Gold 
and IAM Gold became intermediates in 
large part by way of their acquisitions. 
Thus, Latin America and the Caribbean 
has played an important role in the 
advancement of these Canadian gold 
companies.
Mine / Project Country Canadian company 2005 contained gold
(million ounces)
2005 Gold production 
capacity
(thousand oz/yr)
Pascua Lama Chile Barrick Gold 23.7 762
Lagunas Norte Peru Barrick Gold 9.5 540
Veladero Argentina Barrick Gold 4.1 535
Rosebel Surinam IAM Gold 4.8 260
Refugio Chile Kinross Gold 14.3 245
Marlin Guatemala Goldcorp 2.6 217
El Sauzal Mexico Goldcorp 2.0 190
Ampari Brazil Goldcorp 2.7 160
San Francisco Brazil Yamana Gold 2.8 109
Jacobina Brazil Yamana Gold 3.9 108
Cerro Casale Chile Barrick/Kinross 28.4
Las Cristinas Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) Crystellex Intl. 20.9
Pueblo Viejo Dominican Rep. Barrick Gold 18.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Metals Economics Group, “Review of Latin American gold developments,” 
Strategic Report, vol. 18, January-February 2005.
Lastly, the assets of Canadian mining companies 
in the region are now quite concentrated in a handful of 
countries. Almost half (47.5%) are in Mexico and consist 
primarily of the assets that Goldcorp obtained when it 
acquired Glamis Gold. A little over 12% are in Chile 
and are found mainly in the operations of Barrick Gold, 
PotashCorp., Teck Cominco, Kinross Gold and Goldcorp. 
Almost 12% are in Argentina and include primarily the 
assets of Barrick Gold, Yamana Gold and Goldcorp. 
About 9% are found in Brazil and consist principally of 
the Yamana Gold and Kinross Gold assets. Six percent 
are in Peru and concentrated in the Barrick Gold and 
Teck Cominco operations. About 5% are in Guatemala 
and consist mainly of the Goldcorp assets.
The following paragraphs describe the strategies of 
the main mining companies investing in Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
Goldcorp 41 (ranked 174th in the top 300 list) merged 
with Wheaton River to become a senior gold company, 
which produced 2,377,700 ounces of gold in 2006 and 
generated revenues of US$ 1.9 billion. It had previously 
been a junior partner to other larger companies in a 
number of projects: to Barrick Gold in Marigold (United 
States), Dee (United States) and Pueblo Viejo (Dominican 
Republic), to XStrata in Alumbrera (Argentina) and to 
Teck Cominco in El Limon (Mexico). Goldcorp became 
an independent operator through a major acquisition, a 
purchase and a swap. The acquisition was that of Glamis 
41 Based on interviews at Goldcorp headquarters in Vancouver, plus Goldcorp (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2006a, 2006b, 2005, 2002).
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2007 169
Gold, which provided Goldcorp with several important 
properties: the Peñasquito and El Sauzal mines in Mexico, 
the Marlin and Cerro Blanco mines in Guatemala and 
the San Martin mine in Honduras. The purchase was 
of the ex-Placer Dome properties (Porcupine mine and 
Musselwhite mine in Canada) from Barrick Gold. The 
swap was for Kinross Gold’s holdings in the ex-Placer 
Dome mines in Canada for a 50% share of La Coipa mine 
in Chile plus cash.
In 2006, 52% of Goldcorp’s production came from 
just three mines (Red Lake in Canada, the 37.5% share 
in the Alumbrera mine in Argentina and the El Sauzal 
mine in Mexico), but the reformulation of its portfolio 
transformed its project pipeline. In the future, Goldcorp 
will expand the Red Lake mine and develop the Los Filos 
and Peñasquito mines in Mexico, the Eleonore mine in 
Canada and its share of the Pueblo Viejo project in the 
Dominican Republic. The Los Filos project came on 
stream in 2007 and will involve a production of 300,000 
ounces of gold a year for ten years. The Peñasquito mine 
is a US$ 1.2 billion project, which will work reserves of 
13 million ounces for 17 years. Also, 7.2 million of the 
Pueblo Viejo reserves of 18 million ounces belong to 
Goldcorp and will be mined over 20 years. The company 
is now in a position to finance many of its own projects 
internally. The new strategy is to focus on gold (67% 
of revenues in 2007; aiming for 74% in 2011) in the 
Americas (47% in Latin America in 2007 and 53% in 
the United States and Canada). With the exception of its 
share in the Alumbrero project in Argentina, Goldcorp’s 
focus in the region is very much on Mexico and Central 
America.
Barrick Gold 42 (seventy-third in the top 300) is 
the largest gold producer in the world, with 8.6 million 
ounces in 2006. The company specializes primarily in 
gold43 and focuses on maintaining a high quality project 
pipeline in order to retain its top position. It was created 
in 1983 and became a global leader by way of major 
acquisitions, including that of Placer Dome —another 
Canadian global top ten gold producer— in 2005. After 
selling many of the Canadian assets acquired with this 
purchase to Goldcorp, Barrick Gold’s exploration in 
North America (where the 37% of the firm’s proven and 
probable reserves are located) has focused on the Nevada 
mines and the Donlin Creek project, as well as Pueblo 
Viejo in the Dominican Republic.44 Latin America and 
the Caribbean has been a key area in past and present 
production and its position in the current project pipeline 
indicates that this will continue.
Barrick Gold’s international expansion began in South 
America in 1994, and was then extended to Australia and 
the Pacific in 1999 and Africa in 2001. Latin America 
and the Caribbean plays a very significant role in present 
production, including the Pierina (reserves: 1.2 million 
ounces of gold) and Lagunas Norte (reserves: 8.8 million 
ounces of gold) mines in Peru, the Zaldivar mine (reserves: 
2.5 million tons of copper) in Chile and the Veladero mine 
(11.4 million ounces of gold) in Argentina. The region 
will continue to be important given the significance in its 
pipeline of the Pascua Lama project (reserves: 17 million 
ounces of gold, with 689 million ounces of silver and 565 
million pounds of copper contained in the gold reserves) on 
the Chile-Argentina border (see box IV.7) and the Pueblo 
Viejo project (reserves: 18 million ounces of gold) in the 
Dominican Republic. 
In other words, the South American operations (total 
reserves: 38 million ounces of gold) and the Dominican 
Republic mine (reserves: 18 million ounces of gold) 
account for over half of Barrick Gold’s overall proven and 
probable reserves. The firm’s strategy seems to consist 
of maintaining its primary specialization in gold and to 
improve its competitiveness by maintaining a high quality 
project pipeline through major acquisitions and its own 
exploration efforts in existing sites (see figure IV.9). Latin 
America and the Caribbean is and will continue to be a 
significant component of this strategy.
Yamana Gold,45 which was a junior mining company 
only a few years ago, became an intermediate firm 
with a gold production of about one million ounces in 
2007 and gold reserves of 6.8 million ounces by way 
of a kind of reverse takeover followed by a series of 
acquisitions. A group of Brazilian and Canadian investors 
bought the original Yamana Gold Company, which had 
been created in 1994, and used their improved access 
to financing on the Toronto stock exchange to expand 
internationally.
42 Based on interviews at Barrick Gold headquarters in Toronto and its office in Santiago as well as Barrick Gold (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 
2006a, 2006b, and 2001).
43 Barrick Gold also possesses a significant copper mine in Chile, Zaldivar, which it acquired as part of Placer Dome in 2005.
44 The Dominican Republic mine is counted as part of the firm’s North American operations because of the technology used.
45 Based on interviews in company headquarters in Toronto and in São Paulo and Yamana Gold (2008, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2006 
and 2003). 
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Box IV.7
PASCUA LAMA: LITMUS TEST FOR BARRICK GOLD’S COMMITMENT TO RESPONSIBLE MINING
Pascua Lama sparked Barrick’s interest in 
1994 and since then the firm has invested 
over US$ 400 million in the project, even 
though it has yet to come into production. 
Today, the Pascua Lama project represents 
one of the company’s largest planned 
development projects ever. 
It is couched in the Chile-Argentina 
Mining Integration and Complementation 
Treaty of 2000 designed to promote mineral 
development in the two countries’ Andean 
border region. Since the reserves straddle 
the border and open pit technology will 
be employed, it was important to have 
both governments on board so that the 
mines could fully incorporate the border 
reserves. In 2001, Barrick Gold obtained 
the requisite environmental permits from the 
Chilean government; however, it decided to 
delay construction due to low commodity 
prices at the time. In 2004, with improved 
international commodity prices, Barrick 
decided to move ahead and applied for 
the requisite environmental permits in 
Argentina and requested a modification of 
the authorization in Chile. Both authorizations 
were received in 2006. Barrick estimates 
that the total investment will be between 
US$ 2.3 billion and US$ 2.4 billion and will 
generate 1,600 direct jobs in operations 
for 23 years, as well as 5,500 during the 
construction period.
The Pascua Lama project generated 
a fierce reaction from critics, who cited 
what they consider to be probable 
negative environmental, personal safety 
and community development impacts. 
Concern was expressed over the future 
of glaciers in the area (Estrecho, Los 
Amarillos, Amarillo and Guanaco, as well 
as the much smaller Esperanza, Toro 1 
and Toro 2), the contamination of ground 
water, the consequences of working at an 
altitude of 5,000 meters and the effects of 
transporting all materials to that altitude, 
and the impacts on the local communities 
in the area (in the municipalities of Alto 
del Carmen and Vallenar in Chile and 
the departments of Jachal, Iglesia and 
Capital in Argentina), where unemployment 
was high and infrastructure development 
was low.
Barrick, perhaps reflecting the legacy 
of mining in Canada and the public debates 
generated there, as well as its need to 
protect its global reputation, responded by 
reaffirming its commitment to “Responsible 
Mining” and by attempting to demonstrate 
this by taking concrete steps in both 
countries. It has invested in training and 
employment, water infrastructure, treatment 
and supply initiatives, provincial education 
programme assistance, telecommunications 
infrastructure support, agribusiness support, 
small business/entrepreneurial assistance, 
programmes to purchase from local suppliers 
and the like. Furthermore, Barrick plans to 
build a US$ 40 million wind farm in the region 
of Coquimbo, which will contribute up to 20 
megawatts of energy to Chile’s strained 
national power grid. Finally, in an undertaking 
that was more than symbolic action (with a 
cost of US$ 50 million), Barrick closed its El 
Indio mine in an environmentally acceptable 
(but not then legally required) manner.
In many ways, the Pascua Lama 
project will be a litmus test of Barrick Gold’s 
commitment to responsible mining.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Barrick, “Pascua-Lama: minería responsable”, Comunicaciones Barrick 
Sudamérica, Santiago, Chile, Ograma Impresores, 2007; “Minería responsable-trabajando en armonía con el medio ambiente y las comunidades”, Santiago, Chile, 
2007, unpublished and G. Puig, “Say ‘No’ to the project Pascua-Lama” 2007 [online] http://www.thepetitionsite.com.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Barrick Gold [onilne] http://www.barrickgold.com., 2007.
Yamana now possesses eight producing mines 
and five properties at development stage. The principal 
acquisitions were the San Andrés mine in Honduras, via 
the purchase of RNC Gold in 2006; the Jacobina mine in 
Brazil, with the acquisition of Desert Sun Mining in 2006; 
the Gualcamaya mine in Argentina, with the purchase of 
Viceroy in 2007; and a 12.5% share in the Alumbrera 
project in Argentina, as well as the Agua Rica property, 
with the acquisition of Northern Orion in 2007. Lastly, 
the El Peñon and Minera Florida properties in Chile and 
the troubled Esquel mine46 in Argentina were obtained by 
way of the purchase of Meridian Gold, also in 2007. 
In the process, Yamana Gold reorganized and is 
expanding its producing mines, such as El Peñon in Chile, 
which is raising production from 250,000 to 500,000 ounces 
per year (oz/yr), Chapada in Brazil (with reserves of 2.5 
million ounces), Jacobina in Brazil (with reserves of 1.2 
million ounces), São Francisco in Brazil (with reserves 
of 1.4 million ounces), Minera Florida in Chile (raising 
production to 120,000 oz/yr), in part financed by the 
income from the 12.5% participation in the Alumbrera 
mine in Argentina. The principal development projects 
include Gualcamaya in Argentina and São Vicente and C1 
46 On the basis of an interview with Yamana officials at their head office in Toronto, it appears that friction with the local authorities —due, among 
other things, to alleged arrogance on the part of Yamana (formerly Meridian) staff and the employment of Chilean nationals— eventually led 
the provincial authorities in San Juan to ban the use of cyanide in those mining operations, thereby forcing Yamana Gold to postpone the project 
until an understanding could be reached.
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Santa Cruz in Brazil. On this basis, organic growth will 
be more important for the firm in the future. Increasingly, 
Yamana Gold will focus exclusively on gold, mainly in 
three South American countries: Chile (40%), Argentina 
(30%) and Brazil (20%-25%). Thus, the region is central 
to this firm.
Kinross Gold 47 was created in 1993 from the 
merger of three companies. By 2006 it had grown 
into an intermediate with 1.65 million ounces of gold 
production, 43 million ounces of gold reserves and 
revenues in the order of Cdn$ 1 billion. It possessed 
nine mines in Canada, the United States, Brazil, Chile 
and Russia. Kinross Gold consolidated its holdings 
by acquiring Bema Gold, which brought it 50% of 
the Maricunga (ex-Refugio) mine in Chile, 49% of 
the Cerro Casale project in Chile and 75% of the 
Kupol project in Russia. Through an asset swap with 
Goldcorp, Kinross Gold obtained a 50% share of 
La Coipa in Chile plus cash, in exchange for its shares 
in the Porcupine and Musselwhite mines in Canada. 
This left Kinross with important operating mines, 
such as Paracatu in Brazil (16.3 million ounces in 
reserves), Round Mountain in the United States (1.9 
million ounces in reserves), Maricunga in Chile 
(5.4 million ounces in reserves), Fort Knox (2.7 
million ounces in reserves) and La Coipa in Chile 
(0.4 million ounces in reserves). It has also assembled 
a solid project pipeline with Kupol (Russia) at 413,000 
oz/yr, the Paracatu expansion (Brazil) with 557,000 
oz/yr and the Kettle River–Buckhorn project, with 
160,000 oz/yr, entering the construction stage. Several 
projects in Latin America are at the feasibility stage, 
such as Refugio Pancho and Cerro Casale (both in 
Chile), or the pre-feasibility stage, such as La Coipa 
Ladera Farellon (also in Chile), among others.
Kinross Gold’s production is concentrated in the 
United States (39%), Chile (26%), Brazil (16%), Canada 
(15%) and Russia (4%); however, most of its reserves 
are located in the Americas (38% in Chile and 37% in 
Brazil). The firm’s strategy now seems to revolve around 
organic growth in and around its best existing assets. In 
geographical terms, the company has four focal points, 
the Andean Cordillera, the Brazilian Craton, the North 
American Cordillera and Far East Russia. Thus, Kinross 
Gold is another Canadian gold mining company for 
which Latin America represents an important global 
portfolio component.
IAM Gold 48 became an intermediate mining company 
through the acquisition of Cambior in 2007, which lifted its 
gold production to about 1 million ounces and its reserves 
to 9.7 million ounces. Previously, the company possessed 
a mixture of assets: wholly-owned Canadian gold mines 
(Doyon Division, Sleeping Giant), the Niobec ferroniobium 
mine and a 1% royalty from Diavik Diamond Mines; a 
wholly-owned mine in Botswana; joint ventures in Mali 
(40% of Yatela and 38% of Sadiola); and minor interests 
in Ghana (18.9% of Tarkwa and 18.9% of Damang). 
The Cambior acquisition brought a 95% interest in the 
Rosabel mine in Suriname, which is now IAM Gold’s 
principal producing mine and has enabled the company 
to refocus its activities.
The expansion of the Rosabel mine is one of IAM 
Gold’s principal projects. In the project pipeline are three 
projects in South America (Camp Caiman in French Guiana, 
La Arena in Peru, Quimsacocha in Ecuador) as well as 
Buckreef in Tanzania and Westwood in Canada. Exploration 
expenditures in 2007 went mainly to South America (45%), 
Africa (30%) and North America (21%). In other words, the 
Cambior acquisition boosted IAM Gold to intermediate status, 
solidified its operations on three continents and shifted its 
focus towards Latin America and the Caribbean.
Silver Standard Resources 49 is a junior silver 
exploration company. It generated zero revenues in 2006 
but invested Cdn$ 39.4 million, possessed total assets of 
Cdn$ 471 million and controlled 107 million ounces of 
proven and probable silver reserves. It is a good example 
of a successful non-gold, precious metal exploration 
company that now faces the decision to either enter into 
production itself or sell off its finds and continue exploring. 
Silver Standard Resources possesses core properties in 
Argentina (Pirquitas, Diablillos), Australia (Bowden), 
Canada (Snowfield, Sulphurets, Silvertip and Sunrise lake), 
Chile (Challacollo), Mexico (Veta Colorada, Pitarrilla, 
and San Marcial), Peru (Berenguela and San Luis, a joint 
venture) and the United States (Candelaria, Shafter and 
Maverick Springs). Its reserves are found mainly in Latin 
America, with 39% in Mexico, 17% in Argentina, 8% in 
Peru and 2% in Chile, as are its principal development 
projects, namely, Piriquitas and Diablillos in Argentina, 
Pitarrilla in Mexico and the San Luis joint venture in Peru. 
Silver Standard Resources expects to be producing 9.7 
million oz/yr by 2009 and is thus another Canadian mining 
company hoping to gain intermediate stature on the basis 
of Latin American precious metal resources.
47 Based on Kinross Gold (2008, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2006).
48 Based on interviews in the company headquarters in Toronto and IAM Gold (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d and 2006).
49 Based on interviews in its office in Argentina and Silver  Standard Resources (2007a, 2007b, 2006). 
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Teck Cominco 50 (fifty-ninth in the top 300) is the 
world’s second largest producer of zinc and may be 
considered the Canadian global leader in base metals. 
Before they merged in 2001, Teck was primarily a 
mining company and Cominco a metals company. Their 
principal Canadian possession was a zinc smelter in 
Trail, British Columbia. They had a broad, if sporadic, 
production experience outside of North America, with 
mines in Thailand, South Africa, Spain and Australia, 
and smelters in India and Japan. They also had separate 
shares in Peruvian operations: the Cajamarquilla zinc 
refinery (Cominco) and a minority (22.5%) stake in the 
Antamina zinc and copper project (Teck), run by Xstrata 
and BHP Billiton. Recently, the company has worked 
towards greater geographical diversification and an 
expanded product mix.
In 2007, Teck Cominco dramatically increased 
its international presence with the acquisition of Aur 
Resources for Cdn$ 4.1 billion, which included two 
important copper mines in Chile (Quebrada Blanca and 
Andacollo). This raised the firm’s copper production by 
a significant 30% and added over 7 billion pounds of 
proved and probable reserves. Teck Cominco has extensive 
exploration experience in several parts of the world, but 
as of 2006 its exploration focus shifted towards Latin 
America. One third of its 2007 exploration budget of 
Cdn$ 90 million was to be spent in Latin America (15% 
in Brazil, 6% in Chile and Mexico, respectively, 4% in 
Peru and 2% in Argentina), the rest went mostly to Turkey 
(16%), Australia (10%) and the United States (10%). In 
fact, several large “potential” projects in the region have 
entered the pipeline, such as the Petaquilla (Panama) and 
San Nicolás (Mexico) copper projects, the San Nicolás 
(Mexico) zinc project and the Morelos (Mexico) gold 
project, in association with Goldcorp (see figure IV.10). 
Even so, with the exception of a copper concentrate mill 
in Chile, most of Teck Cominco’s committed projects are 
outside Latin America (the copper project at Lennard 
Shelf, Australia, the Highland Valley Coal expansion in 
Canada, and oils sands project in Fort Hills, Canada). 
Thus, the firm is shifting its focus towards Latin America; 
that will not be clearly noticeable at the production level, 
however, until the potential projects in the region enter 
into production.
Teck Cominco has achieved product diversification 
in the gold, nickel, diamond and Alberta oil sands 
projects. The Morelos mine in Mexico, Lobo Marte in 
Chile and options for the development of nickel activities 
at two sites in Brazil (Santa Fe and Araguaia) contribute 
to this strategy. 
Figure IV.10
TECK COMINCO’S PROJECT PIPELINE, 2007
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of R. Vance, “Corporate development”, 18 June 2007 [online] http://www.
teckcominco.com.
Teck Cominco thus appears to have taken advantage of 
current high international prices to move forward on several 
objectives, such diversifying its product mix and further 
internationalizing its resource base, particularly in Latin 
America. This company also stands out for its significant 
sustainable development efforts (see box IV.4).
PotashCorp 51 (ninety-ninth in the top 300) is Canada’s 
global leader in industrial minerals, particularly potash. It 
implemented a focused long-term strategy which rested 
primarily on maintaining its global market shares by 
building on its three principal competitive advantages: 
(i) its position as a low-cost potash producer controlling 
75% of global excess capacity; (ii) its cost advantages 
with regard to nitrogen, with access to low-cost natural 
gas and ammonia from Trinidad and Tobago thanks to 
long-term contracts to 2018; and, (iii) the high quality of 
its phosphate rock reserves for producing purified acid at 
a low cost. During 1990-1998 it consolidated its North 
American (including Trinidad and Tobago) operations, 
which consisted of potash production in Canada and feed 
supplement and nitrogen production in the United States 
(plus nitrogen in Trinidad and Tobago) through a series of 
acquisitions and investments. 
PotashCorp did not have a presence in Latin America 
and the Caribbean outside of Trinidad and Tobago until a 
Chilean chemical company, Soquimich (SQM), approached 
50 Based on interviews at Teck Cominco in Vancouver as well as Teck Cominco (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f, 2007g, 2007h, 2007i, 
2006a, 2006b and 2001).
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it during a period in which SQM was experiencing 
difficulties associated with pension fund turmoil in Chile. 
SQM is an integrated producer of specialty plant nutrients, 
iodine and lithium, which are obtained from its nine plants 
that process the caliche ore and solar brines found in the 
Atacama Salt Desert. As of 2001, PotashCorp. bought 
into SQM in successive purchases totaling over US$ 450 
million. In this manner, PotashCorp. established a presence 
in Latin America, which was consistent with its strategy to 
associate with foreign producers to cut transportation costs 
and diversify supply bases.52 Thereafter, to deal with high 
transportation costs, and in a context of overcapacity in potash, 
PotashCorp. made a series of strategic investments worth over 
US$ 1 billion outside of North America, inlcuding the 
establishment of a feed supplement factory in Brazil. 
In this fashion, PotashCorp. was able to compete very 
successfully in the global fertilizer market even though 
its international presence outside North America was 
relatively limited, consisting mostly of minority shares 
in selected strategic partners.
Methanex 53 (150th in the top 300) is another global 
leader, possessing a global market share of around 20% 
for methanol. Methanex is, formally speaking, a chemicals 
company; however, its corporate strategy is better understood 
from a natural-resource-seeking perspective. Only 8% of its 
sales come from Latin America and the Caribbean, but over 
90% of its production capacity is accounted for by operations 
in Chile (56%) and Trinidad and Tobago (35%), although 
new plants are coming on stream in Egypt and China. 
The Methanex operation in Chile is a US$ 1-billion-
plus investment located in the extreme south of the country, 
in Cabo Negro near Puntas Arenas, relatively close to the 
border with Argentina. The four methanol plants produce 
about 10% of world supply and represent Methanex’s 
largest low-cost production hub. This site is strategically 
located with regard to natural gas resources in Chile 
(40%) and Argentina (60%), distance from urban centres 
and infrastructure for exporting to Asia, North and South 
America and South Africa using primarily its own tanker 
fleet. The initial investment was facilitated by Chilean 
foreign investment rules, under Article 11bis of Decree 
Law 600. The Methanex methanol operation in Chile has 
been very successful but not without problems. In spite of 
a protocol on gas supplies signed by Chile and Argentina, 
when national supplies grew tight the Government of 
Argentina did not fully observe either the protocol or the 
firm’s contracts with Argentine suppliers and, moreover, 
applied an export tax to natural gas. Both of these factors 
significantly impacted the Chilean plants. Methanex (Chile) 
is examining two responses to these problems: first, to 
establish plants in Argentina to ensure direct access to 
Argentine natural gas supplies and, second, to associate 
with the Chilean National Petroleum Corporation (ENAP) 
to further develop natural gas supplies in Chile.
Thus, Latin America and the Caribbean is a very 
important region for Canadian mining companies and they 
have undertaken large investments there. Some of Canada’s 
global leaders in the mining industry are heavily involved 
in the region (Barrick Gold, Teck Cominco, Methanex) 
others less so (PotashCorp., Cameco). Several “rising star” 
Canadian mining companies owe a significant degree of 
their success to their investments in the region (Goldcorp, 
Kinross Gold, Yamana Gold, IAM Gold, Silver Standard 
Resources) and Canadian exploration companies continue 
to invest heavily there. In other words, mining is the single 
activity in which Latin America and the Caribbean is the 
most important region for Canadian OFDI.
The overview of Canadian mining companies 
operating in Latin America and the Caribbean would not 
be complete without a panorama of mining companies’ 
opinions of the region. The Fraser Institute conducts an 
annual survey of metal mining and exploration companies 
(Fraser Institute, 2007b), in order to assess how mineral 
endowments and public policy factors such as taxation 
and regulation affect exploration investment. The survey 
is sent to executives and exploration managers in mining 
and metal consulting companies operating around the 
world and covers 65 jurisdictions, including subnational 
ones (provinces, states, territories, and so forth) in Canada, 
Australia and the United States. The 2006-2007 survey listed 
Latin American countries as follows in the overall ranking: 
Chile (seventh), Mexico (eighth), Brazil (seventeenth), 
Peru (twentieth), Argentina (twenty-fourth), Ecuador 
(thirty-third), Colombia (forty-fifth), Bolivia (fifty-fourth) 
and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (sixty-third). One 
of sharpest divergences concerned “mineral potential 
assuming current regulations and land use restrictions”, 
in which 83%, 70% and 78%, respectively, of the replies 
for Chile, Mexico and Brazil were in the “Encourages 
investment” and “Not a deterrent to investment” options, 
whereas 55% and 67%, respectively, of responses for 
Bolivia and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela fell into 
the “Strong deterrent” and “Would not pursue investment 
due to this factor” categories. For this and other reasons, 
Chile has become a favourite of Canadian investors and 
officials (see box IV.8).
52 By 2007, PotashCorp. had obtained 44% of the A series shares and 17% of the B series shares; however, its individual voting share was limited 
to 37.5% of both series. The holders of A series elect 6 directors while the holders of B series elect only 1 director.
53 Based on interviews at the Methanex subsidiary in Chile and Methanex (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2006a and 2006b).
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Box IV.8
CANADA AND CHILE CONNECT
Canada and Chile have struck up a good 
relationship, in several ways. Investors 
have been pleased with their treatment 
in Chile, and not only in the mining sector 
(Barrick Gold, Teck Cominco, Goldcorp, 
Kinross Gold, Yamana Gold). Canada 
has become the source of a significant 
proportion of Chilean FDI: equivalent to 
16.4% of the stock of FDI in Chile during 
1974-2007 (to May) and 57.5% of the 
flow for 2006. Major non-mining investors 
included Brookfield Asset Management, 
Scotiabank, Ontario Teachers’ Pension 
Fund, Methanex and PotashCorp of 
Saskatchewan.
CANADA: FDI IN CHILE, 1974-2007
(Thousands of United States dollars)
a Provisional data for 2007 correspond to the period January-May. 
CANADA: INVESTMENT MECHANISM IN CHILE, 1974-2007
(Percentages)
Source: Foreign Investment Committee of Chile.
A number of companies were so 
satisfied with their operations in Chile 
that they made their offices in Chile into 
subregional offices, as was the case for 
Barrick Gold, Finning International, and 
SNC-Lavalin. This last company established 
its global Center of Excellence for Copper 
in Chile.
After NAFTA in 1994, the next FTA 
Canada signed was with Chile in 1997. 
During the negotiations for that FTA, 
Canadian and Chilean officials found they 
had much in common and that, in turn, led 
to significant cooperation in other settings, 
both multilateral (WTO work on investment 
in services) and hemispheric (the nine 
negotiating groups for the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas initiative). 
Thus, Canadian investors and 
government officials alike have had 
very positive experiences in Chile and 
with Chilean officials, leading to further 
cooperation in other areas, and this has 
brought the two countries closer.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Thus, Canadian natural-resource-seeking companies 
fall into two main categories. Oil and gas companies seem 
to have better opportunities elsewhere, including in the 
Alberta oil sands in Canada, and have largely vacated 
the region (with the partial exception of Colombia and 
Brazil), whereas mining companies, especially precious 
metal companies, continue to invest heavily there, 
although they clearly prefer certain national business 
environments over others within the region.
3.	 Canadian	companies	seeking	markets	(national	or	subregional)
The principal market-seeking investments by Canadian 
companies are found in the sectors of finance and asset 
management, other services directed at mining clusters, 
telecommunications and legal materials for lawyers, and 
manufactures.
Along with mining companies, Canadian banks or 
asset management companies represent the other major 
group of firms investing in the region in recent years. They 
have done so in order to offer their financial services in 
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Bank, or to acquire real estate or infrastructure assets in 
those markets, as has been the case for Brookfield Asset 
Management and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan. 
Scotiabank 54 is ranked thirteenth in Canada’s top 300 
list. It is the most international of the Big Six Canadian 
banks and has a major presence in several Latin American 
countries, such as Mexico, Chile, Peru, Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Costa Rica and El Salvador, as well as the 
Caribbean. About 43% of its net income from international 
activities is generated in the Caribbean Basin and Central 
America, and almost one third (32%) comes from Mexico. 
The remaining quarter comes from South America, Asia 
and other countries taken together.
NAFTA was an important factor in Scotiabank’s decision 
to expand in Mexico by acquiring a minority participation 
in Inverlat in 1994. The “tequila crisis” caused it to rethink 
its Mexico strategy, but the strong financial sector reform 
implemented there convinced the firm to remain in the 
country by acquiring a majority participation in Inverlat for 
US$ 215 million, which established its single largest operation 
outside of Canada. Scotiabank’s presence in Mexico (with 
1.4 million clients, 7,400 staff and net income of US$ 500 
million in 2007) fitted well with its new strategy to service 
“middle class” clients there. Its Mexican operations have been 
expanding at a rate of 100 branches a year, aiming to reach 
the 800-1000 level in order to compete on a better footing 
with the principal banks operating in the country.
In the rest of the region, Scotiabank has undertaken 
opportunistic asset acquisitions during the last decade 
or so. That strategy was not successful in Argentina, 
where the purchase of Banco Quilmes in the 1990s led to 
serious losses during the 2001-2002 crisis and numerous 
local clients were left stranded by Scotiabank’s hasty 
withdrawal. The new strategy in the region is to reach 
a minimum market share of 10% in each market, hence 
Scotiabank’s purchase in recent years of Banco del 
Desarrollo in Chile, Banco Wiese in Peru, Corporacion 
Interfin in Costa Rica, some of the Citicorp and BBVA 
assets in the Dominican Republic and Dehring Bunting 
& Holding in Jamaica. Scotiabank feels that it now has a 
competitive advantage in the region, since it has reached 
a critical mass of experienced employees and can thus 
contemplate better integration of its operations there.
Royal Bank of Canada (RBC)55 is ranked first 
in Canada’s top 300. It is less internationalized than 
Scotiabank in part because it closed down its large branch 
network and withdrew from many markets after being 
hurt by the sovereign and corporate debt crisis in the 
1980s. The Bank’s main presence in the region has been 
in the Caribbean where it maintained a retail presence and 
has its private banking headquarters. RBC has recently 
redefined Latin America as an important growth pole 
and is offering “intermediate-wealth” financial services 
for institutions, corporations and individuals mainly in 
Brazil, Mexico and Chile.
RBC recently undertook a major initiative to 
expand its presence in the Caribbean by purchasing its 
former subsidiary, RBTT, which had been nationalized 
in Trinidad and Tobago in 1987, for over US$ 2 billion. 
That acquisition included assets in Jamaica, Netherlands 
Antilles and Costa Rica, which will help RBC broaden 
its existing footprint in the Caribbean Basin (Bahamas, 
Cayman Islands and Barbados). In this fashion, RBC 
becomes the fourth largest bank in the Caribbean, with 
over US$ 13 billion in assets there, after Scotiabank (see 
figure IV.11). 
Figure IV.11
PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE CARIBBEAN, 
BY TOTAL ASSETS, 2006
(Billions of United States dollars)
54 Based on interviews at Scotiabank headquarters in Toronto and Scotiabank (2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2006).
55 Based on interviews at Royal Bank of Canada headquarters in Toronto and Royal Bank of Canada (2007a, 2007b, 2007c and 2006).
56 Based on interviews in Brookfield Asset Management headquarters in Toronto and Brookfield Asset Management (2007a, 2007b, 2006).
57 The Ontario Teachers Pension Plan is not found in the Canadian top 300 because it is a public sector entity, nonetheless, it is relevant to consider 






























































































Source: Royal Bank of Canada, “RBC and RBTT: a new Caribbean leader”, 2 October 
2007 [online] http//www.rbc.com; Scotiabank, official site 2007 [online] http//
www.scotiabank.com.
Brookfield Asset Management (BAM) 56, ranked 
sixty-eighth in Canada’s top 300 list, and Ontario 
Teachers’ Pension Plan 57 are both providers of financial 
services. The major differences between them lie in their 
corporate strategies, internationalization processes and 
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risk management policies. BAM has possessed a solid 
base in Brazil since its creation, in the form of Brascan, 
of which it currently owns 60%. Brascan held assets of 
over US$ 700 million in real estate (4.8 million leasable 
square feet), infrastructure (15 hydroelectric generating 
stations with an installed capacity of 249 MW) and natural 
resources before its recent acquisitions, which included 
15 malls for about US$ 2 billion and a hydroelectric 
plant, Itiquira Energetica S.A., for US$ 288 million, 
which increased its renewable energy footprint in Brazil 
to 451 MW. Brookfield recently established a “Chilean 
Transmission Fund”, with the acquisition of Transelec 58 
from HydroQuebec for over US$ 2 billion, which brought 
assets in the form of over 8,000 kilometres of transmission 
lines and 51 power stations in Chile. Thus, BAM has 
a long history in Latin America, where it is among the 
principal Canadian investors, and its recent acquisitions in 
Brazil and Chile are among the region’s largest registered 
investments.
Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP)59 is involved 
in a broader base of activities, across more countries and 
in a more passive but higher-risk manner than BAM, as 
discussed in box IV.6. Its assets in the region were recently 
extended with the purchase of sanitary companies in Chile, 
namely Esval (for US$ 570 million), Essbio (for US$ 340 
million) and Aguas Nuevo Sur del Maule (ANSM). 
Unlike BAM, which invests directly and with partners 
in the businesses in which it has developed expertise; 
OTPP prefers to purchase local management along with 
physical assets.
Box IV.9
PENSION PLAN INTERNATIONALIZATION VIA OFDI: MANAGING RISK IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
58 Based on interviews in Transelec (Brookfield Asset Management subsidiary) in Chile as well as Transelec (2007 and 2006). 
59 This section is based on interviews at Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan headquarters in Toronto as well as Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan (2007a, 
2007b, 2007c and 2006).
The Ontario Teachers Pension Plan 
(OTPP) is not found in the Canadian 
top 300 list because it is a public sector 
entity; nonetheless, it is relevant for this 
analysis because of the manner in which 
it manages risk. OTPP and Brookfield 
Asset Management (BAM) look similar in 
structure and risk management policies, but 
they are not. They both possess property, 
infrastructure and natural-resources 
assets; in fact, the property arm of OTPP 
—Cadillac Fairview— is a rival of the BAM 
property division. Also, OTPP and BAM 
are direct competitors for the acquisition 
of infrastructure assets around the world. 
Nonetheless, there are important differences 
in the way that the two companies operate, 
expand internationally and manage risk.
While both attempt to bring a long-term 
perspective to their investments, OTPP 
is under more pressure to obtain results. 
OTPP is responsible for one of the largest 
payrolls in Canada: it paid out Cdn$ 3.8 
billion in benefits to retired teachers in 2006, 
which was more than double the amount it 
received from contributions. It is Canada’s 
largest single-profession pension plan, with 
Cdn$ 106 billion in net assets as of the end 
of 2006. OTPP represents 271,000 active 
and retired teachers in Ontario. The Plan’s 
funding position is based on the present value 
of the fund’s inflows, derived from investment 
income from its assets and contributions, 
and its outflows, represented by current and 
future pension payments (or obligations). 
It was the perceived shortfall in pension 
asset returns that drove OTPP to shift to 
actively managing its own assets in 1997, 
saving the 3% commission previously paid 
to intermediaries and upping returns from 
its direct investment. The maturity outlook of 
the Plan’s risk management will always be 
conditioned by the pension pay-out profile, 
which is not the case for BAM.
OTPP has a geographical asset 
distribution not all that dissimilar to that of 
BAM, with a focus on Canada (42%), the 
United States (20%), and Europe (22%). 
The main difference is in emerging countries 
where OTPP has a widespread presence 
based on relatively little previous experience 
whereas BAM concentrates on the region 
where it has long-term experience: Latin 
America, particularly Brazil.
Another big difference is that OTPP 
tends to regard its direct investments as 
if they were bonds and expects them 
to perform as such. It purchases local 
management while playing down country 
and other risks, such as regulatory and 
environmental ones. In contrast, BAM limits 
its investment to those activities in which 
it has developed strong expertise and it 
is directly involved in their management. 
Moreover, BAM receives both direct returns 
from the investment and fees from its 
partners for managing them.
Finally, OTPP tends to take on more 
very large, high-stakes investments. This 
is demonstrated by the 2007 purchase 
of Bell Canada, the national telephone 
operator, for about Cdn$ 35 billion. In an 
era in which national telecoms operators are 
consolidating worldwide due to increased 
competition and reduced earnings, OTPP 
seems to be undertaking a notably 
countercyclical strategy. 
In other words, OTPP and BAM 
demonstrate very different ways of 
operating, expanding internationally and 
managing risk.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of interviews at Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan headquarters, Toronto; Ontario 
Teacher’s Pension Plan (OTPP), official website 2007 [online] http//www.otpp.com; “OTPP to acquire interest in two Chilean water companies”, Press release, 15 May 
2007 [online] http//www.otpp.com; “OTPP completes purchase of interests in Chilean water utilities”, Press release, 27 August 2007 [online] http//www.otpp.com and 
Annual Report, 2006, Toronto.
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Canadian financial institutions, be they banks such as 
Scotiabank or Royal Bank or asset managers like BAM 
or OTPP, have recently undertaken major investments in 
Latin America and the Caribbean running into billions of 
dollars, which has propelled them up the list of the top 
10 Canadian investors in the region, along with a number 
of mining companies.
Other Canadian service companies have also been 
active market-seeking investors in the region in activities 
associated with mining clusters, telecommunications and 
legal materials for lawyers. Some of the best examples 
are Finning International, SNC-Lavalin, Nortel Networks 
and Thomson Corp.
Finning International 60 is ranked eighty-first in 
Canada’s top 300 and is a major dealer in Caterpillar 
equipment for the mining, construction, petroleum and 
forestry industries. One of its three global operations 
—Finning International South America (FINSA)— is 
located in Chile and provided 20% of Finning International’s 
2006 revenues and 28% of its earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT). This operation began with the acquisition of 
the machinery division of a local company (Gildemeister) 
in 1993, to which operations in Argentina, Uruguay and 
Bolivia were added in 2003. The FINSA operation now 
consists of three marketing units (mining, machinery 
and power systems), three service units and an extensive 
consumer service network with 24 branches, including 18 
on-site branches, two component rebuild centers, two parts 
distribution centers and 12 CAT rental stores. FINSA has 
experienced spectacular growth with revenues rising from 
US$ 445 million in 2002 to over US$ 1 billion in 2006 and 
the number of employees growing from 1,817 to 3,860 
over the same period. In 2006, FINSA revenues came 
from consumer support services (47%), new equipment 
(39%), power and energy (7%), used equipment (4%) and 
rental equipment (3%) demonstrating its strategy to shift 
toward higher-margin customer support services.
FINSA is very well positioned to take advantage 
of the commodity boom in the countries in which it has 
operations. It encompasses 60% of the machinery and 
power systems market and 95% of mining, where Komatsu 
is its only rival. Sales in 2005 were concentrated in Chile 
(71.3%) and Argentina (25.5%) with small contributions 
from Bolivia (2.6%) and Uruguay (0.6%). Revenues in 
Chile come mainly from mining (68%) and machinery 
(22%). In Chile, where there are 50 long-term mining 
operations, FINSA has long-term contracts with mining 
60 Based on interviews at Finning International subsidiary in Chile and Finning International (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2006a, 2006b and 
2000).
61 Based on a telephone interview with SNC-Lavalin headquarters in Canada, an interview in SNC-Lavalin subsidiary in Chile and SNC-Lavalin 
(2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2006, 2005, 2004 and 2000).
majors like BHP Billiton, XStata, Barrick Gold, Phelps 
Dodge and AngloAmerican, as well as the State mining 
company, Codelco, and intermediates like Antofagasta 
Minerals and Kinross Gold. In the other markets, sales 
come mainly from machinery. Thus, FINSA is one of 
the three global operations of Finning International and 
its performance has been impressive.
SNC-Lavalin 61 is ranked seventy-ninth in Canada’s 
top 300. It is the Canadian global leader in engineering 
and construction and has a worldwide presence (with 
offices in 34 countries and activities in more than 100). 
Although the revenue generated in Latin America and 
the Caribbean fell from 9% of total revenue in 2000 to 
3% in 2006, that situation is now changing owing to the 
new interest shown in mining activities. The Mining and 
Metallurgy Division of SNC-Lavalin followed its clients 
(Barrick Gold, Noranda, Falconbridge, and so forth) to 
South America. In 1995, the firm acquired a local company 
in Chile, BYT Ingenería y Construcción, and merged it 
with another acquisition in Canada, Kilborn, that same 
year. The office in Santiago was responsible for Chile, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay and it has worked on 
at least four major projects with clients, such as the State 
copper company, Codelco, and precious and base metal 
majors such as Barrick Gold, BHP Billiton, Aur Resources 
(now part of Teck Cominco) and AngloAmerican. The 
office in Chile was eventually transformed into SNC-
Lavalin’s Center of Excellence for Copper, its first such 
centre outside of Canada, reflecting the rising importance 
that the firm is giving to mining and to Latin America. 
Its international copper projects (Egypt, Australia and 
Spain) are administrated from the Santiago office in its 
capacity as Center of Excellence for Copper. 
In 2006, SNC-Lavalin acquired its associate in 
Brazil, Minerconsult Engenharia, in order to establish 
a larger presence there. With that firm, SNC-Lavalin 
had won a US$ 100 million engineering procurement 
and construction management (EPCM) contract with 
AngloAmerican Brasil Ltda for a new ferronickel mine. 
SNC-Lavalin’s increased presence in Brazil also permits 
closer coordination with CVRD, the Brazilian iron ore 
major that acquired INCO, a Canadian global leader, in 
2006. SNC-Lavalin is even considering establishing its 
Center of Excellence for Iron Ore in Brazil. Thus, Latin 
America is playing a more important role in the activities 
of the Mining and Metallurgy Division of SNC-Lavalin, 
if not the company as a whole.
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Nortel Networks 62 is ranked thirty-third in Canada’s 
top 300 and is a global leader in telecommunications 
equipment; however, it has fallen upon hard times 
since the ‘dot.com’ meltdown, coupled with increasing 
competition for manufacturers in the information and 
communication technology industry. Like others in 
its industry, it is currently morphing from a telecoms 
equipment manufacturer into a telecoms solutions provider, 
whereby it offers combinations of equipment (produced 
by CM) and services. For that reason, it is analysed as 
a market-seeker in the region rather than the efficiency-
seeker that it used to be.
Nortel has been present in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a service provider since the 1980s. The 
company set up offices in several countries in the region, 
including manufacturing facilities in the larger markets in 
the mid-1990s to take advantage of the telecommunications 
boom. Like other companies in its industry (see chapter 
II), Nortel has gradually shed its manufacturing facilities 
and started outsourcing to contract manufacturers for the 
provision of equipment. In parallel, it has established 
service and client development centres in several countries, 
as well as R&D facilities. In 2006, Nortel’s sales in Latin 
America and the Caribbean reached US$ 631 million, 
about 5% of its total revenues of US$ 11.4 billion. Mexico 
and Brazil are Nortel’s largest markets in the region, but 
the market represented by its Caribbean companies taken 
together in fact surpasses that of Brazil. 
Nortel has been in Brazil since 1990, investing to 
produce equipment for telecoms networks and corporate 
telecommunications. Since 2007, as part of the global 
trend towards outsourcing, Nortel (Brazil) handed 
production over to contract manufacturers. It now focuses 
on selling equipment (especially optic network equipment) 
—both produced locally by contract manufacturers and 
imported— and providing support and services related 
to that equipment, under two business models: in the 
corporate market, Nortel works with partners that sell 
to corporations; in the network market, it sells directly 
to the telecommunications operators. The firm considers 
that regulatory issues have held back further investment 
in Brazil. 
The recent experience of Nortel in Argentina is 
also worth mentioning. Economic crises and regulatory 
issues have held back telecoms investment in the country 
for lengthy periods. Between crises, Nortel has often 
been able to rapidly modernize its assets on the basis 
of technology that is more sophisticated even than in 
parts of Europe and North America, facilitating migration 
to “third generation” (3G) services (see chapter III). 
Nevertheless, the firm has found that regulatory issues 
remain in Argentina as well. 
Thomson Corp.63 is ranked sixty-second in Canada’s 
top 300 and is the global leader in information services. 
Several new divisions were created during the firm’s 
remaking as it shifted from newspapers and the leisure 
travel business, including Thomson Learning and the 
Thomson Legal and Regulatory Division. Thomson Learning 
represented what little presence Thomson had in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, with offices in Mexico, Brazil 
and Argentina; however, that division was divested in 2006. 
Thomson Legal and Regulatory Division consisted of two 
business groups: North American Legal and International 
Legal and this maintained Thomson Corp’s presence in 
Latin America by way of the La Ley acquisition made in 
Argentina over the 1997-2000 period.
La Ley was a well-known and prestigious company that 
had provided legal information and software to lawyers for 
over 60 years. With the entry of Thomson, La Ley received 
a technological boost that brought it more firmly into the 
electronic information age and it enjoyed strong growth 
until the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002. In fact, Thomson’s 
influence was central to the survival and recovery of La 
Ley during this troubled period. With Thomson’s office 
in Spain, La Ley became the core of the Iberoamerican 
segment of the International Legal Division. Even so, the 
importance of Latin America in Thomson’s international 
assets is relatively minor. That could change dramatically, 
however, with Thomson’s acquisition of Reuters, which 
possesses a stronger presence in the region. 
Lastly, Bombardier’s Transportation Division in 
Brazil does not produce in the country but possesses a 
service centre where it adapts, updates and refurbishes 
train and subway wagons. A market for these services 
exists in Brazil because although the Brazilian train fleet is 
well-maintained, it is relatively old, requiring the kind of 
technological updating and refurbishing that Bombardier 
provides locally. Most of the sales of this Brazilian 
subsidiary are provided solely to Brazilian clients as the 
Argentine market is serviced from Bombardier facilities 
in Europe. 
Thus, market-seeking Canadian service companies have 
become very active in Latin America and the Caribbean 
over the last decade or so. Because of the magnitude of 
their recent investments, financial institutions in the form 
of banks, such as Scotiabank and Royal Bank, or asset 
62 Based on interviews at Nortel subsidiaries in Argentina and Brazil and Nortel Networks (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d and 2006).
63 Based on an interview with the Thomson subsidiary in Argentina and Thomson Corporation (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2006 and 2000).
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managers, such as Brookfield Asset Management and 
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund, have shot up the list of 
Canadian foreign investors in the region. Less dramatic, but 
of much significance, have been the expanding activities 
and presence of Canadian market-seeking companies 
servicing the mining cluster (Finning International and 
SNC-Lavalin), telecommunications (Nortel Networks) and 
other activities (Thompson Corp. and Bombardier). 
Canadian manufacturers have also been important 
market-seeking investors in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Prime examples include Quebecor World, 
McCain Foods, Magna International and Agrium.
Quebecor World 64 is ranked seventieth in Canada’s 
top 300 and is a global leader in the publishing and 
printing industry. It undertook serious restructuring after 
2002; nonetheless, it has faced a very difficult crisis in 
2007-2008. Its efforts to shift to lower-cost production 
sites in Mexico in the context of NAFTA did not seem 
to pay off as expected. In the company as a whole, the 
number of operating facilities and staff levels declined 
and Quebecor World was forced to merge its European 
operations with Roto Smeets De Boer. Usually only 3%-4% 
of Quebecor World’s total revenue is generated in Latin 
America;65 nonetheless, those assets have continued to 
perform relatively well.
In spite of the relatively poor results in Mexico, in 
the 1990s Quebecor World invested in plants in Argentina 
and Chile, which were accompanied by operations in 
Peru, Colombia and Brazil after the 2001-2002 crisis in 
Argentina. A new greenfield plant was then opened in 
Mexico. The strategy was to establish a Latin American 
network to minimize individual country risk. These 
operations are coordinated from the Argentina office 
but compete internally. Since books and many published 
materials (but not paper and other inputs, such as used 
machinery) enter most Latin American countries tariff- 
and tax-free, Quebecor World was able to assemble a kind 
of product-level “free trade agreement” allowing greater 
flexibility and specialization within its network based on 
shared production scheduling, communication and problem-
solving within a context of individual profit centres. One 
Mexican plant focused on telephone directories, mostly 
for the North American market, as did the Recife plant in 
Brazil. The Colombian operation focused on books and 
the Chilean plant specialized in magazines and flyers. 
The Argentine and Peruvian facilities maintained mixed 
production according to the variable demand faced by 
the company. The relative success of the Latin American 
operations compared to those in North America and 
Europe represents a quandary for the plants in the region 
because the parent company’s weak financial situation 
might oblige it to sell off its Latin American operations to 
its major competitors in the United States (Donnelly) or 
Europe (Spanish publishers), both of whom are looking 
to expand their presence in the region in order to reduce 
the costs of their Spanish-language products.
McCain Foods 66 is ranked seventy-fifth in Canada’s 
top 300 and is the global leader in frozen French fries. 
McCain Foods entered South America at the invitation of 
McDonalds,67 which was expanding in the region in the 
early 1990s, although it was internally a difficult decision 
given the history of instability and economic crisis in the 
region (Stoffman, 2007, p. 206). McCain used its tried-and-
true method of exporting to establish a position in the local 
market, then following up by demonstrating the advantages 
of frozen French fries to the local food industry, before 
building a plant. McDonalds accounted for 90% of sales in 
the region at first; however, that share had fallen to 30% by 
2007 as sales to small chains, independent restaurants and 
school cafeterias surged. The decision to locate the plant 
in Argentina rather than Brazil (favoured by McDonalds) 
was based on the belief that potatoes could not be grown 
efficiently in Brazil and that Argentina’s geographical 
conditions —more similar to Canada’s— were more 
favourable for local production. McCain Foods set up one of 
its biggest plants in Balcarce (400,000 metric tons of potato 
which gives 200,000 metric tons of final product), large 
enough to export to neighbouring markets, Brazil (70% of 
production), Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile (and, sometimes, 
Colombia, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and South 
Africa). As well as contracting local suppliers, McCain 
Food developed twenty-four sites of fifty hectares each on 
its farm of 23,000 hectares in the south of Argentina (Rio 
Negro) and was soon processing about 10% of Argentina’s 
potato production. Demand was so strong that it expanded 
the plant in 1996, 1997 and 2000, investing a total of 
US$ 160 million in the operation, including the original 
US$ 20 million. McCain Foods’ success in Argentina led 
64 Based on interviews at Quebecor World subsidiary in Argentina and Quebecor World (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2006 and 2002).
65 That figure has risen to around 8% recently because the non-Latin American revenues are shrinking.
66 McCain Foods is not listed on a stock exchange and the amount of publicly-available information is therefore limited. This analysis is based on 
interviews at McCain Foods subsidiary in Argentina, McCain Foods (2007) and Stoffman (2007).
67 McDonalds offered McCain Foods an open price calculation with an agreed return on investment; however, McCain Food insisted on all costs 
plus a pre-agreed and guaranteed profit margin for a larger-scale plant (Stoffman, 2007, p. 173).
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to additional smaller investments in Colombia68 (US$ 25-
US$ 30 million) and Chile (a “flakes” plant) and the 
company is now contemplating a plant in Brazil close to 
São Paulo to save on transportation costs.
All this is not to say that the Argentine plant has 
not faced serious problems: the financial crisis and 
huge devaluation of 2001 caused it to miss its mid-term 
production targets. More recently, the shortage and 
cost of natural gas and electricity have disrupted the 
production process, as have unusual climatic problems 
Even so, the McCain Foods operation in Argentina has 
won it market share throughout the region and especially 
in the Southern Cone.
Agrium 69 is ranked ninety-fourth in Canada’s top 
300. In 1995 the company decided upon a course of 
internationalization and set a target of one sixth of its 
assets outside of North America by 2000. Argentina, 
with one of the most fertile agricultural bases in the 
world, was selected for this initiative. In 1996, Agrium 
acquired 18 retail centres there to form Agroservicios 
Pampeanos S.A. It went ahead with a project to establish 
a joint venture called Profertil S.A. with Repsol YPF, 
the Spanish petroleum company with many assets 
in Argentina, to build an ammonia and urea plant in 
the Bahia Blanca petrochemical complex. That plant 
came on stream in 2001 and was the world’s largest 
manufacturing plant for urea granules with production 
at 1.1 million tons per year. In 2005, Agrium acquired 
12 more retail farm centers in Argentina, four in Chile 
and two in Bolivia. Thus, the firm was putting into 
practice its internationalization plan with Argentina at 
the centre of that activity.
The Agrium operations have encountered certain 
difficulties. First, the 2001-2002 economic crisis and 
subsequent devaluation in Argentina caused some distress 
to those assets, mainly with regard to foreign trade. Second, 
the gas shortages in Argentina as of 2005 resulted in the 
stoppage of urea production for a time as national regulators 
gave priority to residential consumption. Nevertheless, 
these operations seem to have weathered the storm and 
Agrium’s retail activities continue to expand outside of 
Argentina to neighboring markets in the Southern Cone. 
These operations are central to Agrium’s internationalization 
outside of North America.
Magna International 70 is ranked tenth in Canada’s 
top 300 and is one of the country’s main efficiency-seeking 
manufacturers. Its largest international investments go 
increasingly to establish export platforms in low-cost 
countries for the automotive industry. That part of its 
operations will be examined in the next section on 
efficiency-seeking activities; this part looks at Magna 
International’s two independent plants in Brazil, Magna 
Closures do Brazil, and Litens, part of its Tesma Division, 
which are more properly viewed as market-seeking 
operations. Both companies were set up at the end of the 
1990s and are located in the State of São Paulo, close 
to their main clients (automobile producers or system 
providers).71 Magna Closures’ operations in Brazil focus 
almost exclusively on the local market, with minor exports 
limited to neighbouring Argentina and, sporadically, to 
Italy. Unlike Mexico, where NAFTA has facilitated the 
establishment of low-cost export platforms to supply 
the North American automobile industry, Brazil’s 
higher-cost automobile industry is primarily for local 
consumption, so local suppliers have basically market-
seeking operations.
Celestica 72 is ranked forty-fifth in Canada’s top 300 
and is another efficiency-seeking company with a market-
seeking investment in Brazil. Like other manufacturers in 
Brazil, production is mostly for sale on the local market 
and, only in a secondary manner, for regional exports. 
The company plant is located in the State of São Paulo, 
close to airports that bring in imported components and 
to the facilities of some of the major Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs): Celestica also undertakes the 
surface-mounting stages of production for OEMs requiring 
to take advantage of Brazilian fiscal incentives for local 
production (see chapter II).
In sum, Canadian market-seeking investors have 
become very active in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Services, more than manufactures, have been the focus 
of the recent boom in market-seeking investments. Major 
investments by banks, such as Scotiabank in Mexico 
and South America and Royal Bank in the Caribbean, 
and asset managers, like Brookfield Asset Management 
in Brazil and Chile and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 
in Chile, have led the way. Market-seeking service 
providers, such as Finning International in the Southern 
68 The Colombian plant is smaller (40,000 metric tons) and located close to Bogotá. It was designed to serve the local market using a different 
potato.
69 Based on Agrium (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2006a, 2006b and 2000).
70 Based on Magna (2007, 2006) and interview at its officies in Brazil.
71 Another plant, belonging to the Decoma division (bumpers, front ends, and so on) was set up in Minas Gerais, linked to Mercedes’ Class A 
product line. This line was unsuccessful, however, so when Mercedes closed it down in 2005, Decoma also left.
72 Based on interviews at Celestica subsidiary in Mexico and Celestica (2008, 2007a and 2007b) and Onex (2007a and 2007b).
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Cone, SNC-Lavalin in Chile and Brazil, Nortel in Brazil 
and Argentina, Bombardier in Brazil, and Thomson in 
Argentina, have a notable presence. Market-seeking 
manufacturers are represented by Quebecor World in 
the large and mid-sized markets, McCain Foods and 
Agrium in Argentina and Magna International and 
Celestica in Brazil. After natural-resource-seeking 
(mining), market-seeking OFDI thus constitutes a 




Efficiency-seeking OFDI by Canadian manufacturing 
companies in Latin America and the Caribbean took 
off with the signing of NAFTA in 1994, five years after 
Canada entered into a free trade agreement with the 
United States. Those two agreements revolutionized 
manufacturing activities in Canada, eliminating the need 
for “branch plants” by United States investors in Canada 
and opening up the Canadian manufacturing sector to 
more international competition. This was particularly 
true for the automotive and transportation equipment 
industries, as well as electronics and apparel, among 
others, in which lower-cost operations in Mexico and, 
in some cases, Caribbean Basin countries were used 
to heighten the efficiency of Canadian manufacturers’ 
operations.
Magna International 73 is ranked tenth in Canada’s top 
300. It is a global leader in auto parts, having succeeded 
in breaking into North American supply chains before 
expanding globally. As well as producing a wide array of 
auto parts, it assembles complete vehicles for OEMs. In 
Latin America, Magna International possesses 15 efficiency-
seeking plants in Mexico and two market-seeking plants 
in Brazil (see above). The Mexican operations account 
for 14% of Magna’s total employees but only 6.6% of 
sales. The firm was obliged to set up efficiency-seeking 
operations in Mexico, not only to reduce its own costs but 
also to accompany many of its traditional United States 
automobile TNCs (such as DaimlerChrysler, GM and 
Ford), which established assembly plants in the country 
to lower production costs and thus compete better against 
Asian companies in the North American market. Even so, 
the principal Asian auto TNCs, such as Toyota, Honda 
and Hyundai, continued to gain market share in North 
America, which hurt the United States auto TNCs and 
their main suppliers, of which Magna International is 
one. Fortunately, the firm was able to stay viable on its 
global operations. This case of another Canadian auto parts 
manufacturer, Linamar, was rather different, however. 
Linamar 74 is ranked 145th in Canada’s top 300. 
Though a global leader, it is much less internationalized 
than Magna International, since 73% of its sales come 
from its Canadian operations. Its five plants in Mexico 
accounted for 8.1% of sales and its sales volume there 
rose from US$ 92 million in 2001 to US$ 186 million in 
2006. Linamar has made acquisitions in Mexico, such as 
Federal Mogul’s camshaft plant in Saltillo in 2002, and 
some of Ford’s assets more recently, and has set up new 
greenfield operations. Linamar is expanding its operations 
in Europe and Asia in an attempt to attain a global presence 
in order to compete better in the industry.
Bombardier 75 is ranked twenty-sixth in Canada’s top 
300 and is a global leader in the manufacture of vehicles 
for air and rail transportation. Even though Bombardier’s 
principal products are usually considered mid- to high-
technology and safety standards require certification by 
authorities in the importing country, the company has 
established efficiency-seeking operations in Queretaro, 
Mexico in order to reduce the cost of the components 
that it assembles. Bombardier’s subsidiary, Bombardier 
Recreational Products (ranked 137th in Canada’s top 
300) has also established an efficiency-seeking operation 
in Juarez, Mexico. 
Thus, Mexico has been selected by numerous efficiency-
seeking Canadian companies looking to establish export 
platforms to feed the North American market with their 
auto parts and transportation equipment. 
73 Based on Magna (2007, 2006).
74 Based on Linamar (2007, 2006a, 2006b and 2002).
75 Based on Bombardier (2007a, 2007b, 2007c and 2002), Los Angeles Times (2007) and The Wall Street Journal (2007b).
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The electronics industry is also undergoing a strong 
globalization process in which Canadian companies 
have attempted to compete better by establishing export 
platforms in Mexico. In fact, the competition is so strong 
that some have been obliged to leave manufacturing to 
focus on services (Nortel Networks) or to specialize in 
electronic manufacturing services (Celestica).
Nortel Networks,76 ranked thirty-third in the top 300, 
no longer assembles its telecoms equipment in its own 
efficiency-seeking plants in Mexico; rather, it contracts out 
this work, mostly to Flextronics. Thus, Nortel Networks’ 
operations in Mexico have shifted from efficiency-seeking 
plants to the provision of telecommunications services. 
Nortel’s major research and development centres are 
found in Canada (3), United States (4), Europe (3) and 
Asia (1). There are none in Latin America.
Celestica,77 which is ranked forty-fourth in the top 
300, was a global leader in electronics manufacturing 
services and has faced increasingly difficult times, as noted 
earlier. Celestica is a highly internationalized electronics 
manufacturing services (EMS) company whose centre 
of gravity has shifted firmly towards Asia, as its North 
American and European sales have weakened. While 15% 
of its sales and 11% of its assets are still in Mexico, the 
firm’s export platform there appears not to have improved 
efficiency to the extent expected. 
Thus, as in the case of autoparts and transportation 
equipment a number of efficiency-seeking Canadian 
companies chose Mexico to establish export platforms 
to feed the North American market with their electronic 
products, especially telecommunications equipment; 
however, the competitive advantages they found there 
were not enough to provide the injection of vigour they 
were looking for.
Lastly, in sharp contrast to the efficiency-seeking 
Canadian companies mentioned in the auto parts, 
transportation equipment and electronics industries, is 
Gildan Activewear (GA), an apparel manufacturer.78 It does 
not rank in the top 300 (although it is the largest Canadian 
apparel firm by revenue); however, it is considered a global 
leader in apparel. Created in 1984, Gildan Activewear 
(GA) initially manufactured textiles and produced and 
sold finished fabric as a principal product line. In 1992 
its strategy was reconfigured to focus exclusively on the 
manufacture and sale of activewear for the wholesale 
imprinted sportswear market. At present, it specializes 
in the large-scale marketing and manufacturing of basic, 
non-fashion apparel products for customers requiring an 
efficient supply chain and consistent product quality for 
high-volume, automatic replenishment programmes. In 
2005, GA implemented a retail market initiative to sell 
its existing activewear products to United States and 
Canadian regional retailers without logos or decoration 
and to expand its product line into underwear and basic 
athletic socks.
GA has yielded a strong performance: its sales rose 
from Cdn$ 329 million to Cdn$ 773 million between 
2001 and 2006 and its total assets rose to Cdn$ 723 
million over the same period. By 2006 revenue, the firm’s 
main products are T-shirts (77%), fleece products (14%), 
sport shirts (6%) and underwear and socks (3%); and its 
principal markets were the United States (88%), Canada 
(6.5%) and Europe (5.5%). Notably, GA possessed 49% 
of the market for T-shirts and 44% for fleece in the United 
States screen printer sales channel.
GA built its success on efficiency-seeking 
internationalization of its production system. In order 
to be globally cost-competitive, it expanded its textiles 
operations in the Caribbean Basin, using its Canadian 
operations to produce shorter-run, higher-value product 
lines. That implied restructuring its Canadian and United 
States manufacturing operations and establishing a lower-
cost production system in the Caribbean Basin. In 2005, the 
yarn-spinning plants at Long Sault, Ontario and Montreal, 
Quebec, were closed and that activity transferred to the 
United States. As of end-2006, GA closed its textile 
manufacturing facility in Valleyfield, Quebec and reduced 
the operations of its knitting facility in Montreal, Quebec 
and cutting facility in Bombay, New York. GA announced 
the closure and downsizing of its sock manufacturing 
capacity in North Carolina and Virginia.
In the Caribbean Basin, GA established an integrated 
production system which consisted of 40 directly or 
indirectly wholly-owned subsidiaries. Furthermore, it 
constructed an integrated knitting, bleaching, dyeing, 
finishing and cutting facility in the Dominican Republic 
to complement its established plant in Honduras and one 
planned for Nicaragua. It is also building two integrated 
world-scale facilities for fleece and athletic socks beside 
its Honduran plant. GA added three new sewing operations 
76 Based on interviews at Nortel subsidiaries in Argentina and Brazil and Nortel Networks (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d and 2006).
77 Based on interviews at Celestica subsidiary in Mexico and Celestica (2008, 2007a and 2007b) and Onex (2007a and 2007b).
78 Based on Gildan (2007, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2001).
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at Choloma and Villanueva, Honduras; Rivas, Nicaragua 
and Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The firm supplements this 
production system by using third-party contractors in the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti. Altogether, during 2004-
2006, GA invested Cdn$ 220 million in its manufacturing 
and distribution operations. 
In sum, GA radically revised its strategy in order to 
survive and prosper in the extremely competitive apparel 
industry. Vertically-integrated manufacturing operations 
allowed it to provide a combination of competitive prices 
and premium quality products and to deliver superior 
value to customers. The firm was able to price its products 
competitively thanks to the reduction of operating costs. This 
was accomplished in three ways: (i) investing in modern, 
automated equipment and facilities; (ii) increasing capacity 
through the development of integrated regional hubs in 
the Caribbean Basin, where it benefited from strategic 
locations and favourable international trade agreements; 
and (iii) focusing on producing a narrow range of basic, 
high-volume product lines in order to maximize production 
efficiencies. Notably, this was achieved in a manner quite 
uncommon for apparel operations in the Caribbean Basin: 
GA was the only vertically integrated basic activewear 
apparel manufacturer —and one of only eight apparel 
companies worldwide— to receive accreditation from the 
Fair Labor Association.
Thus, efficiency-seeking OFDI in Latin America 
and the Caribbean by Canadian companies became more 
relevant with NAFTA and other measures freeing trade in 
apparel in the Caribbean Basin. The experience of some 
of the major Canadian electronics companies, such as 
Nortel Networks and Celestica, suggests that the NAFTA 
benefits did not compensate for the hyper-competitiveness 
of Asian firms in the North American market. Something 
similar seems to be taking place in the automotive industry, 
in which Canadian auto parts suppliers are still largely 
dependent on United States auto TNCs, such as GM, Ford 
and Chrysler, which are losing market share to Asian 
competitors, such as Toyota, Honda and Hyundai. While 
the apparel industry is usually considered to be even more 
dislocated by Asian competition, one Canadian company 
—Gildan Activewear— has proved an exception, by 
successfully establishing efficiency-seeking activities 
in the Caribbean Basin in order to compete better in the 
North American market. 
Briefly then, Canadian companies have implemented 
different strategies in Latin America and the Caribbean 
in their efforts to seek natural resources, markets, or 
efficiency. Mining companies have traditionally led the 
way in the region with huge investments in base metals 
(Teck Cominco) and more recently, precious metals 
(Goldcorp, Barrick Gold, Yamana Gold, Kinross Gold 
and IAM Gold), taking advantage of the commodity 
boom. Huge acquisitions by mining TNCs seem to be 
replacing exploration as a means of obtaining the quality 
projects needed to feed their project pipelines, although 
exploration by Canadian juniors is at an all-time high. 
Banks (Scotiabank and Royal Bank) seeking markets 
for their financial services and asset management 
companies (Brookfield Asset Management and Ontario 
Teachers’ Pension Plan) looking for markets for their 
infrastructural and real estate activities have undertaken 
very large investments in the region in the last few years. 
There are other market-seeking investments in services 
(Finning International, SNC-Lavalin, Nortel Networks, 
Thomson and Bombardier), but of a smaller magnitude. 
Relatively little new investment has come from Canadian 
oil and gas companies, which seem to focus on investment 
opportunities in North America. In manufacturing, 
natural-resource-based activities (Methanex and Agrium) 
and market-seeking investments (McCain Foods and 
Quebecor World,) seem to have adapted well, although 
there have been no major new investments in the most 
recent period. With the exception of Gildan Activewear, 
efficiency-seeking manufacturers (Magna International, 
Linamar, Bombardier, Nortel, and Celestica) have not 
done particularly well in their Mexican or Caribbean 
Basin operations. No evidence of strategic-asset-seeking 
investments was encountered in the region. 
Generally speaking, however, although the Latin 
American and Caribbean region is an increasingly important 
destination for Canadian OFDI, this investment has not 
been of an integrating type that could draw Canada and 
the region closer. Little of the market-seeking OFDI has 
been for the purpose of integrating operations in the region 
(Scotiabank and Quebecor World might be exceptions) and 
few of the Canadian firms’ holdings in the region represent 
an important part of their overall assets (mining companies 
are the exception here, as is Gildan Activewear). Efficiency-
seeking investments involve mostly Mexico and a few 
Caribbean Basin countries and focus solely on the North 
American market. Canada and Chile developed a special 
relationship on the basis of shared interests, as is evident 
in their FTA and cooperation in multilateral (WTO) and 
hemispheric (FTAA) forums; however, this has been more 
of an exception than a rule for Canada in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. In other words, Canadian OFDI in 
Latin America and the Caribbean tends to be sporadic and 
opportunistic and the Canadian government has not been 
able to sustain particularly close bilateral or hemispheric 
relations with the majority of the countries. Even so, Canadian 
companies and their business practices generally enjoy a 
favourable reputation in the region, especially as regards 
the strong tendency of Canadian companies to hire local 
managers and provide them with opportunities to advance 
within the corporate framework.
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5.		 Final	reflections
Latin America and the Caribbean became more important 
for Canada when it became clear that the Canadian 
development trajectory needed to expand beyond the 
North American market. In recognition of that fact, a 
new Secretariat for the Americas was created in 2007 
within the Canadian Department of External Affairs and 
International Trade. The question that remains is: “What 
exactly is Canada currently pursuing in the region?”
In the 1970s Canadian officials gave much thought 
to the decision of whether to join the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and thereby give greater priority 
to Latin America and the Caribbean. They wanted to avoid 
being caught in the middle in any confrontations between 
the United States and Latin American and Caribbean 
countries or being seen as promoting an essentially United 
States agenda in the region. In spite of the risks, Canada 
took the decision to join the OAS. 
It was not until 20 years later, however, that Canada 
began to seriously implement more active policies in 
the region. These new policies were coherent with 
Canada’s multilateral trade and investment initiatives at 
the time in WTO and OECD and its bilateral initiatives 
in terms of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
FTAs. As in the world at large, those initiatives in Latin 
America and the Caribbean found both eager and less 
eager partners. Willing partners were found for BITs 
(Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Ecuador, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Panama, Uruguay 
and Costa Rica) and FTAs (Mexico, Chile and Costa 
Rica). The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
initiative reflected Canada’s interest in playing a major 
role in redefining the integration of the Latin American 
and the Caribbean region into the Americas, basically 
in a NAFTA-style framework. The FTAA negotiations 
were suspended in 2005 in part because as some partners 
pulled out over what they considered overly generous 
rules to protect and promote foreign investment.79 To a 
certain extent, Canada found itself in the very situation 
that it had wanted to avoid when it joined OAS, as it 
was viewed in some quarters as promoting an essentially 
United States agenda in the region. 
Although FTAA has ground to a halt, there are new 
possibilities for Canada in the region since it softened 
its stance on investment protection. The Canadian 
government has apparently re-evaluated its previous 
position on investment in light of its own experiences 
with Chapter 11 of NAFTA and as a result the failure of 
the MAI initiative of OECD, among others. After a hiatus 
of eight years, Canada signed its first Foreign Investment 
Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPA), with Peru, 
in 2006 and is negotiating others with India and China. 
The FIPA modality has been interpreted as diluting some 
of the previous protection modalities and avoiding some 
of the controversies that have arisen in existing BITs, and 
therefore as offering a more acceptable package for major 
developing country recipients of FDI.
Canada would do well to pursue a genuinely Canadian 
agenda in the region. As well as following its normal trade and 
investment interests and priorities, the Canadian government 
might consider sharing some of its experiences with the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Canada’s FTA experience 
with the United States is directly relevant to the actions or 
intentions of several of the region’s countries. Canada’s national 
debate on the mining industry has had global repercussions 
which are also pertinent to the region (Government of Canada, 
2007c; Canadian Intergovernmental Working Group on the 
Mineral Industry, 2006) and the country’s debate on the future 
of the manufacturing industry is similarly useful (Canadian 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association, 2005). The new 
process of the Competition Policy Review Panel created by 
the Ministries of Industry and Finance, which will report on 
June 30 2008, is also illustrative (Government of Canada, 
2007b). Lastly, the way the Canadian government’s thinking 
has evolved with regard to both FDI and OFDI is relevant, 
especially now that Latin American and Caribbean FDI in 
Canada is growing considerably (Government of Canada, 
2007a and Ste-Marie, 2007). These areas, among others, could 
form the basis for new dialogue and two-way cooperation 
between Canada and more of the region’s countries in 
the context of the new policies being implemented by the 
Secretariat of the Americas of the Canadian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
79 Brazil had negotiated 14 BITs, but the Brazilian Congress did not ratify them. Argentina became embroiled in a host of investor-State dispute 
settlement proceedings as a result of its severe economic crisis, which cooled the environment. Subsequently, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador disowned all or parts of the investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms provided in their BITs. 
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Annex
Table IV-A-1
CANADA’S TOP 300 COMPANIES, BY REVENUE, 2006
(Thousands of Canadian dollars)
Rank Revenue Company and year-end Ownership Listed on 
stock market
Industry
1 36 045 000 Royal Bank of Canada (Oc06) National Yes Banks
2 34 194 000 Manulife Financial (De06) National Yes Life insurance
3 33 340 112 General Motors of Canada (De06) Foreign No Automotive
4 32 301 000 George Weston (De06) National Yes Food stores
5 30 767 000 Power Corp. (De06) National Yes Management companies
6 30 273 000 Power Financial (De06) National Yes Finance and leasing
7 28 651 000 Loblaw Companies (De06) National Yes Food stores
8 27 334 000 Great-West Lifeco (De06) National Yes Life insurance
9 24 277 000 Sun Life Financial (De06) National Yes Life insurance
10 24 257 000 Magna International (De06) a National Yes Automotive
11 23 641 000 Alcan Inc. (De06) a National Yes Integrated mines
12 23 514 000 Imperial Oil (De06) Foreign Yes Integrated oils
13 22 482 000 Bank of Nova Scotia (Oc06) National Yes Banks
14 22 302 000 Toronto-Dominion Bank (Oc06) National Yes Banks
15 22 227 000 Manufacturers Life Insurance (De06) National Yes Life insurance
16 21 317 000 Great-West Life Assurance (De06) National Yes Life insurance
17 20 166 000 CIBC (Oc06) National Yes Banks
18 20 097 000 Onex Corp. (De06) National Yes Management companies
19 18 670 000 Petro-Canada (De06) National Yes Integrated oils
20 18 153 000 Bank of Montreal (Oc06) National Yes Banks
21 17 771 000 BCE Inc. (De06) National Yes Telephone utilities
22 17 348 000 Bell Canada (De06) National No Telephone utilities
23 16 768 000 EnCana Corp. (De06) a National Yes Oil and gas producers
24 15 830 000 Suncor Energy (De06) National Yes Integrated oils
25 15 226 000 DaimlerChrysler Canada (De06) f Foreign No Automotive
26 14 973 000 Bombardier Inc. (Ja07) a National Yes Transportation equipment 
and components
27 14 806 000 Shell Canada (De06) Foreign No Integrated oils
28 13 192 900 Empire Company (My06) National Yes Food stores
29 12 900 000 Honda Canada (Ma06) Foreign No Automotive
30 12 853 300 Sobeys Inc. (My06) National Yes Food stores
31 12 698 000 Husky Energy (De06) Foreign Yes Integrated oils
32 11 643 000 Cdn. Natural Resources (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
33 11 602 000 Nortel Networks (De06) a National Yes Telecommunications
34 11 152 800 Jean Coutu Group (PJC) (My06) a National Yes Specialty stores
35 10 945 900 Metro Inc. (Se06) National Yes Food stores
36 10 932 600 Enbridge Inc. (De06) National Yes Oil pipelines
37 10 687 000 ACE Aviation Holdings (De06) e Foreign Yes Management companies
38 10 168 800 Alimentation Couche-Tard (Ap06) a National Yes Food stores
39 10 164 000 Air Canada (De06) Foreign Yes Transportation
40 9 862 000 Novelis Inc. (De06) a National Yes Metal fabricators
41 9 838 900 Quebecor Inc. (De06) National Yes Publishing and printing
42 9 547 000 Talisman Energy (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
43 9 049 005 Costco Wholesale Canada (Se06) Foreign No Department stores
44 8 850 000 Rogers Communications (De06) National Yes Telecommunications
45 8 817 100 Celestica Inc. (De06) a National Yes Electrical and electronic
46 8 693 300 Telus Corp. (De06) National Yes Telephone utilities
47 8 567 000 Imperial Oil Resources (De06) Foreign No Oil and gas producers
48 8 379 000 Canada Life Financial (De06) National Yes Life insurance
49 8 269 100 Canadian Tire (De06) National Yes Specialty stores
50 8 123 000 London Life Insurance (De06) National No Life insurance
51 8 075 000 Ford Motor Co. of Canada (De06) a Foreign No Automotive
52 7 786 436 Shoppers Drug Mart (De06) National Yes Specialty stores
53 7 727 000 Canadian National Railway (De06) National Yes Transportation
54 7 699 000 TransCanada Pipelines (De06) National Yes Gas pipelines
55 7 699 000 TransCanada Corp. (De06) National Yes Management companies
56 7 529 000 Syncrude Canada (De06) National No Oil and gas producers
57 7 336 502 McKesson Canada (De06) Foreign No Wholesaler
58 7 275 000 Ultramar Ltd. (De06) a Foreign No Integrated oils
59 6 974 000 Teck Cominco (De06) National Yes Integrated mines
60 6 964 331 Hudson’s Bay Co. (Ja06) Foreign No Department stores
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Table IV-A-1 (continued)
Rank Revenue Company and year-end Ownership Listed on 
stock market
Industry
61 6 803 700 Fairfax Financial Holdings (De06) a National Yes Property and casualty 
insurance
62 6 665 000 Thomson Corp. (De06) a National Yes Miscellaneous services
63 6 524 000 Nova Chemicals (De06) a National Yes Chemicals
64 6 500 000 Katz Group (Ja06) National No Specialty stores
65 6 475 000 National Bank of Canada (Oc06) National Yes Banks
66 6 300 000 Jim Pattison Group (De06) National No Management companies
67 6 267 000 IBM Canada (De06) Foreign No Electrical and electronic
68 6 261 000 Brookfield Asset Management (De06) a National Yes Management companies
69 6 100 000 Home Depot Canada (Ja07) Foreign No Specialty stores
70 6 096 000 Quebecor World (De06) a National Yes Publishing and printing
71 5 950 300 Sears Canada (De06) Foreign Yes Department stores
72 5 898 244 Maple Leaf Foods (De06) National Yes Food processing
73 5 873 000 Barrick Gold (De06) a National Yes Precious metals
74 5 677 400 Dofasco Inc. (De06) Foreign No Steel
75 5 552 962 McCain Foods (Ju06) National No Food processing
76 5 463 900 Canada Safeway (De06) a Foreign No Food stores
77 5 458 000 Nexen Inc. (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
78 5 361 000 CVRD Inco (De06) a Foreign No Integrated mines
79 5 190 814 SNC-Lavalin Group (De06) National Yes Contractors
80 5 067 000 Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. (De06) National Yes East coast forestry
81 5 047 649 Finning International (De06) National Yes Wholesaler
82 4 944 528 Best Buy Canada (Ma07) Foreign No Specialty stores
83 4 937 900 Industrial Alliance Ins. & Fin. Svs. (De06) National Yes Life insurance
84 4 693 000 RBC Capital Markets (Oc06) National No Investment houses
85 4 670 000 Rogers Wireless (De06) National No Telecommunications
86 4 600 000 Home Hardware Stores (De06) National No Specialty stores
87 4 589 200 Canadian Pacific Railway (De06) National Yes Transportation
88 4 582 700 Canfor Corp. (De06) National Yes West coast forestry
89 4 579 809 Gerdau Ameristeel (De06) a Foreign Yes Steel
90 4 551 936 Rona Inc. (De06) National Yes Specialty stores
91 4 473 094 Cargill Ltd. (My06) Foreign No Wholesaler
92 4 406 376 ING Canada (De06) Foreign Yes Property and casualty 
insurance
93 4 226 199 Zellers Inc. (Ja06) National No Department stores
94 4 209 000 Agrium Inc. (De06) a National Yes Chemicals
95 4 191 202 PCL Construction Group (Oc06) National No Contractors
96 4 025 028 Saputo Inc. (Ma06) National Yes Food processing
97 4 017 000 Domtar (Canada) Paper (De06) National Yes East coast forestry
98 4 000 000 Dow Chemical Canada (De05) Foreign No Chemicals
99 3 892 500 PotashCorp. of Saskatchewan (De06) a National Yes Chemicals
100 3 808 758 Ipsco Inc. (De06) a National Yes Steel
101 3 719 664 West Fraser Timber (De06) National Yes West coast forestry
102 3 667 000 Westcoast Energy (De06) Foreign Yes Gas pipelines
103 3 566 490 TD Mortgage (Oc06) National No Trust savings and loan
104 3 484 875 CGI Group (Se06) National Yes Consulting
105 3 411 000 Tembec Inc. (Se06) National Yes East coast forestry
106 3 403 000 Cascades Inc. (De06) National Yes East coast forestry
107 3 402 000 Tembec Industries (Se06) National No East coast forestry
108 3 307 416 AVIVA Canada (De06) Foreign No Property and casualty 
insurance
109 3 227 700 Desjardins Fin. Scty. Life Assurance (De06) National No Life insurance
110 3 215 000 HSBC Bank Canada (De06) Foreign Yes Banks
111 3 202 000 Rogers Cable (De06) National No Cable
112 3 089 220 Research In Motion (Ma07) a National Yes Telecommunications
113 3 078 800 Enbridge Gas Distribution (De06) e National No Gas utilities
114 3 012 400 Quebecor Media (De06) National No Cable
115 3 000 000 Pratt & Whitney Canada (De06) Foreign No Transportation equip. 
and components
116 2 998 469 Agricore United (Oc06) National Yes Agriculture
117 2 941 300 Epcor Utilities (De06) National No Electrical utilities
118 2 925 600 Atco Ltd. (De06) National Yes Management companies
119 2 896 785 GMAC of Canada (De06) Foreign No Finance and leasing
120 2 792 800 TransAlta Corp. (De06) National Yes Electrical utilities
121 2 780 000 BMO Capital Markets (Oc06) National No Investment houses
122 2 748 900 Bell Aliant Regional Comm. (De06) National No Telephone utilities
123 2 743 414 CanWest Global Communications (Au06) National Yes Broadcasting
124 2 701 000 Canadian Oil Sands Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
125 2 700 600 Russel Metals (De06) National Yes Wholesaler
126 2 690 680 McDonald’s Restaurants of Cda. (De06) Foreign No Food services
127 2 685 814 Standard Life Assurance of Cda. (De06) Foreign No Life insurance
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Table IV-A-1 (continued)
Rank Revenue Company and year-end Ownership Listed on 
stock market
Industry
128 2 623 989 Transat A.T. (Oc06) National Yes Transportation
129 2 660 000 CIBC World Markets (Oc06) National No Investment houses
130 2 614 134 Shaw Communications (Au06) National Yes Cable
131 2 604 598 IGM Financial (De06) National Yes Investment companies
132 2 600 000 Kruger Inc. (De06) National No East coast forestry
133 2 500 779 BMMC (Oc06) National No Trust savings and loan
134 2 488 900 Canadian Utilities (De06) National Yes Electrical utilities
135 2 430 626 Mitsui & Co. (Canada) (Ma07) e Foreign No Wholesaler
136 2 388 000 Scotia Capital (Oc06) National No Investment houses
137 2 361 200 Bombardier Recreational Prod. (Ja06) National No Misc. consumer products
138 2 320 794 E-L Financial (De06) National Yes Property and casualty 
insurance
139 2 300 000 Nissan Canada (Ma06) Foreign No Wholesaler
140 2 300 000 Siemens Canada (Se06) Foreign No Electrical and electronic
141 2 292 186 Nestle Canada (De06) Foreign No Food processing
142 2 288 112 Provident Energy Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
143 2 271 000 TD Securities (Oc06) National No Investment houses
144 2 264 823 Toronto Hydro (De06) National No Electrical utilities
145 2 264 795 Linamar Corp. (De06) National Yes Transportation equip. 
and components
146 2 264 300 Superior Plus Income Fund (De06) National Yes Wholesaler
147 2 237 444 ATI Technologies (Au05) a Foreign No Electrical and electronic
148 2 196 000 Transcontinental Inc. (Oc06) National Yes Publishing and printing
149 2 149 500 Penn West Energy Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
150 2 117 848 Methanex Corp. (De06) a National Yes Chemicals
151 2 081 000 Union Gas (De06) Foreign Yes Gas utilities
152 2 044 416 Co-operators General Insurance (De06) National Yes Property and casualty 
insurance
153 2 042 161 Addax Petroleum (De06) a Foreign Yes Oil and gas producers
154 2 027 700 Terasen Inc. (De06) Foreign No Gas utilities
155 2 025 872 Gaz Métro Limited Partnership (Se06) National Yes Gas pipelines
156 2 007 869 Gaz Métro (Se06) National No Gas utilities
157 1 955 918 Economical Mutual Insurance (De06) National No Property and casualty 
insurance
158 1 955 900 Algoma Steel (De06) National Yes Steel
159 1 949 608 CTVglobemedia (No06) c National No Broadcasting
160 1 944 850 Cinram International I.F. (De06) a National Yes Misc. industrial products
161 1 942 000 Brookfield Properties (De06) a National Yes Property management 
and investment
162 1 931 900 Manitoba Telecom Services (De06) National Yes Telephone utilities
163 1 916 355 Kingsway Financial Services (De06) a National Yes Property and casualty 
insurance
164 1 914 524 GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (De06) Foreign No Biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals
165 1 914 013 Wawanesa Mutual Insurance (De06) National No Property and casualty 
insurance
166 1 900 000 Tolko Industries (De06) National No West coast forestry
167 1 885 600 Catalyst Paper (De06) Foreign Yes West coast forestry
168 1 879 404 Cameco Corp. (De06) National Yes Integrated mines
169 1 849 900 Fording Canadian Coal Trust (De06) National Yes Misc. mines
170 1 831 000 Stelco Inc. (De06) c Foreign Yes Steel
171 1 817 807 TD Meloche Monnex (Oc06) National No Property and casualty 
insurance
172 1 807 230 Ensign Energy Services (De06) National Yes Oil and gas field services
173 1 794 847 TransForce Income Fund (De06) National Yes Transportation
174 1 788 300 Goldcorp Inc. (De06) a National Yes Precious metals
175 1 773 718 WestJet Airlines (De06) National Yes Transportation
176 1 772 900 Cott Corp. (De06) a National Yes Food processing
177 1 771 936 Aliant Telecom (De05) National No Telephone utilities
178 1 771 168 Dorel Industries (De06) a National Yes Misc. consumer products
179 1 768 622 Toromont Industries (De06) National Yes Wholesaler
180 1 745 472 Extendicare Inc. (De06) National Yes Medical services
181 1 724 349 Great A&P Tea Co. (Canada) (Fe06)ac Foreign No Food stores
182 1 719 565 AXA Canada (De06) Foreign No Property and casualty 
insurance
183 1 701 800 Bowater Cdn. Forest Products (De06) Foreign No East coast forestry
184 1 700 629 Royal Group Technologies (De05) d Foreign No Misc. industrial products
185 1 676 096 CCS Income Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas field services
186 1 670 000 Mazda Canada (Ma05) Foreign No Wholesaler
187 1 650 452 Nordic Insurance Co. of Canada (De06) National No Property and casualty 
insurance
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Table IV-A-1 (continued)
Rank Revenue Company and year-end Ownership Listed on 
stock market
Industry
188 1 610 433 Intrawest ULC (Ju06) a Foreign No Lodging
189 1 595 091 Enerplus Resources Fund (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
190 1 588 305 Harvest Energy Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
191 1 580 237 Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (Jl06) e National Yes Agriculture
192 1 545 300 Cdn. Tire Petroleum (De06) National No Specialty stores
193 1 536 850 Lloyd’s Underwriters (Canada) (De06) Foreign No Property and casualty 
insurance
194 1 531 774 Unilever Canada (De06) Foreign No Misc. consumer products
195 1 528 340 Torstar Corp. (De06) National Yes Publishing and printing
196 1 525 300 Terasen Gas (De06) Foreign No Gas utilities
197 1 500 000 Canpotex Ltd. (De06) National No Wholesaler
198 1 481 691 Royal & Sun Alliance Canada Grp. (De06) Foreign No Property and casualty 
insurance
199 1 476 954 Fortis Inc. (De06) National Yes Electrical utilities
200 1 457 509 Flint Energy Services (De06) National Yes Oil and gas field services
201 1 444 000 Desjardins General Ins. Grp. (De06) National No Property and casualty 
insurance
202 1 442 488 Cara Operations (Ap06) National No Food services
203 1 439 287 Precision Drilling Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas field services
204 1 436 855 Aviva Insurance Co. of Canada (De06) Foreign No Property and casualty 
insurance
205 1 425 000 Direct Energy Marketing (De06) b Foreign No Gas utilities
206 1 423 700 CU Inc. (De06) National Yes Gas utilities
207 1 411 059 Uniprix Group (De06) National No Specialty stores
208 1 408 416 Northbridge Financial (De06) National Yes Property and casualty 
insurance
209 1 407 754 Canetic Resources Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
210 1 401 000 Cascades Boxboard Group (De06) National No Packaging and containers
211 1 393 779 Mittal Canada (De06) Foreign No Steel
212 1 386 743 Jazz Air LP (De06) National No Transportation
213 1 384 400 St. Lawrence Cement Group (De06) Foreign Yes Cement and concrete
214 1 381 250 Parmalat Canada (De06) f Foreign No Food processing
215 1 380 989 Yellow Pages Income Fund (De06) e National Yes Publishing and printing
216 1 375 318 Highland Valley Copper (Ja06) National No Metal mines
217 1 375 300 Lear Canada (De06) a Foreign No Automotive
218 1 368 523 Keyera Facilities Income Fund (De06) e National Yes Oil and gas producers
219 1 362 604 AltaGas Income Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
220 1 347 000 Purolator Courier (De06) National No Misc. services
221 1 335 351 Canada Bread (De06) National Yes Food processing
222 1 330 082 Brick Group Income Fund (De06) e National Yes Specialty stores
223 1 329 515 Wolseley Canada (Jl06) Foreign No Wholesaler
224 1 309 500 Videotron Ltee (De06) National No Cable
225 1 264 847 SSQ Financial Group (De06) National No Life insurance
226 1 263 955 Forzani Group (Ja07) National Yes Specialty stores
227 1 261 390 RBC Life Insurance (De06) National No Life insurance
228 1 259 800 ARC Energy Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
229 1 255 000 Norbord Inc. (De06) a National Yes East coast forestry
230 1 253 225 CitiGroup Finance Canada (De06) Foreign No Finance and leasing
231 1 250 750 National Bank Financial (Oc06) d National No Investment houses
232 1 232 861 Pengrowth Energy Trust (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
233 1 231 000 Mercedes-Benz Canada (De05) Foreign No Wholesaler
234 1 222 000 Univar Canada (De06) Foreign No Wholesaler
235 1 216 435 CCL Industries (De06) National Yes Packaging and containers
236 1 216 000 Rogers Media (De06) National No Broadcasting
237 1 212 314 Energy Savings Income Fund (Ma06) National Yes Gas utilities
238 1 206 524 Wajax Income Fund (De06) National Yes Wholesaler
239 1 206 055 Dundee Corp. (De06) National Yes Finance and leasing
240 1 202 200 Alliance Atlantis Communications (De06) e National Yes Broadcasting
241 1 202 000 Iron Ore Co. of Canada (De06) Foreign No Steel
242 1 200 000 Norampac Inc. (De06) National No Packaging and containers
243 1 199 866 Parkland Income Fund (De06) National Yes Specialty stores
244 1 195 000 Sony of Canada (Ma07) Foreign No Wholesaler
245 1 185 600 Emera Inc. (De06) National Yes Management companies
246 1 185 045 HudBay Minerals (De06) National Yes Integrated mines
247 1 179 789 Taiga Building Products (Ma06) National Yes Wholesaler
248 1 178 968 NAV Canada (Au06) National No Transportation
249 1 178 037 Dominion of Cda. Gen. Ins. (De06) National No Property and casualty 
insurance
250 1 172 559 Xerox Canada (De06) Foreign Yes Electrical and electronic
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Table IV-A-1 (concluded)
Rank Revenue Company and year-end Ownership Listed on 
stock market
Industry
251 1 167 000 Hyundai Auto Canada (De05) Foreign No Automotive
252 1 152 000 MDS Inc. (Oc06) National Yes Medical services
253 1 150 000 Bell ExpressVu (De06) National No Broadcasting
254 1 149 500 Sherritt International (De06) National Yes Integrated mines
255 1 129 135 LionOre Mining International (De06) a National Yes Metal mines
256 1 125 417 Uni-Sélect Inc. (De06) National Yes Wholesaler
257 1 125 206 Security National Insurance (De06) National No Property and casualty 
insurance
258 1 115 774 Aecon Group (De06) National Yes Contractors
259 1 114 100 CAE Inc. (Ma06) National Yes Transportation equip. 
and components
260 1 111 607 Inmet Mining (De06) National Yes Integrated mines
261 1 103 269 First Quantum Minerals (De06) a National Yes Metal mines
262 1 099 728 Biovail Corp. (De06) a National Yes Biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical
263 1 090 000 Fluor Canada (De06) a Foreign No Contractors
264 1 071 141 Retirement Residences REIT (De05) National No Medical services
265 1 070 833 FirstService Corp. (Ma06) a National Yes Miscellaneous services
266 1 069 604 KCP Income Fund (De06) a National Yes Misc. consumer products
267 1 069 185 ShawCor Ltd. (De06) National Yes Oil and gas field services
268 1 067 618 Canada Trust (De06) National No Trust savings and loan
269 1 056 100 ING Bank of Canada (De06) Foreign No Banks
270 1 055 223 Noranda Income Fund (De06) Foreign Yes Mining services
271 1 055 065 Reitmans (Canada) (Fe07) National Yes Clothing stores
272 1 054 170 EllisDon Inc. (Fe05) National No Contractors
273 1 052 506 MDA Ltd. (De06) National Yes Computer software and proc.
274 1 052 100 TransAlta Utilities (De06) National No Electrical utilities
275 1 051 900 Allstream Inc. (De06) e National No Telecommunications
276 1 051 335 BASF Canada (De06) Foreign No Chemicals
277 1 031 000 AstraZeneca Canada (De06) a Foreign No Biotech. and pharmaceutical
278 1 016 352 CHC Helicopter (Ap06) National Yes Transportation
279 1 013 197 Harris Steel Group (De05) Foreign No Metal fabricators
280 1 013 000 Compass Group Canada (Au06) Foreign No Food services
281 1 011 038 Inter Pipeline Fund (De06) National Yes Oil pipelines
282 1 011 000 Western Forest Products (De06) e National Yes West coast forestry
283 1 010 644 Laurentian Bank of Canada (Oc06) National Yes Banks
284 1 008 800 Ivanhoe Cambridge (De06) National No Property management 
and investment
285 1 004 445 Amex Bank of Canada (De06) Foreign No Banks
286 1 004 167 Cognos Inc. (Fe07) a National Yes Computer software and proc.
287 1 003 287 Mullen Group Income Fund (De06) National Yes Transportation
288 990 942 Pharmasave Drugs (National) (De05) National No Specialty stores
289 979 100 Nova Scotia Power (De06) National Yes Electrical utilities
290 961 200 Mackenzie Financial (De06) National No Investment companies
291 960 404 Lions Gate Entertainment (Ma06) a National Yes Entertainment services
292 958 785 International Forest Products (De06) National Yes West coast forestry
293 944 924 North West Co. Fund (Ja07) National Yes Department stores
294 939 107 Connors Bros. Income Fund (De06) a National Yes Food processing
295 937 060 Husky Injection Molding Sys. (Jl06) a National Yes Misc. industrial products
296 930 881 Green Shield Canada (De05) National No Property and casualty 
insurance
297 928 176 Sun Media (De06) National No Publishing and printing
298 923 201 Empire Life Insurance (De06) National No Life insurance
299 914 127 UAP Inc. (De06) Foreign No Wholesaler
300 911 491 Western Oil Sands (De06) National Yes Oil and gas producers
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Globe and Mail, “2007 Top 1000 companies. The Report on Business Magazine’s 
The Top 1000 Canada’s Power Book” [online database] 2007; “2007 Top 350 Private Companies. The Report on Business Magazine’s The Top 350 Private Companies” 
[online database] 2007.
Notes:  For ranking purposes, figures from companies that report in foreign currencies have been converted to Canadian dollars and partial-year results have been annualized.
 Foreign currencies are converted into Canadian dollars at the end of the relevant period for balance sheet items and at the average exchange rate for the relevant period for 
earnings items.
 Earnings per share figures are presented in Canadian dollars (unless all periods were reported in another currency) and annualized to 12 months. 
 Share-price calculations are based on closing share prices on the companies’ balance sheet dates.
a  Company reports in United States dollars.
b  Company reports in pounds Sterling.
c  Figures have been annualized in latest year. 
d  Figures have been annualized in previous year.
e  Figures have been annualized in previous three through five years.
f  Company reports in Euros.
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